quote:

ORIGINAL: loki100

yep, Hitler would have been so much more effective if he'd put in the requisite hundred's of hours into playing World in Flames as opposed to being a product of his own ideology and the world view of the militaristic strand in 19C German thinking

quote:

ORIGINAL: 76mm

quote:

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay
Russia, having maintained a peacetime production schedule, is not much more powerful than they were at the summer of 1941. And they haven’t yet learned any lessons about the poor state of their forces.

But of course, this is completely incorrect, borderline fantastical. Russia was in the midst of a major re-armament and mobilization drive. In addition, after the Winter War they realized that their army's training was woefully deficient and put a major emphasis on training to rectify as many problems as they could. In fact, Hitler invaded Russia in 1941 because he feared that it would be a much more fearsome opponent if he waited.

I could provide numerous facts, figures, and citations to back these facts, but won't bother because you would completely ignore them, as usual.

quote:

ORIGINAL: RFalvo69

quote:

ORIGINAL: loki100

yep, Hitler would have been so much more effective if he'd put in the requisite hundred's of hours into playing World in Flames as opposed to being a product of his own ideology and the world view of the militaristic strand in 19C German thinking

Before he could do that there would have been a giant internecine battle in the OKW about which optional rules to use.

Also, WiF is, of course, stacked against France - something that would have convinced Hitler to attack the French just after Case White and attempt to close the matter around - or little after - Winter '39.

quote:

ORIGINAL: RangerJoe

The Germans were so short of fuel that they did not have enough to provide to France to get the milk from the dairy farms to the processing plants. Much of it spoilt or was spilt.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Aurelian

The question to ask the Italians is "Why didn't you stay neutral?" Would of been so much better for Hitler if they did.

quote:

ORIGINAL: RangerJoe

Yet the attack on France as a big gamble. If the Germans would have held to the original plans, they would have been crushed. Instead the plans were changed. Just think if Chuckie de Gaulle would have been able to cut off the German panzer spearhead. It would have been like December 1944 to January 1945 with panzers abandoned and the German crews trying to walk back to Germany.

quote:

ORIGINAL: warspite1

My comments referred to post France i.e. the defeat of France. The bottom two sentences in my original quote refers to Directive No.9

I think this Directive probably gives the answer to what Hitler thought possible at the time and does not refer to defeat of the French, but a tactical victory that sees them take French territory along the coast. As said, that was the limit of their realistic thinking. I would not doubt the planners in the Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine developed various plans.

Should the Army succeed in defeating the Anglo-French Armies in the field and in seizing and holding a sector of the coast opposite England, the task of the Navy and Air Force to carry the war to English industry becomes paramount.

The part underlined at the end of the sentence is also relevant here because Lemay has dismissed there being any sort of air war over England in the absence of Sea Lion. That clearly was not Hitler's vision.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Buckrock


...

I don't see the intended conditions for the directive's execution as relevant in this case, just the timing of when it was issued. My original point was only that some level of planning for how Germany might achieve "the defeat of England" was clearly already underway before the end of 1939 and from that, the idea of sounding out Spain earlier in regard to Gibraltar shouldn't be completely dismissed as a hypothetical possibility. It's almost certain that the real hard-bargaining between Germany and Spain over some Gibraltar action wouldn't have occurred until at least Summer 1940 but an earlier start to the initial dialogue or even just Gibraltar appearing earlier on Germany's official list of "things that may hurt England", might have led to the panzers rolling into Spain in early Autumn rather than late Autumn, or whatever time-line your hypothetical group-think consensus produces.

quote:

ORIGINAL: warspite1

quote:

ORIGINAL: Aurelian

The question to ask the Italians is "Why didn't you stay neutral?" Would of been so much better for Hitler if they did.

warspite1

Sounds like a counterfactual that we could discuss [:D]

quote:

ORIGINAL: Buckrock

quote:

ORIGINAL: warspite1

My comments referred to post France i.e. the defeat of France. The bottom two sentences in my original quote refers to Directive No.9

I think this Directive probably gives the answer to what Hitler thought possible at the time and does not refer to defeat of the French, but a tactical victory that sees them take French territory along the coast. As said, that was the limit of their realistic thinking. I would not doubt the planners in the Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine developed various plans.

Should the Army succeed in defeating the Anglo-French Armies in the field and in seizing and holding a sector of the coast opposite England, the task of the Navy and Air Force to carry the war to English industry becomes paramount.

The part underlined at the end of the sentence is also relevant here because Lemay has dismissed there being any sort of air war over England in the absence of Sea Lion. That clearly was not Hitler's vision.

