RE: The question to ask about The Italians

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warspite1 -> RE: The question to ask about The Italians (10/12/2020 7:13:18 AM)
quote: ORIGINAL: UP844 P.S. On a marginal note, even though the Regia Marina got the use of Gibraltar, its ships were conceived for sailing in the Mediterranean, so they were short-ranged (the "Soldati" class destroyers had a range of 2,200 miles, against the 5,500 miles of the RN "J/K" or the USN "Fletcher" destroyers). warspite1 Indeed, and the range was not their only problem. Many RM destroyers were not good sea boats and pretty fragile too - as amply demonstrated after the 2nd Battle of Sirte.... maybe not ideal for the Atlantic! Obviously just having Gibraltar and denying it to the British would have been advantageous to the Axis, but so long as the British had taken bases in the Canaries (and possibly the Portuguese islands (depending how war in the Iberian Peninsular panned out)) then the impact would have been lessened, and there would likely be limited options for the RM - at least until the Mediterranean Fleet had been dealt with.

Buckrock -> RE: The question to ask about The Italians (10/12/2020 7:59:48 AM)
Though they had Operation Puma for the Canaries on the books in 1940 (post French defeat), Churchill and the Defence Committee considered the islands too exposed (enemy land based air) to hold and use as a potential Gibraltar replacement. The Azores (even though they were Portuguese) instead were the primary option in 1940, with the Cape Verde islands possibly thrown in for good measure. It was only after Barbarossa that the British military leadership really felt confident enough to believe the Canaries might be taken and kept as a major operating base.

warspite1 -> RE: The question to ask about The Italians (10/12/2020 9:46:06 AM)
quote: ORIGINAL: Buckrock Though they had Operation Puma for the Canaries on the books in 1940 (post French defeat), Churchill and the Defence Committee considered the islands too exposed (enemy land based air) to hold and use as a potential Gibraltar replacement. The Azores (even though they were Portuguese) instead were the primary option in 1940, with the Cape Verde islands possibly thrown in for good measure. It was only after Barbarossa that the British military leadership really felt confident enough to believe the Canaries might be taken and kept as a major operating base. warspite1 Well obviously we'll never know, but it would have been interesting to know what Churchill's reaction to an actual German invasion of Spain would be. The CoS' would have been discussing 'Felix' i.e. a pro-German Spain (because who really believed that Hitler would invade Spain?). Therefore the Canaries would need to be taken by force and then occupied with a reluctant and resentful population. The British would also be discussing and accepting or rejecting a mere hypothetical. But now - in this counterfactual - the British would be faced with a very different - and now very real - proposition; Germany have invaded Spain and Gibraltar isn't going to survive this. As with Greece in 1941, I don't think Churchill would have resisted any chance to take the war to Germany (whether sensible or not). Now, Britain would be seen as an ally coming to assist the Spanish (and as mentioned previously they would do what they could). Therefore there would be agreement to British forces on the islands, time to get defences deployed - and a perhaps very important piece of Spanish soil to house Franco and a Government-in-exile. Not having the faintest interest in The Canaries, even though push is now coming to shove, and the Admiralty are having to face up to the reality of the loss of The Rock - in this scenario would appear very strange on many levels. This is particularly true given what we know of Churchill's Modus Operandi. I know this wouldn't suit Lemay's 'staff study' because he doesn't appear to take kindly to Allied leaders actually being able to react to different events (that is the preserve of the Axis only). But in this case, Churchill would be acting entirely in character. As said, we will never know, but I think Puma would be taken off the shelf and dusted down - with appropriate revisions now that the Spanish are friendly - and a new Puma II drawn up [:)]

Buckrock -> RE: The question to ask about The Italians (10/12/2020 10:14:47 AM)
The British did believe Hitler might invade Spain (and Portugal) in 1940. The Joint Intel Committee actually stated (in Jan '41) they were surprised Germany had not done so during 1940 (and the Joint Planning Staff even laid out how the Germans might have conducted the operation during that period). British military decision makers (DefComm and CoS) routinely looked at both potential options (Naughty Axis Spain and Innocent Neutral Victim Spain) while reviewing contingency plans that would involve a British intervention.

warspite1 -> RE: The question to ask about The Italians (10/12/2020 11:10:40 AM)
quote: ORIGINAL: Buckrock The British did believe Hitler might invade Spain (and Portugal) in 1940. The Joint Intel Committee actually stated (in Jan '41) they were surprised Germany had not done so during 1940 (and the Joint Planning Staff even laid out how the Germans might have conducted the operation during that period). British military decision makers (DefComm and CoS) routinely looked at both potential options (Naughty Axis Spain and Innocent Neutral Victim Spain) while reviewing contingency plans that would involve a British intervention. warspite1 Interesting, and I will conservatively assume that the no-no for the Canaries followed on from the Naughty Axis scenario - although its not clear from your post whether that was the case. However, apart from some intelligence guys being surprised that Hitler didn't do something he appears to have had absolutely no intention to do (nice work intelligence guys [;)]), I don't really see (in my honest opinion) that this changes the way Churchill may well have reacted to an actual German move into the Iberian Peninsular.

