RE: Allied Strategy- One or Two Pronged????? (Full Version)

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Mr.Frag -> RE: Allied Strategy- One or Two Pronged????? (5/27/2004 6:10:47 AM)

quote:

When testers reported they had reinforced Wake, was that with non-historical starts?


There are two possibilities. One is the Vary start. Midway/Wake can be reinforced. The other is Non-Historical where the player probably sent thos troops down to Rabaul instead.



j campbell -> RE: Allied Strategy- One or Two Pronged????? (5/27/2004 2:42:11 PM)

Mike,

i agree with the Dolittle raid as merely a publicity stunt-and a risky one at that considering what there was to gain vs. lose. It ended up costing the Chinese about 250,000 lives as a direct result of American action. Chiang had no illusions about what the doolittle raid was going to cost but Roosevelt did not listen/care. it did however, cement the japanese decision on the Midway operation-hence leading to the destruction of 4 japanese CV-but who whould have known this before the raid?



Speedysteve -> RE: Allied Strategy- One or Two Pronged????? (5/27/2004 2:42:18 PM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: mdiehl


quote:

I love this quote: "The American Army doesn't solve its problems. It overwhelms them."


That's one of my favorites too. I first saw it in "An Army at Dawn." Any idea when the sequel is supposed to come out?


IIRC this is Rick Atkinsons book?

If so I thoroughly enjoyed it. I too am eagerly awaiting the 2 other releases. It's been a while since "An Army at Dawn" was released but i've heard nothing more on the sequels...........



jhdeerslayer -> RE: Allied Strategy- One or Two Pronged????? (5/27/2004 5:11:51 PM)

I believe the 2nd book is coming in 2005 and the final 2008. Says the schedule somewhere in Volume 1 I believe.



mdiehl -> RE: Allied Strategy- One or Two Pronged????? (5/27/2004 6:46:13 PM)

quote:

Why would the US have risked almost the entire carrier forces afloat if they did not think they could win at Midway?


Immaterial to the discussion at hand. The original thrust was that the US player should not be rewarded for doing that which the JCS intended to do. Sit around and wait for a great opportunity to strike a blow. Midway was exactly such an opportunity. Unless you are going to require that the Japanese player send an understrength TF to a remote, substantially built up island with a potentially robust aircraft contingent, far from Japan's logistical bases, and also require that the Japanese player set all air units in that TF to "airfield attack," then it is inappropriate to demand action from the Allied player.

Every time this trivial notion comes up it is a transparent AF ploy to fabricate of whole cloth circumstances that merely generate VP for the Japanese player. Just admit that you want to handicap the Allied player and be done with all the badly informed notions about 'that which history requires.'

quote:

And why even attempt to thwart the Japanese at Coral Sea if the JCS could wait to take offensive until '43? The fact is they couldn't wait and events bore that out.


Your one sentence demonstrates a failure to understand Coral Sea. It was not an offensive operation. It was purely a defensive operation. The JCS DID in fact wait until 1943 to take the offensive in New Guinea.

quote:

Not to mention Doolittle or the Rabaul raid.... It was for exact moral/political reasons that you offhandedly dismiss as "garbage".


The Rabaul raid had absolutely nothing to do with "political" reasons. It was done solely and exclusively to test Japanese defenses along the perimeter and upset Japanese operational planning. It was an excellent strategic move, and any allied player would likely pull the "raid and fade" trick a couple of times, simply to keep the Japanese player committing assets to remote areas. But if the Allied player is risk averse, I see no reason to demand that the Allied player attempt such operations. The Doolittle raid was more of the same. An effort to upset Japanese operational plans, force redeployments, new commitments and loss of face in the chain of command. It was NOT at any point conceived primarily as a pr stunt for political consumption by the American home public. Anyonw who believes otherwise does not understand what it means to attack your opponents mindshare.

quote:

The fact that the Japanese were building an airstrip on Guadalcanal forced the US to take action or have lines of communication with Australia threatened. Which is what the Victory Points kind of approximate, they force you to take some action as the Allied player and not hide in a shell.


Why not prevent the Japanese player from hiding in a shell with his CVs and sitting around wating for a 6 on 3 CV battle. I guess we should require that Japan attempt to invade San Francisco by rewarding large numbers of VPs to the Allied player for possessing San Francisco.

quote:

The Japanese advance forced the hand of the Allies, who by winning (Midway), or coming to a draw with the IJN (Coral Sea), took the initiative in '42 and gained valuble experience and confidence that carried over to huge gains of '43.


Right. So unless the Japanese player is required to lose 4 CVs in an ill-advised blunder, it follows that one should not require the Allied player to sacrifice resources in ill-advised blunders (which a Guadalcanal campaign would likely be unless you have substantially depleted Japan's CV force).

quote:

It'll be up to the Allied player on how to respond to the IJN player.


Agreed. That is why I'm coming around to Mike's POV that the VP scoring system simply be ignored. Maybe there should be an option to disable the VP count. It'd be interesting to see how strategies differe between a VP game and a non-VP game.

quote:

And it's just a disingenous stab at someone to say that political considerations in the early part of the Pacific War were bunk.


Actually, it is a disingenuous stab to suggest that such claims were bunk. Political considerations were not the driving force behind any early PTO Allied raids. CVs were much too valuable to place them under undue risk solely for PR footage. That is why Hornet and Enterprise turned back from the Doolittle raid at the first sign of potential risk, and why Spruance's orders at Midway were to engage only if there was a likelihood of inflicting greater damage on the enemy. The US was in the Pacific War for the long haul, and the op-planners knew that defeating Japan was merely and solely a matter of time. Claims that the public would have demanded a negotiated peace had none of the victories of 1942 occurred are AF self-serving whole-cloth fabrications based on nothing at all.



