RE: Aircraft Weapons, their Pro Allied slant in WiTP (Full Version)

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treespider -> RE: Aircraft Weapons, their Pro Allied slant in WiTP (9/20/2005 5:39:10 AM)

And in response to your heaven on earth at Rabaul...

quote:

" The harsh tropical environment added to the decline of the JNAF at Rabaul, for unlike their Allied counterpoarts, the Japanese failed to control the mosquito problem which devasted whole units with malaria. The Allies, on the other hand, sprayed and dusted their bases frequently with the insecticide DDT, which was unavailable to the Japanese. The latter also lacked quinine and its synthetic substitue Atebin."

Henry Sakaida, Aces of the Rising Sun, 1937-1945



spence -> RE: Aircraft Weapons, their Pro Allied slant in WiTP (9/20/2005 6:26:15 AM)

Seems to me that Japan lost the strategic initiative before more than a handful of the new and modern weapons produced by the Allies showed up on the battlefield. The Corsairs and Essexes served only to grind the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere to dust. It was the P-40s and Kittyhawks, F4Fs and SBDs, Treaty Cruisers and 6 original US CVs that ended the Japanese march of conquest and took the first steps back on the road to Tokyo Bay.

Seems to me that there are enough hard-coded rules/game mechanics to allow the Japanese Player (with the benefit of historical hindsight) to stretch Yamamoto's (estimate of) "running wild for six months to a year" well into 1943. IRL the Allies went toe-to-toe with the IJN from May 1942 on and were generally successful (without what was in the pipeline for 1943+ their victories might have proved Pyrrhic but a level playing field in production, at least; is one Japanese fantasy not entertained by the game). With the Zero Bonus, restrictions on Allied CV coordination, the uber-CAP capability of the KB (which, in a lot of the AARs I've read seems to be more effective than that of 1944 (real life) TF 38s), and the overrated durability of Japanese CVs (I know they had better armor but how come IRL none of them survived even 5 hits) all combine to make a head on challenge of the IJN by the Allied Player almost certainly suicidal. The forums are full of wait for this , wait for that.....THENNNNN... you can go after the Japs.

It's OK since it's a game. But some folks seem to be believing that's how it really was.




treespider -> RE: Aircraft Weapons, their Pro Allied slant in WiTP (9/20/2005 6:50:10 AM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: spence

Seems to me that Japan lost the strategic initiative before more than a handful of the new and modern weapons produced by the Allies showed up on the battlefield. The Corsairs and Essexes served only to grind the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere to dust. It was the P-40s and Kittyhawks, F4Fs and SBDs, Treaty Cruisers and 6 original US CVs that ended the Japanese march of conquest and took the first steps back on the road to Tokyo Bay.

Seems to me that there are enough hard-coded rules/game mechanics to allow the Japanese Player (with the benefit of historical hindsight) to stretch Yamamoto's (estimate of) "running wild for six months to a year" well into 1943. IRL the Allies went toe-to-toe with the IJN from May 1942 on and were generally successful (without what was in the pipeline for 1943+ their victories might have proved Pyrrhic but a level playing field in production, at least; is one Japanese fantasy not entertained by the game). With the Zero Bonus, restrictions on Allied CV coordination, the uber-CAP capability of the KB (which, in a lot of the AARs I've read seems to be more effective than that of 1944 (real life) TF 38s), and the overrated durability of Japanese CVs (I know they had better armor but how come IRL none of them survived even 5 hits) all combine to make a head on challenge of the IJN by the Allied Player almost certainly suicidal. The forums are full of wait for this , wait for that.....THENNNNN... you can go after the Japs.

It's OK since it's a game. But some folks seem to be believing that's how it really was.




You forgot to mention code breaking and internal squabbling between the IJA/IJN.

Some nice what if's that played into the Allied hands...What if the Japanese had not surrendered the field during the battle of the Coral Sea and pressed forward towards Pt. Moresby? What if Japan had not opted for Combined Fleet's Midway option and instead went with the Naval General Staff's plan for New Caledonia, Fiji and Samoa?...What if the Tone's catapault had not been malfunctioning on the morning of June 4, 1942? What if one of Chikumas search planes had not had a faulty engine forcing it to return earlier in its search route... What if the Japanese submarine cordon had not been delayed for one day in departing....What if Nagumo had carried out an earlier two-phase search, what if the observer in the Chikuma plane had been more watchful on the outward leg of his search?

