quote:

ORIGINAL: Nemo121

1. ASW Kates.

No, it doesn't mean I don't want to run most of the ASW efforts in DEI, China Sea etc as those seas border on areas the IJA will be responsible for. It just was a reference to you talking about the Kate being useful for ASW from carriers... I wouldn't be planning to use carriers for this purpose as in those constricted waters Ki-49Q and G4MQs would have all the range required.

quote:



What you seem to be missing is that you GET ASW carriers! Not that you have to keep them I suppose...

quote:

ORIGINAL: Nemo121



2. Ki-36

quote:

Moot: we can't use it in that role.

Sid, playing nice with others involves an element of going "Well I wouldn't do that BUT if they want to then I'll let them. Hopefully once they begin to fail for all the reasons I've outlined that they will fail they will see sense."....

quote:



Nemo: You are confusing what I can negotiate with a ruling as a mod designer. I am responsible for the Ki-36 in its present form. I came up with it under the supervision of Joe Wilkerson in a different era - when we were working on planes for CHS. If you cannot come to terms with the reasons I changed the plane's classification - and created tiny bombs for it - then I screwed up big time and need to change it back - or take it out entirely. I mean - literally - "we can't use it in that role" - whatever that may require. Probably it means returning the plane to pure recon status. Maybe it means killing the thing and all its associated units (freeing up slots)? Maybe we can keep it as it is - IF it turns out to be possible to grasp that this advanced trainer with a secondary observation mission only carried bombs for a tirtiary mission - and those only for tactical applications in the most ideal of operating situations. But I didn't stutter - we do not have the option of misusing this plane or these units in a strategic bombing role as a team - not because I (as IJN) don't want to do so - but because it is ahistorical and not possible IRL for this plane to have been used in this role. I fear I created a monster - and I did so in spite of being warned about it by people like Mike. Maybe I must undo the damage? Maybe you can come to terms with the idea this limited data change was only intended to be used in a way representative of real history - or not used at all (which is my preference) - and the plane upgraded? But it isn't an option - and the sooner you come to terms with this and move on - the better.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Nemo121

... Honestly, you can't expect to have veto rights over my air tasking orders.

I don't.


However if the Chinese shoot down a lot of them then, obviously, I'd be forced to bring in Ki-48s or Ki-21s to do the job. Let the game bring about this change organically instead of banning it.

I don't like losing the pilots. I don't like losing the HI points scrapping will generate. I don't like losing the capabilities that better planes in the hands of those not dead pilots would generate. And I am alarmed you are not persuaded by the combination of these things. But I would not ban it for any of those reasons - I would just give my advice and abide by your choices - and fear we will lose faster as a result. Regretfully - it is banned for other reasons you do not seem to grasp - and you are confusing my advice with the reason for the banning.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Nemo121

As to where we divide things...

Would operations vs Australia be an IJN or an IJA thing or should we leave it up for discussion when the in-game opportunity arises. I am asking because if our goal is to prevent attacks into the DEI - which I think should remain an IJA area of operations -  then wouldn't it make sense for the job of taking those northern bases to be an IJA operation since IJA is going to be very motivated to keep them in Japanese hands to protect its DEI assets.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Nemo121

4.

quote:

IRL you would not run a major offensive of this sort and NOT commit major squadrons - which then were used as training units - only to turn those into your first line units later.

In real life I would view it as extremely sensible to use squadrons with obsolete aircraft in a tertiary theatre ( China)


REPLY: We really are not yet of a mind about China. It is anything but a tertiary theater. It is not even a secondary theater. It is the PRIMARY THEATER OF WAR. That is - were it not for China - there would be no war at all. IF IJA regards China as "tertiary" - cut a deal and end the embargo - and we don't have to Strike South at all.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Nemo121

4.

quote:

IRL you would not run a major offensive of this sort and NOT commit major squadrons - which then were used as training units - only to turn those into your first line units later.

In real life I would view it as extremely sensible to use squadrons with obsolete aircraft in a tertiary theatre ( China) and, when targets in China had dried up, commit these squadrons to training ready for conversion to the Me-264. I do NOT like committing my best planes to the front until I've built up a critical mass of this new plane.

REPLY: We have a very brief period of operational initiative. And - in your words - the Me has a great force multiplier in its range. You are going to cost us the greatest of justifications for building it if we cannot use the very first handful for recon. [USAF says "the primary mission of an air force is to gather information about the enemy"] You are going to cost us significant opportunities to hit the enemy while he is still weak and fragmented if we cannot use the very first squadrons (12) in strikes against targets not possible for any other plane.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Nemo121


4.

quote:

IRL you would not run a major offensive of this sort and NOT commit major squadrons - which then were used as training units - only to turn those into your first line units later.