UP844 -> RE: The question to ask about The Italians (10/12/2020 12:00:05 PM)
The RM destroyers (as well as the earlier classes of light and heavy cruisers) were mostly conceived to oppose French ships in the Mediterranean, which were the designed along similar lines, with high speed as the primary requirement (even though French ships had greater range, approx. 3,000 miles). This range limitation also affected all other ship classes: the "Littorio" battleship had a range of just 4,200 miles. In addition to the range factor, hull shapes were optimized for speed rather than for seaworthiness and engines emphasized power over reliability: the loss of two vessels after the 2nd Sirte was due to engine troubles that left them incapable to manoeuvre in the storm. Since even some German ships (namely, the "Narvik" class destroyers) had similar issues, the balance of naval power in the Atlantic would not be so shifted as the presence of ten Axis 9-factor fleet 1/2" cardboard counters (in Third Reich terms: why should AH be considered less reliable than SPI? [:D]) based in Gibraltar might suggest.

UP844 -> RE: The question to ask about The Italians (10/12/2020 12:21:12 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: Buckrock Though they had Operation Puma for the Canaries on the books in 1940 (post French defeat), Churchill and the Defence Committee considered the islands too exposed (enemy land based air) to hold and use as a potential Gibraltar replacement. Unless the Luftwaffe was allowed to use French air bases in Morocco (), only bombers could reach the Canaries from the Spanish peninsula: a few fighters and - above all - a radar stations should be enough force them to night missions. () an unlikely, but not impossible, assumption: see Syria 1941. Even with Germans based in Morocco, Santa Cruz de Tenerife is 320 km from the Moroccan coast, far enough to prevent Me109s from escorting bombers. Last but not least, supporting serious bombing strikes against the Canaries would not have been easy. Let's assume the Germans could safely ship bombs, fuel and spare parts to Casablanca (even though it can be assumed RN submarines would be waiting for them): they will still be 800 km away from the shortest route from Morocco to the Canaries.

Buckrock -> RE: The question to ask about The Italians (10/12/2020 3:23:39 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: warspite1 Interesting, and I will conservatively assume that the no-no for the Canaries followed on from the Naughty Axis scenario - although its not clear from your post whether that was the case. Both scenarios became major British concerns at different points during 1940, Germany taking the Iberian Peninsula and then bouncing into Spanish NW African territories or Spain joining the Axis and then the Luftwaffe deploying to Spanish controlled airfields in Iberia and NW Africa, etc. Both scenarios brought the identified problem of the potential British naval base being exposed to land-based enemy airpower. Edit - Because compass headings are tricky. quote: However, apart from some intelligence guys being surprised that Hitler didn't do something he appears to have had absolutely no intention to do (nice work intelligence guys [;)]), I don't really see (in my honest opinion) that this changes the way Churchill may well have reacted to an actual German move into the Iberian Peninsular. Believe whatever floats your boat. Churchill was the Chair of the Defence Committee. The Defence Committee decided yay or nay on joint plans passed on by CoS after they had made their own recommendations regarding those plans. Churchill also regularly chaired the CoS Committees. There were few aspects of the plan cycle (miltary and political) that were beyond his purview as Chief Imperial Warlord, and that included the serious sandboxing of a plan that would occur when some German move was considered imminent and a decision to pull the trigger had to be made then or likely not at all. That happened in late 1940 with "Operation Grind", Churchill ordering the plan not to be activated (obviously) and to instead let Mr. Hitler have his wicked way with Spain if he so dared while Mr. Churchill would console the victim afterward. Anyway, aren't you getting ahead of your own hypothetical timeline? Last time I checked, we still seemed to be stuck in the pre-France-Defeat stage with the Germans not yet allowed to have a Med Strategy. Isn't it time now to establish when actually they could've and would've come up with it, so that you can then start determining the next point, when the Germans would make their move into Iberia? Once that's done, you can then go through in great lyrical detail about how Churchill's brigades would go charging in to thwart the Bosche and rescue the bits of Spanish and Portuguese territory that were deemed worth "saving".[:'(]

Buckrock -> RE: The question to ask about The Italians (10/12/2020 3:26:28 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: UP844 quote: ORIGINAL: Buckrock Though they had Operation Puma for the Canaries on the books in 1940 (post French defeat), Churchill and the Defence Committee considered the islands too exposed (enemy land based air) to hold and use as a potential Gibraltar replacement. Unless the Luftwaffe was allowed to use French air bases in Morocco (), only bombers could reach the Canaries from the Spanish peninsula: a few fighters and - above all - a radar stations should be enough force them to night missions. () an unlikely, but not impossible, assumption: see Syria 1941. Even with Germans based in Morocco, Santa Cruz de Tenerife is 320 km from the Moroccan coast, far enough to prevent Me109s from escorting bombers. Last but not least, supporting serious bombing strikes against the Canaries would not have been easy. Let's assume the Germans could safely ship bombs, fuel and spare parts to Casablanca (even though it can be assumed RN submarines would be waiting for them): they will still be 800 km away from the shortest route from Morocco to the Canaries. What particular airfields they thought the Germans might use wasn't mentioned in the minutes of the Defence Committee meeting, only that Churchill stated he did not want to consider the Canaries as an alternative base for Gibraltar in the current circumstances as they sat too close to potential enemy airfields. If the opportunity comes, I'll see if I can find any more details on the decision for when Warspites' hypothesis finally reaches the appropriate point in its timeline. Should only take another 50 pages for this thread to get there.

gamer78 -> RE: The question to ask about The Italians (10/13/2020 12:30:21 AM)
quote: ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay ..Turkish division that was sent to Korea, later, was a joke of a division. SPI depicts most of them as static. With Soviet help, Turkey is quickly subdued (though the Germans have a full year to achieve that if necessary). Leaving an Italian garrison (perhaps augmented by Armenians and Kurds). I believe it was a division for diplomatically acceptance to Nato only. Nothing more than that. 25 years a ago I remember low rank soldiers-Veterans in Korean War- visiting barracks in İzmir telling about US soldiers even have cigarette case they don't have. It wasn't their war that is ok. Armenians were sent in WW1 and Kurds were not as much populated as today in eastern cities. I don't see their threat at that time. I believe 'Libya'is Roman and Egyptian name? İn Ottoman times separate regions as Trablus, Bingazi and Fizan was called 'Trablusgarp'.