A fair amount of plain old luck came together to help the Allies stem the tide when they did....

Of course it is a game and players do have the benefit of 20-20 hindsight.



ChezDaJez -> RE: Aircraft Weapons, their Pro Allied slant in WiTP (9/20/2005 7:01:09 AM)

quote:

... that is, Frank does not say with a shorter round trip the Japanese certainly would have won the air campaign.


No, he doesn't say that because, no matter what, the Japanese could not afford a war of attrition which is essentially what Guadalcanal became. After October, the Allies were in a much better position to replace aircrews and planes, especially pilots. Frank, Lundstrom, Francillon and Bergerud all do say that Japanese pilot losses probably would not have been as great had they built airfields closer to the battle. In fact, Bergerud and Lundstrom both agree that one of the major Japanese faults was their failure to develop those airfields.

quote:

He wasn't writing that summary chapter in the context of "things that could have gone better for the Allies" ... like having sufficient warning via the radar and coastwatcher net that the F4Fs could typically obtain positional advantage. When it worked, the warnings turned one sided "attacker has initiative and positional advantage" affairs into, essentially, meeting engagements.


The Japanese were very predictable in their attacks and could be counted on to arrive over Guadalcanal near the noon hour. Radar and coastwatcher warnings allowed allied aircraft to stay on the ground until the last minute but the allies always had a reasonable idea of the Japanese time of arrival overhead without them. Towards the end of December 1942, the Japanese shifted their attacks towards late afternoon but their operational losses went up as they attempted to return to their bases at night amidst the mountainous terrain.

The survival advantage always goes to the defender. If forced to bail out, US pilots had a substantially better chance of rescue than did Japanese pilots. American search and rescue efforts were much better organized. The US (and the Allies in general) put a great deal of effort into recovering downed pilots. The Japanese, on the other hand, paid little more than token attention to it. Unless he was fortunate enough to come down near a Japanese base, a downed Japanese pilot had little, in any, chance of rescue. Most Japanese fighters either didn't have radios or they didn't work so, in most cases, weren't able to broadcast their location for a rescue effort. And as the battle wore on, the waters around Guadalacanal and the southern Slot simply became too dangerous for Japanese flying boats or ships to operate in.

Chez





ChezDaJez -> RE: Aircraft Weapons, their Pro Allied slant in WiTP (9/20/2005 7:39:11 AM)

quote:

Seems to me that there are enough hard-coded rules/game mechanics to allow the Japanese Player (with the benefit of historical hindsight) to stretch Yamamoto's (estimate of) "running wild for six months to a year" well into 1943. IRL the Allies went toe-to-toe with the IJN from May 1942 on and were generally successful


That's true to a point, with the benefit of historical hindsight. But that's a double-edged sword. The allies can also play with the benefit of hindsight. If the Japanese player can avoid losing his fleet carriers in 1942 then, yes, the Japanese offensive can probably continue on to 1943. But to what end? If the Allies avoid an automatic Japanese victory at the end of 42, then the finale is clearly written. The Japanese can not win no matter how many carriers he has because sooner or later he has to commit them. And when he does, the allies can afford to trade carrier for carrier in a war of attrition.

And BTW, the Japanese Zero bonus is gone on 1 May 1942. There after, the Zero begins a long downward slide against better allied aircraft and pilots. I'm having a hard time against even the lowly P-39 and my PBEM is only in June 1942! Here's an example: (notice my bombers aborted!)

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Day Air attack on Koepang , at 28,77

Japanese aircraft
A6M3 Zero x 18
G4M1 Betty x 17

Allied aircraft
P-39D Airacobra x 41

Japanese aircraft losses
A6M3 Zero: 10 destroyed
G4M1 Betty: 2 destroyed, 13 damaged

Allied aircraft losses
P-39D Airacobra: 4 destroyed, 6 damaged

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Chez



Sharkosaurus rex -> RE: Aircraft Weapons, their Pro Allied slant in WiTP (9/20/2005 8:47:01 PM)

Here is a top ten list of things Japanese pilots started to use to increase their fuel consumption efficiency and make it easier for them to fly to Guadalcanal.

