RE: RHS Design Theory: Atomic bombs and bombers

RE: RHS Design Theory: Atomic bombs and bombers (Full Version)

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bigred -> RE: RHS Design Theory: Atomic bombs and bombers (6/6/2012 2:51:50 AM)
quote: ORIGINAL: khyberbill That sort means it is not very credible. hi, kyber, have you designed a mod. I have noted another AE mod that as modified history to say the japs got a better deal in the WNT when everyone knows the japs were wire tapped. My POV is a mod designer can do what ever they want. Please tell me, What do u have as a mod for our review and entertainment?

khyberbill -> RE: RHS Design Theory: Atomic bombs and bombers (6/6/2012 3:01:03 AM)
I am not contesting his mod, I am contesting his sources. He can put Klingon Birds of Prey in his mod if it pleases him. He quoted three Manhattan Project scientists, and I asked for their names. I am still waiting for the names.

el cid again -> RE: RHS Design Theory: Atomic bombs and bombers (6/6/2012 10:13:09 AM)
quote: ORIGINAL: khyberbill I am not contesting his mod, I am contesting his sources. He can put Klingon Birds of Prey in his mod if it pleases him. He quoted three Manhattan Project scientists, and I asked for their names. I am still waiting for the names. You have a long wait. Even an official summary of what is said often is sanitized of numbers and of names. And in this case the source is a general officer who was in charge of the investigation at the time - not the sort of person who is likely to falsify what was learned. But also not the sort of person to break the rules - even when speaking on the record for publication. I will only refer you to open source material and/or its author in any matter. You may elect to credit quoted serving US military officers who happen to be formally involved with the matter - or you may discredit what they say - on the record - knowing it is for publication. I choose to believe such statements unless there is compelling evidence, or at least a credible motive, to disbelieve them. I was asked to create this capability by a tester. I decided there is enough merit to include it and I explained why? I also decided that the Japanese should not have a guaranteed shot at such a weapon - and that any game which proceeds close to history sould prevent its use. Further - the cost should be very high - meaning at the price of other things that would be probably more useful. So I created special planes - needing a dedicated factory - and powerful engines. Neither will produce unless there are enough HI points and supply points in the right hexes. And if they do not - the bomb cannot be used. Allied raids on factories, and Allied use of mine and submarine and air warfare to cut off imports, will - independent of each other - prevent this option from occuring. In a logistical oriented mod - with major resource centers in Japan not present - the Japanese simply must import what they need or industry won't produce. Even a player of the mod who does not want to do so need never produce the planes required. I have biological warfare Uji bombs in the game - but I do not use them myself - on moral and practical military grounds. They are there if a player wants to do what Gen Ichii did - with the nearest we have to the kind of planes he used to do it. I create options - and do not tell players which to implement. I was willing to give this player -and any others who follow - this option. I made it hard to do even if they want to because I think that is justified - while the US is guaranteed to get both kinds of bombs. I corrected bomb weight so the B-29 isn't so range limited - neither kind weighs 20,000 pounds as it says in stock data. I corrected the B-29s so they were unarmed - all the atomic bombers were unarmed. Time will tell if these devices or planes even work? It is a case of experimenting - and documenting the experiment. I do not require you believe what there is on the record in these matters. I do not like the facct that these matters are not fully disclosed - which they should be once 30 years has passed -by law. But I do note that official statements made in summary usually are confirmed later when more is released. Still - what you believe is your choice.

treespider -> RE: RHS Design Theory: Atomic bombs and bombers (6/6/2012 1:52:24 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: el cid again quote: ORIGINAL: khyberbill I am not contesting his mod, I am contesting his sources. He can put Klingon Birds of Prey in his mod if it pleases him. He quoted three Manhattan Project scientists, and I asked for their names. I am still waiting for the names. You have a long wait. Even an official summary of what is said often is sanitized of numbers and of names. And in this case the source is a general officer who was in charge of the investigation at the time - not the sort of person who is likely to falsify what was learned. But also not the sort of person to break the rules - even when speaking on the record for publication. I will only refer you to open source material and/or its author in any matter. You may elect to credit quoted serving US military officers who happen to be formally involved with the matter - or you may discredit what they say - on the record - knowing it is for publication. I choose to believe such statements unless there is compelling evidence, or at least a credible motive, to disbelieve them. I was asked to create this capability by a tester. I decided there is enough merit to include it and I explained why? I also decided that the Japanese should not have a guaranteed shot at such a weapon - and that any game which proceeds close to history sould prevent its use. Further - the cost should be very high - meaning at the price of other things that would be probably more useful. So I created special planes - needing a dedicated factory - and powerful engines. Neither will produce unless there are enough HI points and supply points in the right hexes. And if they do not - the bomb cannot be used. Allied raids on factories, and Allied use of mine and submarine and air warfare to cut off imports, will - independent of each other - prevent this option from occuring. In a logistical oriented mod - with major resource centers in Japan not present - the Japanese simply must import what they need or industry won't produce. Even a player of the mod who does not want to do so need never produce the planes required. I have biological warfare Uji bombs in the game - but I do not use them myself - on moral and practical military grounds. They are there if a player wants to do what Gen Ichii did - with the nearest we have to the kind of planes he used to do it. I create options - and do not tell players which to implement. I was willing to give this player -and any others who follow - this option. I made it hard to do even if they want to because I think that is justified - while the US is guaranteed to get both kinds of bombs. I corrected bomb weight so the B-29 isn't so range limited - neither kind weighs 20,000 pounds as it says in stock data. I corrected the B-29s so they were unarmed - all the atomic bombers were unarmed. Time will tell if these devices or planes even work? It is a case of experimenting - and documenting the experiment. I do not require you believe what there is on the record in these matters. I do not like the facct that these matters are not fully disclosed - which they should be once 30 years has passed -by law. But I do note that official statements made in summary usually are confirmed later when more is released. Still - what you believe is your choice. In other words - No, he cannot produce the names. In regards to Cid's source - Wilcox's book - quote: H-JAPAN May 21, 2005 The book (Japan's Secret War) cites US National Archive sources, but simply as "NARA," as I recall, with no identifying file numbers, making the notes completely useless. Shortly after the hardcover edition came out I asked the legendary John Taylor, chief of Modern Military at the Archives, and one of the great resources in the field, what he knew of this. He said that if I came across any material like it in my own research ( I was looking at OSS X-2 (counterintelligence) in China and Japanese Intelligence at the time), would I please bring it to his attention, as "nobody's been able to find any of his sources." That was in 1990; and so far as I know, that is still the situation. You can contact John Taylor at NARA for an update, but I don't think anything has changed. If you have access to JSTOR, the absence of any review would be revealing. My own campus' connection is down at the moment; as soon as it's restored I'll check it. Henry Sirotin Hunter College/C.W. Post quote: H-JAPAN May 25, 2005 (1) From: "wgrund@bgnet.bgsu.edu" <wgrund@bgnet.bgsu.edu> Here we go again. I recall about ten years ago when Wilcox's book was reprinted that a round of similar inquiries was floated on H-Japan. I had just returned from a trip to DC where I was doing research for my dissertation on this subject. This is a story that just won't die. The bibliography in Wilcox's second edition provides a pretty good map for primary and secondary sources in English on the subject. I was able to find just about all the sources he used, with only a few exceptions. To the best of my recollection, Wilcox never actually states that Japan succeeded in building and testing a nuclear weapon, but he strongly implies that they did. After considerable research on the subject, both in the US and Japan, I am firmly convinced that the Japanese did NOT succeed in testing (or even building) a nuclear weapon. The Hungnam story likely began when David Snell, a reporter for the Atlanta Constitution, wrote of his encounter with a Japanese COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE officer after the war, who alleged that Japanese scientists had tested a nuclear weapon off the eastern coast of Korea. Wilcox rediscovered this article many years ago when researching this subject. Apparently, however, he did not see Snell's follow up article, where he all but retracted this story. Nonetheless, Wilcox otherwise got a lot of the story correct, that Japanese scientists were involved in nuclear research during the war. Both the army and navy had comparatively small projects. But Wilcox also neglected to include or account for much of the evidence that would suggest that Japan DID NOT develop a nuclear weapon. This is where his book, as work of professional scholarship and history, flies off the rails. (And not because he isn't tenured somewhere.) Furthermore, he introduces material referring to the atrocities of Unit 731, and the postwar cover-up, and by inference, suggests that facts about Japan's nuclear research were similarly suppressed. This is clearly not the case. Japanese scientists and others began to publish articles about their wartime nuclear research activity as soon as the US occupation ended. (The Japanese media had been prevented from publishing anything about nuclear weapons and research, both US and Japanese, by US occupation officials.) If you care to do the research, you can find references to wartime nuclear research in Japan by scientists, military officials, and historians (in Japanese) from as early as 1946. But because Wilcox, and others, did not know of these sources, it was as good as a conspiracy of silence. I suspect we are seeing another round of interest in this subject because we will be commemorating the 60th anniversary of the nuclear attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki this year. We are certain to see interest in this story emerge again in another ten years, fifteen, and I suspect, in 2045. And so it goes� As for Derek Price, he passed away several years ago. On the other hand, I am happy to report that Eri Yagi is still very much alive and enjoying her retirement teaching ballroom dancing (to the disabled no less!) For reviews of the Wilcox book, I recommend the following: John Dower's Review of Robert Wilcox, Japan's Secret War, in Bulletin of Atomic Scientists 43 (Aug.-Sept. 1986), 61-62; and Morris F. Low's, Japan's Secret War? 'Instant' Scientific Manpower and Japan's World War II Atomic Bomb Project, Annals of Science 47 (1990), 347-360. On the Hungnam story, see Walter E. Grunden, Hungnam and the Japanese Atomic Bomb: Recent Historiography of a Postwar Myth,�Intelligence and National Security 13 (1998), 32-60. For a brief, but accurate and scholarly account of Japan's wartime nuclear research, John Dower's NI and F: Japan�s Wartime Atomic Bomb Research, in Japan in War and Peace: Selected Essays (New York: New Press, 1993), 55-100, is a good place to start. For a more detailed account, see the chapters on science mobilization and nuclear research in Walter E. Grunden, Secret Weapons & World War II: Japan in the Shadow of Big Science (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2005), now available. Also, watch for a follow-up article in Historia Scientiarum, co-authored by Masakatsu Yamazaki, Keiko-Nagase Reimer, and Walter E. Grunden on this subject. For a direct comparison of German and Japanese wartime nuclear research efforts, see the article by Mark Walker, Masakatsu Yamazaki, and Walter Grunden in the forthcoming issue of OSIRIS, available in July 2005. Japanese scholars, such as Masakatsu Yamazaki and Yutaka Kawamura, have been even busier researching and publishing on this subject, especially from a more internalist perspective. For selected publications, see the bibliography in my aforementioned monograph. A documentary on Japan's wartime nuclear research is under production by the History Channel and is scheduled for broadcast this summer. I hope this overly long missive helps to clear up some confusion. Most Sincerely, Walter E. Grunden Department of History Bowling Green State University