Speedysteve -> RE: Allied Strategy- One or Two Pronged????? (5/27/2004 7:15:51 PM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: Deerslayer

I believe the 2nd book is coming in 2005 and the final 2008. Says the schedule somewhere in Volume 1 I believe.


Ok great. Do you know the action theatres of the last 2 books?



jhdeerslayer -> RE: Allied Strategy- One or Two Pronged????? (5/27/2004 7:31:56 PM)

I believe the rest of the Mediterean (sp??) campaign and then Western Europe.



Mr.Frag -> RE: Allied Strategy- One or Two Pronged????? (5/27/2004 8:10:49 PM)

Funny enough, the longer you completely hide your CV's as The Allied player, the more of an effect it has on Japan's ego. Not knowing is worse then knowing. Having to always wonder if you are going to get bushwhacked seriously screws with your head.

The Japanese player knows from playing that towards the end of Jan there will be 4 fully stocked Fleet CV's *somewhere* on the map waiting for a chance to spank him because he advanced too fast. This plays with his mind. It is a valuable tool to keep this mind pressure running. Should your CV's show themselves, he now knows where they are *not* and can quickly free up lots of resources that were tied up *in* *case* you showed up.



mdiehl -> RE: Allied Strategy- One or Two Pronged????? (5/27/2004 9:56:59 PM)

quote:

Funny enough, the longer you completely hide your CV's as The Allied player, the more of an effect it has on Japan's ego. Not knowing is worse then knowing.


You've got a point there. But to keep the threat credible the Allied player is likely to show up once in a while, hit hard, and disappear. Hence the "raid and fade." Keeps the Japanese player on a sort of alert state with air units deployed at their limits, etc.



ColFrost -> Germany First (5/27/2004 10:33:06 PM)

Mike Scholl said
"As long as you realize that the arguments for early Allied offensives are pure garbage,
and that it was not only considered "acceptable" to wait for 1943, but it was the Joint
Chiefs express plan and strategy to do so. That's what "Germany First" meant........It looks like the game's "victory points" are going to force much the same kind of
nonsense on the Allied Player (Midway or no Midway), so you should be pleased. But
please don't try to cloak it in any robes of "Historical Necessity". Original US strategic
planning would have had the war with Japan going into 1946 if necessary..., and no
one was worried about the Japanese "winning" in the interim. ""

And

"When I said GARBAGE, I meant that in the terms of the overall strategic planning and
outlook of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, OFFENSIVE action was not a priority in the Pacific
Theatre. When the War broke out, certainly DEFENSIVE measures in the Pacific were
a priority (The Brits and Commonwealth at least had that covered in Europe and the
Atlantic, and would find some assets for India)........."

I apologize. I should have been more clear. I meant not doing /any/ operations, not offensive operations. I was speaking of allowing , for example, the Japanese player to take everything they wanted until the Allied player had a technological advantage. I would think that the American public couldn't handle the laundry list of defeats month after month without a Doolittle or a Gaudalcanal (which was excessively hyped as "America takes it back to the Japs!").

But seriously, (especially Mike Scholl, mdiehl, and Mr. Frag, who I always seem to run afoul of), do you think the US could have not tried to do anything until 1943, including defend points in the south Pacific, without perhaps a negative opinion forming, and a 'negotiated settlement possible?" I may be wrong, but if I don't ask, I won't know. [:)]

Look forward to your response.



kaleun -> RE: Germany First (5/27/2004 10:45:22 PM)

To add to your question, there were election s in the US in 1944 IIRC. I wonder, if no offensive action had been taken in 1942-43, under a wait for absolute supremacy policy, would FDR have still won in 44? Actually, so shortly after Normandy, he probably would have, but would he have run the risk? After all they couldn't be certain that Overlord would be launched in the summer of 44. If Overlord had been delayed due to weather, and if there had been no successes at Midway, Guadalcanal, How would that affect the US political arena for the elections in 44?
Could spark (probably will) a ton of posts.



Mr.Frag -> RE: Germany First (5/27/2004 10:59:52 PM)

quote:

do you think the US could have not tried to do anything until 1943, including defend points in the south Pacific, without perhaps a negative opinion forming, and a 'negotiated settlement possible?"


They did not have the troops available for offensive operations earlier. Had Coral Sea/Midway not pretty much eliminated the Japanese navy, there would have been very little the USA could do. Anyone would has played the scenario 19 as in UV gets about a quarter of what Japan could really have thrown into the mix.

As war will always show, the attacker controls the tempo until the defender is strong enough to block all attacks *AND* have enough left over to attack with. This does not happen until '43.

All the ships and planes in the world will not win a land battle. Troops win those.



ColFrost -> RE: Germany First (5/27/2004 11:32:06 PM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: Mr.Frag

quote:

do you think the US could have not tried to do anything until 1943, including defend points in the south Pacific, without perhaps a negative opinion forming, and a 'negotiated settlement possible?"


They did not have the troops available for offensive operations earlier. Had Coral Sea/Midway not pretty much eliminated the Japanese navy, there would have been very little the USA could do. Anyone would has played the scenario 19 as in UV gets about a quarter of what Japan could really have thrown into the mix.

As war will always show, the attacker controls the tempo until the defender is strong enough to block all attacks *AND* have enough left over to attack with. This does not happen until '43.

All the ships and planes in the world will not win a land battle. Troops win those.


Yeah, but the if the defensive 'victories' at Coral Sea and Midway had not happen, do you think their would have been political pressure on the home front? In 1942, Europe wasn't a done deal (maybe it was statistically, but they didn't know that).

Anyway, in my original post I was referring to Allied tactics about hiding until a technological advantage. Which I know is a good tactic, but is going to make turns May 42 to December 42 rather dull. It was not supposed to be a serious point as to history.



