el cid again -> RE: Commands (11/7/2006 12:25:42 AM)
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quote:
ORIGINAL: Nemo121 quote:
And if you are going to be combat ineffective - LOL! Never, ever in my life has anyone who has made such an assumption about my future forces in a strategy game been around to see it become reality. Then please explain how you have managed not to disabuse yourself of the romance of heavy bombers? They are not cost-justified for strategic bombing for UK and US - how on earth might they be for a tiny power like Japan? Unless you change this attitude you simply must be far less effective than you would be if you had 1) A much larger and more modern fighter force (made from the same resources that built the excessive number of bombers); 2) A much more robust supply depot system feeding air operations because you have not invested those points in bombing non-military targets (which is my definition of a strategic target: not a military unit); 3) A much greater ability to invest bombs (with the more modest bomber force) in real military operations (because you didn't invest them in non-military targets). Wether you are combat effective or not is partly up to the enemy: you MUST be LESS combat effective in any case with such a policy. In the long run - you MUST become combat ineffective - due to the sheer size of opposing forces. The goal is to DELAY that day - and investing in heavy bombers and their use on non military targets is certainly not a way to achieve that goal. quote:
I think you are not compromising much at all. You really want to control everything but 4th Fleet and SE Fleet - I guess. No, not that at all. I simply don't trust you to create a hard enough defence of Java. Aha! And in fact that is exactly what I don't trust you to do. Since you are NOT listening to me (or even Monter) about strategic bombing - you won't have the resources to do so. Since you don't understand how naval power requires basing - you won't have the operational capability either. Regretfully, it appears my concern is more valid than yours is. But this is WONDERFUL simulation of the tensions between those services! I think that forces under my command would hold longer ( not necessarily fight better, but hold these important resource areas for longer) and thus protect Malaysia for longer ( which is why I wanted these areas). Impossible to know - since you cannot run it both ways and compare. The only good indicator you are wrong is your focus on strategic bombing. It won't help you do that job - and it will prevent you haveing the numbers of new fighters you will need to do that job well - and it will prevent you having as many supply points for military ops as you would have if they were invested in operations - or even expanding the economy. The indications are you have not made the strategic connection - which interestingly historians of almost all nations have done - about the gross economic inefficiency of the strategic bombing concept. I am a combined arms theorist: I believe in air power - in a strictly military sense. And I believe in logistics - so I will have the planes and the supplies to use on naval threats first of all - and on land units if they get to the point they are on land. I intend to cut his SLOC - and to deny him air bases. Forcing him to defend a long SLOC is the most efficient way to reduce what is at the front. Forcing him to operate far from air bases is the best way to have a shot at hurting him badly - when/if he tries a Guadalcanal like op (too far from air support). Ok, let me give you my final position... I'll trade you Java and Borneo ( in total) in return for having eastern Ceylon and Sumatra... I think that's pretty fair... You get that non-malarial base you've been lusting for and full control of Borneo - which you can fit into your Grand Escort Command etc - while I get to have Sumatra ( which is directly beside Singapore and Malaysia and an essential first line of defence for Malaysia) and control over how the forces in eastern Ceylon are utilised... since Ceylon is essential to IJA plans in India . Obviously the IJN can stage what it wants out of western ceylon and use the repair yards at eastern ceylon for whatever they want. At this stage I will stipulate that the IJA is the senior service and that if you can't agree to cede control of this one area (Sumatra) and one base ( the one in eastern Ceylon) which impinge directly on vital army theatres of operation that the Army will assert this seniority. I would, however, prefer to do this by compromise and, by compromise, you've probably close to doubled the number of bases and useful territory you will be responsible for - not a bad result at all. Once I've accomplished my strategic bombing goals in India I will cede eastern Ceylon to you also... I will no longer need it at that time and will be happy to let your IJN forces occupy it. I just don't want to have to be reliant on IJN good graces in order to conduct what I feel is an essential IJA goal ( the removal of India as a source of supply to Allied forces) by continuously requesting permission to fly what I feel are essential