10 Only carry half ammo
9. Hacksaw off radio mast and discard radio
8. fly high to prevent air resistance
7. polish wing surfaces reduce friction
6. don't leave your chewing gum under wings
5. don't leave golf clubs behind seat in plane
4. don't drink and fly
3. only paint on the actual number of kills- not the claimed number
2. leave parachute at base
1. leave comfort girl at base



treespider -> RE: Aircraft Weapons, their Pro Allied slant in WiTP (9/20/2005 8:52:46 PM)

quote:

Chez wrote:

The Japanese were very predictable in their attacks and could be counted on to arrive over Guadalcanal near the noon hour. Radar and coastwatcher warnings allowed allied aircraft to stay on the ground until the last minute but the allies always had a reasonable idea of the Japanese time of arrival overhead without them. Towards the end of December 1942, the Japanese shifted their attacks towards late afternoon but their operational losses went up as they attempted to return to their bases at night amidst the mountainous terrain.


I assume the timing of the Japanese attacks were in part dictated by the 565 mile approach flight...



mdiehl -> RE: Aircraft Weapons, their Pro Allied slant in WiTP (9/20/2005 8:58:26 PM)

quote:

In fact, Bergerud and Lundstrom both agree that one of the major Japanese faults was their failure to develop those airfields.


I agree too. IMO the error was to put that labor Bn on Lunga rather than somewhere up on New Georgia.

quote:

The Japanese were very predictable in their attacks and could be counted on to arrive over Guadalcanal near the noon hour. Radar and coastwatcher warnings allowed allied aircraft to stay on the ground until the last minute but the allies always had a reasonable idea of the Japanese time of arrival overhead without them.


Nonetheless a squadron awaiting an inbound strike is on alert status whether or not a strike is on the way. A squadron not on a mission to Lunga is not. Thus an "no mission" day is a stand down day for the Japanese but not for the US pilots on Lunga. This is directly relevent to the subject of combat fatigue.

And yes the radar and coastwatchers often worked. Often they did not. At best the early warnings gave the F4F pilots just enough time to gain sufficient airspeed and altitude to avoid being "bounced." But it did not always turn out that the crude early warning net worked properly.

quote:

Towards the end of December 1942, the Japanese shifted their attacks towards late afternoon but their operational losses went up as they attempted to return to their bases at night amidst the mountainous terrain.


I always wondered why they did not launch at night and time their strikes to arrive earlier in the day.

quote:

The survival advantage always goes to the defender. If forced to bail out, US pilots had a substantially better chance of rescue than did Japanese pilots. American search and rescue efforts were much better organized.


That is definitely true. The "initiative" however goes to the attacker and that is a bit of an advantage if one has a hinky early warning system that occasionally breaks down. If you back out the late August major victory (in which the net did not work) the VMF has a slightly favorable kill ratio over the 11th AF.

quote:

The US (and the Allies in general) put a great deal of effort into recovering downed pilots. The Japanese, on the other hand, paid little more than token attention to it. Unless he was fortunate enough to come down near a Japanese base, a downed Japanese pilot had little, in any, chance of rescue. Most Japanese fighters either didn't have radios or they didn't work so, in most cases, weren't able to broadcast their location for a rescue effort. And as the battle wore on, the waters around Guadalacanal and the southern Slot simply became too dangerous for Japanese flying boats or ships to operate in.


All true. That said, when I did my original calculations on this two years ago I counted "downed and recovered" pilots as "shot down." In the long run this allowed the Allies to retain experienced pilots and worked against the Japanese, but does not directly affect any of the arithmetic tallies that we've been over in this thread.

quote:

That's true to a point, with the benefit of historical hindsight. But that's a double-edged sword. The allies can also play with the benefit of hindsight.