Mike Scholl -> RE: Germany First (5/28/2004 7:19:44 AM)

Very well, COLFROST. A serious question deserves serious discussion. Yes, there
would certainly be "pressure" of various sorts and from varying sources to "do some
thing" in the Pacific. Many of the first wave of volunteers into the Armed Forces after
7 December joined with the expressed goal of "killing some Japs". Workers being ex-
horted to put in more hours will eventually want to see some return on their efforts.
And the "loyal opposition across the aisle in Congress" isn't going to miss a chance to
do some "sniping". But the fact was that the great majority of the American Public
knew that war had come on them before they were ready, and much needed to be done
before the full weight of American strength could be brought down on the heads of the
"evil doers"

Those that joined to "kill Japs" realized quite quickly that they didn't really know how to
accomplish that goal, and needed some serious training and practice before they went
into action. People building planes and ships soon realized that even when they had
done their part, other folks had to train to make use of them. Even the Republicans
realized that they had to step cautiously or be confronted with their previous opposition
to "war readiness" legislation. The Newspapers, of course, were free to shout about
whatever they wanted..., but they too needed "access" to the stories and were dependent
on the War Dept. for that access.

The Joint Chiefs were in place to look at the "Big Picture"---and the Big Picture said that
Germany, with access to most of the resources of Western Europe, was the threat that
couldn't be ignored. Japan and Italy were never going to be in that league. And for a
"front man", they had FDR..., a truely skillful politician who had actually managed to
make the "depression" sound like a tough family outing that we would all pull through
if we just stuck together. Certainly there was a desire to "hit back" at the people who
brought us Pearl Harbor even on his part (enter Doolittle---which wasn't as risky as a
lot of people seem to believe). But there is no sound basis to say that continuing a
primarily defensive stance in the Pacifit until even mid-1943 was going to produce a
willingness to deal with the Japanese. The defense would still offer plenty of opportunities
for exciting stories about "our boys" fighting off hordes of fanatics, with pictures of our
bombers "pounding" various unnamed instalations, and some medel ceremonies for our
valiant submariners sinking (or being credited with sinking) some Battleship or another.
Just look at the "Colin Kelley" story if you want an example of WWII "spin doctoring".

The US couldn't just give up and hide in San Diego---but there was no pressing need to
re-take Buna or Guadalcanal or a lot of other places 98% of Americans had never heard
of. Japan was going to "get theirs" sooner or later..., that was one thing 98% of Amer-
icans COULD agree on.



kaleun -> RE: Germany First (5/28/2004 7:22:44 AM)

That was a very good and cogent summary. Thank you.



ColFrost -> RE: Germany First (5/28/2004 8:11:30 AM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

Very well, COLFROST. A serious question deserves serious discussion. Yes, there
would certainly be "pressure" of various sorts and from varying sources to "do some
thing" in the Pacific. Many of the first wave of volunteers into the Armed Forces after
7 December joined with the expressed goal of "killing some Japs". Workers being ex-
horted to put in more hours will eventually want to see some return on their efforts.
And the "loyal opposition across the aisle in Congress" isn't going to miss a chance to
do some "sniping". But the fact was that the great majority of the American Public
knew that war had come on them before they were ready, and much needed to be done
before the full weight of American strength could be brought down on the heads of the
"evil doers"

Those that joined to "kill Japs" realized quite quickly that they didn't really know how to
accomplish that goal, and needed some serious training and practice before they went
into action. People building planes and ships soon realized that even when they had
done their part, other folks had to train to make use of them. Even the Republicans
realized that they had to step cautiously or be confronted with their previous opposition
to "war readiness" legislation. The Newspapers, of course, were free to shout about
whatever they wanted..., but they too needed "access" to the stories and were dependent
on the War Dept. for that access.

The Joint Chiefs were in place to look at the "Big Picture"---and the Big Picture said that
Germany, with access to most of the resources of Western Europe, was the threat that
couldn't be ignored. Japan and Italy were never going to be in that league. And for a
"front man", they had FDR..., a truely skillful politician who had actually managed to
make the "depression" sound like a tough family outing that we would all pull through
if we just stuck together. Certainly there was a desire to "hit back" at the people who
brought us Pearl Harbor even on his part (enter Doolittle---which wasn't as risky as a
lot of people seem to believe). But there is no sound basis to say that continuing a
primarily defensive stance in the Pacifit until even mid-1943 was going to produce a
willingness to deal with the Japanese. The defense would still offer plenty of opportunities
for exciting stories about "our boys" fighting off hordes of fanatics, with pictures of our
bombers "pounding" various unnamed instalations, and some medel ceremonies for our
valiant submariners sinking (or being credited with sinking) some Battleship or another.
Just look at the "Colin Kelley" story if you want an example of WWII "spin doctoring".

The US couldn't just give up and hide in San Diego---but there was no pressing need to
re-take Buna or Guadalcanal or a lot of other places 98% of Americans had never heard
of. Japan was going to "get theirs" sooner or later..., that was one thing 98% of Amer-
icans COULD agree on.


Thank you for your response. [:)] Very well thought out.

At least I'll know that if I ever play you PBEM as the Japanese, that I'll need to worry about your submariners most of all, until '43.[;)]



mogami -> RE: Germany First (5/28/2004 8:26:20 AM)

Hi, You know all these players who plan on sitting back as the Allies are really just waiting for the Japanese player to stick his neck out and get his head chopped off. Lose 4 fleet CV as Japan in early/mid 1942 and see if it takes till 1943 before the USN shows up to land on one of your bases.

What they mean is in Dec 1941 they have no offensive plans. They are going to go after the IJN. Once they get it knocked down to the proper size they will start looking for places to send the USMC.