I don't see the intended conditions for the directive's execution as relevant in this case, just the timing of when it was issued. My original point was only that some level of planning for how Germany might achieve "the defeat of England" was clearly already underway before the end of 1939 and from that, the idea of sounding out Spain earlier in regard to Gibraltar shouldn't be completely dismissed as a hypothetical possibility. It's almost certain that the real hard-bargaining between Germany and Spain over some Gibraltar action wouldn't have occurred until at least Summer 1940 but an earlier start to the initial dialogue or even just Gibraltar appearing earlier on Germany's official list of "things that may hurt England", might have led to the panzers rolling into Spain in early Autumn rather than late Autumn, or whatever time-line your hypothetical group-think consensus produces.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Aurelian

quote:

ORIGINAL: warspite1

quote:

ORIGINAL: Aurelian

The question to ask the Italians is "Why didn't you stay neutral?" Would of been so much better for Hitler if they did.

warspite1

Sounds like a counterfactual that we could discuss [:D]

I hope so [:D]

quote:

ORIGINAL: loki100

quote:

ORIGINAL: Buckrock


...

I don't see the intended conditions for the directive's execution as relevant in this case, just the timing of when it was issued. My original point was only that some level of planning for how Germany might achieve "the defeat of England" was clearly already underway before the end of 1939 and from that, the idea of sounding out Spain earlier in regard to Gibraltar shouldn't be completely dismissed as a hypothetical possibility. It's almost certain that the real hard-bargaining between Germany and Spain over some Gibraltar action wouldn't have occurred until at least Summer 1940 but an earlier start to the initial dialogue or even just Gibraltar appearing earlier on Germany's official list of "things that may hurt England", might have led to the panzers rolling into Spain in early Autumn rather than late Autumn, or whatever time-line your hypothetical group-think consensus produces.

I'd suggest its worth holding the 2 strands around Spain apart.

1 - lets talk to Spain about an attack on Gibralter. They are a fellow fascist regime and this one of their long held territorial ambitions. Ok, but also a full acknowledgement that Spain alone was in no place to think about that operation, especially if separated from Germany by a hostile France (which could, for eg, have released all the Republican POWs it was holding back over the border as the core of a partisan movement), and, as above, Spain was pretty reliant on the US for fuel and food.

So yep, they'd think about it and, I guess, file it under 'not going to happen'. They had experience of Franco and he was prepared to defy Hitler post the fall of France so he's not amenable to long distance pressure. You need France defeated before that chat even starts to have some value ... which elides into:

2 - lets invade Spain to get to Gibralter. Well thats a very different operation but it means that post-France the Nazis decide the solution to a recalcitrant UK is not to bomb/invade but to go into the Med. So somewhere, there is a near complete reframing of how they see the English problem.

Ok, but as rehearsed earlier in this thread, that operation needs to be planned in the space after the surprising fall of France, put into place and executed. And then a hostile Spain needs to be held down.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Aurelian

The question to ask the Italians is "Why didn't you stay neutral?" Would of been so much better for Hitler if they did.

quote:

ORIGINAL: warspite1

And just to clarify so there is no confusion. I haven't read (or if I have I've forgotten) what studies the army and air force may have carried out in 1939 about taking the war to the United Kingdom. My guess is - and it is a guess - is that any such studies don't assume the defeat of France, rather it assumes war with France is on-going and air and naval war against the UK is to be conducted within that framework.

In the absence of any confirmation otherwise then I am assuming that Directive No.9 reflected those studies and looked at taking the war to the UK, but only in the context that war with France is on-going.

If that is wrong then no problem, and I'd certainly be interested in what they came up with.

quote:


This to me is important because a Med-First strategy involving Spain has to assume France is beaten. Why? Because, as said, if anyone in the German High Command knew what a basket case Spain was (as a result of the devastation of almost three years of civil war) then they would not even be bothering to make enquiries of Spain. This is especially true given the need for Germany not to upset their supplies of Wolfram from the Peninsular.

Of course enquiries could have been made through diplomatic channels, military attaches, contacts made during the civil war etc etc at any time and I would not be at all surprised if there were such conversations. But as I think we are all agreed, these would be swiftly re-buffed by Spain (accompanied with the usual niceties observed of course) and - in the absence of any Med-first strategy, would NOT be pursued.

But Lemay's hypothesis doesn't mean such "fireside chats". Instead if his hypothesis is to have credence, we need to acknowledge that Hitler and the High Command could have been seriously thinking about a Med-first strategy either pre-war or "shortly after" and that involves the defeat of France.

