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your allowances do not offset temporal metaphysical realities, as I have pointed out before. To whit: you assume surprise where there cannot be, due to the time zone differences. Assuming that surprise will exist in a game because, IRL, someone screwed the pooch big time is granting yourself too much benefit at the expense of your opponent.

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After news reached the Philippines that an was in progress at around 03:00 a.m. local time on 8 December 1941 FEAF interceptors had already conducted an air search for incoming aircraft reported shortly after midnight, but these had been Japanese scout planes reporting weather conditions.

At 05:00 a.m. FEAF commander Gen. Brereton reported to USAFFE headquarters where he attempted to see MacArthur without success. He recommended to MacArthur's chief of staff, Brig. Gen. Richard Sutherland, that FEAF launch bombing missions against Formosa in accordance with Rainbow 5 war plan directives that Japanese territory from which an attack was likely to come be attacked. Authorization was withheld, but shortly afterward, in response to a telegram from General George C. Marshall instructing MacArthur to implement Rainbow 5, Brereton was ordered to have a strike in readiness for later approval.

Through a series of disputed discussions and decisions, authorization for the first raid was not approved until 11:00 a.m. local time for an attack just before sunset, with a followup raid at dawn the next day. In the meantime Japanese plans to bomb FEAF's main bases was delayed by fog at its Formosa bases, so that only a small scale mission attacked targets in the northern tip of Luzon. At 08:00 a.m. Brereton received a telephone call from General Henry H. Arnold warning him not to allow his aircraft to be attacked while still on the ground. FEAF launched fighter patrols and all of its bombers on Luzon between 08:00 and 09:00 a.m. as a precautionary move. However several confusing and false reports of air attacks culminated in an all-clear being announced at 11:00, at which time the bombers were ordered to land and prepare for the afternoon raid on Formosa. The squadron of defending P-40 fighters patrolling the area also landed at Clark Field to refuel.

At 11:20 a.m., the radar post at Iba Field detected the incoming raid while it was still 130 miles out. It alerted FEAF headquarters and the command post at Clark Field, a warning which apparently reached only the pursuit group commander, with no further action taken to safeguard the air forces.

When the Japanese pilots of the 11th Air Fleet attacked Clark Field at 12:30 p.m., they caught two squadrons of B-17s dispersed on the ground and its squadron of P-40 interceptors just preparing to taxi. The first wave of twenty-seven Japanese twin-engine bombers achieved complete tactical surprise, striking the P-40s as they taxied. A second bomber attack was supported by Zero fighters strafing the field that destroyed 12 of the 17 American heavy bombers present and seriously damaged three others. Only three P-40s managed to take off. A simultaneous attack on the auxiliary field at Iba to the northwest was also successful: all but two of the 3rd Pursuit Squadron's P-40s, short on fuel, were destroyed in combat or from lack of gasoline when the attack caught them in their landing pattern. The Far East Air Force lost fully half its planes in the first attack, and was all but destroyed over the next few days.

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ORIGINAL: ny59giants

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You wanna come within Nell / Claude range of Kwajalein with mini-KB backing? Bring it on. I'll trade you a couple of CVLs for three of your fleet CVs any day of the week.

Your going to marry Mini-KB to the Marshalls for how long?? One or two months??

You have left the whole of the American fleet intact and this is going to stop me?? I have ideas on how your defense can be defeated, but I rather wait until I play the Allies against John to present them.

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You wanna throw in the entire US Fleet? Cool. Congratulations, you beat me at Kwajalein and killed two of my CVLs. While you were pointlessly flexing your muscle on some god-forsaken island in the middle of nowhere with your *entire* fleet, I took Suva, New Caledonia, Port Moresby, Suva, Pago Pago and a couple other islands critical to your LOC. I also took North island of New Zealand, drank all their beer and left. Can't be everywhere at once, I guess.

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ORIGINAL: Chickenboy

I should have mentioned in my original post that I would not consider surprise port attacks on BOTH sides of the international date line (e.g., PH and Manila) in the name of fairness. It's an either / or for me.