If the Japanese land in New Guinea (and we all know they will) these players will send Allied divisions to New Guinea. Once they get the Japanese in retreat they are going to follow them as far as they can.



hithere -> RE: Allied Strategy- One or Two Pronged????? (5/30/2004 11:17:01 PM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: j campbell

Mike,

i agree with the Dolittle raid as merely a publicity stunt-and a risky one at that considering what there was to gain vs. lose. It ended up costing the Chinese about 250,000 lives as a direct result of American action. Chiang had no illusions about what the doolittle raid was going to cost but Roosevelt did not listen/care. it did however, cement the japanese decision on the Midway operation-hence leading to the destruction of 4 japanese CV-but who whould have known this before the raid?


I normally don't get involved with these arguments because it is a lose/lose situation. But I have to disagree with you here. 250,000 Chinese did not lose their lives as a direct result of American action, they were murdered because of direct result of Jap action. The Japs directly shot them in the back of the head, the Japs directly burned them alive, the Japs directly clubed a bayonetted men, women, and children. To blame the U.S. for doing what JAPAN asked, waging war, is just un-believable. So Tokyo got bombed, thats war. Should the U.S. just not done anything???? If the Japs murdered the locals In some of the Island chains (any they did by the way) that we invaded, would that have been our fault? They killed all the CIVILIAN engineers on Wake because they were losing the war and basically starving. was that the U.S.'s fault?
If these seems harsh it is bacause THEY STARTED IT. Not only that, they committed some of the most horrible atrocities of the war. Another 250,000 was just that much closer to their goal.

thank you for your time



kaleun -> RE: Allied Strategy- One or Two Pronged????? (5/30/2004 11:34:57 PM)

DARN RIGHT!



dwesolick -> RE: Allied Strategy- One or Two Pronged????? (5/31/2004 3:11:19 AM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: hithere

quote:

ORIGINAL: j campbell

Mike,

i agree with the Dolittle raid as merely a publicity stunt-and a risky one at that considering what there was to gain vs. lose. It ended up costing the Chinese about 250,000 lives as a direct result of American action. Chiang had no illusions about what the doolittle raid was going to cost but Roosevelt did not listen/care. it did however, cement the japanese decision on the Midway operation-hence leading to the destruction of 4 japanese CV-but who whould have known this before the raid?


I normally don't get involved with these arguments because it is a lose/lose situation. But I have to disagree with you here. 250,000 Chinese did not lose their lives as a direct result of American action, they were murdered because of direct result of Jap action. The Japs directly shot them in the back of the head, the Japs directly burned them alive, the Japs directly clubed a bayonetted men, women, and children. To blame the U.S. for doing what JAPAN asked, waging war, is just un-believable. So Tokyo got bombed, thats war. Should the U.S. just not done anything???? If the Japs murdered the locals In some of the Island chains (any they did by the way) that we invaded, would that have been our fault? They killed all the CIVILIAN engineers on Wake because they were losing the war and basically starving. was that the U.S.'s fault?
If these seems harsh it is bacause THEY STARTED IT. Not only that, they committed some of the most horrible atrocities of the war. Another 250,000 was just that much closer to their goal.

thank you for your time


Well said. You might have added the Rape of Nanking, which happened in 1937 (200,000-500,000 Chinese murdered), over four years before the Doolittle Raid. How was America responsible for this?
Japanese conduct prior to and during WWII was nothing short of barbarous. It irritates me greatly that the sins of Germany are constantly (and deservedly) examined, while those of the Japanese often get buried. The Japanese, like the Germans, started a brutal war of conquest/extermination and, like the Germans, paid a terrible and well deserved price.
We wargamers tend to sometimes lose sight of the moral issues surrounding WWII when playing our games and this is, of course, understandable since they only deal with purely military matters. But it is helpful, on occasion, to stop and imagine a world in which the Axis powers wound up victorious. A horrifying prospect to say the least.



sven6345789 -> RE: Allied Strategy- One or Two Pronged????? (5/31/2004 11:43:12 AM)

dwesolick, it is interesting that you happily accept the fact of killing civilians as a kind of retaliation (quote:"well deserved"). Calling it well deserved means even more, it means if it hadn't been done, it should have been done. Interesting point of view indeed. but i agree to you in one thing. glad the axis didn't win!! I would hate having to run around in a uniform all of the time.

but enough of that.
back to the discussion about allied counterstrategy in 1942. As mdiehl and mogami pointed out, without a CV-battle leading to similar results as midway, there is no real chance for a counterattack. harrassing, yes, counterattacking, no. we are talking about a strategic level here. there is a thing like a strategic initiative, and during the first half year or year of the war, japan has it. period. the general course and the speed of operations is dictated by the japanese player. As the aliied player, you would have to do what was done historically, like keeping the triangle around pearl clear of enemy units, keeping the supply line to Australia open, keeping Australia and maybe PM, keeping up a stable frontline along the India-Burma boundary, and somehow keep the chinese alive, at least as an army in being, forcing the japanese to devote something to china to hold it at bay. Otherwise, hit 'em were they aint is the principle. The japanese CV's are in the indian ocean? Time for a few CV-raids (like the historical ones in early 1942). After your LBA becomes stronger (P-38) and you finally start to get new CV's and later on AA and Hellcats (including well trained LCU's), that would be the time were the allied player starts to take up the initiative, now forcing the japanese player into a position of reacting. The longer the japanese player can postpone this, and the longer the japanese can slow down the inevitable advance of the allies, the greater are his chances to "win" the war by surviving into july 1946.



barbarrossa -> RE: Allied Strategy- One or Two Pronged????? (5/31/2004 4:02:20 PM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: mdiehl

quote:

Why would the US have risked almost the entire carrier forces afloat if they did not think they could win at Midway?


Immaterial to the discussion at hand. The original thrust was that the US player should not be rewarded for doing that which the JCS intended to do. Sit around and wait for a great opportunity to strike a blow. Midway was exactly such an opportunity. Unless you are going to require that the Japanese player send an understrength TF to a remote, substantially built up island with a potentially robust aircraft contingent, far from Japan's logistical bases, and also require that the Japanese player set all air units in that TF to "airfield attack," then it is inappropriate to demand action from the Allied player.