warspite1 -> RE: The question to ask about The Italians (10/13/2020 6:48:20 AM)
quote: ORIGINAL: UP844 quote: ORIGINAL: Buckrock Though they had Operation Puma for the Canaries on the books in 1940 (post French defeat), Churchill and the Defence Committee considered the islands too exposed (enemy land based air) to hold and use as a potential Gibraltar replacement. Unless the Luftwaffe was allowed to use French air bases in Morocco (), only bombers could reach the Canaries from the Spanish peninsula: a few fighters and - above all - a radar stations should be enough force them to night missions. () an unlikely, but not impossible, assumption: see Syria 1941. Even with Germans based in Morocco, Santa Cruz de Tenerife is 320 km from the Moroccan coast, far enough to prevent Me109s from escorting bombers. Last but not least, supporting serious bombing strikes against the Canaries would not have been easy. Let's assume the Germans could safely ship bombs, fuel and spare parts to Casablanca (even though it can be assumed RN submarines would be waiting for them): they will still be 800 km away from the shortest route from Morocco to the Canaries. warspite1 I can only suppose Churchill was worried about air bases in Spanish Sahara (Modern day Morocco/Mauretania), although I can't imagine that there were any airfields worth the name at that time and it would take a large build up of supplies and fuel etc to be able to cater for large numbers of aircraft. The closest tip of Spanish Sahara to Gran Canaria (largest port) is probably less than 200km so assuming the Germans could get Bf-109's to newly created airfields right on the coast then they could escort bombers to Gran Canaria (with little time over the target). But would that even be practicable? As you say, the French could provide assistance via Morocco, but that brings up a whole new can of worms..... Of all the hare-brained, mad-cap schemes that Churchill did get involved in, it would be somewhat ironic that, if Spain was invaded, Churchill didn't grab this one with both hands...

Buckrock -> RE: The question to ask about The Italians (10/13/2020 9:28:26 AM)
quote: ORIGINAL: warspite1 I can only suppose Churchill was worried about air bases in Spanish Sahara (Modern day Morocco/Mauretania), although I can't imagine that there were any airfields worth the name at that time and it would take a large build up of supplies and fuel etc to be able to cater for large numbers of aircraft. The closest tip of Spanish Sahara to Gran Canaria (largest port) is probably less than 200km so assuming the Germans could get Bf-109's to newly created airfields right on the coast then they could escort bombers to Gran Canaria (with little time over the target). But would that even be practicable? Yes it was Gran Canaria that was the intended British objective. Churchill had ordered the navy to look at the possibilities as early as May 1940 while he was still the First Lord of the Admiralty. Churchill's comments (later in 1940 as Prime Minister) at the Defence Committee meeting regarding exposure to air threats were made after a briefing from the CoS, so it was likely they who had pointed out potential issues facing the plan to seize and then utilize Gran Canaria as an alternative to Gibraltar. Unfortunately the last time I was plodding through the Cabinet Documents, I was only looking at Defence Committee minutes, so I never saw any of the CoS briefing reports used in the meeting. quote: As you say, the French could provide assistance via Morocco, but that brings up a whole new can of worms..... Of all the hare-brained, mad-cap schemes that Churchill did get involved in, it would be somewhat ironic that, if Spain was invaded, Churchill didn't grab this one with both hands... I respect your determination to have British troops intervening wherever was needed to spoil German plans but the period after the French defeat until late 1940 was when Churchill was probably at his most cautious and least willing to commit to schemes that could lead to a further strain on the British military resources. I'm basing that opinion primarily from having previously done a walk through of Cabinet papers for both 1940 and 1941. The difference in planning ambition was enormous between those two years. As an example, the relatively achievable "Operation Brisk" (Azores) was green lit in Summer 1940 and the forces put on continuous 48 hour notice for the rest of the year (and the next) but despite Churchill's early desire to obtain Gran Canaria, that operation was only green lit in May 1941 when the larger resources required became available. About the only move I could see considered for the Canary Islands in 1940 would have been a small-scale "denial" operation where a few battalions of British Marines might make a surprise landing, overwhelm the defenders or gain their acquiescence and then hold the facilities until such time the Germans had clearly positioned themselves to attempt an invasion under the cover of land-based air. At this point, the British would attempt to wreck the facilities and then withdraw. This was an historical plan being considered during 1940 but it had so many variables that it was never approved. Clearly though, had the Spanish for some reason issued an open invitation for the British to come and defend the Canary Islands, I'm sure Churchill would have packed his cigars and sun hat and been on the first boat out.