That's not really correct. The "bad realities" for the Allies are largely hardcoded. These include the Zero Bonus which should not under any circumstances be there, and the incorrect higher EXP ratings for Japanese naval pilots. Both the "looping maneuver" and the "greater airtime" were contravened by the use of poor doctrine, poor radios, poor tactical formations, and superior US doctrine (among naval and marine pilots) from the get go. The fact that the game selects for a "run and hide" US strategy rather than a "calculated risk" strategy rather indicates that as a simulation of the strategic choices facing the combatants it is greatly flawed. In WitP the US player KNOWS that he cannot engage KB on an equal footing; in WW2 the USN was willing to do so and was highly successful at times, and universally successful from the strategic POV.

quote:

The Japanese can not win no matter how many carriers he has because sooner or later he has to commit them. And when he does, the allies can afford to trade carrier for carrier in a war of attrition.


The fact that it's a carrier for carrier trade even in the late war (when USN command and control, pilot training, doctrine, aircraft, and operational planning were overwhelmingly superior) is a problem with the "simulation" aspect of the game.

quote:

And BTW, the Japanese Zero bonus is gone on 1 May 1942.


It should never have been written into the code in the first place.

quote:

I'm having a hard time against even the lowly P-39 and my PBEM is only in June 1942! Here's an example: (notice my bombers aborted!)


FoW on or off? Altitude? If that combat occurred at 10,000 feet there's nothing improbable about those results. The P39 was hell's bells at low altitude.



mdiehl -> RE: Aircraft Weapons, their Pro Allied slant in WiTP (9/20/2005 9:02:01 PM)

quote:

" The harsh tropical environment added to the decline of the JNAF at Rabaul, for unlike their Allied counterpoarts, the Japanese failed to control the mosquito problem which devasted whole units with malaria. The Allies, on the other hand, sprayed and dusted their bases frequently with the insecticide DDT, which was unavailable to the Japanese. The latter also lacked quinine and its synthetic substitue Atebin."
"

The USN and VMF pilots did not benefit from mosquito control, adequate antimalarials, or any less harsh a tropical environment until December 1942. In contrast, Japanese pilots at Rabaul benefitted from a base that was *otherwise* far safer, more comfortable, and more adequately supplied and with better facilities than the pilots at Lunga. No matter how you try to wiggle this there is absolutely no question that in every respect living conditions at Rabaul were far superior to the conditions at Lunga. In comparison with Lunga, Rabaul was indeed a "paradise" although I never suggested that it was a literal paradise.



ChezDaJez -> RE: Aircraft Weapons, their Pro Allied slant in WiTP (9/20/2005 9:02:23 PM)

quote:

I assume the timing of the Japanese attacks were in part dictated by the 565 mile approach flight...


Yep, its pretty easy to figure out the arrival time as sunrise occurs around 6-7AM during this time of year. Assuming a sunrise takeoff and 4 hour flight puts the Japanese overhead between 10 and 11AM at the earliest. They most often appeared between noon and 1PM. That allowed them to land back in the Rabaul area with about an hour of daylight to spare. The Japanese tried to avoid night takeoffs and landings with large forces if they could help it.

The sun sets just after 6PM in September (Forecast sunrise/sunset for Tulagi togay is 6:12AM and 6:12PM) and shortening as the fall progresses.

Chez



Sharkosaurus rex -> RE: Aircraft Weapons, their Pro Allied slant in WiTP (9/20/2005 9:47:58 PM)

Today is the equinox so everywhere has 12 hrs direct sunlight.
The Solomon Islands are in the southern hemisphere so day light time is increasing.



ChezDaJez -> RE: Aircraft Weapons, their Pro Allied slant in WiTP (9/20/2005 9:55:58 PM)

quote:

The Solomon Islands are in the southern hemisphere so day light time is increasing.


Oops, my bad. Forgot about that.

Chez



pauk -> RE: Aircraft Weapons, their Pro Allied slant in WiTP (9/20/2005 11:25:11 PM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: spence

S. With the Zero Bonus, restrictions on Allied CV coordination, the uber-CAP capability of the KB (which, in a lot of the AARs I've read seems to be more effective than that of 1944 (real life) TF 38s)


greetings.... i know what you are mean with uber CAP capability, i copy&paste from my game

Day Air attack on TF at 34,71

Japanese aircraft
A6M2 Zero x 62

Allied aircraft
CW-21B Demon x 16
Brewster 339D x 10
Beaufort V-IX x 9

Japanese aircraft losses
A6M2 Zero: 2 destroyed, 2 damaged

Allied aircraft losses
CW-21B Demon: 9 destroyed
Brewster 339D: 9 destroyed
Beaufort V-IX: 5 destroyed

