RE: RHS Design Theory: CSNLFs and other matters (Full Version)

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el cid again -> RE: RHS Design Theory: CSNLFs and other matters (5/20/2012 12:06:01 AM)

I was mainly trying to complete a location file so Scenario 100 can be integrated with other RHS scenarios - Mifune wants a "final" version as a starting point for a review of 100 before it is formally issued. And my focus was on making changes for Scenario 105 - which isn't strictly historical - and should have some changes over the more strict Scenario 101 to 104 location files (which are identical to each other).

But the review process always produces some technical matters which apply generally. In this case, I became aware of some device issues - and have been revising all the device files. In particular, I have discovered that upgrades to devices which should be forced at certain dates are not always implemented. All games - even those in progress - will benefit from these revised device files - insofar as device changes instantly are implemented. There is also a number of eratta - where device listings in land units or their formations could be better. Some of this is inherited, some a function of new RHS devices not always put into play where they could be.

A fairly small body of land combat units are SNLFs and related mini SNLFs or the special case of a Combined SNLF. There appears to be almost a 100% requirement for changes, although these are generally fairly minor. The biggest issues are that (a) there is only one large CSNLF when the war begins (vice the two of history) and (b) its organization is either wrong - or from a much later period in the war (likely - as it has lots of coast defense guns - a typical change as the war shifted from offensive to defensive). Since naval organization is inherently flexible and fluid, and often not based on a fixed TO&E as is normal for Army units, it is very hard to standardize what is in a given naval land unit. In just one reference, the number of men in a company varies from 151 to 292, the number of LMG from a mere 6 to 28, the number of grenade dischargers from 9 to 33, only the number of HMG remaining constant at 4. Even so, there are real patterns and typical cases, and these are what we should use in game terms - unless we have firm data on a specific unit at a specific time.

The biggest change is to start with two CSNLFs: Sasebo and Maizuru. These should simply be two large SNLFs (I call them Assault SNLFs) to which is added a company of (14) Light Tanks, a company of (4) 75 mm Type 88 AA guns, and a company of (4) 37mm AT guns. The Sasebo CSNLF is composed of the Sasebo 1st and Sasebo 2nd - so these units should not appear as separate units - unless they are components of it - in which case the light tank co, AA company and AT company should also be components of it. The Maizuru CSNLF apparently was a combination of the Maizuru 1st and 3rd - and either were both at Truk - or were separated (with the 3 still at base in Maizuru) when the war began. But one should not merely add a Maizuru CSNLF and retain both of the subordinate units - one should either make them componants of the larger formation or cause them not to appear.




el cid again -> RE: RHS Design Theory: Scenario 105 Airborne Logic (5/20/2012 11:09:43 AM)

Scenario 105 RHSEOS Airborne Logic

The Doro Nawa Unit (too late planning group) formed upon mobilization reviewed the ambitious plans for Japanese Army and Navy airborne forces. Although both services were aided by the same (108 member) German military mission, each elected to take a somewhat different solution.
IJA Airborne Units: The IJA decided to create a unified command for both the ground units and the air units responsible to deliver them. Called the Raiding Group Command, this approach is considered superior in airborne theory, but no other nation ever implemented it, before or after WWII. The concept included higher command echelons, such that eventually an airborne brigade could be formed which could operate as a unified force in some operations. The highest echelon is called the Raiding Group. The Germans proposed it should consist of two Raiding Forces, two Glider Forces, an airborne Engineer Unit, an airborne Tank Unit, and an airborne Machine Cannon Unit. Each force would consist of two "regiments" (battalions). The airborne Forces, Engineer Unit and Machine Cannon Unit would be airborne. The Glider Forces and the Tank Unit would be airmobile. This concept was modified by the planning group because it would take years to implement. Since Japan sought a short war, and needed to have maximum effectiveness early in that war, it was decided not to form airmobile units at all, nor gliders to transport them. Instead, the Raiding Group would consist of three Raiding Forces, an Engineer Unit, a Machine Cannon Unit and a Recon Unit, all of which could be operational by the summer of 1942. The entire Group could be delivered by parachute. These units would be supplemented by two additional Raiding "regiments" which could operate independent of the Raiding Force from 1943. The only unit to be recast was the Recon Unit, which was similar to the Tank Unit, except equipped with different kinds of tankettes: a 37 mm armed version, a 6.5 mm MMG version, and an ammo carrier version - supplemented by Type 98 Scout Cars.

IJN Airborne Units: The IJN opted for a simplified airborne unit concept. Called Airborne SNLFs, its units were in effect slightly different versions of the Raiding "regiment" - armed with the standard weapons of Japanese SNLFs. There were no higher echelons or specialist units at all. The historical plan to create two of these units at Yokosuka was modified by the planning committed. Two additional units would be trained at the same facilities, at the cost of not forming two non-airborne SNLFs. These units would also be available in the first year of the war, when light airborne units could most contribute to the planned offensive.