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ORIGINAL: AW1Steve

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ORIGINAL: Chickenboy

I should have mentioned in my original post that I would not consider surprise port attacks on BOTH sides of the international date line (e.g., PH and Manila) in the name of fairness. It's an either / or for me.

You could always send your "rampaging killer torpedo carrying Emily's"! [:D]

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ORIGINAL: ny59giants

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You wanna throw in the entire US Fleet? Cool. Congratulations, you beat me at Kwajalein and killed two of my CVLs. While you were pointlessly flexing your muscle on some god-forsaken island in the middle of nowhere with your *entire* fleet, I took Suva, New Caledonia, Port Moresby, Suva, Pago Pago and a couple other islands critical to your LOC. I also took North island of New Zealand, drank all their beer and left. Can't be everywhere at once, I guess.

I'll take the capture of all the Marshalls vs those bases in early 42. I'll be threatening both Truk and the Marianas very early in the war. My LOC to Australia will have to go through the off map bases, but time is on the Allies side.

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ORIGINAL: zace

Not to mention they are only 7 hours apart....  Are you saying that the Japanese were incapable of using a clock to coordinate them within a little?  Or that the attack on PH would not have worked had it been a little later in the day?

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Remember pearl was set so early so they could raid more times than they did....  If I am not allowed to strike multiple targets as IJ then the allies are not allowed to issue any orders including cap to any units at or within range of PH so I can make the decision to re-sortie the aircraft on the 7th (on that side of the date line)

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Surprise is by definition making someone else screw the pooch.  It could be said that the Allies were so surprised that they were incapable of not messing up on 7 DEC 41

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Who ever came up with the idea that Japan could not hit Manila and PH?  THEY DID.... they just didn't target the docks at both.

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OT: It probably won't help the conversation to mention that I grew up a Cowboys fan, having lived in Dallas for a number of years, so I'll avoid saying how much I disdain the NY Giants.[;)]

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ORIGINAL: Chickenboy

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ORIGINAL: John 3rd

I have voiced my opinion on this topic MANY times and I believe it is a case of hitting BOTH targets on Dec 7th.  I'll gladly split KB and hit Pearl with 4 CVs and nail Manila with 2 CV and Mini-KB.  Net result sees the Battleline damaged and out of the picture for enough time AND a number of SS gone forever.  Sinking those SS has a much stronger impact on the long-term then does sinking an old BB or two...

Before Castor and others go off regarding attaining surprise in both attacks, remember in the 2x2 we have running right now allowances were made for that.  Fighters at Manila were allowed to be set for CAP and a random number of SS were allowed to be formed up in TF (turn time stamp x 2 for SS allowed into TF).  Made no difference to the attack.

In Mike and I's upcoming AAR (Reluctant Admiral) using my new Mod we will follow the same HR for the double attacks. 

Yes, John, you have voiced your opinion on this topic MANY times. As I have mentioned previously, your HRs in the Philipines do not override the hard-coded first turn Allied CAP limitations / hard settings. Point being: whatever 'allowances' you offer to the Allies to permit first turn Manila / Clark CAP settings, the game hardcodes to 'nerf' them on December 7-8. Result: CAP don't fly as Allies have been told to expect.

Also, your allowances do not offset temporal metaphysical realities, as I have pointed out before. To whit: you assume surprise where there cannot be, due to the time zone differences. Assuming that surprise will exist in a game because, IRL, someone screwed the pooch big time is granting yourself too much benefit at the expense of your opponent.

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ORIGINAL: ny59giants

Brad,
I forgot that McNabb is a Chicago boy. He could have gone back home. [;)]
I have always hated the Cowgirls and always will. So, Mcnabb and the skins are not a big deal to me.

OT - A perfect Sunday in the fall is a Giants win and a Cowgirls loss. [:)]

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ORIGINAL: zace

Not to mention they are only 7 hours apart....  Are you saying that the Japanese were incapable of using a clock to coordinate them within a little?  Or that the attack on PH would not have worked had it been a little later in the day?