khyberbill -> RE: RHS Design Theory: Atomic bombs and bombers (6/6/2012 7:57:09 PM)
Thanks Treespider. Manhattan Project scientists tended to be rather loquacious so I equate no names as no credibility. Slightly off topic but is Calhouns still going strong in Knoxville? I miss that place and used to do some damage there on Thursday nights when they had an "all you can eat ribs" night.

el cid again -> RE: RHS Design Theory: Atomic bombs and bombers (6/8/2012 12:46:07 AM)
quote: For a brief, but accurate and scholarly account of Japan's wartime nuclear research, John Dower's NI and F: Japan�s Wartime Atomic Bomb Research, in Japan in War and Peace: Selected Essays (New York: New Press, 1993), 55-100, is a good place to start. I actually use Dower as a source - since he establishes beyond doubt there there was some atomic research in Japan - and since he admits a lot of records were destroyed. But Dower is a Japanese apologist who takes a very minimalist position in re that research. This has two roots: (1) scholarly - the position that if you don't have a good original source to cite, nothing is ever credible; and (2) that Japan was a victim of atomic attacks whose hands were (almost) completely clean in that it never was seriously in the game. And clearly Japan didn't drop atom bombs on San Francisco and Seattle (or any similar combination) - so in the crudest sense - it is true Japan wasn't in the game all the way to operational delivery of atomic bombs during the war. But that misses the moral point. IF Japanese scientists with official funding were trying to build atomic bombs, radiological bombs or hydrogen bombs, THEN what happened is on the same playing field. If I am not a defender of the decision to use atomic bombs on cities, nevertheless I do not think their development was unreasonable, nor that their use (for example, on the target long planned for, the major fleet base at Truk) on a military target would be illegal. There was good reason to believe Germany was involved in research, and we knew it had a thousand tons of high grade ore (from Shinklobwe) and a potential of more from a mine in Europe. Knowing the details of such research was not something we could expect to do with precision. Never mind what I think about how they were used - the position of the left that use vs Japan was wrong because they were not a threat in kind is nonsense. Japan was the first nation in history to achieve technical overkill potential (the ability to kill the entire human population of the world with a wmd IF it could be uniformly delivered). [No real overkill exists in my technical opinion - you can never deliver it everywhere to everyone. But 16 tons of anthrax spores were enough to kill everyone in the world in theory.] Japan had serious cw programs in both Army and Navy. And both services planned for aircraft delivery of both radiological and atom bombs in the medium term (ideally by 1945, but in any case within a couple of years of that) - designing bombers for that mission. How far they got is details. They were in the game. As for what the details are, there are severe limits on what we can know, and even more severe limits on what we can say. Part of the problem is our expectations: a US Navy captain serving with the USSBS, who lived in retirement near me when I was in Tacoma, said that several IJN officers told him about atomic research but "at the time, I didn't believe them, which I now believe was a mistake." But Gen Groves was different - HE thought there at least might be enough to warrant sending a team to check out the evidence. Unfortunately for us, they could only go where we had control - so they report well on activities in Japan - but not at all about those in Korea. Even so, we found things rarely reported that are impressive: In the present day the preferred method for uranium separation is to use a centrafuge. The designs in most programs today are based on a German development from WWII. Yet we captured three times as many centrafuges in Japan as we did in Germany, and the Japanese design was actually better - in at least one way (air suspension vice bearings = less resistence and wear, greater efficiency). All the literatue about the failed gaseous diffusion plant don't change that, like us, there were other, parallel lines of development, and not all were failures. We too thought of centrafuges, but doubted our technical ability to make them - both Japan and Germany never doubted and succeeded. I have engaged in correspondance with Wilcox for the last three days. He has agreed to both adding citiations and images of documents in the Third Edition of Japan's Secret War. If all knowledge was bounded by what has already been documented and published, no new material could ever be written. Authors and researchers need to have a more open minded approach than to reject everything not already "proven" to scholarly standards. What people say in interviews, and what documents and physical evidence indicate all count. Over time, generally more and more material is added. Significant fractions of that are functions of what is allowed to be released: that is, there is more that someone has decided to hold conficential. Sometimes for personal or political reasons: Dr Nishina's daughter was ashamed when she learned her father had engaged in atomic research, saying "father, how could you?" I think there is a formal Allied concern about disclusure of technical materials related to "low tech" atomic weapons - radiological bombs - and generation of atom bomb fuel without elaborate physical separation problems. I know four different authors who identified materials of interest, and McGeorge Bundy records in the introduction of Danger and Survival - that there is official interference with producing the materials - even when there is Presidential authorization. The whole story has not come out. But enough has come out that it is possible to say there was an atomic arms race almost from the day fission was discovered. The Day Man Lost reveals much of the early steps of the Japanese program - at the same time describing parallel efforts in the Manhattan Project. The critical thing preventing development of anything is the decision to try. However small the chances were of successful operational deployment during the war, they were non zero. And no one knew how long it would take, or how long the war might last? It is entirely reasonable in a game world, with different priorities, to consider the possibility of opertaional weapons in the 1945-6 time frame - by either side. This is ALL I have tried to say is implied by what we know. Japan tried. Its theoritical physics was better than in Germany and in some ways better than ours: they calculated 2% enrichment is all you need to make a light water reactor (we had to make measurements to find out); one of their physicists concieved of fusion before any of ours did - that kind of thing. But I do not propose to debate this matter any longer. This is a game mod design thread. It explains the rationale. When asked for sources, I gave what there is. If you want more - wait. I don't know how much will come out in the long run, but I know more is going to come out. And believe what you wish. Surely we no longer can sleep better because potential enemies don't have atomic weapons! Does it matter if that was the case in WWII?