I maintain that it is that that is a step too far.

quote:


I mean just thinking about it. So September 1939, Hitler and his cronies are chewing the fat.

Hitler: "Ribbentrop, why don't you get on the blower to Madrid and ask if they fancy joining us in the war?"

Ribbentrop: "Are you sure Mein Fuhrer?"

'Comedy Goering': "Yes, they could take Gibraltar and also threaten France from the rear ..... Ooohheerrr Missus!"

Halder: "I'm not too sure about that, after the civil war aren't they a bit screwed and that like?"

Hitler: "Let's ask Canaris... what do you think Admiral?"

Canaris: "Well they have oil reserves of a maximum of 1.5 months, they have a population on the brink of starvation and rely for their oil and food from the USA. They have a poorly equipped army of 250,000, a poor road system, a desperate rail system, a shortage of transport, a hodge-podge of aircraft from different manufacturers and different countries that they have to cannibalise to keep as many flying as possible, and a small, obsolete navy.... Oh and I should add that we rely heavily on the Wolfram that comes from Portugal and Spain so need to ensure those supplies are kept safe."

ALL: "We'll leave it then...."

Hitler: "Anyone fancy a pint?"

quote:

ORIGINAL: warspite1

quote:

ORIGINAL: Buckrock

quote:

ORIGINAL: warspite1

My comments referred to post France i.e. the defeat of France. The bottom two sentences in my original quote refers to Directive No.9

I think this Directive probably gives the answer to what Hitler thought possible at the time and does not refer to defeat of the French, but a tactical victory that sees them take French territory along the coast. As said, that was the limit of their realistic thinking. I would not doubt the planners in the Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine developed various plans.

Should the Army succeed in defeating the Anglo-French Armies in the field and in seizing and holding a sector of the coast opposite England, the task of the Navy and Air Force to carry the war to English industry becomes paramount.

The part underlined at the end of the sentence is also relevant here because Lemay has dismissed there being any sort of air war over England in the absence of Sea Lion. That clearly was not Hitler's vision.

I don't see the intended conditions for the directive's execution as relevant in this case, just the timing of when it was issued. My original point was only that some level of planning for how Germany might achieve "the defeat of England" was clearly already underway before the end of 1939 and from that, the idea of sounding out Spain earlier in regard to Gibraltar shouldn't be completely dismissed as a hypothetical possibility. It's almost certain that the real hard-bargaining between Germany and Spain over some Gibraltar action wouldn't have occurred until at least Summer 1940 but an earlier start to the initial dialogue or even just Gibraltar appearing earlier on Germany's official list of "things that may hurt England", might have led to the panzers rolling into Spain in early Autumn rather than late Autumn, or whatever time-line your hypothetical group-think consensus produces.

warspite1

And just to clarify so there is no confusion. I haven't read (or if I have I've forgotten) what studies the army and air force may have carried out in 1939 about taking the war to the United Kingdom. My guess is - and it is a guess - is that any such studies don't assume the defeat of France, rather it assumes war with France is on-going and air and naval war against the UK is to be conducted within that framework.

In the absence of any confirmation otherwise then I am assuming that Directive No.9 reflected those studies and looked at taking the war to the UK, but only in the context that war with France is on-going.

If that is wrong then no problem, and I'd certainly be interested in what they came up with.

This to me is important because a Med-First strategy involving Spain has to assume France is beaten. Why? Because, as said, if anyone in the German High Command knew what a basket case Spain was (as a result of the devastation of almost three years of civil war) then they would not even be bothering to make enquiries of Spain. This is especially true given the need for Germany not to upset their supplies of Wolfram from the Peninsular.

Of course enquiries could have been made through diplomatic channels, military attaches, contacts made during the civil war etc etc at any time and I would not be at all surprised if there were such conversations. But as I think we are all agreed, these would be swiftly re-buffed by Spain (accompanied with the usual niceties observed of course) and - in the absence of any Med-first strategy, would NOT be pursued.

But Lemay's hypothesis doesn't mean such "fireside chats". Instead if his hypothesis is to have credence, we need to acknowledge that Hitler and the High Command could have been seriously thinking about a Med-first strategy either pre-war or "shortly after" and that involves the defeat of France.

I maintain that it is that that is a step too far.

I mean just thinking about it. So September 1939, Hitler and his cronies are chewing the fat.

Hitler: "Ribbentrop, why don't you get on the blower to Madrid and ask if they fancy joining us in the war?"