The attack at Pearl was just after 7am Honolulu. That's midnight Manila. I'll accept a surprise NIGHT port attack as being roughly the same time. Wanna do that? Probably not. You're looking for a daylight MORNING phase attack. Manila has time to scramble. Just because they didn't IRL, dithered, and were destroyed on the runway doesn't mean that IJ players should be afforded the assumption of gross incompetence demonstrated by the Allied air command, Phillipines on that day.

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Remember pearl was set so early so they could raid more times than they did....  If I am not allowed to strike multiple targets as IJ then the allies are not allowed to issue any orders including cap to any units at or within range of PH so I can make the decision to re-sortie the aircraft on the 7th (on that side of the date line)

I'm sorry, but I honestly don't understand what you're trying to say here.

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I would like to distinguish between gross incompetence and surprise. There is a distinction. One can 'give' the IJ player a first strike surprise. To also 'give' them first day morning phase incompetence is an unjustifiable boon, IMO. I've not seen that selector switch on setup.

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ORIGINAL: zace

Go read on reactions to traumatic situations which are thought to be impossible.  The first reaction is denial and largely the non-responsiveness of commanders across the globe was because of this.  Then when it finally set in that this was correct, was not a drill, and actually happened they went into stunned mode and just didn't act at all.  All of this is because of surprise on a national level.

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ORIGINAL: ny59giants

Andre,
That was some party at Jerry's new house last September. [sm=00000028.gif]

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ORIGINAL: zace

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ORIGINAL: zace

Not to mention they are only 7 hours apart....  Are you saying that the Japanese were incapable of using a clock to coordinate them within a little?  Or that the attack on PH would not have worked had it been a little later in the day?

The attack at Pearl was just after 7am Honolulu. That's midnight Manila. I'll accept a surprise NIGHT port attack as being roughly the same time. Wanna do that? Probably not. You're looking for a daylight MORNING phase attack. Manila has time to scramble. Just because they didn't IRL, dithered, and were destroyed on the runway doesn't mean that IJ players should be afforded the assumption of gross incompetence demonstrated by the Allied air command, Phillipines on that day.

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Remember pearl was set so early so they could raid more times than they did....  If I am not allowed to strike multiple targets as IJ then the allies are not allowed to issue any orders including cap to any units at or within range of PH so I can make the decision to re-sortie the aircraft on the 7th (on that side of the date line)

I'm sorry, but I honestly don't understand what you're trying to say here.

Addressing these together.  The raid happened so early on the 7th local date in HI because the Japanese had time and plans to launch the planes multiple times against the island.  If you are saying the raid has to be that early then why can't KB strike multiple times in a single day against HI?  The game mechanics limit this.

If you are saying the game mechanics say you can have a morning raid on both then you miss the point.  The surprise would happen in both places if you hit manila at 8am and HI at 2-3Pm.  You would still have plenty of time and since AE restricts me from carrying out multiple attacks the same day with the same planes this is more realistic in the context of the game.

Not to mention that the attacks on Manila do not always go in the AM phase and in truth I have had a PH attack go in the afternoon phase.  IRL the IJ did not attack the harbor there but instead destroyed the planes.  In the game you can just build more from supplies....never mind that the frames arn't even on the island.

It is very fanboyish to say that one side can not do something because of how it matches with reality while wearing shades that block out actual reality then not restrict the other side.  IF manila were not attacked that day (clark in reality) then none of the ships likely would have left port.  Are you saying that the IJ player can't attack manila but then the Allies can't sortie ships for 4 days or until they do?

The whole idea that the IJ were not capable of coordinating raids across time zones is rather insulting IMHO.  We have every indication from history that they were well within their capability to do so if they wanted and the fact that they did not want to do this on PH day is not a representation of abilities and should not restrict as though it were.

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I would like to distinguish between gross incompetence and surprise. There is a distinction. One can 'give' the IJ player a first strike surprise. To also 'give' them first day morning phase incompetence is an unjustifiable boon, IMO. I've not seen that selector switch on setup.