No, not really immaterial to the discussion. My point was, since it has obviously eluded you, that there were political considerations (among a myriad of other considerations that drove Allied operations in 1942. The post that this was in response to contended that there were absolutely no political (PR if you like that better) considerations before 1943. And it had absolutely not one reference to the game at this point. So when you say this.......


quote:

Every time this trivial notion comes up it is a transparent AF ploy to fabricate of whole cloth circumstances that merely generate VP for the Japanese player. Just admit that you want to handicap the Allied player and be done with all the badly informed notions about 'that which history requires.'


.....I don't know what your talking about. It's my post you're dissecting, not Madflav's.

quote:

And why even attempt to thwart the Japanese at Coral Sea if the JCS could wait to take offensive until '43? The fact is they couldn't wait and events bore that out.


quote:

Your one sentence demonstrates a failure to understand Coral Sea.It was not an offensive operation. It was purely a defensive operation. The JCS DID in fact wait until 1943 to take the offensive in New Guinea.


You have a hard time looking past your own nose here my friend. I will agree that the overall strategic considerations of the operations was the defense of PM and Australia. But the operation at it's heart was a "meeting engagement" with carrier forces. Purely defensive operations are not meeting engagements. And the Allied landings at Guadalcanal were not "defensive" and certainly took place well before 1943. Again forced upon JCS by Japanese offensive operations. My grasp of Coral Sea is no less tenuous than your own.

quote:

Not to mention Doolittle or the Rabaul raid.... It was for exact moral/political reasons that you offhandedly dismiss as "garbage".


quote:

The Rabaul raid had absolutely nothing to do with "political" reasons. It was done solely and exclusively to test Japanese defenses along the perimeter and upset Japanese operational planning. It was an excellent strategic move, and any allied player would likely pull the "raid and fade" trick a couple of times, simply to keep the Japanese player committing assets to remote areas. But if the Allied player is risk averse, I see no reason to demand that the Allied player attempt such operations. The Doolittle raid was more of the same. An effort to upset Japanese operational plans, force redeployments, new commitments and loss of face in the chain of command. It was NOT at any point conceived primarily as a pr stunt for political consumption by the American home public. Anyonw who believes otherwise does not understand what it means to attack your opponents mindshare.


Doolittle's raid was not meant to boost US public morale and was purely intended to mess with the mind of Nippon?

I think at this point in the war, Allied understanding of the Japanese mindset was incomplete at best. After all the setbacks of late '41 into the spring of '42, the US public needed a boost. And I'm sorry if your favorite revisionist autuer of the nanosecond thinks otherwise. Why would Roosevelt play it up so highly, so shortly after it's completion.

Politics have EVERYTHING to do with war, even the Rabaul raid.

Back to the game....if the Allied player wants to not risk a thing prior to '43, then I say fine that's his perogative. We'll all employ different strategies with this beast of a game. That's just one of them.

quote:

The fact that the Japanese were building an airstrip on Guadalcanal forced the US to take action or have lines of communication with Australia threatened. Which is what the Victory Points kind of approximate, they force you to take some action as the Allied player and not hide in a shell.


quote:

Why not prevent the Japanese player from hiding in a shell with his CVs and sitting around wating for a 6 on 3 CV battle. I guess we should require that Japan attempt to invade San Francisco by rewarding large numbers of VPs to the Allied player for possessing San Francisco.


What are you talking about? The overall strategic goal for the Japanese was to go over to the defensive after making thier economic gains that would enable them to be self sufficient in natural resources. They over extended themselves. Ever hear the reference "victory disease"?

quote:

The Japanese advance forced the hand of the Allies, who by winning (Midway), or coming to a draw with the IJN (Coral Sea), took the initiative in '42 and gained valuble experience and confidence that carried over to huge gains of '43.


quote:

Right. So unless the Japanese player is required to lose 4 CVs in an ill-advised blunder, it follows that one should not require the Allied player to sacrifice resources in ill-advised blunders (which a Guadalcanal campaign would likely be unless you have substantially depleted Japan's CV force).


Again, I'm talking history here and your answering with a game context. Immaterial to the original discussion and quite shrill.

quote:

It'll be up to the Allied player on how to respond to the IJN player.


quote:

Agreed. That is why I'm coming around to Mike's POV that the VP scoring system simply be ignored. Maybe there should be an option to disable the VP count. It'd be interesting to see how strategies differe between a VP game and a non-VP game.


I pay little attention to VP's in Uncommon Valor and just fight the war the best I can. So it is refreshing that we agree somewhere.

quote:

And it's just a disingenous stab at someone to say that political considerations in the early part of the Pacific War were bunk.


quote:

Actually, it is a disingenuous stab to suggest that such claims were bunk. Political considerations were not the driving force behind any early PTO Allied raids. CVs were much too valuable to place them under undue risk solely for PR footage. That is why Hornet and Enterprise turned back from the Doolittle raid at the first sign of potential risk, and why Spruance's orders at Midway were to engage only if there was a likelihood of inflicting greater damage on the enemy. The US was in the Pacific War for the long haul, and the op-planners knew that defeating Japan was merely and solely a matter of time. Claims that the public would have demanded a negotiated peace had none of the victories of 1942 occurred are AF self-serving whole-cloth fabrications based on nothing at all.


So you are contending that the meager damage caused by a few Army bombers striking the mainland of Japan was the main thrust of the Doolittle raid and therefore worth the risk of precious carriers? Sorry, 60 years of documented works disagree with you here.

The main point of engaging in combat is to inflict greater damage on the enemy, period. Midway, notwithstanding.