el cid again -> RE: RHS Design Theory: JAAF & RTAF Art (REVISED) (6/8/2012 12:49:46 AM)
This material reposted after significant updating at the end of the thread.

el cid again -> RE: RHS Design Theory: Updated Aircraft Cross References (6/13/2012 12:18:29 PM)
After a comprehensive review, the documentation supporting RHS aircraft pointers related to air art have been updated. So have the aircraft files, in order to better exploit the existing filmstrips. But the main function of these lists is to permit understanding of what we can do better. Mifune will shortly issue revised filmstrips that address the issues identified in the notes on these documents. The documents also include identification of air art not used by RHS but which is in the RHS filmstrips - in case anyone wanted to use it.

el cid again -> RE: RHS Design Theory: Amsterdam Island - the Axis Entry Point (6/16/2012 7:22:07 PM)
In the SW map corner, at hex location 6, 173, is a dot location called Amsterdam Island. It is a real geographical location in approximately its correct position on the map (map edge projection distortion makes it difficult to be certain precisely where it should be?). IRL this place is administered by France, but it is uninhabited. A volcanic cone, it is unsuitable for use as an airfield or as a port. The only attempt at an economic use in history (raising cattle on the narrow coastal strip) failed. In RHS, Amsterdam Island is shown as IJA and is defined as the Axis Entry Point. It is used for German raiders (Thor starts there) and submarines (these appear later in the game, along with another raider). This is done so the Germans must transit the Indian Ocean to reach any friendly port - and not (at least at this time) - as a proper Axis base for any Axis ships or submarines. [I would like to have an Axis export point. Until I figure out how to have one, transport submarines and German surface blockade runners have no place to export to - and the German and Italian subs used to that end are generally not in the game. The German blockade runners are restricted to the Far East - where they did run cargoes locally.] There are unusual House Rules related to Amsterdam Island. Neither side may use the location as a base, nor put ground units on the island. Lacking engineers, this de facto prevents construction of port or airfield facilities, or fortifications. To which add that such construction is itself forbidden. It is ONLY the Axis Entry Point. Its only other theoretical function is that Axis (only) ships or submarines might use it to "enter port" (at the level 0 port with no supplies or naval support) to repair damage. And of course tenders or tankers or repair ships might service a ship present in the hex. [This simulates German use of places like this, but more often Kerguelin Island, which is apparently South of our map, to perform such tasks] Due to location, it is unlikely this function will be germane to most games. The other special House Rule is that the Allies may not "stake out" the island. That is, since it is the only Axis Entry Point, and since all German reinforcements must use it to enter the map (at known dates), it is unfair to station a task force or ship or submarine there - or close enough for aircraft from ships - to intercept them. Since the Allies have a map edge zone immediately to the west permitting ships exiting the map to move to off map locations (e.g. Capetown), the restriction is minimized: Allied ships (and submarines) may not enter hex 6,173; Allied ships (or subs) with a reaction range greater than 0 may not enter any hex within that number of hexes plus one of hex 6,173; Allied ships with aircraft set for flight operations may not enter any hex within range of hex 6,173 (defined as the range setting of the air unit conducting flight operations plus one). Basically the Allies may transit the area (without entering the hex or being able to react to (or air detect or air attack) any Axis naval unit in hex 6,173 or any hex adjacent to it. Placing naval units so they would cover hexes two or more hexes from 6,173, while not a technical violation of the rule, is "gamey" behavior violating the spirit of the rule. It is not defined as forbidden as a favor to the Allies to minimize the restricted area - mainly to facilitate transits in unforseeable situations to the off map locations. But it isn't intended to have lots of units hang out down there to hunt down enemy units entering the map. Which is not to say patrols in the general area are forbidden. Player discretion is required to make the game work reasonably well. Creating many Axis Entry Points is considered inferior to trusting player good judgement.

LargeSlowTarget -> RE: RHS Design Theory: Amsterdam Island - the Axis Entry Point (6/18/2012 6:43:36 AM)
Funny, in my personal mod I have included a similar concept. My "Occupied Europe" base is in the SE corner of the map, so the player face the historic choice of sending the Axis ships through the Central Pacific (simulates the Cape Horn route, risking interception when crossing the US-ANZAC "life line") or via the NEI and then hugging the southern border of the map all the way to the SE corner (this should simulate the travel time for crossing the IO and giving Cape Town a wide berth). The base is 0/0 size and receives a very moderate daily allottment of fuel plus has a very small light industry capacity to turn ressources shipped to "Europe" into supplies - it will take some time to cumulate a shipload of supplies (and fuel) which simulates the "off-map" movement time through the Atlantic and the port time in Europe. The Allies get a couple of Omaha class CLs at the Falklands for patrol duty in the vicinity of the "Occupied Europe" base. House rules state no base construction allowed and use of the Omahas only for "distant blockade" of the base. The base serves as entry point for German and Italian subs and blockade runners (I decided to make appear the AMCs Thor and Michel as TFs in the IO). An Allied ground unit is scheduled to appear at "Occupied Europe" in May 1945 to take over ownership.