In real life I would view it as extremely sensible to use squadrons with obsolete aircraft in a tertiary theatre ( China) and, when targets in China had dried up, commit these squadrons to training ready for conversion to the Me-264. I do NOT like committing my best planes to the front until I've built up a critical mass of this new plane. This plan achieves this effect. IN any case Sid getting involved in which squadron upgrade routes I take is getting far too involved in IJA policy. Best you concentrate on the IJN and let me focus on the IJA. You may not agree with my policy on upgrading BUT the whole idea between having multiple players was to allow different command styles. Efforts to turn me into a mini-Sid are doomed to fail. I have my own ideas and practices and while I'm willing to compromise and even give in on really major stuff... as I did over India... this discussion on my upgrade choices is meddling too much in IJA issues. There is no disrespect or anger there, just a wish to set some boundaries which can be adhered to for the good of the game and our respective blood pressures [:D]


REPLY: The issue of upgrading Ki-36s to Me-264s in a single bound was a secondary issue. The real problem was to use the Ki-36 to run up 99% experience ratings and then convert that for use with the big bomber. It is an entirely gamey approach to play and absolutely worthless in terms of simulating what might happen with either units or planes?
I have only minor technical interest in how you upgrade units? I have much more serious concerns about how you play - and how it might prevent a proper evaluation of anything? I now am becoming concerned you do not grasp what "reasonable non-gamey play" means?

quote:

ORIGINAL: Nemo121


5.

quote:

If you contemplate Ki-36 for ANY mission at all - we do not see eye to eye. It ought to be tied for first place on the way out

It is in first place to be phased out BUT while I don't have the numbers of modern planes to replace it I WILL use the Ki-36 for such missions as I think it can achieve with a suitably low loss rate. Again though, this is my style of play. While we SHOULD discuss STRATEGY I do not think it is helpful to try to change eachothers STYLES and outlooks. I am not mini-Sid.

REPLY: The idea we won't use a too slow aircraft - but will immediately replace it with a plane more likely to survive - is a strategy of play. Speed matters in WITP air combat. The Ki-36 sufferred horribly and had to be withdrawn from non-trainer duty. You said you might do the same thing AFTER suffering horrible losses. I am saying "skip the horrible losses part" of that as a strategy.


6. Use of all bomber types over China...
Well here we DO see eye to eye... Essentially once Malaysia, DEI and Phillipines are taken I will be switching most of the bomber force to China + India in order to mount really massive strategic bombing offensives. My first priority is to establish the Malaysia/DEI/Phillipines/Northern Oz/Ceylon/Burma line though and support that as fully as possible. The instant that is done it will be China's turn though.

REPLY: Again - if you see JAAF bombers as strategic bombers - and strategic bombing as a way to win wars - we don't share strategic concepts. I think there are ONLY TWO strategic military forces: field armies and fleets.
I deny the theory of air power advocates in the early 20th century - quoting Norman Friedman here - 'that air forces represented an independent means to victory.' They are inherently costly - and if there might be salvation for the concept using nuclear explosives - that would be illegal, immoral and beyond the means available for Japan. I see bombers as tactical assets - exactly as the Axis air forces did - and also as the Soviet air force did. You may use them to empower your field armies - or the fleets - but not to kill an enemy power outside that context.


7.

quote:

I am alarmed at your consistent focus on strategic bombing.

I am, at least, a competent player. I know when to focus on non-strategic missions. My view, however, is that this is so self-evident that it doesn't even warrant discussion as an objective. It is simply assumed. I am prepared to discuss this further but ONLY in the presence of an actual strategic outline of what we want to do and when. Discussing it now is simpy discussing it in too much of a vacuum to decide anything concrete.

REPLY: I am concerned at your idea of (a) don't attack China day one; (b) when you do attack it - use bombers;
I don't hear any focus on the critical strategic objetive - the rail link between NE Asia and SE Asia - nor see how bombers can sieze or hold it? I don't hear any response to my twice repeated call for that stretegic objective to be achieved truly ASAP - in the absolute minimum number of days/ weeks? Instead - once again I hear about transferring bombers (alone ) to China -AFTER other ops are over with. It does not sound like we have any sort of strategic sense of priorities in common here. Maybe we do - but I have not heard a hint of it yet.




8. Paras... Ok, you get the two Yokos and I get the IJA Raiding Bde. That's fine. Also there is the 2nd Sasebo.
Regretfully - all the other units that will appear are IJA - and none of them in the year that matters -- 1942.

9. Kodiak Island and Alaska.
Ok, so you would support the capture of Kodiak and other Alaskan bases in order to mount strategic bombing raids against CANADA and CONUSA? As you know I wish to use the Me-264 for this from these bases.


REPLY: I support the capture of the Aleutians to deny bases to the enemy. I might support taking Kodiak. I don't mind raids on the US with bombers - but I am alarmed at a focus on that. We cannot afford the logistics nor the plane losses entailed. I see taking Kodiac mainly as a way to insure they attack Kodiak - and if we WEAKLY but cleverly defend it - we might tie em up big time in a battle we don't need to win? If you must try a bomber campaign - take ALL of Alaska and eat its supplies - which at least cuts down on the shipping them from Japan.



10. Fighters etc..
Sounds fine to me. 180 Zeroes and 120 Bettys sounds good. Remember the Nells auto-upgrade to bettys in January 42 so that's about 60 Bettys guaranteed from January 42. 120 per month would give us deep enough pockets to hit Indian resources from Ceylon even in the face of some losses.


REPLY: Nells do not auto upgrade. Not sure why - but in 1943 they still are being made.