Where you get your last statement is beyond me. I never mentioned in my post anything nearing what your flames contend. I suggest you have other issues afoot.



dwesolick -> RE: Allied Strategy- One or Two Pronged????? (5/31/2004 4:03:56 PM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: sven6345789

dwesolick, it is interesting that you happily accept the fact of killing civilians as a kind of retaliation (quote:"well deserved"). Calling it well deserved means even more, it means if it hadn't been done, it should have been done. Interesting point of view indeed. but i agree to you in one thing. glad the axis didn't win!! I would hate having to run around in a uniform all of the time.



I never said "civilians" specifically, I meant the Germans and Japanese as a whole (leaders, military, and civilians). They paid a terrible and well deserved price for plunging the world into the most bloody war in history.



j campbell -> RE: Allied Strategy- One or Two Pronged????? (6/1/2004 12:09:50 AM)

I stand corrected- i should have said as an "indirect" result as they (the Americans) did not actually pull the triggers.
However, they certainly knew that dire reprisals would be made in China (for right or wrong reasons) by going forward with the raid. whether you accept this or ot the simple fact remained that The doolittle raid was a political action with little military value that had far reaching repurcussions (if u were chinese) that in my mind outweighed its political value-not to mention it carried high risks as a military venture as well.


You misjudge my post- I do not condone the actions of the Japanese leadership or military actions-actually i find it horrifying. however, i always find it interesting that mass slaughter as retaliation is an acceptable means to justify an ends whereas when our enemy does it (albeit in a more personal matter-they used rifles, bayonets, swords and gunbutts) it is credited with the terror that it was.

Dwesolick-glad to see that you could add things to my post that were unstated-Rape of nanking etc .

its as if to say -you (ie the Japanese) opened the door so now anything goes-i think that is an acceptable answer-but call it what it is and not try to stand on any "moral highground".

I'll end my remarks here as i don't want to be dragged into an argument that is fruitless to argue in the first place.

as sven stated-all this detracts from the original thread.



hithere -> RE: Allied Strategy- One or Two Pronged????? (6/1/2004 12:35:37 AM)

thanks...i was not trying to say that you condone what the Japanese did. i was commenting on the comment [&:] that it was caused directly by the U.S. That is a mindset (mindset is prob the wrong word, hopfully you know what i mean) that is here to this day..but i won't even get started on THAT [:)]
I got alittle carried away..sorry about that..

acually I do believe that the raid was mostly political (to lift moral (SP?)) with some favorable military side affects (that the Japanese people saw U.S. bombers in their sky and forced Japanese assest to stay near the home Isles)

As for the two pronged attack...I think you have to, esp in this game...if the allies want have any chance of early offense's, because after Pearl Harbor (and with no Midway), fleet on fleet the Japanese come out ahead, but they will be forced to spread their fleet around to protect vital area's..multiple attacks will force this more...so the allies may get a 2 on 2 or maybe even a 2 on 3 advantage. for a few days at least. ofcourse the Jap's will have better machines. but that is a chance and chance is a huge part of war.



mogami -> RE: Allied Strategy- One or Two Pronged????? (6/1/2004 12:48:19 AM)

Hi, The Allies are going to mount more then one offensive towards Japan. There is no way for them to employ all their forces otherwise. Aifields can only hold so many aircraft. Why send 10 divisions to capture a base that can be captured by 2? The only way the Allies can bring all their force to bear is to spread it out.

They will begin with just one focus point but by 1944 they will have at least 4 and depending on player style and events up to that point could have 2 or 3 more. But there will always be operations in CBI towards Bangkok and points south.

There will always be operations in New Guinea that once complete will leave a large force unemployed unless it heads north (Palau-PI-Saipan) And of course the direct path from Pearl through Kwajalean toward Saipan. Then there are the limited ops up north if the Japanese occupy Kiska an Attu (and there is no reason for the Japanese not to do this)

The Allies also have the possible route from Darwin directly into the SRA. This threat is a major concern for the Japanese. If they do not prepare for it the Allies can cut off the supply by occuping the bases. Thus it requires a significant amount of Japanese material to guard against. Almost a quarter of Japanese strength has to be deployed against an allied avenue of approach that will likely never be used. (As long as the required quarter of Japanese strength is so employed)

The Allies will use more then one offensive. They can't help it. It's the only way to utilise their numbers. If the forward airfield of one thrust is a size 7 then only 350 aircraft can be used. Another airfield is needed. Looking for airfields in range of the Japanese will constantly require advances in different areas.



Culiacan Mexico -> Germany First - Never happened. (6/1/2004 12:10:44 PM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl
…But the fact was that the great majority of the American Public knew that war had come on them before they were ready, and much needed to be done before the full weight of American strength could be brought down on the heads of the "evil doers"…Those that joined to "kill Japs" realized quite quickly that they didn't really know how to accomplish that goal, and needed some serious training and practice before they went into action. People building planes and ships soon realized that even when they had done their part, other folks had to train to make use of them.
Eh? The American public understanding the dynamics of modern warfare in 1942-43… not likely.

The main reason the Doolittle Raid was done was from domestic consumption, yet it risked valuable assets on an operation that could never achieve anything of significant tactical value. Politically, it was felt needed to bolster the American morale a “dramatic retribution that Roosevelt--and America--so intently desired”.

-Newspaper headlines of the raid electrified America. New York Times: "japan reports tokyo, yokohama bombed by 'enemy planes' in daylight." Columbus Evening Dispatch: "U.S. warplanes rain bombs on leading cities of Jap empire." New York Daily News: "U.S. bombs hit 4 Jap cities."-

Edward Oxford - American History Magazine in August 1997.

The American public loved it, because they didn’t ‘know’ the realities.
quote:

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl
The Joint Chiefs were in place to look at the "Big Picture"---and the Big Picture said…

“During the Second Washington Conference in the early summer of 1942, an acrimonious debate raged between the British and their new American allies over the future strategic course of the war against the European Axis powers. General George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff of the United States Army, espoused the view that the Allies could successfully confront the European Axis only by means of an amphibious invasion of Western Europe, and that consequently no operations which might detract from this goal should be undertaken.”