Ribbentrop: "Are you sure Mein Fuhrer?"

'Comedy Goering': "Yes, they could take Gibraltar and also threaten France from the rear ..... Ooohheerrr Missus!"

Halder: "I'm not too sure about that, after the civil war aren't they a bit screwed and that like?"

Hitler: "Let's ask Canaris... what do you think Admiral?"

Canaris: "Well they have oil reserves of a maximum of 1.5 months, they have a population on the brink of starvation and rely for their oil and food from the USA. They have a poorly equipped army of 250,000, a poor road system, a desperate rail system, a shortage of transport, a hodge-podge of aircraft from different manufacturers and different countries that they have to cannibalise to keep as many flying as possible, and a small, obsolete navy.... Oh and I should add that we rely heavily on the Wolfram that comes from Portugal and Spain so need to ensure those supplies are kept safe."

ALL: "We'll leave it then...."

Hitler: "Anyone fancy a pint?"

quote:

ORIGINAL: warspite1

quote:

ORIGINAL: Aurelian

quote:

ORIGINAL: warspite1

quote:

ORIGINAL: Aurelian

The question to ask the Italians is "Why didn't you stay neutral?" Would of been so much better for Hitler if they did.

warspite1

Sounds like a counterfactual that we could discuss [:D]

I hope so [:D]

warspite1

Well I can prove it would have been a bad thing because in my last game of World In Flames.....

quote:

ORIGINAL: UP844

quote:

ORIGINAL: Aurelian

The question to ask the Italians is "Why didn't you stay neutral?" Would of been so much better for Hitler if they did.

All in all, it would have been so much better for Italy too [;)]. No bombing, no 2-year ground war, no destruction...

In my opinion, Italy would likely have followed a path similar to Spain, becoming a democracy in the 1960s, some time after the death of Mussolini.

Perhaps, some of the pro-German hardliners would have been allowed to take part in the Crusade against Bolshevism (again, as Franco did with his hardliners).

Perhaps, the oil surveys started in the late 1930s in Libya would have been completed [:D].

quote:

ORIGINAL: UP844
Perhaps, the oil surveys started in the late 1930s in Libya would have been completed [:D].

quote:

ORIGINAL: Buckrock

quote:

ORIGINAL: warspite1

And just to clarify so there is no confusion. I haven't read (or if I have I've forgotten) what studies the army and air force may have carried out in 1939 about taking the war to the United Kingdom. My guess is - and it is a guess - is that any such studies don't assume the defeat of France, rather it assumes war with France is on-going and air and naval war against the UK is to be conducted within that framework.

In the absence of any confirmation otherwise then I am assuming that Directive No.9 reflected those studies and looked at taking the war to the UK, but only in the context that war with France is on-going.

If that is wrong then no problem, and I'd certainly be interested in what they came up with.

What they came up with included both an Army invasion study and a Navy one. Both were soon rejected as no invasion could even be considered until Britain had been broken militarily and economically first. I'll try to find them but remember, this particular theater of war isn't my preferred ride.[:'(]

Edit - I just noticed the late '39 invasion studies are both briefly described in the Wikipedia entry for Operation Sea Lion. You'll just have to take me on my word that's not where I first read of them during my earlier scholarly pursuits.[:D]

quote:

The question to ask the Italians is "Why didn't you stay neutral?" Would of been so much better for Hitler if they did.

quote:

ORIGINAL: warspite1
He not only wanted Mare Nostrum for the Mediterranean, but he wanted an Italy free of the jailers that, as he saw it, were preventing Italy from accessing the oceans of the world.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Bo Rearguard

quote:

ORIGINAL: warspite1
He not only wanted Mare Nostrum for the Mediterranean, but he wanted an Italy free of the jailers that, as he saw it, were preventing Italy from accessing the oceans of the world.

This was a chronic complaint Mussolini was fond of harping on. He often wailed that Italy was a prisoner in the Mediterranean. He called Corsica, Tunisia, Malta, and Cyprus "the bars of this prison", and described Gibraltar and Suez as the prison guards.

quote:

ORIGINAL: warspite1

quote:

The question to ask the Italians is "Why didn't you stay neutral?" Would of been so much better for Hitler if they did.

It’s an interesting question. I don’t think it makes too much difference to Germany in the long run to be honest – although it would certainly have meant less distraction, less diversion of resources. But enough to tip the scales in the USSR? No, I don’t think so.

But I think Italy is a more interesting question. Could Italy have stayed neutral? Yes, I think the example of Franco shows us that Italy could and Mussolini could have survived into old age running the country.