Shark7 -> RE: RHS Design Theory: Amsterdam Island - the Axis Entry Point (6/18/2012 3:21:11 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: LargeSlowTarget Funny, in my personal mod I have included a similar concept. My "Occupied Europe" base is in the SE corner of the map, so the player face the historic choice of sending the Axis ships through the Central Pacific (simulates the Cape Horn route, risking interception when crossing the US-ANZAC "life line") or via the NEI and then hugging the southern border of the map all the way to the SE corner (this should simulate the travel time for crossing the IO and giving Cape Town a wide berth). The base is 0/0 size and receives a very moderate daily allottment of fuel plus has a very small light industry capacity to turn ressources shipped to "Europe" into supplies - it will take some time to cumulate a shipload of supplies (and fuel) which simulates the "off-map" movement time through the Atlantic and the port time in Europe. The Allies get a couple of Omaha class CLs at the Falklands for patrol duty in the vicinity of the "Occupied Europe" base. House rules state no base construction allowed and use of the Omahas only for "distant blockade" of the base. The base serves as entry point for German and Italian subs and blockade runners (I decided to make appear the AMCs Thor and Michel as TFs in the IO). An Allied ground unit is scheduled to appear at "Occupied Europe" in May 1945 to take over ownership. I did the exact same thing. Just as a place for the Monsun U-boats to enter at. Though I set the base up a bit differently so that boats that get damaged halfway can 'make the return trip' and repair.

JWE -> RE: RHS Design Theory: Amsterdam Island - the Axis Entry Point (6/18/2012 8:12:39 PM)
I am curious. You guys can't edit the zone and link files? I have been living in mod space for so long now, that I forget what's open for stock stuff.

treespider -> RE: RHS Design Theory: Amsterdam Island - the Axis Entry Point (6/18/2012 8:21:47 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: JWE I am curious. You guys can't edit the zone and link files? I have been living in mod space for so long now, that I forget what's open for stock stuff. IIRC the Japanese(Axis) side are prohibited from the Zones and links....so are off limits which forces the Germans to arrive at an on map site.

Shark7 -> RE: RHS Design Theory: Amsterdam Island - the Axis Entry Point (6/19/2012 4:29:29 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: treespider quote: ORIGINAL: JWE I am curious. You guys can't edit the zone and link files? I have been living in mod space for so long now, that I forget what's open for stock stuff. IIRC the Japanese(Axis) side are prohibited from the Zones and links....so are off limits which forces the Germans to arrive at an on map site. That sums it up. No off map movement for IJN, so our option is to use PWHexedit to edit the map data and put a small 'occupied europe' base in the very SW corner of the map. It's a work-around, but the only way to do it (that I know of).

el cid again -> RE: RHS Design Theory: RHS Composite Atomic Bomb Devices (6/22/2012 10:15:39 PM)
This is a compromise to achieve several objectives: 1) To have atom bombs do more damage to targets. 2) To have atom bombs which fail to detonate properly still (almost always) "fizzile" - cause an explosion worse than any conventional bomb does 3) To model the fact that there is a range of yields possible with atom bombs (Hiroshima was below nominal size; Nagasaki greater than expected) 4) To render effects appropriate to target type where possible. For example, to have armor penetration such that a battleship's armor might protect it (based on the testing of IJN Nagato). Also to model a 1000 yard lethal radiation radius (this is the estimate used originally; Hiroshima was about 900 yards and Nagasaki about 1100 yards, so 1000 is in the right range). For background, I consulted the Los Alamos Primer by Robert Serber. This might be called a Second Edition - because it was annotated by the original author a generation later - with all the benefits of 20-20 hindsight about the original. It also was edited by Richard Rhodes, which the original, used at Los Alamos during the war, was not. ISBN 0-520-07576-5 In addition I tested aircraft, devices and target effects in a 1945 testbed. After testing, I restored the stock atom bomb device to its original specifications, for reference, but failed to use it on any aircraft. There is no designated air unit to deliver it either. Instead, I created three RHS atomic bomb devices, which are used in a two combinations to form two different composite weapons: one modeled on the Hiroshima Gun Type Uranium fueled bomb; the other modeled on the Nagasaki Implosion Type Plutonium fueled bomb. Instead of limiting bomb production per se, I limit bomber production of the special bombers fitted with atom bomb loadouts. Further, these bombers are restricted by a House Rule to only be used in air units with one of the two atom bomb suffixes: UB (for Uranium Bomb) or IB (for Implosion Bomb). All such air units are limited to a single plane, and all are governed by special additional House Rules designed to prevent immediate re-use (see below). Each atomic bomber gets a single atom bomb represented by four devices. One of these devices is the Dud Atom Bomb Effect Device: it almost always works (dud rate = 1) - and it represents a 60 ton (not kiloton) yield "fizzile" which occurs even though the main "bomb" is a dud (fails to produce a proper nuclear explosion in its design range). This device generally works if there is a proper explosion as well, but helps the composite device in that case because it generally will hit a different "target" - being treated as a separate bomb by code. [A problem is that code is far to restrictive on the number as well as type of targets in an attack. Increasing the number of targets from a code point of view is an important aspect of the composite device.] In addition to the Dud Atom Bomb Effect Device, each nuclear bomber also carries three 33% of U235 Bomb or 33% of Implosion Bomb "sub bomb" devices. These have fairly high dud rates, designed to combine (when you drop three at once) to produce typical outcomes of full yield, 2/3 yield or 1/3 yield, with the chance of no proper detonation at all fairly low (about 9.7% for the U235 combination, or 12.5% for the Implosion combination). A side effect of this design is that you also get 3, 2 or 1 different targets hit (in addition to the target of the Dud Atom Bomb Effect Device described above). Thus the four device combination will hit a variable number of targets from 1 to 4 about 99% of the time, with multiple targets being the general case - a single target only is hit when all of the 33% of yield sub-devices fail. If all three 33% of yield devices work, the Dud Atom Bomb Effect Device simulates the remaining 1% of yield. The yield of the 33% UB is 6 kilotons (for a maximum of 18 kilotons if all three work). The yield of the 33% IB is 7.5 kilotons (for a maximum of 22.5 kilotons if all three work). Each 33% of yield sub-device has an accuracy of 100, similar to the stock atom bomb device. In technical terms, effect is calculated by the yield (TNT equivalent weight in pounds) of the entire bomb. That is, a full U235 Bomb type yield = 18 kilotons = 18,000 tons times 2000 pounds per ton = 36 million. Assuming that was an HE bomb, the RHS value = 4 times the square root (which is 6000) = 24,000. We use 5% of that value for armor penetration and anti armor value (1200 mm). Each 33% of yield device gets the full effect value of 24,000 but only 1/3 (8000) for its soft effect. The US 393rd Bomb Squadron has a nominal maximum strength of 12 planes. It contains three detachments, one defined for UB and two for IB versions of the B-29B. Both the parent unit and all the detachments appear with a third version of the Silverplate B-29B equipped for atom bombs (all of which are unarmed). This is called the PB version where PB = Pumpkin Bomb. The Pumpkin Bomb is a 10,000 pound conventional bomb (= to a 6300 pound bomb in terms of effect) used to give air crews experience with the Silverplate bombers, as well as to provide recon and decoys for actual atom bomb armed versions of the plane when atomic attacks are made. Because all three bombs carried (UB, IB and PB) weigh less than the 20,000 pound capacity of a B-29, they may all carry one bomb to what would normally be extended range. Here it is redefined as normal range. Extended range missions are also possible to 90% of the range of a B-29. Extended range missions carry no bombs but a 3D camera instead, and normally would be recon missions. UB bombers start becoming available in July 1945 at a rate of 1 per month, while IB bombers start in August 1945, at a rate of 2 per month. The UB and IB detachments may upgrade to them, respectively, when they are available and are unrestricted in terms of flying recon missions. However, if they fly a bombing mission with a UB or IB composite load, the following day they are required to upgrade to a PB version of the plane, or to disband. Any later day on which a UB or IB bomber is available, they can upgrade to that weapon. The Japanese case is similar but more restricted. While US Silverplate bomber production is automatic and guaranteed, Japanese production of G8N1 and Ki-91 is not. The Ki-91 is delayed in time until late in 1945 and the G8N1 UB version earliest production date is August, 1945. Neither will produce if Japan lacks the requirements for a dedicated bomber plant for the version, the associated engine plant for each version, as well as the HI points required to produce both engine and aircraft. The UB versions of the G8N1 is only able to carry an atomic bomb to normal range, and cameras to a revised extended range (90% of ferry range) with no bombs at all. It is almost stripped of armament - retaining only the tail gun position. The UB Ki-91 is somewhat different: it is fully armed with defensive guns, and carries conventional bombs to extended range, or a UB combination atomic bomb to normal range. Both types are fitted with a regular camera for recon missions (which non UB versions of these planes are not). Aside from the inability to carry atom bomb combinations to the extended range of the conventional versions of these bombers, when the bombers can be used is more severely restricted as well. While the use of an air unit with a UB armed bomber is unrestricted, if it actually conducts a normal range bombing mission (e.g. it is dropping an atomic bomb composite device) the unit must disband the following day. This means it will only reappear four months later. There is only one G8N1 units (from August 1945) and only 1 Ki-91 unit (from November 1945), so the number of atomic bombs usable by Japan is eventually only 1 every 2 months - vs the 3 every month for the USA - and the US gets to start early with 1 in July 1945. The Japanese player for Test 6A was forced to withdraw for job related reasons - so we will restart the Tag Team game with these atomic bombs folded in - using a different Japanese player. Big Red will switch from Allied Chair 1 to Japan (with a helper) and Mifune apparently will take over Chair 1 (the main US command) for the Allies.