JAAF Air Transport Units: Since Scenario 105 suspends the development of the Ku-8 Glider (from the Ki-34 transport plane), the Glider Regiments do not form. Instead, the fifth and sixth Raiding Sentais are formed using Ki-49II transport planes. Since this aircraft is both faster than, and has more range and capacity than the Ki-57, the first and second Raiding Sentais also upgrade to it. In addition, the 107th and 108th Transport Sentais are formed as the third and fourth Raiding Sentais, and are also assigned to the Raiding Group Command. They form on Ki-57 II s and also upgrade to Ki-49II transports. In addition, all JAAF transport Chutais and Units upgrade to using the Ki-49II when available, so they can be assigned to the Raiding Group Command and, by midwar, have the same operational speed, cargo and range. In addition, four Raiding Units are formed of 18 x Type LO or Ki-57I s in 1941 and 1942, upgrading to Ki-49II when available. Non-raiding group air transport units also are upgraded in many instances. See below.

JNAF & Civil Air Transport Units: DNKKK (the national airline) operated on a para-military basis, sometimes using the same equipment as the JNAF (see for example the H6K4-L flying boats). Like the JNAF, it also often used converted Army bombers, with different electrical and communications systems. These two services, as well as some satellite air transport units (see MKKK and the Cochin China Air Transport units as examples, others form late in the war), are integrated and slowly integrated over time, so that most units end up operating a version of the Ki-49 II transport redesignated L4M2 (since it cannot substitute in the same units, having different internal systems). The main exceptions are long range units, operating converted Navy bombers or flying boats. The DNKKK (and MKKK) are substantially reorganized and reequipped, and three new Raiding Groups (14th, 16th and 18th) come from this effort - the fourth is a slightly expanded 20th Transport Chutai (now 20th Raiding Group). The reduced number of civil air hubs are, however, expanded to full size (32 machines). As well - the civil air training program is expanded immediately, instead of waiting until later in the war. Type LO - which historically participated in air assault operations - equip one of the new Raiding Units under JAAF control. DC-3s are converted to L2D1 standard (joining 2 prototype JNAF machines) and assigned to operate in China. Except for some special cases, naval transport production is concentrated on the L2D2, similar to DC-3 and C-47 (of which it is a licensed production variant), but it carries less cargo over a longer range - important in Pacific Ocean operations. Civil air organizations concentrate initially on short range logistical support using Ki-34s converted to L1N1 standard, and upgrade to medium range operations with the Ki-49 II in L4M2 form. Unlike IRL, it is not intended civil operators will participate in air assault operations.




el cid again -> RE: RHS Design Theory: Scenario 105 Japanese Bomber Logic (5/23/2012 11:28:49 AM)

Scenario 105 RHSEOS Japanese Bomber Logic

This is a supplement about bombers (and planes derived from bombers) considered for inclusion in Scenario 105. In some cases the bombers were added to all RHS scenarios. In others, only to 105. If rejected, the reasons are given. The objective was to add types which could have been put into Japanese service which also contribute something to the war effort not available with domestic designs.

In RHS Senarios 100 to 104 the G5N2-L is also present. Until now, there was also a G5N1 bomber variant - essentially the same plane with the same performance in bomber form. That is now changed. The G5N1 design failed due to unreliable engines, which instead of being perfected were eventually abandoned by the IJN. The G5N2 was an attempt to get something out of the design using lower powered engines. But since performance was even less adequate with a 20% reduction in power for an already overweight and underpowered design, they turned them into transport planes. Had it been deemed acceptable - and I will let players decide that - to make a bomber version - it would be called the G5N2 without the -L tail (meaning transport). A similar Army project with different, but similar low powered engines, and Army type guns, would have been the Ki-68 I. By 1943, Mitsubishi perfected an engine in the range of the Nakajima one intended for the G5N1. But had it been used, by then the plane would have had different guns - so it would be the G5N3 - or with Army weapons - the Ki-68 II. All four of these are now in all RHS scenarios - including even 101 because I am sure Mifune intends to fold them in. For Scenario 105, I continue the development one more step - assuming that both services would want a better armed and higher performing version before the G8N or Ki-91 were ready (in 1945 and 1946 respectively). These of course become the G5N4 and Ki-68 III - and feature upgraded guns and slightly better performance but, as usual, slightly less range. This work is based on various reference materials, including unpublished ones in the National Diet Library - and my own experience in aircraft development (for example I worked on the B-1 bomber) - which required I be able to calculate how a plane would perform before it was actually built - something hard to do in WWII but SOP in the computer age. These six bomber variants may share two bitmap images - one in JNAF colors - and one in JAAF. Only the Navy has a transport version - and its art was always part of AE.

The Ju-88 is different. While it was in the WITP form of RHS (as was the Liz), it is not now in any of the RHS scenarios (except the not yet issued Scenario 100 by Mifune). I have added five variants for Scenario 105 - all of which can share the same bitmap - as all three have three armament stations. The Ju-88A5 is a bomber version - with armor and a respectable bombload (although in game terms it only carries 3000 of its 4000 kg maximum - that is very good for a Japanese bomber). Later in the war, the Ju-88A17 is a production option - substituting at normal range its external bombs for two 45 cm torpedoes. At extended range, the A17 only has its internal load (of ten 50 kg bombs) - something also carried by the Ju-88C night fighter variants. There are two of these - the first without radar - the second as soon as Japanese radar is developed for it. And there is a Ju-88D - derived from the Ju-88A but without either internal or external bombs - but able to carry two large drop tanks for very great range. It was widely used in the War in Europe in numbers. All these later versions are midwar production options. Only the Ju-88A5 is entering production when the game starts - and no units have them.
 