Japanese Ships
CVL Ryujo
CVE Hosho, Torpedo hits 2, on fire


zero exp level app 70, zero bonus +4

[:D][8|](sorry, couldn't resist[;)])




treespider -> RE: Aircraft Weapons, their Pro Allied slant in WiTP (9/20/2005 11:51:24 PM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: pauk


quote:

ORIGINAL: spence

S. With the Zero Bonus, restrictions on Allied CV coordination, the uber-CAP capability of the KB (which, in a lot of the AARs I've read seems to be more effective than that of 1944 (real life) TF 38s)


greetings.... i know what you are mean with uber CAP capability, i copy&paste from my game

Day Air attack on TF at 34,71

Japanese aircraft
A6M2 Zero x 62

Allied aircraft
CW-21B Demon x 16
Brewster 339D x 10
Beaufort V-IX x 9

Japanese aircraft losses
A6M2 Zero: 2 destroyed, 2 damaged

Allied aircraft losses
CW-21B Demon: 9 destroyed
Brewster 339D: 9 destroyed
Beaufort V-IX: 5 destroyed

Japanese Ships
CVL Ryujo
CVE Hosho, Torpedo hits 2, on fire


zero exp level app 70, zero bonus +4

[:D][8|](sorry, couldn't resist[;)])





What's so uber about 35 out classed planes being intercepted by 62 and then only losing 23 out of the 35....If the Zero's were so uber shouldn't all of 35 been shot down? After thats almost two Zeros for every one incoming plane and they still launched at least two torps... I guess you were being facetious..[;)]



pauk -> RE: Aircraft Weapons, their Pro Allied slant in WiTP (9/21/2005 12:03:06 AM)

yes i was facetious, or at least i tried to be....[;)]...

forgot to mention, i'm the bad guy (Jap) in this situation....[:D]



Mike Solli -> RE: Aircraft Weapons, their Pro Allied slant in WiTP (9/21/2005 12:05:21 AM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: pauk

yes i was facetious, or at least i tried to be....[;)]...

forgot to mention, i'm the bad guy (Jap) in this situation....[:D]


You're mistaken. You're the good guy.



tsimmonds -> RE: Aircraft Weapons, their Pro Allied slant in WiTP (9/21/2005 2:43:54 AM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: treespider


quote:

ORIGINAL: pauk


quote:

ORIGINAL: spence

S. With the Zero Bonus, restrictions on Allied CV coordination, the uber-CAP capability of the KB (which, in a lot of the AARs I've read seems to be more effective than that of 1944 (real life) TF 38s)


greetings.... i know what you are mean with uber CAP capability, i copy&paste from my game

Day Air attack on TF at 34,71

Japanese aircraft
A6M2 Zero x 62

Allied aircraft
CW-21B Demon x 16
Brewster 339D x 10
Beaufort V-IX x 9

Japanese aircraft losses
A6M2 Zero: 2 destroyed, 2 damaged

Allied aircraft losses
CW-21B Demon: 9 destroyed
Brewster 339D: 9 destroyed
Beaufort V-IX: 5 destroyed

Japanese Ships
CVL Ryujo
CVE Hosho, Torpedo hits 2, on fire


zero exp level app 70, zero bonus +4

[:D][8|](sorry, couldn't resist[;)])





What's so uber about 35 out classed planes being intercepted by 62 and then only losing 23 out of the 35....If the Zero's were so uber shouldn't all of 35 been shot down? After thats almost two Zeros for every one incoming plane and they still launched at least two torps... I guess you were being facetious..[;)]

It is not the result that is specious, it is the fact that Mini Me Butai in January 42 can put up a CAP of 62 zeroes. I don't think Nagumo put up that much CAP at Midway.



ChezDaJez -> RE: Aircraft Weapons, their Pro Allied slant in WiTP (9/21/2005 3:50:39 AM)

quote:

It is not the result that is specious, it is the fact that Mini Me Butai in January 42 can put up a CAP of 62 zeroes. I don't think Nagumo put up that much CAP at Midway.


As those 2 carriers would have a mximum capacity of 59, I would guess that he also had landbased air as part of the CAP. That is assuming he holds Kendari, 1 hex away.