Thomas E. Nutter - THE ALLIED STRATEGIC DEBATE


For many they saw a British Empire determined to avoid a return to the continent, but content to invade everywhere else: Africa, Greece, Sicily, Sardinia, Corsica, Crete, Norway, etc. Why let millions of men set in England for an invasion of the continent the British obviously don’t want when they can be committed now in the Pacific for something useful? FDR sent Hopkins to London in April to persuade Churchill, but the peripheral strategy remained the highest priority for Britain. When Operation Torch was approved, it undermined Marshall’s beliefs and made him side with Admiral King who wanted a more aggressive policy in the Pacific.

“When none of the British or American war planners even dared to think of going on the offensive in the Pacific in 1942-43, King successfully lobbied to do just that. ‘No fighter ever won his fight by covering up -- merely fending off the other fellow's blows,’ he wrote. ‘The winner hits and keeps on hitting even though he has to be able to take some stiff blows in order to keep on hitting.’ He earned President Roosevelt’s complete confidence.

“Most naval historians agree that King was the greatest naval commander of the twentieth century. His powers of reason were first-rate, and his professionalism and understanding of the complexities of modern warfare were without parallel. Although he was too unrestrained a personality to succeed as a military diplomat, he was intelligent, dynamic, and merciless, widely respected for exacting outstanding results from his ships and his men. He was also feared and hated, but his grasp of strategy and his ability to impose his will on the enemy were major factors in the defeat of the Axis navies in World War II.”

Thomas Buell, Master of Sea Power (1979)


PS. I am not saying in the ‘Game’ certain action should or shouldn’t happen, just that there were reasons military actions were conducted before 1943.


Note: The “Germany First Policy” (RAINBOW 5) was not followed even though that is what was agreed on: major assets were committed to the Pacific well before the issue in Europe was decided, and the few assets freed up by victory in Europe were fairly insignificant to the victory against Japan. In fact, Admiral King and other who wanted a full scale offensive… got their wish.



Mike Scholl -> RE: Germany First - Never happened. (6/1/2004 6:13:53 PM)

Ernie King the "greatest naval commander of the twentieth century"? You have to be kidding.
King placed himself in command of the defenses of the US Eastern Seaboard during the first
several months of the war..., and steadfastly refused British aid or advice on how to cope with
the U-Boats. The result was what the U-Boat arm refered to as the "Second Happy Time".

He was opinionated, Anglo-phobic, and a self-admitted S-O-B. He was also dynamic, forceful,
and a firm defender of his Navy against all comers..., right or wrong. But realistically, only his
Mom would call him the greatest Naval Commander of the Twentieth Century.



mdiehl -> RE: Germany First - Never happened. (6/1/2004 8:06:43 PM)

quote:

You have a hard time looking past your own nose here my friend. I will agree that the overall strategic considerations of the operations was the defense of PM and Australia. But the operation at it's heart was a "meeting engagement" with carrier forces. Purely defensive operations are not meeting engagements.


I'll skip over your multiple, obvious ad hominems.

The existence of a meeting engagement does not obviate the importance of the basic circumstance that the US CVs were deployed in the Coral Sea. They were there as a blocking (defensive) move against an anticipated Japanese move against Port Moresby. Your use of the phrase "meeting engagement" strikes me as a gross misuse of language. In the stretegic sense (since we're talking about motivations here we are, primarily, talking about strategic decisions), one would only say it was a "meeting engagement" if both forces were attempting to seize the same objective at the same time. They weren't. Only Japan was sending troop transports in the engagement and the ONLY reason why the USN was there was to block the move. It was, therefore, by any reasonable standard, a defensive engagement not an offensive one. Moreover, there were not even any follow-up assets available on a contingency basis to exploit any lopsided Allied victory, should one occur. The Coral Sea campaign, from the US raids in February 1942 down through the CV battles, was from the Allied POV a suite of strategic defensive actions whose primary purpose was to maintain a forward base from which Allied offnsive operations could be launched in 1943 and to prevent the establishment of a Japanese forward base.

If your point is that military engagements have political fallout that was often the source of much haymaking in the press, then we agree. But there is absolutely no basis for arguing that political decisions were a driving motivating factor in the Coral Sea campaign.

quote:

And the Allied landings at Guadalcanal were not "defensive" and certainly took place well before 1943. Again forced upon JCS by Japanese offensive operations. My grasp of Coral Sea is no less tenuous than your own.


It was never part of the Allies original strategic plan to take the offensive in the SoPac in 1942. Op Watctower is often also called "Op Shoestring" because it was opportunistically cobbled together and initiated in about 8 weeks. It was the most jury-rigged operation of the Allied war effort. It was executed primarily to deny the Japanese a forward air base. Going into Watchtower, there were no plans for follow up operations in the Solomons in 1942. It was solely intended to be a one-shot invasion whose strategic purpose was defensive in nature. Moreover, it never would have happened unless the USN had been victorious at Midway.

quote:

Not to mention Doolittle or the Rabaul raid.... It was for exact moral/political reasons that you offhandedly dismiss as "garbage".


It depends. Attacking Japanese morale and, more importantly, their mindshare was the objective. I think of the Doolittle Raid as a "spoiling attack" executed on a strategic level. And it worked. Of the cases that you mention the Doolittle Raid comes the closest to being a "politically motivated" raid, but it was not primarily the US public who was expected to be the recipient of the message. Even so, in the general thrust of this discussion, don't you think it's pretty strange to assert that the Allied player should be required to take such risks when the Doolittle Raid itself demonstrates that the USN was, in 1942, pretty risk averse? After all, they DID launch those B-25s from a range that most understood would result in their running out of fuel.

quote:

Doolittle's raid was not meant to boost US public morale and was purely intended to mess with the mind of Nippon?