Buckrock -> RE: The question to ask about The Italians (10/13/2020 2:48:53 PM)
Just as a snapshot of the historical CoS thinking in 1940 if Gibraltar were to become untenable (note the current absence of the Canary Islands in the to-do list). From The Chiefs of Staff Committee's "Strategic Appreciation", 1st Sep 1940.... "THE ATLANTIC. Today our trade routes in the Atlantic are more severely threatened than those in the Indian Ocean or the Pacific. This threat would be intensified by a German advance south-westward into Spain and West Africa. Should Gibraltar become unusable by our naval forces, Italian units would have greater freedom of exit from the Mediterranean into the Atlantic. To meet this threat we must be prepared, if necessary, to - (a) divert trade from south and east of Singapore across the Pacific and through the Panama Canal. - (b) occupy the Azores and Cape Verde Islands in order to deny their use to the enemy as fuelling bases and use the Azores as a base ourselves. The necessary land and air forces must remain earmarked for these operations. - (c) Route shipping in the South Atlantic via Trinidad for bunkers and thence to Bermuda and Halifax for convoy, basing surface escort forces on Bermuda and Halifax. An advance to the South-West, while bringing few immediate economic benefits to Germany, would place her in a better position to weaken the blockade and threaten our sea communications. To carry it out would require little diversion of effort and it might well be combined with naval and air attacks on our shipping and ports in the United Kingdom as well as air attacks directed against our industry and morale."

warspite1 -> RE: The question to ask about The Italians (10/13/2020 3:14:36 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: Buckrock Clearly though, had the Spanish for some reason issued an open invitation for the British to come and defend the Canary Islands, I'm sure Churchill would have packed his cigars and sun hat and been on the first boat out. warspite1 And this has to be the thinking as far as I'm concerned - others may view it differently and that is fine. But everything about Churchill, his actions - Greece was a real doozy - says he would have ordered troops, aircraft and ships to the Canaries (note this is in circumstances of the scenario being discussed only) and done everything possible to keep Spain in the game for as long as possible - hopefully he would be dissuaded from sending troops to the mainland.... As far as the CoS thinking is concerned (and I still have to believe they are thinking of a Felix).....but even then, I know one mustn't use hindsight but FFS.... Why did they not mention the NorthWest Passage while they were about it?

Zap -> RE: The question to ask about The Italians (10/13/2020 4:16:03 PM)
And the Italians what happened to them in the discussion? So the consensus says Germany could not supply them with upgraded tanks. But they could have proved their troops with training on military tactics, organization, maybe even instill in them the concept of fighting with more tenacity. Again this is in the realm of possibility. If it was done, despite all reasons why you think it was impossible. Would that help have made the Italians a better fighting force and could it have made a difference in Africa?.

Buckrock -> RE: The question to ask about The Italians (10/13/2020 4:44:45 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: warspite1 quote: ORIGINAL: Buckrock Clearly though, had the Spanish for some reason issued an open invitation for the British to come and defend the Canary Islands, I'm sure Churchill would have packed his cigars and sun hat and been on the first boat out. warspite1 And this has to be the thinking as far as I'm concerned - others may view it differently and that is fine. Well you're more optimistic than the Defence Committee and CoS were in late 1940 about Spanish co-operation in the Canaries if they weren't also being offered British troops to fight side-by-side with the Spaniards in Iberia or even Morocco. quote: But everything about Churchill, his actions - Greece was a real doozy - says he would have ordered troops, aircraft and ships to the Canaries (note this is in circumstances of the scenario being discussed only) and done everything possible to keep Spain in the game for as long as possible - hopefully he would be dissuaded from sending troops to the mainland.... You can dream. Unfortunately there was also the issue at this time of limited military resources available for such an effort as it would have to follow quickly on the heels of the operations against the Azores and Cape Verde and unlike the latter two, there were no forces already selected or on standby for the Canary Islands. But we can deal with all this once your hypothesis ticks along a bit.[:'(] quote: As far as the CoS thinking is concerned (and I still have to believe they are thinking of a Felix).....but even then, I know one mustn't use hindsight but FFS.... Why did they not mention the NorthWest Passage while they were about it? The CoS were more likely to be referring to an actual German advance into Spain (ie an attack on) as this assessment was made at a time when it was believed by the British that "the tide may have turned" regarding the likelihood of Spanish co-operation with Germany now that Franco was reported to be losing his influence while the all-important Spanish Generals (many now on the British payroll) would likely refuse to support a German entry into Spain. It was believed Germany would now have to either go big or go home. Edit - Actually I just checked and the CoS report was issued about two weeks before reports from Spain reached London indicating an apparent Spanish change of attitude towards German co-operation. So the CoS report is likely referring to a situation where Spain has actively joined the Axis or at least grants access to Germany to operate on her soil, the opposite of what I mentioned above. And it may take me some weeks of searching to establish the CoS view of a German advance on the NW Passage but I'm sure there will eventually be an answer found.

RangerJoe -> RE: The question to ask about The Italians (10/13/2020 5:03:30 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: warspite1 quote: ORIGINAL: Buckrock Clearly though, had the Spanish for some reason issued an open invitation for the British to come and defend the Canary Islands, I'm sure Churchill would have packed his cigars and sun hat and been on the first boat out. warspite1 And this has to be the thinking as far as I'm concerned - others may view it differently and that is fine. But everything about Churchill, his actions - Greece was a real doozy - says he would have ordered troops, aircraft and ships to the Canaries (note this is in circumstances of the scenario being discussed only) and done everything possible to keep Spain in the game for as long as possible - hopefully he would be dissuaded from sending troops to the mainland.... As far as the CoS thinking is concerned (and I still have to believe they are thinking of a Felix).....but even then, I know one mustn't use hindsight but FFS.... Why did they not mention the NorthWest Passage while they were about it? Due to the unusually cold winters during that period, the NorthWest Passage was probably not usable for a decent length of time plus the risk of ships getting stuck in the ice over the winter as pretty high. In the 1920s, the Arctic Ocean had a lot less ice coverage while Southern South America as well as Australia was having severe droughts. Then the climate cycle changed to a cold pattern with a string of 7 colder than normal winters starting in the 1930s. Then a record cold winter in 1941-1942in Eastern Europe.