mdiehl -> RE: RHS Design Theory: RHS Composite Atomic Bomb Devices (6/23/2012 6:49:57 PM)
The problem here, Cid, is that the whole story does not pass the "ballpark test." The US spent almost as much money and resources designing the bomb as it spent manufacturing all of the other weapons it used during the entire war. The research facilities were massively scaled, redundant, and required DOZENS of energy physicists, not to mention machine tools and processors with extremely fine tolerances. You'd expect SOME kind of paper trail if the Japanese came close. Money spent on weird projects. Energy physicists all working together in large numbers in a known space. Some notebook somewhere that shows that they figured out what the correct diffusion equation would be. Evidence that a cyclotron was built. Evidence of a heavy water facility. There's none of that. So while it may seem great for a mod, or for a game like Starship Troopers, it seems very difficult to me to rationalize it on the grounds that it is "historically plausible." It's not. It just doesn't pass the ballpark test. To believe it, you have to embrace the whole tautological approach used by your average conspiracy theorist -- absence of evidence is proof of a cover-up.

el cid again -> RE: RHS Design Theory: BBC "Atomic plans returned to Japan" (6/24/2012 11:36:13 PM)
Here is a 2002 item in English involving original documents and one assessment of the atomic bomb plans: Saturday, 3 August, 2002, 18:44 GMT 19:44 UK Atomic plans returned to Japan Japan is the only country to suffer a nuclear attack Documents hidden since World War II showing Japan's plans for an atomic bomb have been returned to the country, according to a newspaper report. The widow of the Japanese scientist who had spirited the documents out of the country after the war has given them to a Tokyo research institute, the Asahi daily says. The 23-page dossier shows the Japanese army's plans for a relatively weak atomic bomb - blueprints that were ordered destroyed just before Japan's surrender in 1945. The documents were instead secretly given to chemist Kazuo Kuroda, who then left for the United States and died there last year. Japan surrendered six days after Nagasaki The documents, the newspaper says, could be a valuable addition to the study of Japan's wartime history. They show how far Japan got in trying to build nuclear weapons of its own before the United States dropped atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, killing hundreds of thousands of people in August 1945 and forcing a surrender. Weaker weapon Kuroda, who was a professor emeritus at the University of Arkansas before his death in 2001, kept the documents secret for more than half a century. His widow has sent the documents to the Riken scientific research institute just north of Tokyo where Kuroda worked as a young man, the Asahi newspaper reported. A photograph published in the newspaper shows diagrams and drawings of a bomb, together with text written by a military officer who interviewed the scientist at the head of the atomic bomb development team. But the newspaper says experts who have examined the documents do not believe the bomb would have been very powerful.