Primarily, yes. And it worked. Look at where the Japanese thrust was -- SE Asia and the Indian Ocean. The Doolittle Raid focused the IJNs attention back on the Central Pacific (a quiet theater after December 1941), and resulted in the restriction of a significant amount of Japanese aircraft to the defense of Japan. It also forced the IJN to react, causing them to divide their forces for their planned attempt at Port Moresby (reduced the plan from 6 CVs to 2 CVs + 1 very light CV), in order to save 4 CV for their hastily conceived, cobbled-together attempt at Midway. So, I'd say that the US op planners were pretty darned good at predicting Japanese mindset.

quote:

Why would Roosevelt play it up so highly, so shortly after it's completion.


You have mistaken effect for cause. The raid occurred. It was executed for some fairly compelling military reasons. Having executed the raid, it was then played up for far more than it was worth in terms of physical damage. Why would you expect such an event NOT to be played up, regardless of the original military purposes that set the raid in motion?

quote:

Politics have EVERYTHING to do with war, even the Rabaul raid.


I think the claim is trivial and overblown. It has to be made on a case-by-case basis if your wish to assign "political reasons" rather than "military reasons" as the primary driving force in the planning and execution of an operation or a campaign.

quote:

Back to the game....if the Allied player wants to not risk a thing prior to '43, then I say fine that's his perogative. We'll all employ different strategies with this beast of a game. That's just one of them.


I agree.

quote:

What are you talking about? The overall strategic goal for the Japanese was to go over to the defensive after making thier economic gains that would enable them to be self sufficient in natural resources. They over extended themselves. Ever hear the reference "victory disease"?


So, your argument is that the Japanese should not suffer from any game-introduced inherent pressure to sustain their offensives because it went against their original strategic plan? Yet at the same time you maintain that the Allies should suffer from game-introduced inherent pressure to take the offensive, even though it went against their strategic plan? Hey, as long as logical consistency doesn't matter, you can have your cake and eat it too.

quote:

The Japanese advance forced the hand of the Allies, who by winning (Midway), or coming to a draw with the IJN (Coral Sea), took the initiative in '42 and gained valuble experience and confidence that carried over to huge gains of '43.


The Japanese advance probably forced the Allies to take risks in the Coral Sea action. The Midway invasion did not "force" the Allies' hand in any way. It was purely a wonderously vulnerable target of opportunity for the USN. The Japanese were TAKEN at Midway, the USN planned from the outset for the result that happened, and had every reason to be confident that such a result would likely happen. Indeed, one could with better reason argue that the USN "forced the Japanese hand" into a thrust at Midway because of the Doolittle Raid. This gets back to my earlier allusion to a "strategic spoling attack" and "attacking your opponent's mind share."

quote:

Again, I'm talking history here and your answering with a game context. Immaterial to the original discussion and quite shrill.


No, you've quite clearly taken Op. Watchtower out of its historical context and, frankly, the Doolittle Raid as well. If that's "talking history" then I need no part of it. I think you have to put these actions in their contingent circumstances to understand why they happened and to assign importance to motivating factors commensurate with their real importance. Watchtower happened in order to deny the Japanese a forward air base. It was made doable in a rather hastily cobbled together way primarily because the USN had sunk 4 IJN CVs and thought that they'd sunk two more big CVs at Coral Sea.

quote:

So you are contending that the meager damage caused by a few Army bombers striking the mainland of Japan was the main thrust of the Doolittle raid and therefore worth the risk of precious carriers? Sorry, 60 years of documented works disagree with you here.


Nope. Sixty years of writing don't disagree. Most of the writings include a discussion of the strategic goals of the mission, and subsequent operations that the mission was supposed to kick off. If you are, err, narrowly focussed enough on the simple question "what did the Doolittle Raiders' bombs blow up?" then you will only conclude that the raid had no effect. You might then put the logical cart before the horse -- 'the raid had no effect, therefore it was anticipated that it would have no effect, therefore the motivating purpose of the raid was for US domestic political consumption.' But, as you ought to know:

1. The raid was aimed first and foremost at the minds of Japanese operational planners.
2. The raid was secondarily aimed at the military targets that were to be bombed.
3. The raid was supposed to result in the birth of a tactical air force in China, comprised of the raiding B-25s after they arrived in China.
4. The least important consideration was US public consumption. That is why the USN CVs fled when detected. It was far, far more important that the CVs make a clean getaway than any measure of success for the mission. In short, there was no willingness to take a real risk for the sake of political gain back home. And that, fella, cuts to the heart of yours (and others') suggestions that there ought to be some sort of inherent game mechanic that forces the Allies to take risks in 1942.

quote:

The main point of engaging in combat is to inflict greater damage on the enemy, period. Midway, notwithstanding.


That's a really odd statement. Lots of combat has objectives other than "inflicting greater damage." Why did the Axis invade Crete? For that matter, why did the UK resist? If you have a really plum strategic objective that you think will allow you to substantially enhance your overall war effort, it is often acceptable to risk greater damage to yourself than you are likely to inflict on your enemy. On another note, why "Midway notwithstanding?" Your statement is almost verbatim the orders given to Ray Spruance.



Culiacan Mexico -> RE: Germany First - Never happened. (6/2/2004 6:15:19 AM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

Ernie King the "greatest naval commander of the twentieth century"? You have to be kidding. King placed himself in command of the defenses of the US Eastern Seaboard during the first several months of the war..., and steadfastly refused British aid or advice on how to cope with the U-Boats. The result was what the U-Boat arm refered to as the "Second Happy Time".

He was opinionated, Anglo-phobic, and a self-admitted S-O-B. He was also dynamic, forceful, and a firm defender of his Navy against all comers..., right or wrong. But realistically, only his Mom would call him the greatest Naval Commander of the Twentieth Century.
Well actually, it was a military historian who called him that.



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