Because RHS has added the CoChin China Air Force, we need to add the Fiat BR.20. 85 of these machines were traded for soybeans in the 1930s. They were operationally successful but unpopular in both China and in Spain, and JAAF turned them over to a mercenary air force before the Pacific War began. In 1941, there were two line squadrons with spares. Since this aircraft was known to be in Japanese service, it had an Allied code name (Ruth).
The FW-200 Condor was actually developed in its patrol bomber form for the JAAF, and it was properly licensed for production by Japan. Like the G5N, it also existed in a transport form - and may be a more practical and realistic 4 engine transport for Japanese use than the G5N2-L was. I included this model so players may make that call - but it isn't scheduled for production or use by any unit - even in Scenario 105. The maritime reconnaissance version also may be more suitable than the G5N3 is. Again, I included it as an option for players, but did not schedule any production or unit assignments. The real problem with the aircraft is that, by Pacific standards, its range is marginal.

The Me-264 was considered. We added it in the WITP version of RHS, and I have since obtained a great deal of information about it. It was taken out of RHS/WITP for the same reason it isn't included here: it is simply too big and expensive for Japan to operate successfully. [Even Germany contemplated only 24 line machines after 6 prototypes if the decision was made to raid the USA with it.] The aircraft is so big only one airfield in Europe could operate it - and a full range mission required air refueling after take off - a concept demonstrated but not approved for German operational service. There is no way to adequately simulate the costs associated with, or the airfields required by, this aircraft in AE. In addition, it is doubtful if the Germans would have exported its technology, and it would have taken too long to get into service.

FW-200 Series: Bombers accepted for Scenario 105 (or other RHS scenarios) are able to be used early in the war, or at least by mid-war. The initial version - built from a modified prototype and designated FW-200A for game purposes - is essentially a recon aircraft able to mount four external 250 kg bombs for short ranges (because external loads cause a lot of drag). By the time the Pacific War began, a more advanced MR version was available, and it could have been built in Japan early in 1942: this version can carry 12 x 50 kg bombs in a ventral gondola even on extended range missions as well as 2 x 500 kg and 2 x 250 kg bombs externally on shorter range missions. Both are unusual bombers in that the extended range is 3 times as great as the normal bomb range for the A and 2 times as great for the C models. The BW-200B is the transport version and it carries a respectable load much farther than the bomber normal range, but not as far as the bomber extended range.



BigDuke66 -> RE: RHS Design Theory: Scenario 105 Japanese Bomber Logic (5/23/2012 6:20:41 PM)

Are things from other mods incorporated like stacking limit, AAA & ASW revision from DaBigBabes for example?



el cid again -> RE: RHS Design Theory: Scenario 105 Japanese Bomber Logic (5/24/2012 6:54:06 AM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: BigDuke66

Are things from other mods incorporated like stacking limit, AAA & ASW revision from DaBigBabes for example?



I am not very familiar with other mods - except those by Treespider and Mifune. In general, RHS leaves things as is except for cause - but modifies things with problems.

In reference to your questions - there is a significant revision for ASW devices - and the introduction of smart ASW devices (in particular the acoustic ASW torpedo - but also a magnetic sensing depth charge - both Allied devices). Related to this, submarines have been modified - and the entire theory of ASW is different - I will try to find a description and post it in this thread. Submarines have been somewhat hardened by the addition of "armor" rated at 1/3 of the main hull thickness. Escorts are much more likely to run out of ASW ammo as they fire patterns - not shots from single weapons on the sub bearing - the location of the target is unknown so the pattern is centered on where it was - but it has probably moved during the delivery process even if the location was originally perfect (which is astonishingly rare). ASW is designed - and actually works in RHS - such that subs are rarely sunk by a single attack - and succomb to cumulative damage - as IRL.

AAA is also revised in some respects. First of all - because RHS has a very different aircraft system - AAA is more effective. This because durability is far less than stock. This is where RHS began - when the work was done for CHS - supervised by a professional programmer - and it has always worked very well. Second - AAA is carefully rated for altitude effectiveness - weapon by weapon. But altitude isn't maximum altitude - it is effective altitude. Third - vast numbers of AAMG are added - reflecting what is really present - so flying below 3200 feet will cause more damage than is normal in other mods - because of all the extra light AAA. Fourth - RHS added unusual AA "guns" representing AA rockets and other devices - and super heavy AAA - representing for example 15 cm guns defending the Imperial Palace and 20 cm guns defending Singapore (just found in a part a few years ago - they look for all the world like modern, streamlined USN 155 turrets).

As for stacking limits - this is addressed only slightly - with respect to islands which were clearly rated too big for the forces which might engage. This was done in the pwhexe file - before it was split in to 19 seasonal files. In general, RHS has lower stacking limits on islands which were rated as unlimited or other very large values when it was clear that wasn't right during the pwhex generating process - something I did myself. However, RHS isn't too worried about this item because it has a primary "house rule" - which says - if it isn't realistic - don't do it. We expect players to engage in self restraint - and that really works well most of the time. There will always be ways to work the technicalities - and we don't attempt to prevent them all.