missions from your bases. I see you are making an effort of a sort. But it is devoid of military principles. You are not addressing Ceylon for what it is - in military terms: an island; more than that a distant island; more than that an island that will never fall without a tricky and dangerous to coordinate naval operation; more than that an island on the front certain to be involved in enemy naval counteroffensives. Not one phrase in that long list fails to focus on the germane point: this is a naval location. If you won't go for that - then we don't go for Ceylon. Pure and simple. It is as if I demanded control of the wing of Kwantung Army headed for Lake Baikal. [Something I am not interested in by the way - lake or not]. And your are "offering" Sumatra as if it is a concession - when it was not asked for. Sumatra is so close to Malaya that it makes sense to treat it as a vital part of the defense of Malaya. I never asked for Sumatra (except in the generic form of saying "everything not on the mainland ought to be naval" - which was meant for attention - not because I intended to apply it to Sumatra). So you are asking for what you already have on the one hand, but for what you can not have on the other hand. If you fear my defense of Java - how much more must I fear your defense of Ceylon? The POINT of going to Ceylon is to change the sea frontier of the Bay of Bengal - in our favor - to render the defense of Burma and Malaya a second string operation - because the enemy dare not approach them. It is to be a forward patrol point and a lightning rod - a predictable point they will engage - a battle we can afford to lose (because we don't need it). [That is my favorite battle - one I don't have to win. I get to decide when the cost of defending it is worth the exchange rate ?] I hear no such remarks from you: so do I trust you with such trade offs? Not a chance. If Ceylon is not mainly for such a purpose - the risk of going there is too great to dare. I must be out of position in the East to cover it - and while that may be practical - it is risky. The major naval forces are MOBILE ones. Kiddo Butai - in a single sweep - cover 120 degrees of longitude - from Hawaii to Ceylon - winning every battle along the route. Divide up that broad expanse of ocean - presumably you must divide up the major naval forces which contest it. IF you don't - and also do not let the navy control ops - then you will be moving uncovered - a truly dangerous concept. Doing this right is very hard indeed - because there is more than one enemy out there. There is a true fleet in the Indian Ocean - one with carriers as well as capital ships. So, in the bargaining you've gained Northern Oz, the Phillipines, Borneo, Java, Kendari ( and the island it is on), [you must refer to Celebes] Amboina as well as undiluted control over all of Papua New Guinea AND western ceylon. HOWEVER Ceylon is facing North-west AND impinges on a mainland area ( India) and thus I want control over its eastern base [IF India was an IJA territory this would be logical. Since it is not - or did you change strategy without telling me? - it isn't. We lack the ability to simulate a major land campaign in Western India - and the economic structure to simulate a major occupation of India and not be de facto cheating - getting way too much supply] ( and Sumatra... again because it is simply essential to holding Singapore). So, you've got everything from about 2 o'clock on the dial down to about 8:30pm on the dial. That's an awful, awful lot. IF we were measuring things in radians - perhaps. But I am thinking in terms of units. I don't see how to get anywhere near a balance in units? Am I missing something? Make a list. Figure it out. And the germane thing is neither area nor radius nor unit counts: the germane thing is open ocean operations. IJA is not equipped or trained to do this, and dividing the marginally adequate long range forces of the Navy too much insures only defeat. One last thing, I think you should agree to re-negotiate this IF I can subdue China and the Soviet Union. Since you think this will never happen you shouldn't have anything to fear by agreeing to this IF it were to happen. There is a point. You can't so it isn't much of a deal. But you are still not describing what you have in mind? Sounds to me like another way to carve up the compass - and divide those very rare strategic naval assets. We have ten battleships - and two building - most of them obsolescent. We have 6 CV - and we will get about 2 a year more. There are a dozen good CA - and four poor ones - and no modern CL at all. These vessels are supposed to last 30 years (some are already older than that) and they can't be replaced during this war. There are not enough patrol planes for this immense area - nor even as many as it takes just to defend Hawaii (or Ceylon) alone! There are not many bomber units - and they will not remain combat effective long enough to defeat a mid or late war force (just to hurt it). By mid war I need MOST of your bombers for patrol work - or enemy submarines will destroy our economy. Just how do you propose to divide up this fragile and inadequate force and still have me be effective? Japan's greatest historical mistake was NOT to keep the Kiddo Butai together. Its land based air force MIGHT be effective IF it is NOT divided to any great extent. Forgive me for being skeptical that you have something constructive in mind here. This is a marginal force - by what fraction do you intend to make it more marginal? quote:
And you really do not grasp the essence of "victory" either in China or Russia I believe it is highly fortunate for you that you won't be facing me as an opponent. Such a gross misappreciation of the situation is the sort of thing I would punish ruthlessly in-game. Well - I can read a map - and an OB. You are not going to do anything much to Krasnyarsk - so it is going to feed an enemy force - forever. And I don't think you understand there are other supply sources? Anyway - you are talking like an Axis army officer (role playing I admit) - with too much arrogance by half. It never hurts to assume the enemy might be dangerous - if you are wrong you just win sooner. Only the unwise depend on the enemy being easy to beat. Again I just ask that IF I can subdue the Chinese and Soviets that you agree to renegotiate some army control of some theatres so that army forces have a chance to have a bit of fun in 1944 ( and take the pressure off the navy). Since you don't think it will ever happen it shouldn't be a problem for you. I don't think you think naval. My capital ships are mobile. It is not a "theater" either. It is just an "operating area" - a very different concept. My ships may be in Japan itself - but their strategic significance is that they can move to another place. But ONLY if they are of a sufficient mass - and as time passes 100% of the fleet is just a task force to the enemy - will they have a chance. Air power is even more fragile. And the one thing it cannot be is combat effective for naval ops and exhausted (and out of supplies) due to strategic bombing. Once again - if you have something in mind - tell me what it is? It better be a whole lot better than ANYTHING I have heard yet - or I will have big concerns. As to how much of the navy I want... Give me a few CVEs and CVLs as well 2 Zero daitai and a few Betty daitai to I don't think you understand naval talk. A daitai is a sort of squadron or small group. Naval air does not usually come that way. Usually it comes in larger formations that contain daitai. IJN air power is divided by function and / or location. When you negotiate for an area, you tend to get the assoicated parts of it. Thus - you will have an entire Air Flotilla based on Saigon. This has many bomber "daitai" - but only one fighter one - an ad hoc one in fact so it has any. It also has other kinds of planes. Ships come with their air groups. One thing you don't seem to understand is that I plan to outfit JAAF with Zeros, Betty's, Nells, Kates and Vals, to the degree they are not required - so you have this power INHERANT in own forces. On top of that the entire 22nd Air Flotilla will be part of the Malaya op - and then I expect it to face the Indian Ocean. I do not think it will come back - except in a crisis - and it is the 21st and 23rd Air Flotillas that will have to do the main work (supplimented by the 24th - which must also cover the North) in the South. In effect - in 1942- we will be lucky to have one air flotilla per major area - and these probably will be split (24th - if Home and North - is yours; so is 22nd - which is Burma/Southern Western Sector; 21st and 23rd are my offensive land based arm - and I don't see how to divide them further? - and cover such a vast area - they won't be enough - and I will need planes from the 24th I am sure). So, that's the deal. If necessary I will assert the seniority of my service ( something you alluded to in email in the early stages of discussing this when you said words to the effect that in the final reckoning the IJA was the senior service and would have the final say) and say that the IJA simply refuses to cede Sumatra or eastern Ceylon to the IJN. Say it all you like. It is reckless to go without the Navy - and the Navy isn't going for such a distant naval objective unless it is clear who is in charge in a naval op? It is truly amazing your fixation on the West - when it is not your real problem - and when you lack either the kind of forces or the expertise to pull it off well. It is not part of the Asian mainland - it is very hard to reach by sea (because of the problem of the Malay / Sumatra barrier ) - and dangerous to go there - too many enemy bases nearby - too long a SLOC - too distant from other points so forces involved cannot return quickly enough no matter how needed they are? This is a very iffy concept from the get go - it is one that is impossible in every repsonsible sense without naval assets - and it certainly will have to be coordinated with other naval issues in other naval operating areas. Do YOU have either the expertise or the operational courage to delay or call off a ceylon op because of impacts in the SRA? Or in the East? I didn't think so.
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