el cid again -> RE: RHS Design Theory: RHS Composite Atomic Bomb Devices (6/25/2012 12:38:39 AM)
quote: ORIGINAL: mdiehl The problem here, Cid, is that the whole story does not pass the "ballpark test." The US spent almost as much money and resources designing the bomb as it spent manufacturing all of the other weapons it used during the entire war. The research facilities were massively scaled, redundant, and required DOZENS of energy physicists, not to mention machine tools and processors with extremely fine tolerances. You'd expect SOME kind of paper trail if the Japanese came close. Money spent on weird projects. Energy physicists all working together in large numbers in a known space. Some notebook somewhere that shows that they figured out what the correct diffusion equation would be. Evidence that a cyclotron was built. Evidence of a heavy water facility. There's none of that. So while it may seem great for a mod, or for a game like Starship Troopers, it seems very difficult to me to rationalize it on the grounds that it is "historically plausible." It's not. It just doesn't pass the ballpark test. To believe it, you have to embrace the whole tautological approach used by your average conspiracy theorist -- absence of evidence is proof of a cover-up. First of all, of course, there is a paper trail. Never mind deliberate efforts to destroy (or otherwise hide) records, more than a little survives. But, except for MAGIC intercepts and reports post war by US investigators, pretty much all of it is in Japanese (go figure). To that add that not even native Japanese speakers can read most of it with understanding. [A trivial example: I wanted help reading a chapter of a book by a LT who served on I-400 - this was about a version of the submarine planned but not built - translated. I went to one of only 7 Japanese immersion schools in North America - which happened to be where I live (with my daughter as a student). The closest the staff could come to translating the title was "etherial submarine"! About two years later I concluded the best English usage translation would be "hypothetical submarine" - since it was a plan not implemented. That version of I-400 was smaller than the one actually built - carried only two in tact bombers (not counting the spare assemblies sufficient for a third) - and was to be powered by a "special" engine - that is - by atomic power; it explains the official name of the class "submarine (or diving can) extraordinary" (sensuikan tokibitsu) as well as the peculiar snorkel used by all the I-400s - NOT sufficient for the diesel engines used on the version as built - ONLY adequate to recharge air flasks or run the auxiliary diesel - precisely the same as on every modern nuclear submarine. Second, bomb plans were intercepted in 1946, and a different copy surfaced in 2001 (see BBC item above). Third - the Japanese program was not unified - but badly fragmented. I have identified (so far) no less than five different programs, none of them joint between the services. The entire idea of developing atomic power or bombs during the war was marginal at best given the limited time - and only a focused program with a unified goal had a chance of early success. USN was the first US institution to initiate atomic research - but it was not allowed to design a SSN until 1945 (as a paper exercise, sponsored by Groves). [Of the Allied powers, only RN designed an SSN earlier - in 1942.] But the 1941 program of IJN was focused on atomic power (see Rhodes histories or The Day Man Lost - the surviving document is quoted almost in full) "for battleships or large factories" - resulting in a similar 1942 Japanese design effort. The Army attempted unranium enrichment by thermal diffusion (wholly unsuccessfully) but the Navy tried centrafuges - something the US thought was beyond the state of the art - but a whole lot more efficient than other techniques. The Navy centrafuge used air bearings - better than the German design (which is almost universally used today). While several scholars say the Navy device was a design only, the US Army captured 18 - more than it did in Germany (12) - which might be an indication someone is trying to misrepresent the facts (for whatever motive). But the scholars might be honest: one of them, from whom I have a letter, worked in the Army program and he admits communication with the Navy researchers in a different place was "not so good" and that he just heard a rumor it was a design only. But many commentaries omit entirely mention of the superior technology of the Navy centrafuges. Maybe because the different programs left different trails, and a person examining one has no idea what is in the other? Or possibly to discourage small programs. [Most small nations nuclear programs use the centrafuge separater - and it may once have been policy not to advertise them] Fourth - the Japanese (and German) exotic research programs obviously impressed investigators. The first IJA program was JAAF - to design an atomic powered airplane. We (as well as the Russians) invested billions in this concept post war - not only officially but also private investment by companies - before concluding the concept was dangerous (what happens when it crashes or is shot down?) and not very practical (on Earth shielding is needed, and it is heavy; also the entire machine tends to become radioactive over time). [We - and the Russians - eventually did get space reactors - which need little shielding and which can turn radioactive without much problem - from the research] There were similar programs in the USA to develop engines for cruise missiles and ballistic missiles - both of which were inspired by this concept. Fifth - the Japanese program had a better theoretical foundation than others. This was concluded in the 1941 Navy Park meeting. Japan had more cyclotrons for research than any other nation (3 vs 2 for the USA and 0 for Germany - and 2 more under construction already). Japan's physicits were theoriticians, and in fact were better at atomic science in the event than the assembled global brain pool of the Manhattan project on several occasions. They correctly calculated the minimum enrichment to use light water as a moderator was 2%. They correctly calculated that the ideal enrichment for a bomb was 89%, but that 20% was enough to work with a massive uranium or thorium tamper. The first person to express the concept of the "super" (US Manhattan Project term) or Hydrogen bomb was a Japanese physicist - not one of the much larger pool working in the USA - and not in Germany either - were fission was discovered. This kind of foundation permited, in theory at least, a more efficient program than could be mounted in other places. Sixth - the critical problem was correctly identified in 1941: Fuel supply. Short of invading Canada all the way to the Canadian Great Lakes, or sending an expedition to Africa, where was Japan to get the fuel? [Japan considered going after 4200 tons of tailings at Shinklobwe in 1942. The US actually did go after it in 1942. Those "tailings" - less pure than the 26% ore shipped to New York and Belgium in 1938 (1000 tons each) - averaged 19% uranium by weight - almost 10 times better than "high grade" ore from any other source - and 100 times better than low grade ores used when uranium can be a biproduct of some other mineral target. Most of what Japan could get was like that - 0.2% uranium ore - for example 6000 tons imported from Malaya - the only time Uranium has ever been exported from Malaya - but the amount of uranium was small - and in fact it had more plutonium than uranium. Fuel supply caused the Navy to prefer power plants to one time use bombs. Also power plants could be made to work without any enrichment - because Japan (alone of all the great powers) had heavy water in quantity - from the Noguchi complex at Konan. [Japan's first SSN design is one of only two in history to use natural uranium fuel - the French originally designed Gymnote to use a similar reactor - but in the event the reactor was too heavy for the submarine - so it completed with a conventional plant instead - see Conway's All the World's Fighting Ships article on Gymnote] Even with just natural uranium fuel, Japan was short. The Russians captured one SSN reactor complete but unfueled - presumably to study. The most likely reason Japan could not field either atomic power plants or bombs in quantity is lack of fuel for them. Its only pitch blende mind opened only at the very end of the war. Like the later Chinese nuclear program, Japan depended mainly on surface mining by traditional methods (uranium was used in the ceramic industry, as a source of a pigment, so China had an actual uranium industry before other countries did, and a proper refinery in Shanghai.) Even if Japanese atomic designs would work, they could not afford to fuel them in numbers. This does explain the interest in thorium (also dating from the 1941 meeting). I long theorized that references in Japanese and Koran to a "thorium bomb" simply meant a bomb with a urnaium primary and a much larger thorium tamper (something a US scientist says makes sense terminology wise) - although most believe it means using U-233 derived from thorium. U-233 won't work in a gun type device, although that was not known at the time. But a U-235 does - and could be used at relatively low levels of enrichment - if there is a big thorium tamper around it. [The Thorium does fission too - contributing to yield] Otherwise, thorium fuel elements in a reactor extend the core life. Just sitting there it turns to U-233 - replacing the U-235 burned up by operation. Lack of uranium makes using thorium much more attractive. [See India - one of the few places thorium research is still ongoing; India too suffers from being poor in uranium minerals]

dwg -> RE: RHS Design Theory: BBC "Atomic plans returned to Japan" (6/28/2012 10:46:38 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: el cid again They show how far Japan got in trying to build nuclear weapons of its own All they show is that someone allegedly had an allegedly wartime era plan for an alleged bomb that allegedly passed scrutiny by some alleged expert. They don't show that plan originated in WWII - Japan is positively notorious for fans confusing the issue between fact and fantasy by portraying creations of their own as WWII era, to the point that serious history books sometimes have to specifically set aside sections to explain and exclude them. They don't identify the expert: who is he and how qualified is he to comment on theoretical bomb design - that's a pretty specialised skill-set and not one that the owners tend to parade in public. Even assuming the plan is contemporary, it may be a very simple sketch of a gun-bomb, and just slapping two big enough lumps of U235 together has some potential to initiate a chain reaction. The existence of a plan does not correlate to the existence of the capability, nor does the existence of a plan correlate to the quality of that plan. I can point you at US plans for a canard fighter using an axial flow jet turbine in 1939 (the Lockheed L-133 and X-1000), but that doesn't mean the US could turn one out anytime soon. I can point you at plans of aircraft that looked perfectly feasible, but where the actual aircraft turned out to be utter dogs, in some cases even refusing to leave the ground. Plan does not equal Bomb. Nor does the mention of BBC add anything to the authenticity of your story, the BBC are simply quoting Asahi Shimbun and the BBC newsroom is notoriously stuffed full of non-technical types (I've met a few over the years) who would be utterly incapable of assessing the technical merit of the report.

