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TIMJOT -> (9/19/2001 10:46:00 PM)
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originally posted by Grumbler;
quote:
Feel free to quote your source on this japanese plan. HP Wilmott (who is writing about precisely this issue) notes no such plan. He notes on page 67: "Only after the imposition of the Allied blockade in mid-1941 did the Japanese face up to the twin realities that they had to contemplate a war with Britain, the Netherlands, and the United Staes and that the war would come that year. Until mid-1941 the diffusion of power in the Japanese upper council had lead to the puruit of two divergent objectives. The objective of the dominant army faction was the Asian mainland, specifically China but generally more widely, with the USSR figuring strongly in the army's list of priorities. The interest of the Navy was in Southeast Asia. Though in early 1941 the two serices had agreed to pursue a southwards option, it was not until the trade embargo that the two armed forces studied the implications of the Allied move in detail. As a result of this study, they finalized plans that merged the army's and the navy's strategic considerations and intentions."
Grumbler, I had hoped we could have a nice friendly debate without resorting to this tedious siteing of sources stuff, but if you insist.
"THE PACIFIC CAMPAIGN" van der Vat, p.65,pg3;
(Quote)"Force having failed to settle the China Insident, the Army now seriously proposed dividing Japan's already stretched resources by risking the opening of a huge and complex new front. But at least the generals had the wit to limit their designs to French,Dutch,and (only if unaviodable)British possessions, leaving out all American territories such as the Philipines. The admirals disagreed with the generals. The residual Dutch and minimal British maritime presence in the Far East was not enough to justify the Navy's voracious budgetary plans, past, present or future. Conviently, their staff war-games late in 1940 were supervised by Yamamoto himself, and showed that an attack on French and Dutch possessions in the Far East would bring first the British and then the Americans into the ensuing war - and therefore that, instead of the risk of ignoring the US, the much bigger risk of attacking its intersts should be taken from the first! The student of Japanese strategic thinking at this period cannot fail to be struck time and gain by the numbing, mountainous stupidity of the generals and admirals and those who supported them.
"The Eagle against the Sun"pg N/A;
(QUOTE) "Now, in the summer and autumn of 1941 , army and navy stategist considered four alternatives (1)to sieze the DEI first, then the Philipines and Malaya;(2)to advance step by step form the Philipines to Borneo, Java, Sumatra, Malaya;(3)TO BEGIN WITH MALAYA AND THEN ADVANCE IN REVERSED ORDER TO THE PHILIPINES, THUS DELAYING AN ATTACK ON AMERICAN TERRITORY;(4)to attack Malaya and the Philipines simultaneously, followed by a quick siezure fo the DEI. The navy prefered option 2,because it offered a secured line of advance while the Army prefered option ,because it siezed the most important objectives first and it delayed an attack on American territory, which intern allowed for the possibility avoiding a war with America if it did not react. They eventually compromised on option 4.
I also have read pretty much the same thing in "Yamamoto the Reluctant Admiral" unfortunately I dont have the book in hand so I cant site specifics. That being said, I never said the Japanese didnt have some legitimate reasons for attacking America, just that it was the wrong decision and as demostrated by Van Der Vat that it was a decision skewed by the exageration of the American threat by the Navy to justify their bugetary prominience. Also that there was at least other alternative plans debated.
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[ September 19, 2001: Message edited by: TIMJOT ]
[ September 19, 2001: Message edited by: TIMJOT ]
[ September 19, 2001: Message edited by: TIMJOT ]
[ September 19, 2001: Message edited by: TIMJOT ]
[ September 19, 2001: Message edited by: TIMJOT ]
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I didn't realize how nuttily lucky we were. Er, I mean, how well we planned the carrier dispositions while waiting for the inevitable strike on Pearl that we knew was coming THAT weekend. In fact, we knew it was coming on Sunday and not Saturday.
Think you got the Hornet and the Wasp mixed up. Just checked a navy site, and the Wasp was operational in 1940 (after taking FOUR years to build!). It was the Hornet that was still working up. Pretty good site at ![]("biggrin.gif")