BigDuke66 -> RE: RHS Design Theory: Scenario 105 Japanese Bomber Logic (5/24/2012 7:33:20 AM)

Thanks for the answer, the complete RHS series sounds very impressive, looking forward to get my hands on it.[&o]



el cid again -> RE: RHS Design Theory: RCAF Plane Art (REVISED) (5/30/2012 6:29:45 AM)

This material reposted after significant updating at the end of the thread.



el cid again -> RE: RHS Design Theory: RNZAF Plane Art (REVISED) (5/30/2012 10:13:56 AM)

This material reposted after significant updating at the end of the thread.



el cid again -> RE: RHS Design Theory: USAAF Plane Art (REVISED) (5/31/2012 8:26:22 AM)

Moved to end, should be page 11, after addition of ECM fitted aircraft



el cid again -> RE: RHS Design Theory: Plane List 1 Slot Order (REVISED) (5/31/2012 8:34:35 AM)

Moved to end, should be page 9, after addition of ECM fitted aircraft.



el cid again -> RE: RHS Design Theory: Soviet Plane Art (REVISED) (5/31/2012 8:44:30 PM)

This material reposted after significant updating at the end of the thread.



el cid again -> RE: RHS Design Theory: Soviet Secret Experience Ratings!! (6/1/2012 1:49:27 AM)

Did you notice those ancient Russian biplanes eating up Japanese fighters?
Turns out it isn't because they have twice as many forward guns - which after all
remain rifle caliber. Rather it is because of a data trick put in either by a Russian
fan boy or on purpose to insure a 1945 offensive success. After all, in stock and in most mods the Russians are not active in 1941, so few get to see them in action.
In Test 4B Big Red was so impressed he said Russia should consider going to war - surely it would clean up - with those lopsided air combat results.

Well - there is a reason for the outcomes. Seems the Russians have better pilots than - well - anybody! Typical Russian air groups have ratings of 50, or 65, with several at 75. And the Russian default value - rarely used in stock because few units have 0 in the experience field - is right up there with the rest - same as USAAF for example. It is irritating - doubly so because correcting it is a tedious task multiplied by 5 when you manage 5 scenarios - and I want to stop development. But never mind - it is too big a problem to ignore. I regard every test, every game in stock or most mods (because most preserve the stock unit experience data and pilot ratings) as fatally flawed - it needs to be addressed. So I took the time, not merely to fix it, but to get a sense of what the data should be. And I was conservative in my ratings. Sure enough, the Russians often had high performance planes - but horrible loss ratios. There are exceptions - and over time - the experience ratings should go up. [Indeed they do - from 50 to 65 and 75. But those values are better than IJN, the most experienced and overtrained air force in the world in 1941.]

Since we have more than one scenario, and know if the Russians are active or passive in 1941, we also have the option to change the default value of pilots when the unit is set to zero. For the Russian passive scenarios - where players cannot control the training rate - I set the base value 50% higher than in the Russian active scenarios. But even so, it is lower than in stock. And never mind my ratings are 20 or 30 - they are probably high. I suspect the base should be 15 for a stock like Russian passive scenario - to get something close to the historical performance. But is it wiser to avoid extreme changes and see how things work. For units appearing in 1945, where stock rates them uniformly at 65 (unless 75) - I decided a drop of 20 points to 45 was a good first pass approximation. It too is probably too high - but 45 insures a good performance by a unit - and by 1945 there are a lot of veterans in the Red Air Force - and by the offensive in summer - no longer Germans to fight. It is right up there with other Allied air forces. For the five cases of 75 - every one a DC-3 unit - I rated them at 50 - higher still - in case there was some justification for those ratings being higher than the rest. [Note that two of those units are not transport units, but bombers. And the other three are offensive, armed transports with a top turret - used by airborne over enemy territory. Their ratings may be useful. In RHS the Soviets have four different kinds of DC-3 derived designs - including a regular transport (more cargo and range, no guns), an armed transport, a long range recon plane, and a bomber).]




el cid again -> RE: RHS Design Theory: USN, USMC, FF & RTAF vs Art (REVISED) (6/1/2012 7:21:09 PM)

Moved to end, should be about page 9, after addition of ECM aircraft



el cid again -> RE: RHS Design Theory: Atomic bombs and bombers (6/1/2012 11:32:22 PM)

I have a request for a Downfall Scenario. That will take a long time - even if I attempt it - but

I expect Series Six tests may last into the end game period - so why not set it up by looking at the wmd situation - at least in part?

Two players in other mods who reached 1945 report (a) atomic bombs didn't work at all or (b) they worked but did little damage to the target.

Another player - about to start test six A as Japan - wanted a Japanese atomic bomb option. He also wanted cw and bw. Now we have the Uji bw bomb already - and planes to deliver it - modeling Gen Ichii's Unit 731 Air Unit (JAAF refused to do his dirty work). But I am ignoring cw and bw on both sides otherwise for now - pending a better sense of how Uji works. The US and UK had substantial cw capability, and the US Army intended to use it on Japan for Olympic and Coronet (along with no less than 12 atom bombs).

I think we can devise atomic bombs that are not atomic bombs in code terms. If the existing atomic bomb code is problematical - and not very effective even when it works - then it may be regular bombs will produce a reliable solution which, even if not as great in impact on everything in a target hex as a real atom bomb - at least are real nasty things. I think we can better model the real weapons and bombers than has been done by stock - significantly so.

Another problem is that only 12 B-29s were made of the peculiar "Silverplate" version for atomic weapons and these had three different loadouts. Yet the 393rd Bomb Squadron has a strength of 15 machines. So I decided to revise its size to 12 - and to create two detachments - such that you get all three weapons loads. These include:

B-29B Superfort UB = Uranium Bomb for Little Boy in the "main" squadron - with a strength of 2 of 12 planes

B-29B Superfort IB = Implosion Bomb for Fat Man in the 1st detachment - with a strength of 4 of 4 planes

B-29B Superfort PB = Pumpkin Bomb for the conventional HE form of Fat Man in the 2nd detachment - with a strength of 6 of 6 planes.