Division of Duties:

IJA-Owned:
Kwanting Army
China Army
Burma Army
Southern Area Army
Northern Command.
Home Army.

Those are fine by me....


IJN
4th Fleet
Combined Fleet.

Again, fine by me.


As far as the Grand Escort Command goes I think it makes sense to have that operated on a per region basis...

REPLY: Except it doesn't. Ships don't change command when they cross the line. And GEC should allocate resources by operational needs of the escort/submarine war - not some theater needs. In a sense the merchant marine and GEC are strategic commands: they move supplies and resources and oil and fuel BETWEEN theaters for grander objectives than theater commanders have. IF you make GEC theater dependent - theater will say "I need this more than you do" - and GEC will lose every time. Even its ships and planes will be robbed "just for this crisis." No one will be watching the patterns of the subs and planning "lets kill those bases, cut their access off at this point with mines, air patrols, surface patrols, name it" etc. And no one is looking at shipping triangles (etc) for economic efficiency (If we go that way we are in the wrong theater - so lets go this way and avoid that).



When ships are in the DEI or near China and the Home Islands I think it makes sense for the escorts and hunter-killer groups to be commanded by the same player who is running the convoys and the ASW aircraft patrols.

REPLY: Yes it does. And so the question is - who should be running the convoyas and the ASW aircraft patrols? Does not have to be the player defending the Home Islands from invasion (by whom? Russia?). And the DEI might be defended by me - if you ever come to terms with what I proposed above. I sure don't see how you are going to change command for a convoy from Java (IJA) past the Philippines (IJN) to Home Islands (IJA again?). I see how you easily can take over everything - Army and navy though. You got IJA - JAAF - and now all the ships to do Malaya, DEI - Philippines- (India? Australia?) - AND the GEC? What is left - besides Kiddo Butai and scrap? - You even get most of JNAF.

When convoys are going into your regions ( mostly the Pacific territories) then you are responsible for them and you should be assigned the necessary escorts.

As for division of the SRA between IJA and IJN. I think that is a disaster waiting to happen.


REPLY: And the Army is well suited to fighting amphib invasions?

What I am concerned about is the eventual British and Australian counter-attack. If we have a divided command ( e.g. Burma and Malaysia are under IJA control but Sumatra under IJN control)

REPLY: Not what I posted: I said SUMATRA was IJA. And - IRL - it was! But Borneo was not.


then we are prone to costly errors. Once these territories would be taken (+ Ceylon) I really wouldn't see much need for any major naval detachments and would be happy to give most of the naval forces under my command back to you.


REPLY: I never heard about IJA controlling naval forces taking Ceylon. IF we go to Ceylon I will do it - with Kiddo Butai covering. And no divided command nonsense. It is a major naval op. If you take over that sort of thing - and also apparently Australia - what exactly do I do - and with what? Not much.


I'd need just enough to cover convoys running to Ceylon from Malaysia and another TF to act as a quick-reaction force against any sudden Aussie raids. I would see most of my defensive strength coming from army and naval air units under my command, not actual surface combat TFs.

Oh one other thing I should make clear. As China and the Soviet Union come under control I would be more than willing to send a few of the divisions thus freed up in order to bolster the garrison of islands in the Pacific.

quote:

ORIGINAL: el cid again

REPLY: Nells do not auto upgrade. Not sure why - but in 1943 they still are being made.

quote:

but because it is ahistorical and not possible IRL for this plane to have been used in this role.

quote:

Makes me sort of junior auxiliary nothing for the resource free open ocean areas - more or less.

quote:

We really are not yet of a mind about China. It is anything but a tertiary theater.

quote:

You are going to cost us the greatest of justifications for building it if we cannot use the very first handful for recon. [USAF says "the primary mission of an air force is to gather information about the enemy"] You are going to cost us significant opportunities to hit the enemy while he is still weak and fragmented if we cannot use the very first squadrons (12) in strikes against targets not possible for any other plane.

quote:

I deny the theory of air power advocates in the early 20th century - quoting Norman Friedman here - 'that air forces represented an independent means to victory.' They are inherently costly - and if there might be salvation for the concept using nuclear explosives - that would be illegal, immoral and beyond the means available for Japan. I see bombers as tactical assets - exactly as the Axis air forces did - and also as the Soviet air force did. You may use them to empower your field armies - or the fleets - but not to kill an enemy power outside that context.

quote:

I am concerned at your idea of (a) don't attack China day one; (b) when you do attack it - use bombers;
I don't hear any focus on the critical strategic objetive - the rail link between NE Asia and SE Asia - nor see how bombers can sieze or hold it? I don't hear any response to my twice repeated call for that stretegic objective to be achieved truly ASAP - in the absolute minimum number of days/ weeks? Instead - once again I hear about transferring bombers (alone ) to China -AFTER other ops are over with. It does not sound like we have any sort of strategic sense of priorities in common here. Maybe we do - but I have not heard a hint of it yet.

quote:

If you must try a bomber campaign - take ALL of Alaska and eat its supplies - which at least cuts down on the shipping them from Japan.

quote:

REPLY: Nells do not auto upgrade. Not sure why - but in 1943 they still are being made.

quote:

You got IJA - JAAF - and now all the ships to do Malaya, DEI - Philippines- (India? Australia?) - AND the GEC? What is left - besides Kiddo Butai and scrap? - You even get most of JNAF

quote:

I never heard about IJA controlling naval forces taking Ceylon. IF we go to Ceylon I will do it

quote:

I intend to WITHDRAW from the Pacific.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Nemo121

quote:

but because it is ahistorical and not possible IRL for this plane to have been used in this role.