The other possibility is that he stripped the carriers of all attack aircraft and loaded them with just Zeros. That would a slight overload but not enough to prevent flight ops.

And 62 Zeros should be able to tear up 26 obsolete fighters and 9 Beauforts.

Chez



tsimmonds -> RE: Aircraft Weapons, their Pro Allied slant in WiTP (9/21/2005 4:05:44 AM)

No, I reckon that Zuiho is there too.

Ryujo 28 zeroes
Zuiho 18 zeroes
Hosho 5 Zeroes
Total 51 Zeroes

Toss in Taiyo with a carrier-capable zero daitai and you're there.

My point is that too many of them are assumed to be available to intercept incoming strikes, and too many of those that are available, actually do. The success rate for interceptions, absent radar and FDOs, should be fairly low.



ChezDaJez -> RE: Aircraft Weapons, their Pro Allied slant in WiTP (9/21/2005 4:38:36 AM)

Didn't know about the other carriers, just saw what was listed in the combat report and assumed that's all there was.

But as far as the number intercepting, I really don't see that as a problem. Enterprise and Saratoga had a CAP of 53 fighters overhead at the Battle of Eastern Solomons.

Even lacking radar, the Japanese nearly always had search planes out. It's possible that the inbound raid was detected by one of them and all available fighters were launched.

Chez




tsimmonds -> RE: Aircraft Weapons, their Pro Allied slant in WiTP (9/21/2005 4:57:47 AM)

quote:

Enterprise and Saratoga had a CAP of 53 fighters overhead at the Battle of Eastern Solomons.


And of these, how many actually intercepted the incoming strikes, how many were stacked at incorrect altitude, how many were mis-vectored, and how many just could not figure out what to do because the single fighter-direction radio channel was overwhelmed with chatter? This is exactly my point. Fifty-three planes in the air over the TF should not equal fifty-three planes attacking as defensive CAP in WitP.



treespider -> RE: Aircraft Weapons, their Pro Allied slant in WiTP (9/21/2005 5:03:07 AM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: irrelevant

quote:

Enterprise and Saratoga had a CAP of 53 fighters overhead at the Battle of Eastern Solomons.


And of these, how many actually intercepted the incoming strikes, how many were stacked at incorrect altitude, how many were mis-vectored, and how many just could not figure out what to do because the single fighter-direction radio channel was overwhelmed with chatter? This is exactly my point. Fifty-three planes in the air over the TF should not equal fifty-three planes attacking as defensive CAP in WitP.



But in the game perhaps there are 62 in the air but only 26 actually do any fighting... In the zen of the replay the 26 plane strike perhaps arrives over the target in groups of 5 or 6 over a two hour period..And there are only 12 planes on cap at any one time and they rotate over the course of the two to three hours represented by this combat report.

I think we tend to take the combat reports as an isolated single combat as it may be in many cases...




treespider -> RE: Aircraft Weapons, their Pro Allied slant in WiTP (9/21/2005 5:05:58 AM)

Continuing my above thought....Pearl Harbor was actually two different attacks both of which would be resolved in the game by a single combat report in the AM.



tsimmonds -> RE: Aircraft Weapons, their Pro Allied slant in WiTP (9/21/2005 5:06:46 AM)

quote:

But in the game perhaps there are 62 in the air but only 26 actually do any fighting...

Well....could be I suppose. I don't watch the air-to-air nearly as closely as I do the ground combat. Just that some of the results certainly seem to indicate that all of the CAP are intercepting....



Nomad -> RE: Aircraft Weapons, their Pro Allied slant in WiTP (9/21/2005 5:10:57 AM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: irrelevant

quote:

But in the game perhaps there are 62 in the air but only 26 actually do any fighting...

Well....could be I suppose. I don't watch the air-to-air nearly as closely as I do the ground combat. Just that some of the results certainly seem to indicate that all of the CAP are intercepting....


I feel one of the really bad problems here is that there is no way to find out what happened. It would have been nice if some sort of report was generated so you would know what went right and what went wrong.