The three variants produce at a rate of 1 UB, 2 IB and 3 PB per month from May, 1945 (when Silverplane planes began to be delivered). The weapons for them produce at a rate of 1 UB (from July), 2 IB (from August) and 10 PB (from June).

These weapons weight 9,000 pounds (for UB) or 10,000 pounds (for IB and PB). Precise values are classified - but these are close and far better than the 20,000 pounds of stock. These bombers can fly with that load to what is normally extended range - so I redefined that as normal range - and gave them a much greater range with no bomb - for recon missions. All three planes are unarmed in defensive terms - because all Silverplate bombers had no guns.

For weapons values - I used a variation of the RHS device definitions. I classified the Pumpkin Bomb as having the effect of a 6300 pound HE bomb - since it is filled with 6300 pounds of explosives - the rest of the weight being intended to simulate the Fat Man. In RHS that is a fairly impressive bomb in its own right - but nothing like an atom bomb. The soft effect is square root of 6300 times four (317) - the same function we use for other HE bombs. Accuracy is 10 - an RHS convention for conventional bombs (which do not vary much in hit probability - never mind the impression you might get from stock data). Penetration and anti-armor value is 58 - this isn't an anti-armor weapon and it is assumed to do its damage by blast at some distance from an actual hard target.

The "atom bombs" are different. They have accuracy = 99 (up from 90 for stock) - it isn't that hard to hit with an atom bomb! They have a dud rate of 10% for uranium bombs (less complex, we felt it did not need testing) and 20% for plutonium bombs (more complex, we felt it needed testing). They have values

US IB anti soft 6481 anti-armor 648 dud rate 20 production 2 from 8/45 weight 10000
Jap UB anti soft 4472 anti-armor 447 dud rate 10 production 1 from 8/45 weight 9000
US UB anti soft 5196 anti-armor 520 dud rate 10 production 1 from 7/45 weight 9000

The anti-soft value is square root of estimated yield in tons times 2000 - to put it on the standard RHS scale for HE. The anti-armor value is 10% of the anti-soft value. Effect = anti-soft value for atom bombs.

A special version of the G8N can carry the Japanese bomb - provided of course it actually is produced. The US is guaranteed to get the silverplate B-29s - it is hard wired. Japan isn't guaranteed to get G8Ns - it depends on development - availability of engines - and actual production by an aircraft factory - all of which might fail.

Another dimension of the matter is political and code. I defined the US Uranium Bomb in the existing atomic bomb slot. I left the 393rd Bomb Squadron in its slot (merely attaching planes to it in detachments 1 and 2 - resizing it to 12 planes - and assigning it the B-29B Superfort UB). This results in the peculiar situation that the main "squadron" has only 2 planes at full strength, but its detachments are both larger - at 4 and 6 respectively. The detachments get bombs defined in the additional air devices range - and with no special relationship to code. The UB production rate of 1 is identical to the stock atom bomb. IF stock bombs work - THEN the 393rd BS will work as defined by the manual - and ALSO you will get political penalties for their use. But use of Implosion bombs - or Japanese Uranium bombs - will NOT have any political effects. This is in part so we can test the existing code system - to see how often games have a situation as reported - no atom bomb actually worked? We might move the US uranium bomb somewhere else if it doesn't work at all. But with the US implosion bomb there is a hedge - we have another device that may work - sort of as IRL - more than one technology on the table.



BigDuke66 -> RE: RHS Design Theory: Atomic bombs and bombers (6/2/2012 12:06:41 AM)

Sounds good but regarding the Japanese A-bomb I wonder how realistic that is even if the war would go into 1946.

I recommend to ask michealm about details of how the code for the A-bombs work, maybe with luck it's only a matter of setting the right values instead of fixing(redoing) the code itself.



el cid again -> RE: RHS Design Theory: Atomic bombs and bombers (6/2/2012 12:07:51 AM)