Why not? It has the range to fly to a target and bombs to drop on the target. As such using it to bomb targets in range seems very reasonable to me. If you think it is unreasonable then you should include a "Designer's Intent" document with your mod. Otherwise mere mortals can't be expected to read your mind as to planes and missions.

Using a plane listed as a level bomber with bombs on it to bomb the enemy seems pretty reasonable to me. Now you tell me it is only realistic if I use it against only certain targets and only in certain theatres and only for a given period of time.



REPLY: OK - I admit it. I screwed up. It is no longer a "level bomber." Sorry. I was warned, I failed to listen to experienced programmers, and they were right: you cannot expect players to know the operational histories of esoteric hundreds of planes in the sense we fanatics do.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Nemo121

quote:

Makes me sort of junior auxiliary nothing for the resource free open ocean areas - more or less.

Not really. You'd have the Hawiian theatre of operations and everything clockwise down to and including New Zealand. If you want Northern Oz then that's fine too... I do, however, think dividing the DEI is a disaster waiting to happen so would not like to let Java/Sumatra/Borneo go. But if you want Timor and Northern Oz +/- Amboina that'd be fine by me.

REPLY: You are not considering the impacts of what you are saying. I remain commander of the resource free open ocean areas (New Caledonia excepted). I cannot justify controlling most of IJN or JNAF. You really want to go that way? The "Hawaiian theater" was NEVER contested by Japan after Midway. It is the most empty theater we command. Look at 4th Fleet. It has almost no units, or locations, and absolutely no resources.
Southeast Fleet is bigger - but barely.

IJA is a CONTINENTAL command - and the NAVY should do the amphib ops. Otherwise - we should divide them.
To do well we need to do initial ops well. If a later situation develops - we deal with it later. I can always say "everythign West of Palau is under your operational control." And you can say "everything South of xyz is under your operational control." for some situation that makes such a thing appropriate. You are going to control all the major naval bases except truck - and all the medium ones - same for JNAF - under your allocation. I repeat: what is my job: Adm Nugumo?



So, how about this, clockwise from Hawaii to a line running from Amboina/Timor/Northern Oz would all be yours?

REPLY: Like a sandwich between IJA and the Allies. Thanks.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Nemo121

[

quote:

We really are not yet of a mind about China. It is anything but a tertiary theater.

Ok, poor word choice... An important theatre but one in which the enemy air force is not much of a threat... at the moment... That may change and if it does I will, obviously, adapt.

RIGHT>

quote:

You are going to cost us the greatest of justifications for building it if we cannot use the very first handful for recon. [USAF says "the primary mission of an air force is to gather information about the enemy"] You are going to cost us significant opportunities to hit the enemy while he is still weak and fragmented if we cannot use the very first squadrons (12) in strikes against targets not possible for any other plane.

I never said anything against either of those two choices. I'd be quite happy to equip a few recon squadrons with Me-264 for long-range recon purposes but I won't unleash them in a strategic bomber role until such time as there are sufficient to really hit the enemy hard.

REPLY: Check. And we have many recon elements - tiny units of 3 can be fitted.

quote:

I deny the theory of air power advocates in the early 20th century - quoting Norman Friedman here - 'that air forces represented an independent means to victory.' They are inherently costly - and if there might be salvation for the concept using nuclear explosives - that would be illegal, immoral and beyond the means available for Japan. I see bombers as tactical assets - exactly as the Axis air forces did - and also as the Soviet air force did. You may use them to empower your field armies - or the fleets - but not to kill an enemy power outside that context.

And on this we disagree to a large extent. Not as much as you seem to think but to a large extent. Still, I won't order you to conduct strategic bombing but I do plan to engage in it as the opportunity presents itself.

REPLY: Yet it is a strategic concept. Engaging in a strategic bombing campaign we cannot afford will hurt us badly: we will invest in the wrong planes, not then being able to build the right ones; we will use our pilots on the wrong missions - not then being able to perform the right ones; we will have to feed the air units supply points, which then are not available to perform the vital missions. Many historicans thing that USAAF was badly misused in strategic bombing instead of mine laying and naval bombing and army support. I agree with them. But at least the USA can afford such luxurious mistakes: Japan cannot. Look at your proposed numbers for Me-264s - more than I think a larger air force needs total for first line fighters and bombers combined. Such numbers - which I repeat are not a realistic option - will greatly delay the re-outfitting of the largely obsolescent planes of JAAF - and also similar planes in JNAF. But much worse than that is the focus of strategy and its impact on operations: our air power will be misapplied - and it won't be impacting the offensive as it could be. For example, tactical/operational bombing in support of land/naval ops is not used every day - or needed - and can usefully divert a lot of the time to ASW. But strategic bombing campaigns - with multiple objectives such that "when I finish here I will transfer to there and start on them" mean the bulk of bombers NEVER are used for ASW - where as if Japan is wise MOST bombers will spend MOST of their time on ASW. The sooner you sink a sub, the better: and the numbers of subs must increase even if we are 99% successful in surpression. ONLY such a weighty attack may cause victory in the form of an enemy AFRAID to send his subs forward.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Nemo121

quote:

I am concerned at your idea of (a) don't attack China day one; (b) when you do attack it - use bombers;
I don't hear any focus on the critical strategic objetive - the rail link between NE Asia and SE Asia - nor see how bombers can sieze or hold it? I don't hear any response to my twice repeated call for that stretegic objective to be achieved truly ASAP - in the absolute minimum number of days/ weeks? Instead - once again I hear about transferring bombers (alone ) to China -AFTER other ops are over with. It does not sound like we have any sort of strategic sense of priorities in common here. Maybe we do - but I have not heard a hint of it yet.

My strategic priorities are as follows:
1. Secure DEI/Malaysia/Phillipines.
2. Secure Ceylon with 4 or 5 divisions.
3. Shape the Chinese theatre of operations ready for the Chinese invasion plan.
4. Invade China using multiple routes of attack, multiple operational manoeuvre groups with a view to taking it down as quickly as possible.
5. Defending Korea during the attack on China and then, once China is finished, turning on the Soviet Union.

I fully expect to have China pretty much closed down by mid-42. I do not foresee any major difficulty with this and that's a lot better than a lot of bullish approaches from Day 1 will get you... Oh and your precious railroad will be cleared well before then.

REPLY: That RR is a secret ASW weapon! Nothing that goes to NE Asia (or backwards to SE Asia) by rail gets torpedoed. Also - resources and supplies move unlimited distance by rail with fantastic efficiency.

quote:

If you must try a bomber campaign - take ALL of Alaska and eat its supplies - which at least cuts down on the shipping them from Japan.

Yep, this is the same conclusion I've reached.

REPLY: Careful: too much agreement may spoil our reputation for never agreeing.

quote:

REPLY: Nells do not auto upgrade. Not sure why - but in 1943 they still are being made.

Yeah there's an error in RHS EOS... The upgrade slot of Nells points to Nells. It should be changed to point to the Betty.

REPLY: This is deliberate - not an error. So you can generate replacement planes. You cannot upgrade all of them and if you have no replacements - units be come ineffective.

quote:

You got IJA - JAAF - and now all the ships to do Malaya, DEI - Philippines- (India? Australia?) - AND the GEC? What is left - besides Kiddo Butai and scrap? - You even get most of JNAF

Don't go getting paranoid again. If you want the Grand Escort command it is yours. Obviously some ASW ships will have to be assigned to individual theatres so that, for example, the forces in DEI can provide a few escorts for convoys the IJA in DEI is running.

REPLY: What convoys? Grand Escort command IS the convoys. Plus dedicated patrol planes. Not much else - maybe a hunter killer group - if we give it assets for one?

So, think of it this way. IJN would run everything clockwise from a line east of Guam/Wake to a line running from Guam/Wake to Amboina and Northern Oz. So, pretty much you'd cover 3pm to 7:30pm on the clock.


As regards Borneo: I disagree that that should be IJN... I think it makes a lot more sense for the Phillipines, Borneo, Kendari, Java, Sumatra to be under a unified command with the IJA taking everything south of a line from Guam to Kendari.

REPLY: Being islands - why an IJA command? If you have the armies of China and Manchuria and Malaya and Home Islands - and the forces in the North - not much is left if you add to them ALL these islands.

quote:

I never heard about IJA controlling naval forces taking Ceylon. IF we go to Ceylon I will do it

We're dividing things by theatre. India is an IJA theatre

REPLY: Who says so (well - I guess you just did - but I never read that anywhere)? India was an IJA theater historically because IJA went there by land. I thought you wanted to go by sea? Sea is NAVY stuff. Long range naval ops must be navy - and covered by naval carriers. No other logical possibility.


so the invasion of Ceylon seems, to me, to be an IJA operation.

REPLY: Ceylon is an island DISTANT From possible land bases - so it is a naval op. Your IJA sound like the PLAN - the Imperial Japanese Army Navy.



Hell, if you went for Port Moresby I'd just give you the divisions you'd need and wouldn't tell you how to use them.


REPLY: What if I want Ceylon? Why is it different?

I figured the same would apply to an operation vs Ceylon.


REPLY: Me too. Since it is - like Port Moresby - a distant thing across the water...

Since it is to be taken to base IJA strategic bombing efforts it would be an IJA operation. Getting there is accomplished by the Navy but the whole reason for going is cause the IJA wants to go there...

REPLY: Well - I am not advocating a strategic bombing offensive. But I do have a desire to see bombers there - to contest the sea lanes. Maybe they can do both?

I am open to discussion on this but I think it is doable long before KB could get into the area and waiting for the Navy will only slow things down.

