ColinWright
Posts: 2604
Joined: 10/13/2005 Status: offline
|
quote:
ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay quote:
ORIGINAL: ColinWright We have been over this before, ... And you would think that you would someday understand my position, but that never seems to happen. You keep repeating your straw man. It's actually just the opposite. I repeatedly address every element of what you are pleased to describe as a 'position,' while you just keep repeating the same discredited claims. However, we can go through it again...quote:
One more time: For most scenarios, the designer knows how many divisions are going to be in combat. However, he can use all of them vigorously or only some of them, with a minimal effect on the resulting supply level. For example, in France 44 scenario, there is no broad front/narrow thrust dilemma for the Allies. Advance with all of 'em -- they'll get just as about as many supplies as if you advance with none of 'em. The funny bit is that this shows what could happen if the problem was admitted. What if the designer could radically increase the transport asset effect? Then one could create a dilemma between moving all one's divisions or only some of them. Not exactly a comprehensive solution, but if it's under the control of the designer, it could only help. See what neat things happen if you admit the problem is there in the first place? In a second case, though, the designer may well know how many divisions there will be -- but he has no means of controlling how many of those divisions the player pumps into situations where only a few of them could have been supplied. It's a Case Blau scenario. Send two divisions through the Caucasus passes or send ten -- they'll get the same supply either way. It's North Africa. You can send a brigade down to Siwa Oasis -- why not send a corps? quote:
Players of most scenarios don't have the option to double their force. Even if they do, the Force Supply Level will handle it. That's a nonsensical statement. Far from 'handling it,' the force supply level will simply ignore it. It'll stay exactly the same, even though twice as many troops are now attempting to use the supplies. The fact is that in supply, we've got a paradigm that owes nothing to reality. We might as well have a system where weapons values are assigned according to the value of the weapon's designation. A British Mk VII light tank, for example, would be three and a half times more powerful than a JS II. ...and no doubt if that was the system, you would vigorously and stubbornly defend it. Point out that Mk VII's aren't going to fight JS II's, etc. quote:
Just take the Murmansk example. If you're designing a scenario modeling just the Murmansk operation, it's not a problem. If the players opt for twice as many divisions then just halve the FSL when they do. Uh huh. Suppose we've got a real ambitious scenario. Like one covering the whole Finnish front? You can advance around Leningrad with ten divisions if you've got them -- why not ten divisions against Murmansk?quote:
The problem occurs for strategic-level scenarios or scenarios with contested naval operations. They are a special case. The 'special case' shibboleth. So far, I have cited the following 'special cases'. Sealion. The Northern part of the Eastern Front. The Southern part of the Eastern Front. France in 1944. North Africa. Without thinking too hard, I can add Burma in 1943-45, and France in 1918. What exactly are you going to be left with? The Korean war and three carefully-limited World War Two scenarios?quote:
I want them to work, too. But don't claim that this is a problem for every scenario. TOAW works too well for that to be the case. In fact, TOAW doesn't work well at all. Wildly ahistorical results occur, tactics that never would have worked in reality are rewarded, and designers often can obtain reasonable results only by frog-marching the scenario to the desired conclusion with liberal doses of shock. I don't particularly mind all that -- I don't expect a computer system to be able to perfectly simulate large chunks of a historical reality that often isn't terribly well-understood to begin with. However, it would help if the problems could at least be admitted. Then there would be some hope of at least partially addressing them. For an example, see what popped up the instant I opened up the case of France in 1944. Why, creating an option to enhance transport-asset sharing allows a sort of volume-based supply mechanism... Come on out and play, Curtis. All kinds of neat things can turn up. Just quit with this 'all is for the best in this best of all possible worlds' schtick. Admit the problems that are obviously there and we might be able to make some improvements.
< Message edited by ColinWright -- 7/27/2010 7:55:55 PM >
_____________________________
I am not Charlie Hebdo
|