UP844 -> RE: The question to ask about The Italians (10/13/2020 5:27:37 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: Zap And the Italians what happened to them in the discussion? They were being judged ideal as garrisons from Lisbon to Bassora [:D]. quote: ORIGINAL: Zap So the consensus says Germany could not supply them with upgraded tanks. But they could have proved their troops with training on military tactics, organization, maybe even instill in them the concept of fighting with more tenacity. Again this is in the realm of possibility. If it was done, despite all reasons why you think it was impossible. Would that help have made the Italians a better fighting force and could it have made a difference in Africa?. The Italian mobile forces in Africa learnt a lot from the Afrika Korps and from 1941 onwards performed better than it is usually recognised by friends and foes alike (e.g. the "Ariete" Division at Bir-El-Gubi in 1941 during Crusader or the "Centauro" Division at Kasserine in 1943). Of course, you can have a sound doctrine, but this won't make an M13/40 capable of destroying a Lee or a Sherman. Infantry units (the few ones remaining after Compass) were mostly used in static defensive roles and so they didn't have many opportunities to learn from the Germans. On a side note, in 1944 the Germans trained (and partially equipped with small arms) four infantry divisions of the Repubblica Sociale (the Italian fascist state in the North), but they subsequently refused to use them against the Allies, leaving them to garrison the Ligurian coast against possible (and highly unlikely) Allied landings. The sole exception were a few battalions that took part in the 1944 Christmas attack against the US 92nd Infantry Division (see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Garfagnana).

warspite1 -> RE: The question to ask about The Italians (10/13/2020 5:31:22 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: RangerJoe quote: ORIGINAL: warspite1 quote: ORIGINAL: Buckrock Clearly though, had the Spanish for some reason issued an open invitation for the British to come and defend the Canary Islands, I'm sure Churchill would have packed his cigars and sun hat and been on the first boat out. warspite1 And this has to be the thinking as far as I'm concerned - others may view it differently and that is fine. But everything about Churchill, his actions - Greece was a real doozy - says he would have ordered troops, aircraft and ships to the Canaries (note this is in circumstances of the scenario being discussed only) and done everything possible to keep Spain in the game for as long as possible - hopefully he would be dissuaded from sending troops to the mainland.... As far as the CoS thinking is concerned (and I still have to believe they are thinking of a Felix).....but even then, I know one mustn't use hindsight but FFS.... Why did they not mention the NorthWest Passage while they were about it? Due to the unusually cold winters during that period, the NorthWest Passage was probably not usable for a decent length of time plus the risk of ships getting stuck in the ice over the winter as pretty high. In the 1920s, the Arctic Ocean had a lot less ice coverage while Southern South America as well as Australia was having severe droughts. Then the climate cycle changed to a cold pattern with a string of 7 colder than normal winters starting in the 1930s. warspite1 Erm.....[:D]

RangerJoe -> RE: The question to ask about The Italians (10/13/2020 5:55:48 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: warspite1 quote: ORIGINAL: RangerJoe quote: ORIGINAL: warspite1 quote: ORIGINAL: Buckrock Clearly though, had the Spanish for some reason issued an open invitation for the British to come and defend the Canary Islands, I'm sure Churchill would have packed his cigars and sun hat and been on the first boat out. warspite1 And this has to be the thinking as far as I'm concerned - others may view it differently and that is fine. But everything about Churchill, his actions - Greece was a real doozy - says he would have ordered troops, aircraft and ships to the Canaries (note this is in circumstances of the scenario being discussed only) and done everything possible to keep Spain in the game for as long as possible - hopefully he would be dissuaded from sending troops to the mainland.... As far as the CoS thinking is concerned (and I still have to believe they are thinking of a Felix).....but even then, I know one mustn't use hindsight but FFS.... Why did they not mention the NorthWest Passage while they were about it? Due to the unusually cold winters during that period, the NorthWest Passage was probably not usable for a decent length of time plus the risk of ships getting stuck in the ice over the winter as pretty high. In the 1920s, the Arctic Ocean had a lot less ice coverage while Southern South America as well as Australia was having severe droughts. Then the climate cycle changed to a cold pattern with a string of 7 colder than normal winters starting in the 1930s. warspite1 Erm.....[:D] Yes, then some very brilliant[;)] people in Nazi Germany felt that Europe was due for a warmer than normal winter during 1941-1942 so they were a little slow in delivering winter weather equipment to their forces in the USSR . . . [8\|]