dwg -> RE: RHS Design Theory: RHS Composite Atomic Bomb Devices (6/29/2012 12:27:09 AM)
quote: ORIGINAL: el cid again the Japanese (and German) exotic research programs obviously impressed investigators They may have impressed investigators at the time, but now we're able to put them in a historical perspective. The German aviation industry in WWII, where I'm best qualified to criticise, makes me wince. It's almost an example of how to lose a war, the inefficiency is appalling and the political backstabbing is beyond belief. Oh, they produced a lot of interesting research, and some of it was very useful to us as we looked into transonic flight, but it just wasn't the research they needed. It's not that they were trying to run before they could walk, more they were trying to triple jump before they could crawl. None of your postings say the Japanese came close to having nuclear weapons or nuclear power, just as none of the German aeronautical research says they came close to a functioning supersonic fighter. What they say is that Japan had people researching the area and making theoretical speculations based on hypothetical technologies, which anyone who knows enough to know they had a nuclear programme already knew. Look at the G10N/Fugaku as a parallel, we may lack information on the precise design process and even whether any of the many Fugaku concepts floating about on the net have any relation to that design process, but we have enough information to understand it in context, we have the speculations on use, and they're all reasonable enough to find, but what people tend to forget is the thought process that looks at ideas like a 100 transport raid on Seattle carrying 30,000 troops - which IIRC was one of the ideas mooted by Chikuhei Nakajima to drum up interest, and says 'Okay, you've had your fun speculating, but what can we actually do that's useful NOW'.

bigred -> RE: Installer status (7/2/2012 12:43:23 AM)
...Sid, what is the time frame for having an installer available?

danlongman -> RE: Installer status (7/2/2012 1:35:40 AM)
This is so silly. Everybody knows there are bazillions of actively secret conspiracies going on all around us. It is just common knowledge to anybody who has the right connections and knows how to read between the lines. Look at the secret 11 herbs and spices recipe I am burping right now. It is a SECRET and I live in a small city within minutes of three KFC's!!! And the recipe for Coca-Cola for crissake! I had 2 of them last week! If the Japanese didn't know all about nukulear and atomic stuff then where did Godzilla (Gojiro) come from? It didn't come from the Good Old USA!! Even the actors in those movies who are supposed to be "Americans" are just Japanese guys with make up. In a world where thousands of people have been kidnapped by aliens and lived to talk about it on TV how can you poop all over the secrets that are sort of revealed in this thread? cheers

el cid again -> RE: Installer status (7/3/2012 12:39:31 AM)
quote: ORIGINAL: bigred ...Sid, what is the time frame for having an installer available? I am ready to try to update a prototype installer (with out of date files) in all respects except final versions of aircraft art - these are being worked on (by someone else) and, when done, the installer will be updated. Any eratta that are reported by that time will also be folded in.

el cid again -> RE: Installer status (7/3/2012 12:51:19 AM)
quote: ORIGINAL: danlongman This is so silly. Everybody knows there are bazillions of actively secret conspiracies going on all around us. It is just common knowledge to anybody who has the right connections and knows how to read between the lines. Look at the secret 11 herbs and spices recipe I am burping right now. It is a SECRET and I live in a small city within minutes of three KFC's!!! And the recipe for Coca-Cola for crissake! I had 2 of them last week! If the Japanese didn't know all about nukulear and atomic stuff then where did Godzilla (Gojiro) come from? It didn't come from the Good Old USA!! Even the actors in those movies who are supposed to be "Americans" are just Japanese guys with make up. In a world where thousands of people have been kidnapped by aliens and lived to talk about it on TV how can you poop all over the secrets that are sort of revealed in this thread? cheers In the real world, there really are matters it isn't politic to officially disclose. Japan banned Unit 731 (the first good review of its biological warfare organization) when it was published - in an effort to avoid it being easily accessable in Japan. It may have been more successful in re some of its (at least five) atomic research programs. But there is also the matter of luck: the primary site for Navy research wasn't in Japan, and was not accessable to American investigators - so official English reports from it were not possible. Most of the evidence is in Japanese, Korean or Russian. The author of Japan's Secret War is considering a third edition, and I have suggested presenting in image form original documents - even if not in English - instead of a text only approach as in the original book. While the files of Kuroda - which turned up in Kansas - are not open to him - a Japanese newspaper did publish a copy of the atomic bomb plan - and I suggested we should reprint it from the newspaper copy. The existance of the plan - as reported by the BBC above - is enough to show the falsehood that they never did such a thing. You may believe what you wish - it is a free country. But this subject isn't about fiction - or science fiction - or pulp fiction - all of which apply to Godzilla.

el cid again -> RE: RHS Design Theory: RHS Composite Atomic Bomb Devices (7/3/2012 1:06:34 AM)
quote: ORIGINAL: dwg quote: ORIGINAL: el cid again the Japanese (and German) exotic research programs obviously impressed investigators They may have impressed investigators at the time, but now we're able to put them in a historical perspective. The German aviation industry in WWII, where I'm best qualified to criticise, makes me wince. It's almost an example of how to lose a war, the inefficiency is appalling and the political backstabbing is beyond belief. Oh, they produced a lot of interesting research, and some of it was very useful to us as we looked into transonic flight, but it just wasn't the research they needed. It's not that they were trying to run before they could walk, more they were trying to triple jump before they could crawl. None of your postings say the Japanese came close to having nuclear weapons or nuclear power, just as none of the German aeronautical research says they came close to a functioning supersonic fighter. What they say is that Japan had people researching the area and making theoretical speculations based on hypothetical technologies, which anyone who knows enough to know they had a nuclear programme already knew. Look at the G10N/Fugaku as a parallel, we may lack information on the precise design process and even whether any of the many Fugaku concepts floating about on the net have any relation to that design process, but we have enough information to understand it in context, we have the speculations on use, and they're all reasonable enough to find, but what people tend to forget is the thought process that looks at ideas like a 100 transport raid on Seattle carrying 30,000 troops - which IIRC was one of the ideas mooted by Chikuhei Nakajima to drum up interest, and says 'Okay, you've had your fun speculating, but what can we actually do that's useful NOW'. I do not disagree about the divided nature of German aircraft programs. Japan did relatively better in terms of actual production on a smaller industrial base. Yet it remains the Germans did achieve things we didn't - in particular re jet aircraft. Had they been wiser they could have done so sooner and with more effective products too. There is a line in Ice Station Zebra which, if fiction, is also true: "Our (UK) German Scientists gave us the ..., Your (US) German scientists gave us the .... and Their (USSR) German scientists gave them the ..." - The US, UK and USSR all hired German scientists in an astonishing range of fields because they had leads in lots of technologies. Too many technologies too far out to win WWII in fact - better to have concentrated on a few near term efforts than to spread out like they did. But still - the ideas were impressive. The idea of nuclear powered aircraft, missiles and spacecraft was deemed worthy of major investment - and took over a decade to fully understand - which was my point in the comment you were responding to. Probably nuclear propulsion for ships was a more realistic short term goal - but the Allies decided to eshew it in favor of bombs. [Only RN designed an SSN before 1945, and the 1945 Manhattan project design was intended only as a paper study to inspire post war programs - not something for consideration for doing during the war. Yet the USN was the first agency in the US to initiate atomic research - it started with uranium separation - and the reason was pre war interest in an SSN. IJN interest in such a concept is not any more unrealistic than these early USN and RN concepts were.] If you are interested in G10N or similar projects, I suggest going to the company. Mitsubisi is more forthcoming - and even has a museum - than Nakajima - but there are company records and staff familiar with them you can talk to or write to. There is also the official encyclopedia of WWII in Japanese - well over 100 volumns - virtually none of it translated into English - but which is a massive record of extant information in every sense. Finally, there is the National Diet Library, which will assign an English speaking, retired Japanese mitliary officer on staff to help you find materials on any matter in its collection. I grant all these things are easier if you (as I was) are stationed in Japan, and if you spend your time visiting such places instead of the insides of bars as most servicement do - but one could either write or travel to Japan as an alternative way to get at what exists instead of being satisfied with the fraction in reference books.