REPLY: No it is not. It is never smart to send a valuabe force to sea uncovered. And we can't afford to lose the ships - never mind the troops on them - which are worth more than the ships - probably. This is my other big concern: your willingness to commit reckless naval ops uncovered. It is why IJN must control naval ops - we know how to run ships - and protect them. You seem somehow to have missed that we face TWO Allied Fleets BOTH with numbers of battleships and Carriers - one in the Indian Ocean is more effective sooner than the one you think of in Hawaii. And it can stand up faster in Level 7 - depending on what happens to things related to Madagascar.

quote:

I intend to WITHDRAW from the Pacific.

I disagree with this as I feel you will miss a lot of opportunities to hurt the enemy if you withdraw too quickly but it is your theatre and you can do what you want there.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Monter_Trismegistos

El cid: we know Nemo's "strategic priorities". Could you tell us your strategic priorities? (not only restricted to your theatres, also for those of IJA).

Nemo: BTW while I disagree most times with Cid, I must say that about strategic bombing I agree with him. I think the most improtant thing you must divide is supply. And I think El cid is right not permitting you simply waste it on such expensive missions. Nemo, what effects are u expecting from that? You think you could do more than a scratch to allied industry?

quote:

ORIGINAL: Nemo121

Ok, new draft of commands:

IJA commands:
Kwantung ( with emphasis on Soviet Union),
Northern Area,
Home Army,
China Army,
Burma Army ( covering Malaysia and Burma)

Maybe we should do this from the start? I wonder if hard code will let Yamashita be under Burma Area Army?
I mean for Malaya ops.

and
Southern Regional Army ( covering Sumatra, Java & Borneo).

IJN commands. Everything south of the Aleutians clockwise to Exmouth including Amboina, Kendari and the Phillipines.

I think the North Pacific is your area. That is, if you have all the bases up there - that is where the patrols will come out of. I won't have anything North of Hawaii - Wake - Marcus etc.

Why do I think Borneo is so essential to holding Sumatra and Java? Simple, it gives my defence greater depth and a place to store counter-attacking forces I otherwise might not have. If you are really bothered I'll even let you have the eastern half of Borneo with my forces holding everything west of ( and including ) Kuching and Balikpapan/Samarinda.

Still not thinking like a Continental player. And still not letting the Navy control the seas. It is the SEA routes that matter. Still - central Borneo is impassible mountain jungle - and a practical division point. Something to be said for one guy bossing ALL sides of the South China Sea. But a DIAGONAL line across Borneo cuts OUT Java. And Java and South Borneo control the Java Sea. You think you have a depth of command problem - contemplate the next farther south command. WITH Java and Borneo the area is very thin. And I am going to try to take Darwin to make it fatter. But what is the point of taking Northern Australia without Java? That is - I don't know where you think I am going to base? But the only shipyard - and malaria free base hexes - are on Java.


Surely between defending everything south of the Aleutians, the Phillipines and northern Australia + Kendari/Amboina that gives you enough to do.

You are talking vast areas with nothing in them - either to take or defend. Just islets. Start talking UNITS. Start talking RESOURCES. You have 90% of everything. I am sort of the "open ocean fleet auxiliary" - and with the escort service also - the "near seas escort auxiliary and second line patrol auxiliary".


As far as Ceylon goes I think we will have to split responsibility as one of the major reasons that the IJA would fight for such an invasion is in order to get Me-264 bases. Maybe we should just split the island 50/50 after we take it. You get the western half, Colombo ( close to the shipping lanes), and I get the eastern half, Trincomalee ( with an airbase I can use to bomb inland India).

Strange - and not military sensable either. Who ever heard of a divided command? The US learned the hard way (in Alaska) it is fatal to success. Also in the PI. We didn't make that mistake again. This is a naval command - it is an island - across a distant sea - and its on the front lines - sure to be invaded by naval forces. It must have a unified naval command to make any sense - or to have any chance of effective value. When things change - a naval call - the bombers need to go away. And no reason for them to be JAAF Me-264s. Since the navy gets some - they can do the job from there. Now if you want to allocate some shipping - to move supplies - and send MORE Me-264s - I will drop their loads on your target list. Indeed - unlike you - I have no problem with being told "this is what I think needs to be bombed" at any time - for my bombers. I surely will say "Alert enemy invasion expected from 01/15/4x from that threat axis - set bombers that remain in this area to attack at 6666 feet" or whatever.

That establishes the doctrine of 50/50 splitting of contested areas... and in the south I stand firm on holding western Borneo but have ceded Kendari, Amboina, eastern Borneo and the Phillipines to you...

A foolish doctrine I am shocked to hear proposed, one I do not agree with, and will surely never accept. Being a team does not mean we have to be doing stupid things. Letting the Army take over distant islands is hardly logical in the first place. Dividing command at the front in any important place is first class folly. And note that this proposal means you are neither being respectful of my strategic advice - nor third party comment - that strategic bombing is way too wasteful to actually contemplace. Do this and surely we will lose faster. Just as USAAF was guilty of gross wastage of resources - surely your bombers would delay the enemy longer if you simply hunt submarines with them than if you engage in strategic bombing. I also don't think the game model is likely to be valid for evaluating it.

Question: what IS strategic bombing in game terms? Do you mean "city bombing"?