warspite1 -> RE: The question to ask about The Italians (10/14/2020 7:04:49 AM)
quote: ORIGINAL: Zap And the Italians what happened to them in the discussion? So the consensus says Germany could not supply them with upgraded tanks. But they could have proved their troops with training on military tactics, organization, maybe even instill in them the concept of fighting with more tenacity. Again this is in the realm of possibility. If it was done, despite all reasons why you think it was impossible. Would that help have made the Italians a better fighting force and could it have made a difference in Africa?. warspite1 What happened to the Italians? Well they've remained a feature as you would expect from an early war discussion. But as UP844 says, Lemay has them good only for occupation duty everywhere - and although he may be right in terms of their combat value, that can't happen in real life because it ignores.... real life. I don't know why you've said: quote: But they could have proved their troops with training on military tactics, organization, maybe even instill in them the concept of fighting with more tenacity. Again this is in the realm of possibility. If it was done, despite all reasons why you think it was impossible. A number of people have made pertinent points about the Italian Army in WWII - and specifically that the addition of German equipment (even where possible) wasn't, in itself, going to change much. But of course the Italians could have attempted to change things and it would not have been impossible - in theory nothing is impossible... BUT Firstly there has to be a recognition of the problem. Who is going to recognise that, when Mussolini was only interested in numbers of divisions and not their quality in terms of equipment and the number of regiments within? Who is going to recognise, that when Pariani was so grossly incompetent as Chief of the General Staff and under-secretary of war, he oversaw an army that didn't have enough uniforms let alone equipment. He oversaw the switch to 'binary divisions' by cutting the regiments from three to two and, as he himself recognised, meant that the divisions were really no more than mixed brigades.... Then, once the war started and those deficiencies became all too evident (if they weren't really known about before, which seems unbelievable) there was limited opportunity to make good for all the reasons mentioned previously about the lack of industrial base to equip a large army. Without appropriate equipment, troops - no matter how well trained - are going to struggle. So who was going to train these troops, who was going to instil this new doctrine? Remember the Italian Army decision to not focus on tanks and armoured fighting vehicles was a choice. Simply, the army rejected such 'exotic doctrines'. In late 1940! General Roatta was 'decisively opposed to the abolition of horse cavalry.... Badoglio said of the Germans tactics that shattered the French "We'll study it when the war is over". General Roatta's (of Guadalajara fame....) CoS wrote after the war that the Italian Army neglected training "from an absence of doctrine, exercise areas, and equipment, but also because of the wide-spread assumption that in battle, intuition and individual valour counted for more than training". There was a desperate shortage of NCO's "disastrously weak in numbers, tradition and prestige". The poor state of education in the south did not help the situation. There is plenty more to write sadly but its all of the same vein. I would recommend Mussolini Unleashed 1939-41 Politics and Strategy in Fascist Italy's Last War (Knox) The obvious thing, certainly with hindsight, is they should have asked the Germans to effectively train the Regio Esercito - certainly post Prague. But that wouldn't do for three reasons, Italians clearly didn't think (or probably more accurately didn't want to admit) they had a problem and, despite what Lemay thinks about Italy, in the real world, even if they did, the Italians were too proud, and their general nervousness of Germany too strong, to even consider such a thing. But also, no one knew at that stage how effective the German Army was going to be. So although an obvious solution with hindsight - it was really no solution at all. If the CoS and Under-Secretary of War, in August 1939, was prepared to give the Army the sign-off in terms of their readiness for war (despite everything he knew) then who were the "they" that were going to order this re-training and provision of an amended doctrine? So when you say "they could have" I think it needs to be understood who "they" actually are, what "they" actually believe, and what "they" had to work with, before looking at what "they" could have done differently.

warspite1 -> RE: The question to ask about The Italians (10/14/2020 11:50:23 AM)
quote: ORIGINAL: Buckrock quote: ORIGINAL: warspite1 quote: ORIGINAL: Buckrock Clearly though, had the Spanish for some reason issued an open invitation for the British to come and defend the Canary Islands, I'm sure Churchill would have packed his cigars and sun hat and been on the first boat out. warspite1 And this has to be the thinking as far as I'm concerned - others may view it differently and that is fine. Well you're more optimistic than the Defence Committee and CoS were in late 1940 about Spanish co-operation in the Canaries if they weren't also being offered British troops to fight side-by-side with the Spaniards in Iberia or even Morocco. quote: But everything about Churchill, his actions - Greece was a real doozy - says he would have ordered troops, aircraft and ships to the Canaries (note this is in circumstances of the scenario being discussed only) and done everything possible to keep Spain in the game for as long as possible - hopefully he would be dissuaded from sending troops to the mainland.... You can dream. Unfortunately there was also the issue at this time of limited military resources available for such an effort as it would have to follow quickly on the heels of the operations against the Azores and Cape Verde and unlike the latter two, there were no forces already selected or on standby for the Canary Islands. But we can deal with all this once your hypothesis ticks along a bit.[:'(] quote: As far as the CoS thinking is concerned (and I still have to believe they are thinking of a Felix).....but even then, I know one mustn't use hindsight but FFS.... Why did they not mention the NorthWest Passage while they were about it? The CoS were more likely to be referring to an actual German advance into Spain (ie an attack on) as this assessment was made at a time when it was believed by the British that "the tide may have turned" regarding the likelihood of Spanish co-operation with Germany now that Franco was reported to be losing his influence while the all-important Spanish Generals (many now on the British payroll) would likely refuse to support a German entry into Spain. It was believed Germany would now have to either go big or go home. Edit - Actually I just checked and the CoS report was issued about two weeks before reports from Spain reached London indicating an apparent Spanish change of attitude towards German co-operation. So the CoS report is likely referring to a situation where Spain has actively joined the Axis or at least grants access to Germany to operate on her soil, the opposite of what I mentioned above. And it may take me some weeks of searching to establish the CoS view of a German advance on the NW Passage but I'm sure there will eventually be an answer found. warspite1 It's not optimism or pessimism. I am just trying to look at the available evidence to decide what I think most likely. Frankly, I wouldn't be surprised either way. As I've commented many times before, the British and French from September 1939 to June 1940 (and the British for some time after) was like a lesson in how not to go to war.... ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Again, no dream - I don't look at this that way. What the British would have done is what they would have done. I am not like some who seem to believe that because I was born in country A, country A has never done anything wrong. You assume that the Azores and Cape Verde operations would have taken place. It's not clear what Germany would have done about Portugal and, absence an attack on that country, putting in place a Canaries operation (with an ally) may have made more sense than upsetting a neutral?? ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Well maybe, maybe not. I still think that looking at Churchill and the actions he took is the biggest reason to believe he wouldn't have been able to help himself. But then nothing would really surprise me...... But so long as one of the island operations - either Spain or Portugal - was carried out then that would limit to some extent the damage of Gibraltar being lost.