FYI there is fairly compelling evidence (albiet politically incorrect evidence strongly opposed by many, and officially repressed in Japan) that Japan had a fully developed uranium gun bomb. The design was described by three Manhattan Project scientists as "just like ours" - not too surprising given that Japan had successfully penetrated the University of California and Los Alamos - and likely had most of the information needed. Since Japan didn't have a source of plutonium, it didn't attempt a plutonium gun (like we did - Tall Man was our design; and like Germany did - its design surfaced in 2010; neither could work properly - but likely would have fizzled - yielding about 54 tons - which isn't nothing). There is less compelling but substantial evidence for a Japanese test (not dropped by bomber) in August, 1945 - from US Army intelligence. [However, the tested device either was a fizzile or not an atom bomb per se - the yield was small - so it might have been a radiological bomb. Japanese radiological bombs were discovered in 1950 in Korea by US Marines - and documentation supporting their design has surfaced since. RW bombs are more like bw or cw weapons - suffering from the same limitations - to which add they are radioactive - go figure! - and hurt people and things stored near them - so don't keep well once charged] Circumstantial evidence such weapons were contemplated exists in bomber programs to deliver them - notably the G8N - the G10N and the Ki-91. Finally - there is strong evidence for a working Japanese reactor project at Konan (Hungnam) Korea - compelling really insofar as it was operated by the Russians until 1948. It was associated with research for a propulsion plant and used as well to generate rw materials for rw bomb research - at least by the Russians - and probably by Japan. It was NOT used to make plutonium for bombs. The Japanese ONLY worked with uranium bomb designs - which are far simpler. The final evidence is in the form of briefings to the PM of Japan at every stage of US bomb development: the briefs were always timely and accurate. Seems it wasn't just the Russians who penetrated the Manhattan Project. [Germany had less success, but some. It got into Oak Ridge and got information related to uranium research and plans for a small heavy water plant.] In the 1990s I worked with authors and academics on both Axis atomic research projects. Unlike in the US - they failed to unify their research. Even so - the Japanese research was amazing - a kind of race we didn't know we were in - until 1945 - when a surrendered German submarine with cargo for Japan related to atomic research caused Gen Groves to realize they were in the game. The Japanese took a simpler road and their actual bomb design - at least its blueprints - was significantly more weaponized than Little Boy. That is, it was simpler, and possibly more reliable. [Uranium bombs are all pretty reliable - so that may not be a meaningful statement; the timing problems are far less severe - and the geometry problems vastly less - than with an implosion device. It was known that timing was a problem with the IB - so we didn't cut down the AA gun inside - trying to get more acceleration = higher speed = faster assembly. But it wasn't fast enough. The full sized gun meant a longer bomb - hence Tall Boy. The German idea was similar - but flawed in other ways - and may have lacked an initiator - so the yield might have been much lower even if it didn't fizzile. An initiator insures the first generation is more than one or two neutrons; you only get so many generations of chain reaction, so the bigger you start - the bigger the final yield is] Japan had five different atomic research programs at different points. The first one pre dates the US Manhattan Project, although not USN Uranium research - and had the same goal as USN: a propulsion plant. The formal Navy Park meeting findings - which are published in many places including The Making of the Atomic Bomb - called for a plant to run "factories" or "battleships."




el cid again -> RE: RHS Design Theory: Atomic bombs and bombers (6/2/2012 12:20:13 AM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: BigDuke66

Sounds good but regarding the Japanese A-bomb I wonder how realistic that is even if the war would go into 1946.

I recommend to ask michealm about details of how the code for the A-bombs work, maybe with luck it's only a matter of setting the right values instead of fixing(redoing) the code itself.



The reason atomic bombs were "realistic" at all was the strategic blunder (taken from Liddle Hart) that unconditional surrender was the only option. Every administration that came to power after Tojo fell had as its PRIMARY objective to end the war. Japan would have settled for (a) keeping the emperor (which in fact was allowed anyway but we refused to consider it as a condition) and (b) it could keep Korea and Formosa to permit growing enough food to feed itself. [In the event, Japan was forced to starve from 1946 to 1948 - when Cold War politics changed our attitude. Saburo Sakai's wife died of starvation in that period.] As Michael Walzer (an army captain in 1945 on a ship standing up for Olympic) writes in Just and Unjust Wars, it is unreasonable to say we had to invade Japan or use atom bombs. The US Strategic Bombing Survey concluded the war must have ended without either and by November 1945. An academic I know who spent decades on the subject says "the report reached the right conclusion, possibly for the wrong reasons" - so the outcome was not really in doubt. Once the USSR entered the war, Japan could no longer import coal, iron ore, copper or oil from Manchuria - and its economic foundation was completely destroyed. The US mine and submarine campaign had probably, alone, decisively rendered the economy unsustainable even before that. The ONLY thing preventing an end of the war was the policy of unconditional surrender - derided by serious military historians as unwise policy - although it is a US tradition since Grant.

But I assume you mean "realistic" in a technical sense. It depends on things we cannot know about the game world. IF Japan is viable, it is realistic. This is why I made Japanese bombs dependent on bombers to be used. You must have bomber factories, engine factories, and HI plants ALL working - and the first two specific plants - or there will never be a bomber to deliver the bomb. IRL the G8N1 was not made - its factory destroyed early in 1945. Do that in a game - and the Japanese won't get to deliver the bomb. To be safe - do a Curtiss LeMay thing - kill all Japanese urban areas that might have plants assigned to build the plane! But some games reach 1945 with tens of thousands of Japanese planes and all cities producing full tilt. In such a situation, Japan could make the plane - and deliver the bomb.