As to the gameplay issues of contention...

1. Ki-36s. Ok, I'll only use them for non-strategic bombing missions.

No longer germane - they no longer carry bombs. I recommended Matrix and CHS make the same change - or rewite the code for bombing to look at bomb size for city bombing.

2. On-map training. This is allowed but ONLY via combat missions & the dedicated training function, ASW, naval search, ground attack, city attack, port and airfield attack missions. Supply missions can no longer be used for training purposes.

Note - however - that ASW bombing trains a unit far more than a training unit does. FYI. While I mean that in the game it does IRL too.

3. If upgrading any squadron equipped with single-engined planes it must spend at least 1 month with twin-engined planes before graduating onto four-engined planes.


Not a bad convention - and you do have numbers of Ki-32/30s. I think some of these are allowed to convert to Kates.

4. NO limitations on naval bombers. If the Allies want to use four-engined bombers on naval attack then they are free to do so.

I never said I had a problem with that. I don't. The real USAAF was stupid not to start doing it right sooner. And eventually they got very good at it. [Skip bombing. This is the problem with 1000 feet - it is the skip bombing thing. Better post this - or they will do it before it was invented!]

5. NO limitations on resource bombing.

How do you bomb resources? Do you think the game code permits it and does so in a realistic way? I must admit I don't remember a lot of this IRL. "Go hit the Shinklobwe mine?" No. Go TO the mine and take the talings. Japan thought about it. The US did it. Neither even thought about bombing it. Hard to imagine a bomb doing anything to an open pit mine either. Tell me more. Maybe we should ban it? Maybe it is impossible already? Maybe it is just fine?
Never heard of it IRL or in game.



6. No limitations on turn 1 port attacks... Sid if you want this you are going to need to say this to the Allies. I think you will find them resistant to this. They are going to want to force us to choose between Manilla and Pearl Harbour.

Why? there is no such limitation anywhere I am aware of? Anyway - I did post this on the Tag Team Thread and drew nary a comment.

7. We also should discuss what we think are reasonable limits on Turn 1 moves. If you check out the landings in the "Chumming The Water" AAR in this AAR section you'll get an idea of what I think is reasonable.... You might use this as a base for stating what you think is reasonable.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Monter_Trismegistos

El Cid: and how would you like to deal with your western border? Stop at Burmese border?

quote:

ORIGINAL: Nemo121

5. NO limitations on resource bombing.

Bio-bombing of food production centres in China. Simple example.


OK - what is "bio bombing?" I admit Japan had BW capabilities. But they are not in the game.
And how do you bomb a "food production center"? The ONLY food production centers I am aware of are IMMUNE to bombing! [See Kodiak -- the biggest of these. Many fishing ports get some food - but you can't bomb it out of existence.]



6. Limitations on turn 1 moves and turn 1 port attacks...

Better post it again. Two of the most common house moves are to limit turn 1 moves and the number of turn 1 port attacks... If we hit Singapore, Manilla and PH all in hte one day the Allied players WILL complain unless it is stated very explicitly pre-game... I' state it again as a lot of people don't read the entirety of your posts.

Well - I don't have any particular plan to attack a lot of ports - but I see no sense in being rule limited. Why is this a popular rule? Turn 1 rules work fine - reflecting planning. You can train for and plan up any thing you want in peacetime.



As to you wanting Borneo, Java/Sumatra etc... Sid, you'll be facing the entire bloody US Navy and US Army all by yourself and now you are fighting for Java/Sumatra and the western half of Borneo too. Give it a break.

Uh - I want something to face them WITH! You get ALL the mainland and ALL the big islands - you get ALL the troops and almost all the planes and ships. You are ignoring the size of the armies on the mainland as well - China and Russia and Commonwealth forces are all bigger than US or Aussie forces will be for a long time. We should be standing back to back - at Tokyo - you facing NW - me facing SE - and I don't have much sense we are doing that. You seem to want to face SW - and me SE - and ignore NW altogether. You also don't seem to read or contemplate what is posted: think about bases. Giving me Timor and undeveloped New Guinea is a wonderful thing - nothing there to give. 100% of it malarial. Not a single major port or airfield. Not a single shipyard. To the extent I back up and base on ports in your area I depend on your defense of them - and it is impossible it will be adequate because you want to waste resources on heavy bombers and then the supply points to use them on targets that do NOT reduce enemy military forces. You will have too few modern fighters and too many enemy bombers - a big problem for my ships. In fact - forcing you to cover less area may be very very wise: you might not be so thinly spread as to be combat ineffective everywhere. And if you are going to be combat ineffective - it hardly seems strategic to permit that to apply to Java. We need to have it functional for as long as possible.


I've compromised in going "fine take the Phillipines, western Borneo, Kendari, Amboina, Timor etc" but I still want some strategic depth. I can give up western Borneo too if you want but the limits of this compromise are Java and Sumatra. They must remain IJA if I'm to put up a coherent defence on our western seafront.


Compromised? You mean instead of wanting 99% of the resources and 95% of the troops, you only want 90%. Some compromise.

Lets back up and start over.

IJA controls the CONTINENT. I control everything OFFSHORE.