Buckrock -> RE: The question to ask about The Italians (10/14/2020 2:32:20 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: warspite1 You assume that the Azores and Cape Verde operations would have taken place. It's not clear what Germany would have done about Portugal and, absence an attack on that country, putting in place a Canaries operation (with an ally) may have made more sense than upsetting a neutral?? Yeah, I do assume that the Azores operation at least would have happened as every time something worrying appeared to be happening in (or to) Spain during 40/41, Churchill would put his finger on the button marked "Operation Brisk" and ask "now tell me why I shouldn't press the button this time". The answer that would stop him rarely seemed to involve what offence the Portuguese may take. If Germany went after Spain or Spain joined the Axis, Portugal was assumed to be collateral damage anyway. And the British saw any operations against the Atlantic Islands as time critical, even if Germany had not yet stepped across any borders. If intel indicating either a German offensive into Spain or a Spanish switch to Axis Radio was confirmed to be imminent, the operation would almost certainly have gone based on what I saw in the Cabinet documents. Cape Verde and Madiera were also on the list but in 1940 they had to wait till sufficient forces were available to ensure a simultaneous grab as once the British made a move it was assumed all the other Atlantic Islands and their owners would go on alert and not neccessarily be welcoming to later visits. Since the Portuguese never signed off on any deals to allow a British presence during this period, it was always uncertain what the reception would be. And it was considered much more likely that a hostile reception might be received in the Spanish Canaries, even if the Germans had entered Spain "without express permission". And as I previously indicated, the Great Spanish Canary Grab was off the books anyway in 1940. While I haven't tracked down the specific CoS report that convinced Churchill back then, I have come across the JPS report (authored by the eminent I.S.O. Playfair) passed up through the CoS to the Defence Committee in April '41 that put "Operation Puma" (originally "Operation Chutney"[sm=vomit-smiley-020.gif]) on the list of approved operations. The report addressed the issues that had earlier nerfed the Canaries..... "Although it was always recognized that the Canaries offered the only substitute to Gibralter as a base for big ships, our original plans for the Atlantic Islands have not hitherto included the Canaries for the following reasons:- a) We could not afford the fighter defence which, owing to their proximity to the mainland of Africa, was thought to be neccessary in view of the possibility of German use of French airfields or hostilities with Vichy France. b) We lacked the neccessary shipping, landing craft and sufficient forces for the operation. These reasons no longer apply." quote: Well maybe, maybe not. I still think that looking at Churchill and the actions he took is the biggest reason to believe he wouldn't have been able to help himself. But then nothing would really surprise me...... But so long as one of the island operations - either Spain or Portugal - was carried out then that would limit to some extent the damage of Gibraltar being lost. Since you previously brought up Greece as an example of Churchillian adventuring, that plan (to commit ground troops to fight on the mainland) had first received the approval in February of Wavell (ME), Dill (CIGS) and the CoS Committee before Churchill gave it the go ahead. By the time it later went pear-shaped, the Brits felt themselves too committed to cancel. On the other hand, the CoS in 1940 had recommended against any attempts to seize the Canary Islands. In judging how likely Churchill would have gone all Warlord and ordered it anyway, Greece is not really a valid indicator of what Churchill might do when his CoS has already said no. Of course, we can never say never (although I just did).

warspite1 -> RE: The question to ask about The Italians (10/14/2020 2:48:35 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: Buckrock And as I previously indicated, the Great Spanish Canary Grab was off the books anyway in 1940. While I haven't tracked down the specific CoS report that convinced Churchill back then, I have come across the JPS report (authored by the eminent I.S.O. Playfair) passed up through the CoS to the Defence Committee in April '41 that put "Operation Puma" (originally "Operation Chutney"[sm=vomit-smiley-020.gif]) on the list of approved operations. The report addressed the issues that had earlier nerfed the Canaries..... "Although it was always recognized that the Canaries offered the only substitute to Gibralter as a base for big ships, our original plans for the Atlantic Islands have not hitherto included the Canaries for the following reasons:- a) We could not afford the fighter defence which, owing to their proximity to the mainland of Africa, was thought to be neccessary in view of the possibility of German use of French airfields or hostilities with Vichy France. b) We lacked the neccessary shipping, landing craft and sufficient forces for the operation. These reasons no longer apply." warspite1 Can you clarify what the last sentence means and why these reasons no longer apply? Interesting that b) above still seems to indicate that they are looking at this as a Naughty Spain scenario?

Buckrock -> RE: The question to ask about The Italians (10/14/2020 3:11:07 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: warspite1 Can you clarify what the last sentence means and why these reasons no longer apply? It means they now (Apr '41) had the required military resources available, that is sufficient ships, landing craft and troops to ensure the capture of Gran Canaria (and then secure the rest of the Canaries) and sufficient fighters for an ongoing air defence of the islands. quote: Interesting that b) above still seems to indicate that they are looking at this as a Naughty Spain scenario? No. The circumstances at this point in time suggested Spain would be the victim of German aggression. Despite that, the report listed four potential scenarios that the 1941 landing might face, three of them with at least some expectation of resistance but since the operation was expected to sail post haste and without waiting for the finer details of diplomacy to be conducted with the Spanish, the task force would always be expected to sail with sufficient force to deal with the worst case scenario.