A gun type bomb is awfully simple. Any technician is up to it - if he knows the theory - and if he can get U-235 enriched to somethign above 20%.
Pretty big if's for 1945. In theory Japan was better off than Germany - and knew it was in the war. It also was "picking the brains" of most of the rest of the great scientists by reading our documents at Los Alamos. [The Los Alamos Primer, alone, given to every new arrival at Los Alamos, would have been enough.] But fuel - that was a big problem. East Asia is urnaium poor - particularly then. Uranium is common but in that era most uranium was used for pigments in making ceramics - at least in China - which had the only urnaium refinery - at Shanghai. Japan built another in Korea. There was not a single pitch blende mind anywhere - until Japan built one - also in Korea - just in time for the war to end. Japan was so desperate it imported thousands of tons of minerals from Malaya with just 0.2 % natural uranium content - the only time that mineral has ever been exported for its atomic content. Significantly it also had even more Thorium - and Japan saw Thorium - which turns into U-233 in a reactor - as a way to extend the fuel life of a reactor. Japan was energy poor - then as now - and blowing up scarce uranium was less attractive than using it for a long time - making power. So they sought ways to stretch the uranium supply - and devised what might be called a breeder reactor. Technically that is the wrong word - a breeder makes more fuel than it consumes. They sought to merely balance consumption and production to extend core life. The kind of cores they used would not last very long - perhaps 30 months - so extending the life really mattered. They didn't need to enrich to make a reactor: they used heavy water so natural uranium could be the fuel. The biggest heavy water plant in the world was not at Oak Ridge (which had a small one, and was working on a somewhat larger one) nor in Norway - but in Korea. And it dated from the 1930s - Japan had a great deal of heavy water - because one industrialist - Nagouchi - forsaw it would make him rich. Put thorium in the reactor and, as it burns U-235, it makes U-233. Nice theory. But it doesn't get you an atom bomb. They never considered reprocessing the fuel for plutonium - also made as it burned and also replacing some of the U-235 - they just saw the plutonium as another way to extend core life. And their reactor (Type 2 = 1942 Special Steam Boiler) had no provision to put in rods just to make plutonium - as was the case at Hanford. It was small - so it could go to sea - a prototype for a seagoing reactor. They also could not make the kind of very pure graphite needed for a reactor like those at Hanford. And noone outside Germany thought of using dry ice - which is cheaper than heavy water and gets you to a reactor with natural uranium unenriched. The solution is simple - engineering wise. A gun type bomb is pretty easy - but you simply MUST have enriched uranium. Over 60% is best - like it says in the primer - if you want a good yield. [Today we use 90% - except in submarine reactors which use higher than weapons grade uranium - for power density reasons. Subs use something like 95% enriched - so it says in open sources I can quote.] The problem with enriched uranium is two fold - you need a lot going in - and you need a lot of time to enrich it. So if there is a technical problem Japan could not solve - fuel is the one. But by 1946 - probably not so much. Assuming Japan has established and defended an autarky and its economy works.



BigDuke66 -> RE: RHS Design Theory: Atomic bombs and bombers (6/2/2012 12:24:21 AM)

Well sounds they were further than I thought, but still how close were they to fabricate a real working A-Bomb?
Especially in regard to the material needed, they request the material from Germany for a reason.
It should be considered to give the Japanese player an RW weapon instead a real A-bomb.



el cid again -> RE: RHS Design Theory: Atomic bombs and bombers (6/2/2012 12:43:17 AM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: BigDuke66

Well sounds they were further than I thought, but still how close were they to fabricate a real working A-Bomb?
Especially in regard to the material needed, they request the material from Germany for a reason.
It should be considered to give the Japanese player an RW weapon instead a real A-bomb.



See Japan's Secret War, by Robert K Wilcox - you want the Second Edition - which has much more material than the first -
and it is time for a third - enough new stuff has turned up to justify it. [I helped him with research on the second]
As I posted above, there is a possibility a bomb was actually tested early in August, 1945. I myself believe it may not
be an atomic bomb - but I know authors who think it was - and that is what the officer in charge of security for the test
said it was to US interrogators. He also witnessed the test. The test was on an island we cannot visit - it is in North Korea -
but if that changes - we can go there with instruments. A German test - one I thought unlikely to have happened - did
leave residual detectable radioactive material on Bornholm Island even though no one went there to measure it for over half
a century. It is possible I am as wrong about the Japanese test as I was about Bornholm. I told authors I was advising not
to write there was a real atom bomb test on Bornholm - as it was so unlikely. I was wrong.

The material from Germany - that is a subject. I spent a year writing The Controversial Cargo of U-234 - for a historian
writing about the ship (See Hitler's Last Mission to Japan). The author originally wanted to publishe my paper as an appendix,
but ran into a firestorm of opposition. I myself had help from a famous chemist from Oak Ridge, who was also my neighbor
in Anchorage, Alaska (he since has died), and who returned to Oak Ridge to examine records where the cargo was processed.
There is a theory (and he published it) that the material probably ended up in the Hiroshima bomb - but it is somewhat doubtful
any of it got far enough through enrichment for that to be true. In spite of that theory, the material - officially labeled uranium
oxide - was not bomb fuel as it was transported. It may have been radiological weapon material - since it was hot - and
since there may have been an intention Japan use rw bombs on US targets - for which Germany would not be held accountable
in the form of any sort of retaliation. I have a whole paper on the subject, in scholarly form, and I leave the conclusion to the
reader - offering several possibile interpretations.

The whole subject is really verboten in official circles. I think it is because of fears that terrorists might use rw - which are almost
low tech - if too much is known. US research is now declassified - but it was so well hidden that an academic failed to find it in
three decades of trying. [I found it at Bectel, a contractor in Las Vegas, which has custody - and which said I was the first to ask for
it.] But related wartime research is almost undocumented in the official histories: an academic I know found a letter in which Oppenheimer
describes to Groves a proposal by Fermi for rw weapons - in which he says it must be able to kill 100,000 or it isn't worth the effort.
Remarkable as that is about the effect of an atom bomb over a city - and indeed - your investment in radioactive fuel is more productive
invested in an atom bomb than in radiological bombs (if killing people can be said to be productive!). Researchers uniformly report
difficulty with access to records related to rw. But it was either the main focus, or a main focus, of Axis atomic research - and they got
closer to fielding rw than atom bombs - it appears. We considered it and rejected it as not able to kill as many people! But the problems
with rw relate to use as military weapons: they are almost ideal terror weapons. A terrorist does not need to inventory the weapon. A
terrorist may not care if his workers or deliverers get sick from radiation either. And fear of "invisible radiation" is a great way to instill
terror. In spite of that, repressing history is a bad idea. All the technical stuff you need to know can be found in any good library, if
you want to be a bad guy. And I don't think most bad guys use libraries. I studied one modern would be rw terrorist: there was never any
threat - he was so incompetent. I don't think he could read with understanding the material he would have needed to in order to succeed.
But even if he could, he never considered basic research in a library.