But the question was “Why didn’t [Italy] stay neutral?” and this is interesting because it’s clear Italy could have.

Mussolini wasn’t interested in living out his life to a grand old age – he wanted a New Roman Empire – North and East Africa, large parts of south east Europe, parts of France. He not only wanted Mare Nostrum for the Mediterranean, but he wanted an Italy free of the jailers that, as he saw it, were preventing Italy from accessing the oceans of the world.
Italy couldn’t achieve any of this alone. As much as he hated it, often railed against it, and even feared it, Mussolini knew that if his dreams of glory were going to become a reality then Italy would have to throw in its lot with Germany at some point. As he said in September 1939:

I…. believe…. Even if we march on separate paths – that Destiny will nevertheless continue to bind us together. If National Socialist Germany is destroyed by the western democracies, Fascist Italy would face a hard future.

But Mussolini, in his sane moments, knew the extent of Italian limitations. I think that Ciano – who feared Italy getting involved, did try his best to avoid war, but with a boss fixated on ‘Empire’, there really wasn’t much he could do and offer by way of alternatives.
Mussolini and many others in Italy – including many close to Il Duce – knew full well that Italy was not prepared – even for a short war.

The spending in the thirties – on Ethiopia and the Spanish Civil war in particular, meant that Italy was spending money she couldn’t afford on foreign adventures, while ignoring what was needed to be done at home – Lira reserves at the bank of Italy were 20bn in 1927 and just 3bn in 1939. So, in late August 1939, just before war came to Poland, Mussolini had no choice but to tell Hitler of his decision to stay neutral. Both the army and the air force had fuel stocks of less than two months (only the navy had built up reserves of around 12 month). Annual steel production was 2.4 million tons – a tenth of Germany and way behind Britain’s 13.3 million tons. Coal and other vital raw materials were low to zero.

Like Hitler, Mussolini loved numbers (quantity over quality) and as such he was determined to have a big army. But a big army could not be supported given Italy’s industrial position. Instead of say 20 fully equipped division, Mussolini insisted on more than 70. To achieve these ‘numbers’ he had to reduce the manpower in each division, but this did not solve the fact that many of the divisions were simply not properly equipped. At the time of Albania the air force boasted of 3,000 aircraft – a report that year showed less than a thousand – and the mainstay of the fighter arm was a biplane. The navy started the war with two updated WWI battleships (although two more plus two Littorios were on the way), but the submarine service, while enormous, contained boats that were not up to scratch and there was little to nothing by way of naval air co-operation.

So in a moment of clarity, but to his own disgust (Verrat (traitor) is how he was heard to be mumbling to himself), Mussolini told Hitler he couldn’t honour the Pact of Steel. As we’ve seen in previous posts, Mussolini then went through periods of pro-German and positively anti-German moods.

But… nothing had materially changed between September 1939 and June 1940 in terms of Italy’s overall preparedness for war. So why did he declare war? Ultimately there is one reason. Mussolini’s dreams of a New Roman Empire. So, fatefully for Italy, in June 1940 Mussolini thought the war was won and so all he had to do was present a few thousand dead to the peace table, sit back and then grab Italy’s share of the booty. Sadly for Italy, the war wasn’t won and Britain refused to surrender……

So ultimately there was one reason Italy didn’t stay neutral, and that was Benito Mussolini.

quote:

ORIGINAL: warspite1

We don't have to think about these things when pushing cardboard counters, or clicking on pixels, but for anyone interested in discussing counterfactuals and history, then yes, they very much do have to.

quote:

ORIGINAL: warspite1

Which is why Mussolini would have been very, very worried at the invasion of Spain by Germany and would have been desperate for the capture of Suez to be an Italian feat of arms.

quote:

ORIGINAL: UP844

Warspite, your post #1343 is right on target! [&o].

While I agree that old Benito was the main cause Italy went to war, it is not altogether inconcevaible that he should have remained neutral. Unfortunately, he believed his own bombastic speeches about "eight million bayonets".

quote:

ORIGINAL: RFalvo69

quote:

ORIGINAL: UP844

Warspite, your post #1343 is right on target! [&o].

While I agree that old Benito was the main cause Italy went to war, it is not altogether inconcevaible that he should have remained neutral. Unfortunately, he believed his own bombastic speeches about "eight million bayonets".

And notice how, quite ironically, the rhetoric itself betrayed Mussolini's unpreparedness. He boasted about "bayonets" in the age of mechanised warfare...