BigDuke66 -> RE: RHS Design Theory: RHS Composite Atomic Bomb Devices (7/3/2012 5:50:55 AM)
In that light I wonder why the player is provided with a chance to use the "thin theory" of an Japanese atomic bomb but is denied to use kamikaze(doesn't matter if they make sense or not). in the game

US87891 -> RE: RHS Design Theory: RHS Composite Atomic Bomb Devices (7/4/2012 5:58:49 PM)
The physics behind an atom bomb was known everywhere there was a physics department in a university. The Italians made plans for a destructive (atomic) bomb. Any phycist worth his salt could come up with plans. The University of Buenos Aires, published plans by Alexandro, Noriega, for just such a thing in 1939. Every physicist knew the potential power of this weapon. But no body could build one. So much for the Japanese plans. They are nothing more than what was published in Argentina in 1938. Matt

el cid again -> RE: RHS Design Theory: RHS Composite Atomic Bomb Devices (7/5/2012 6:47:26 PM)
Good question. In some respects, the kamakaze threat is the most serious we have ever faced. James F Dunnigan (a noted game designer and writer and sometime DOD consultant) wrote to me, in the context of my wonder at comments in professional literature that we had "never completely solved the problem" of defending ships from such attacks that "we probably STILL have not solved the problem, even if we faced actual WWII Japanese propeller driven aircraft." I myself, serving on an anti-air warfare destroyer - one that never, ever missed in an era when the SOP was fire 60 missiles per kill (more than the inventory on board) - have enough of a grasp of the subject to be able to say they were de facto human guided, subsonic cruise missiles. Engaging in numbers and also around the clock (one of the most effective tactics in 1945 was to send out one plane every 5 minutes - looking for a moment of weakness) both create significant problems for the defense. The reason RHS does not activate the Kamakaze option is more technical than philosophical - never mind I have philosophical problems with the idea. The number of kamakaze units was never anything approaching universal, and the ability to perform other missions (e.g. fighter defense, search, transport, ASW, and normal attacks) always was retained. If someone wanted to play with kamakaze planes AS CODE NOW WORKS, it is easy to check that box and make it an option. If there was a more general interest, I can either make it a special variant of a specific scenario, or make it the standard case in all RHS scenarios. I am developing a Downfall Scenario (106) with a view to more fully investigating this option as well as atomic bombs. It may be the technical problems can be addressed without rewriting code - just as I have tried to do with atom bombs. It is my personal belief that the solution for Japan is to build new plane types and use them without guaranteed expendature of the pilots. Even in that case, the chances for success for Japan are extremely marginal - simply due to numbers. But with interior lines, and conservation of pilots, there is at least a theoretical chance for an effective defense to be mounted with high performance aircraft. Nothing much can save the day if obsolete machines, training machines and even transports are to be used as offensive weapons, each one guaranteed to kill its crew wether or not it even reaches its target.

el cid again -> RE: RHS Design Theory: Test Series Six: Demonstration Tag Team Game (7/5/2012 6:56:19 PM)
The demonstration test 6A game had to restart due to loss of the Japanese player for work related reasons. We took the opportunity to fold in a little more development and eratta. The economic part of the first Japanese turn is now done and it has been turned over to Big Red for operational orders. This is a quasi public game and both files and Japanese password are available to anyone who wants to follow it. There are three Allied "chairs" on the other side - in brief a US chair (chair 1), a UK chair (chair 3), and a "central" chair representing NEI, USAFFE, AUS and Russia (chair 2). Chair 3 controls CW other than AUS and NZ, China, Canada and the Alaska Command (sans naval units). Chair 1 controls NZ. Chair 2 controls SW Pacific as well as USAFFE, NEI, Asiatic Fleet and Austraila. This will be a rather fully illustrated game and it is intended to test in particular RHS devices and units, in the context of stock devices and units. There are more than twice as many kinds of aircraft variants on both sides to maximimize player options. As soon as the final air art filmstrips are completed we will issue updates to aircraft data and then update the prototype installer to facilitate RHS installation. Meanwhile hand installation is possible. As well, a player who uses stock or any mod compatable with stock maps may have the RHS pwhexe file set which feature both seasonal changes and wartime construction of roads and rail lines for use with non RHS games. There are 20 files - the current active pwhexe.dat file and 19 named seasonal files which can become the current pwhexe.dat file at the start of a given season. These files are available from Mifune, Big Red and myself - and a prototype RHS site will have them in due course. [When air art is done the site contstruction will be completed.] There is one unissued RHS scenario (100 - Greater Asian Prosperity by Mifune) still being integrated with the others - and one possible additional new one in (106 - Downfall) in early stages of conversion.

dwg -> RE: RHS Design Theory: RHS Composite Atomic Bomb Devices (7/5/2012 11:46:58 PM)
quote: Yet it remains the Germans did achieve things we didn't - in particular re jet aircraft. Lots of proposals, a lot fewer actual achievements - which is pretty much my point. Finding papers relating to a proposal does not mean there was anything more to that proposal than those papers themselves. To take an example from British programmes, I can show you manufacturer drawings of jet-powered versions of the Sturgeon and Mosquito, but neither of those ever went anywhere near production. If we only had those papers, and no complete understanding of the British aircraft programme, would we dismiss those proposals as the minor diversions they are, or assume that there was more to them? This is the problem we face in looking at the German and particularly at the Japanese programmes, we have fragmentary evidence and lack the context to say when something is really of minor importance. quote: Had they been wiser they could have done so sooner Had they been wiser they wouldn't have tried. Germany lacked the necessary resources, such as tungsten, to allow them to turn those few designs they actually completed into war-winners. An Me 262 is of precious little use when it's sitting on the ground waiting for an engine change because its engines have exhausted their 40 hour service life. And even if an Me 262 has working engines it is still the wrong aircraft for Germany's needs, they need something that will allow them to challenge allied fighter aircraft for air-superiority (or prevent them losing it in the first place), not something that will occasionally allow them to try to target a handful of bombers through the hordes of rampaging fighters. A handful of Me 262s are spectacular, a larger number of Fw 190D-9s, or Ta 154s, or Me 155s might actually have been useful. quote: the ideas were impressive The ideas were obvious, it's implementation that is impressive. If you develop a new power source, or any new technology, the first thing you do is look for places you can employ it to advantage (just look at the steam engine and the internal combustion engine). There are in fact two direct parallels to nuclear powered submarines that were investigated in WWII, High Test Peroxide based propulsion, and the Elektroboot. The first failed almost utterly, the second, which was a lucky spin-off from the first, might have been a war winner, if it was available in '42, but not only was it too late, Germany messed up the implementation, going for a massive mass-production scheme that might have made sense in 1942 or 42, but which was absurd a couple of years later. So there are parallels that actually went all the way to hardware, but we don't lose perspective over them the way that people do over nuclear power - and the difference is because we have the information to understand them in context and see the weaknesses, not just the possible strengths.

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