BigDuke66 -> RE: RHS Design Theory: Atomic bombs and bombers (6/2/2012 12:56:43 AM)

Thanks for all the info.
The basic approach "If you let them, they can have it" is quite reasonably, I like that as it is simply up to the Japanese player to do it or don't do it and up to the Allied player to allow it or not allow it.



anarchyintheuk -> RE: RHS Design Theory: Atomic bombs and bombers (6/2/2012 1:21:47 AM)

Interesting stuff on their intel of the US A bomb program.

The little that I've read about Sakai shows his first wife dying in 1954.



el cid again -> RE: RHS Design Theory: Atomic bombs and bombers (6/2/2012 1:52:05 AM)

I added Japanese bombers to the atomic program.

While B-29s are guaranteed to appear - hard wired as replacements - Japanese bombers are the opposite. You must have the right engine plant working, and the right plane factory working - and enough HI points to actually make a plane - or the bombs are useless in game terms. So the Japanese need to dedicate a plane factory to a type of plane that it can use very few of - and that factory, and its engine plant - must actually be able to produce.

But there are two types. The first - the G8N1 - appears (in atomic bomb form) from June, 1945. It is similar to the B-29 - almost stripped of defensive armament - all it retains is a tail gunner position. That permits better airflow - no turrets sticking out - and less weight - for guns and ammo. Like the B-29 silverplate, it has two loads - normal with bomb and extended without one. It carries a camera for use on recon missions - its secondary task. It is intended to fly in pairs - to make it more likely the bomb carrier will arrive - and to photograph the target before and just after the explosion - to get a sense of what was there - and where the bomb went off? But - unlike the B-29s - it only carries the bomb to normal range rather than the extended range of the conventional version. The extended range is longer than before - as when using that it is a recon plane vice a bomber. But its normal range remains as was. [A B-29 silverplate has a new normal range = to extended range of a conventional version while its new extended range is longer than the old one was: de facto radius for recon is 45% of transfer range while bomber radius is 28.5% of transfer range - the values in the fields being 90% and 57% because they will be divided by 2 by code.]

The second type is the Ki-91. It does not appear until October, 1945, at best. It is designed to be an atomic bomber - and so it flies fully armed - to its normal range - with an atomic bomb. At extended range, it carries three 800 kg bombs. The G8N1 carries a Uranium Bomb to 25 hexes. The Ki-91 carries a Uranium Bomb to 40 hexes.
All B-29 Silverplate versions carry their special bombload 36 hexes, for comparison.

For reference, the assumed yield of a US Uranium Bomb is 13.5 kt, a US Implosion Bomb is 21 kt, and a Japanese Uranium Bomb is 10 kt. Both US designs were for 20 kt, but the values used are the measured ones. Japan's design aimed at 10.



el cid again -> RE: RHS Design Theory: Atomic bombs and bombers (6/2/2012 1:55:25 AM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: anarchyintheuk

Interesting stuff on their intel of the US A bomb program.

The little that I've read about Sakai shows his first wife dying in 1954.



Well - his publisher admitted one thing in the biography was made up - a
story from 1945 about shooting down something - and said it was done
by staff to promote the book. Maybe they added or modified other things?



khyberbill -> RE: RHS Design Theory: Atomic bombs and bombers (6/3/2012 1:35:06 AM)

quote:

The design was described by three Manhattan Project scientists as "just like ours" -

Their names please and the published source of this information.



el cid again -> RE: RHS Design Theory: JNAF Aircraft/Art (REVISED) (6/3/2012 12:24:01 PM)

See Page 11



el cid again -> RE: RHS Design Theory: Axis Bitmap Order (REVISED) (6/3/2012 12:25:26 PM)

This material reposted after significant updating at the end of the thread.



el cid again -> RE: RHS Design Theory: Atomic bombs and bombers (6/3/2012 12:28:35 PM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: khyberbill

quote:

The design was described by three Manhattan Project scientists as "just like ours" -

Their names please and the published source of this information.


See Japan's Secret War by Robert K Wilcox
I recommend the Second Edition
ISBN 1-56924-815-X



khyberbill -> RE: RHS Design Theory: Atomic bombs and bombers (6/3/2012 3:22:39 PM)

Are the scientists named in this book?



treespider -> RE: RHS Design Theory: Atomic bombs and bombers (6/3/2012 3:38:59 PM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: khyberbill

Are the scientists named in this book?



Wilcox's book is based on a journalists interview with an unnamed Japanese counterintelligence agent.[8|]



khyberbill -> RE: RHS Design Theory: Atomic bombs and bombers (6/3/2012 4:53:26 PM)

That sort means it is not very credible.



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