What you call incompetence I call surprise.  You look at things with the eyes of today on.  Remember this is 1941.  Most Americans believe that they will stay out of the war, that war will not come to them, that this could never happen.  When PH happened it put everyone in shock and the reactions of other commands you read that day are because of this...  You are too stuck in the movies where the US was itching to go to war.  This just wasn't the case.

Go read on reactions to traumatic situations which are thought to be impossible.  The first reaction is denial and largely the non-responsiveness of commanders across the globe was because of this.  Then when it finally set in that this was correct, was not a drill, and actually happened they went into stunned mode and just didn't act at all.  All of this is because of surprise on a national level.

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ORIGINAL: mike scholl 1

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ORIGINAL: zace

Go read on reactions to traumatic situations which are thought to be impossible.  The first reaction is denial and largely the non-responsiveness of commanders across the globe was because of this.  Then when it finally set in that this was correct, was not a drill, and actually happened they went into stunned mode and just didn't act at all.  All of this is because of surprise on a national level.

Tell you what. Get AE fixed so that the AVERAGE Japanese losses at a surprised PH equal the historical (29 aircrews and 41 aircraft lost or damaged beyond repair), and I'll listen to your theories about what might or could have happened. As long as the loss average remains somewhere between 9-10, then "historical" arguments are bunk.

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ORIGINAL: John 3rd

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ORIGINAL: mike scholl 1

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ORIGINAL: zace

Go read on reactions to traumatic situations which are thought to be impossible.  The first reaction is denial and largely the non-responsiveness of commanders across the globe was because of this.  Then when it finally set in that this was correct, was not a drill, and actually happened they went into stunned mode and just didn't act at all.  All of this is because of surprise on a national level.

Tell you what. Get AE fixed so that the AVERAGE Japanese losses at a surprised PH equal the historical (29 aircrews and 41 aircraft lost or damaged beyond repair), and I'll listen to your theories about what might or could have happened. As long as the loss average remains somewhere between 9-10, then "historical" arguments are bunk.

Has that been going on? The only attack I've conducted resulted in me losing 20+ Vals and 20+ Kates. It was horrific to watch...

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ORIGINAL: mike scholl 1

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ORIGINAL: zace

Go read on reactions to traumatic situations which are thought to be impossible.  The first reaction is denial and largely the non-responsiveness of commanders across the globe was because of this.  Then when it finally set in that this was correct, was not a drill, and actually happened they went into stunned mode and just didn't act at all.  All of this is because of surprise on a national level.

Tell you what. Get AE fixed so that the AVERAGE Japanese losses at a surprised PH equal the historical (29 aircrews and 41 aircraft lost or damaged beyond repair), and I'll listen to your theories about what might or could have happened. As long as the loss average remains somewhere between 9-10, then "historical" arguments are bunk.

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First off, cool it with the fanboy comments. Those don't sit well in this forum. You want to debate, let's talk. Keep the name calling off of the forum.

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The surprise achieved was not simply a matter of "We are here and you didn't see us coming!"

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ORIGINAL: zace

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The surprise achieved was not simply a matter of "We are here and you didn't see us coming!"

It largely was...except they did see it coming.

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The same surprise could be achieved at dinner.

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ORIGINAL: John 3rd

Nicely said Zace.

I too really believe that the Commanders in Luzon---read Dugout Doug--would have been caught flat-footed from a Port Strike.  The Commander of the Asiatic Fleet was very competent but even he didn't react quickly.  The Japanese crushed Clark in the afternoon when the Americans had had well over 8 hours warning.  The Japanese strikes came in over land along a route predicted and they achieved surprise. 

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ORIGINAL: bklooste

What about the almost 400 allied air craft lost or damaged beyond repair historically at PH id gladly give 41 aircraft for that.

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ORIGINAL: mike scholl 1

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ORIGINAL: bklooste

What about the almost 400 allied air craft lost or damaged beyond repair historically at PH id gladly give 41 aircraft for that.

I believe if you check the actual data, you'll find that the Allies didn't have close to 400 A/C at PH..., and that the actual loss was 186.