warspite1 -> RE: The question to ask about The Italians (10/14/2020 3:38:43 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: Buckrock quote: ORIGINAL: warspite1 Can you clarify what the last sentence means and why these reasons no longer apply? It means they now (Apr '41) had the required military resources available, that is sufficient ships, landing craft and troops to ensure the capture of Gran Canaria (and then secure the rest of the Canaries) and sufficient fighters for an ongoing air defence of the islands. quote: Interesting that b) above still seems to indicate that they are looking at this as a Naughty Spain scenario? No. The circumstances at this point in time suggested Spain would be the victim of German aggression. Despite that, the report listed four potential scenarios that the 1941 landing might face, three of them with at least some expectation of resistance but since the operation was expected to sail post haste and without waiting for the finer details of diplomacy to be conducted with the Spanish, the task force would always be expected to sail with sufficient force to deal with the worst case scenario. warspite1 Well I think others should chip in on this. Sounds to me like the Azores would be a given in the event that the Germans "Are off to sunny Spain" sing along now. The question is whether the Canaries would follow in the case of a "by invitation only" type scenario. As said, I think Canaries by force is a no-no and, from what you've produced, so would a Canaries with an uncertain reception "If you're names not daaaaan, you're not comin' in". But a Franco invite? I just can't see Churchill refusing that one.

Buckrock -> RE: The question to ask about The Italians (10/14/2020 3:42:33 PM)
For some reason I'm getting the impression that you really, really want Churchill to get a pet canary as an early birthday present.

warspite1 -> RE: The question to ask about The Italians (10/14/2020 8:06:28 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: Buckrock For some reason I'm getting the impression that you really, really want Churchill to get a pet canary as an early birthday present. warspite1 Not at all. In the specific scenario outlined; Naughty Axis and a party invite from the hostess with the mostest, then it would seem to be a rather dumb move not to. That said there would be good reasons not to so I'm happy to go with the flo on this.

RFalvo69 -> RE: The question to ask about The Italians (10/14/2020 9:51:22 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: Zap And the Italians what happened to them in the discussion? So the consensus says Germany could not supply them with upgraded tanks. But they could have proved their troops with training on military tactics, organization, maybe even instill in them the concept of fighting with more tenacity. Again this is in the realm of possibility. If it was done, despite all reasons why you think it was impossible. Would that help have made the Italians a better fighting force and could it have made a difference in Africa?. My guess is that such a "show of support" would have undermined Mussolini & The Italian General Staff's authority and competence - possibly leading to a much more fragile grip on the nation by the Fascisti (after all, when the measure was full it actually was not so difficult to remove Mussolini from the scene ands get rid of fascism - the problem were the Germans). Anyway, I doubt that Hitler wanted a politically weakened ally (when he realised the reality of the Italian armed forces I guess that all he wanted was for Italy to stay out of trouble and not cause more). On his side, Mussolini, when he had still a relatively grip on power, would have not accepted such level of help from Germany for the same reasons. Beside, in a rare moment of lucidity, Mussolini once confided that he didn't want help from the Germans because "If I let them into my home they will never leave."

Buckrock -> RE: The question to ask about The Italians (10/15/2020 10:14:17 AM)
quote: ORIGINAL: warspite1 quote: ORIGINAL: Buckrock For some reason I'm getting the impression that you really, really want Churchill to get a pet canary as an early birthday present. warspite1 Not at all. In the specific scenario outlined; Naughty Axis and a party invite from the hostess with the mostest, then it would seem to be a rather dumb move not to. That said there would be good reasons not to so I'm happy to go with the flo on this. OK but for any later deliberations on this, I'd suggest not assuming that an historical course of (in)action that seems "dumb" now, was so clear cut back then. As a guide, my take on the British thinking in the period Mar-May '41 (a period where they had now established a discreet but not inconsiderable level of dialogue with certain key Spanish figures of authority) was as follows:- Spain does not currently want to join in or openly co-operate with Axis operations. So long as Britain does nothing stoopidly counter-productive, Spain will continue to resist any purely diplomatic German pressure to allow the their military access to Spanish territory. If however Germany ramps up the pressure by introducing the possibility of a military threat into the mix, Spain will most likely fold in one of the following ways.... a) Agree to join the Axis and openly participate in German actions against Gibraltar, Portugual, etc. b) Issue a diplomatic protest, ask Britain and the US for assistance and then, when that is not immediately forthcoming, claim a fait accompli, request terms with Germany and then give her what she originally demanded. c) Offer some form of limited military resistance in addition to b). In regards to Spanish military resistance, this is the stated JPS view (and concurred by CoS) during the planning of "Operation Puma" (April '41).... "Even in the unlikely event of Spanish forces resisting a German move into Spain, we do not think that such resistance can do little more than delay the investment of Gibraltar." It's worth noting the critical factor in the British planning for the seizure of the Canaries is time. It was estimated to take some 28 days to prepare the operational forces, gather the shipping, set sail and then reach the Canaries. The concern for the British was that even if the Spanish were resisting the Germans on the day the operation was activated, by the time it was closing in on the Canaries, it was considered likely that the Spanish would have already reached terms with the Germans, ceased any hostilities and possibly allowed German airpower to deploy into Morocco and the Canaries. That was a key reason why the British felt any move by them on the Canaries (or even the Azores) needed to be initiated before the Germans had begun their own movement into or against Spain, which in turn made it very tricky to know when exactly to pull the trigger as if they got it wrong, it might be somewhat embarrassing. Little wonder the Brits historically resisted the temptation to pull the trigger with this even during the critical '41-42 period.

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