Now I will "compromise" - you can defend Japan (which is a bunch of islands).

I will compromise further - you can take the entire Northern Command - both the right flank of your position in Manchuria/Korea and the position threatened by the Aleutians. It is also a bunch of islands.

Add it up: you get most of the commands: Kwangtung Army, China Area, Home Defense, Northern, Burma and the Malay portion of Southern. You get most of the army and JAAF. And certain JN assets as well.


Consider ANYTHING you want more than that a "compromise" by me. I tried to be generous - look what it got me?
Draw a line from Singapore to the SE China Coast - bend around that coast until it passes Formosa - and then take off again up the Ruykus to Japan - and bend back along the Kurils and Aleutians. Everything NW of that line is yours.
That is the "natural" division of the Japanese into land and sea commands. All else is a compromise by the Navy.

Now, I suggest you accept that ( I've compromised a lot) and quit pushing for ever more at this stage.

I think you are not compromising much at all. You really want to control everything but 4th Fleet and SE Fleet - I guess. Seems odd to me. Sort of "you get the empty ocean - I get everything else". Maybe you don't get the Naval stuff? You face FLEETS and need NAVAL power in the Southern Area and IO areas. You planning to command those assets ? Your proposal of a sliver along the SE edge of DEI shows you do not understand how to base or operate naval forces. Nor have any grasp why one would sieze such areas? Such command lines would be acceptable in no nation in history.

I also think that IF China and the Soviet Union are removed from the equation you should agree to look at letting the army take over secondary theatres so as to let the Navy concentrate its forces vs the US.

I don't see how to remove either from the equation? China is why we are at war. Russia is the main threat to our main resource areas. How do you "remove them from the equation?" And why is facing them a trivial task?
But - assuming such a question has an answer - what is a "secondary theater?" I have the impression you really do not understand naval units and maintenance/basing. There is no where to repair up in the vast reaches of the Central and South Pacific. This is a desert - just a wet one. We may pass through it - but we don't really live there.
And we cannot expect to generate any local supply worthy of the name. Operations are transitory in nature - and fluid in a sense you don't have on land. We may be attacked quite far in our "rear" - no "line" stops submarines - or for that matter - surface ships.



My reason is that I don't want to enter a situation in which the IJN is, in 44, facing Oz and the US ( probably the only pretty active theatres if the IJA plan goes according to plan) all by itself with not a single unit under army command being active... I want something to do IF the Chinese and Soviets can be knocked out of the game too.


I see. Plan for success? Not much chance of this. By 1943 the Allies should be overpowering (Joe Wilkerson).
And they should be pressing you from India. And you really do not grasp the essence of "victory" either in China or Russia: you may "win" control of territory of interest - but they will remain in the field. The Russians will NEVER be out of supply - and they only get stronger. And Chinese units do not get "eliminated" - they just reappear over and over again. If both these fronts are active - you may find Chinese units leaking up into Russia - to use supplies from there.

So, why  don't you tell me what you plan to hit in the first month of activity ( assuming java and sumatra are in my area of responsibility)

Because Java is not in the activity of the first month in any case - nor is it in your area of responsibility in any case. News flash: Java is an Island. It is the heart of the DEI - and it is the army that hit the Philippines that hit its Eastern flank. Not much point in trying to control a naval theater like DEI with the Army - unless you want the navy. And that means the Navy lacks the ability to "swing" naval units between Southern Area and SE Fleet areas - which flexability is vital to success. It is the naval form of interior lines. There will be major units in these areas - and not divided in command.

and what you need from me to do it? I will then post what I plan to hit my tasked regions with and what IJN forces I would like access to ( mostly a few Nell and Zero daitai).

quote:

And if you are going to be combat ineffective -

quote:

I think you are not compromising much at all. You really want to control everything but 4th Fleet and SE Fleet - I guess. 

quote:

And you really do not grasp the essence of "victory" either in China or Russia

quote:

ORIGINAL: Nemo121

Monter,

I believe strategic bombing will:
a) gift me china in the cheap 4 to 5 months into the game.
b) help me cripple the British and Australian capability to project power,
c) greatly aid the destruction of Soviet forces. ( although this will be a theatre featuring less strategic bombing).


IRL it didn't turn out this way. IF this is possible in the game - lets not do it. I don't think it is possible - but since I don't do strategic bombing I have no data either. But we are supposed to be doing things that the real commanders might have done. And whatever else may be said - the idea of actually defeating China because of strategic bombing is nonsense. It is hard to imagine bombing more effective than actually happened in China - or BW on a wider scale than happened either - yet it did not come close to "defeating China on the cheap." Japans whole war effort lacked the scale to attempt such a campaign in a way to affect Australia or India or Russia. If it were different in the game - and I don't admit that it is - it would not be simulation to try it. Since the same assets not in strategic bombing always pay off much bigger when directly applied to military operations, lest use sensible military strategy. See Freeman Dyson (statistical analyst for Bomber Command) in Weapons and Hope. Or John Newhouse (War and Peace in the Nuclear Age).

quote:

ORIGINAL: Feurer Krieg

I agree. This discussion is one of the primary reasons Japan didn't do as well as they could have in real life.