ChezDaJez -> RE: Aircraft Weapons, their Pro Allied slant in WiTP (9/21/2005 5:48:08 AM)

quote:

Well....could be I suppose. I don't watch the air-to-air nearly as closely as I do the ground combat. Just that some of the results certainly seem to indicate that all of the CAP are intercepting....


One thing I've noticed is that I can put a CAP set to 90% (escort mission vice long range CAP) with 27 planes in the unit so logically you would think that 24-25 fighters would intercept but I seldom see more than 18-20 of them listed on the combat report so my feeling is that the number of planes listed in the combat report is the number that actually intercepted. So there may have even more assigned to CAP.

Also, at the Battle of Eastern Solomons, only 8 fighters failed to intercept out of 53. The failure of these 8 to intercept was attributed to poor radio discipline on the fighter director network by pilots (a problem that plagued US carriers in several actions).

Chez



DrewMatrix -> RE: Aircraft Weapons, their Pro Allied slant in WiTP (9/21/2005 6:15:56 AM)

OK, so I couldn't read all 5 pages tonight (I've been busy at work) and my apologies if this has been mentioned, but

Isn't the main reason that the axis went to larger cal guns that, by mid war, the Axis were on the defensive, shooting at big huge bombers , while the Allied fighters were mostly escorts shooting at Axis interceptors?

It takes more to bring down a 4 engine bomber than an interceptor.



ChezDaJez -> RE: Aircraft Weapons, their Pro Allied slant in WiTP (9/21/2005 6:54:59 AM)

quote:

Isn't the main reason that the axis went to larger cal guns that, by mid war, the Axis were on the defensive, shooting at big huge bombers , while the Allied fighters were mostly escorts shooting at Axis interceptors?

It takes more to bring down a 4 engine bomber than an interceptor.


Well considering the Yamato, Musashi and Shinano were first designed with 18" guns about 1935 with construction beginning in 1937 and completed on 16 December 1941, I'd have to say no, that's not why they built these monstors.

This link explains why:

http://www.ibiblio.org/pub/academic/history/marshall/military/wwii/Japanese.navy/jap_yamoto_bat.txt

Chez



pauk -> RE: Aircraft Weapons, their Pro Allied slant in WiTP (9/21/2005 9:04:51 AM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: irrelevant

No, I reckon that Zuiho is there too.

Ryujo 28 zeroes
Zuiho 18 zeroes
Hosho 5 Zeroes
Total 51 Zeroes

Toss in Taiyo with a carrier-capable zero daitai and you're there.

My point is that too many of them are assumed to be available to intercept incoming strikes, and too many of those that are available, actually do. The success rate for interceptions, absent radar and FDOs, should be fairly low.


You are right, Taiyo was in mini KB.

Seriously, i haven't got anything against above mentioned result, seems to me that changes in 1.6 ("the bombers will always get through"*) works fine. But, spence mentioned AARs and uber cap capability and its effiency) so i have to copy and paste from my AAR. I don't know, maybe i'm really most unfortunate Jap "fanboy" here, but from my experience i just don't think that Japan have often-mentioned advantages. I guess it is depending of the style of the game - sometimes i feel that here are certain number of allied players who think in that way "i don't want loose single DD or plane, but i protest against "unfair" and "unhistorical" advantages that Japan have."



IMO opinion the only problem of game is that everything happends to fast. So yes, Japan can "stretch Yamamoto", but in retrun Allies will re-take japanese possesions (to fast).








*forgot the name of british air commander who stated this? (was it "bomber" Harris?)



treespider -> RE: Aircraft Weapons, their Pro Allied slant in WiTP (9/21/2005 2:10:46 PM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: ChezDaJez

quote:

Isn't the main reason that the axis went to larger cal guns that, by mid war, the Axis were on the defensive, shooting at big huge bombers , while the Allied fighters were mostly escorts shooting at Axis interceptors?

It takes more to bring down a 4 engine bomber than an interceptor.


Well considering the Yamato, Musashi and Shinano were first designed with 18" guns about 1935 with construction beginning in 1937 and completed on 16 December 1941, I'd have to say no, that's not why they built these monstors.

This link explains why:

http://www.ibiblio.org/pub/academic/history/marshall/military/wwii/Japanese.navy/jap_yamoto_bat.txt

Chez



I think he was referencing the caliber of aircraft weapons.



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