Nemo121 -> RE: Commands (11/11/2006 6:04:18 PM)
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Sid, I have told you before what my strategy is. I've then publicly said what I would do to achieve it. Every time I do that I'm told my post is insufficient usually cause of stylistic reasons or a failure to just use some common sense and fill in the blanks. So, last try: Overall strategy: 1. Aid in the recovery of the resource and oil-producing areas of the DEI & Malaysia as well as those portions of China and the Soviet Union which are resource and oil-producing. 2. Create a situation in which the enemy will find it difficult to project his power in any counter-offensive. This is to be accomplished in three ways: a) The denial of bomber bases within range of our resource and oil-producing regions ( thus necessitating the capture of Burma +/- a bit of south-eastern India) b) The destruction of enemy resource and industrial centres which will create the material and manpower which will be used to support enemy bomber, naval and ground offensives. ( thus requiring the strategic bombing of India) c) the establishment of Ceylon as a forward base which the enemy MUST take... and the making of every effort to make sure that such an attempt will cost the British greatly. 3. Once Malaysia/DEI/Burma and Ceylon are taken IJA will focus all of its strength, except for that required for garrison duties and the strategic bomber offensive against India, against China in an effort to take most of China and confine Chinese forces to a bombed out, unproductive hinterlan where small blocking forces ( relatively speaking small obviously) can keep them hemmed back. 4. Once China is take care of then the IJA will turn its attention to the Soviet Union. 5. If all of the above can be achieved then, yeah, I would like to invade Alaska and see about diverting the Allies during 1944 but that's such a pipe-dream that there's little point going into detail on it. A word on strategic bombing and the Indian theatre: If I damage 1 point of a resource centre on 1st June 1942 and it is IMMEDIATELY repaired the 1000 tons of supply used in so doing will result in a break-even point occuring 1000 days later ( that point in time when the supplies produced by the resource centre equal the supplies used in repairing it)... or to put it another way mid-February 1945. So, for the British player it just doesn't make sense to repair resources damaged by Japan unless he is swimming in supply. By its very action strategic bombing of resources slowly brings supply levels down to a subsistence level and then, eventually, drops them below it... making repair of damaged resources a luxury the British in India can no longer afford. Certainly no matter how succesful any resource-bombing offensive against India is the Allies will still be able to come back and launch an offensive... however, robbed of any supply production within India they will not be able to sustain ground forces during a long ground march south to the Burmese border and will be forced to come at Ceylon by sea. Knowing this the IJA ( and hopefully the IJN) will have stocked Ceylon with supplies, troops, Level 9 fortifications, coastal defences, minefields, maximum size airfields and sufficient forward-based ( and reserve) surface combat TFs and naval attack planes to either drive off the first invasion ( resulting in massive losses to Allied shipping and personnel) or just hurt and delay the Allies tremendously. Even with Ceylon taken ( as must eventually happen) the Allies won't be able to march ground forces to south-eastern India and keep them supplied by land. They will have to supply them by sea... and this will necessitate operations against Andaman island, northern Sumatra and Burma/Northern Malaysia... all of which will consume the precious supplies they need for a ground offensive. I believe the British commander is sufficiently knowledgeable to make this same determination and therefore will avoid such a stalemate and will, instead, opt for a further seaborne invasion of Burma/Malaysia or Sumatra. I believe that I will retain the power to make such an invasion an absolute disaster up to, but not including, 1945. I think that's clear. Time for you to fess up your own. P.s. Capture of Palembang and landings south of Palembang will be dependent on when the IJN plans to hit Java.
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