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byron13 -> (10/27/2001 5:00:00 AM)
Gee, Mike, I don't think either one of us meant to step on your toes. As for providing names, no one here thinks its necessary; it certainly doesn't provide any more legitimacy to the message. Secondly, these fora are setup to be anonymous for security reasons, something I'm sure a CGSC student can appreciate. But if it is important to you, fine, I'm Byron Starcher and I was a Captain in the 1st AD before your time. I have not reread your comments that prompted my response, but as I recall, you were speaking in rather absolute terms. The Japanese could only do this, the U.S. would to this, Britain would never lose. But, to the extent that any of it was absolute (and I do not believe any of it is), it is absolute only with the perspective of hindsight. The situation when viewed at the present is almost always different when viewed in hindsight. You of all people should recognize the tremendous impact of the fog of war. Especially a half century ago when countries and cultures were often misunderstood, miscalculating your opponent was easy - especially in the geopolitical realm. So my point was that the absolute cause and effect sequences that you describe were either not absolute or the participants foresaw different effects. As an illustration of how tenuous the difference between success and failure are, which was meant to show how even good calculations can lead to unforeseen results, I cited the Midway and Battle of Britain scenarios. Your response to the Midway scenario pretty much proved my point because it is laced with references to luck, hypotheticals, and Nagumo's miscalculations. That was my point exactly. Change one factor and suddenly the chain of events unfold in a completely different way. And America does not attack Japan in response to a DEI invasion and Britain does "go down" to Germany. So I'm sorry I've offended you. I see the world in gray and see nothing but possibilities. Our current expedition in Afghanistan is no different; no one can predict what the world will look like when we are "finished." Will there be a fundamentalist regime with the bomb in Pakistan? Or will the U.S. force, finally, a lasting peace in Palestine? Will we be seen as complete idiots for continuing to bomb cities (hitting, let's say, a mosque and an orphanage in addition to a hospital) during Ramadan and turning the entire Muslim world against us, or will it be a masterful military plan that completely routes the bad guys? No one knows. And no one knew in the '30s and '40s either. Good luck at CGSC. We need all the good officers we can get. I'd be curious to hear your views on what happens if we decide to go after Iraq for a second time. Me thinks it's not going to be nearly as easy.

Ringbolt -> (10/27/2001 9:15:00 AM)
What is really interesting about this thread is, its two and a half months long.

Mark -> (10/28/2001 1:56:00 PM)
quote: Originally posted by byron: Secondly, these fora are setup to be anonymous for security reasons, something I'm sure a CGSC student can appreciate. But if it is important to you, fine, I'm Byron Starcher and I was a Captain in the 1st AD before your time. Guys, sorry for personal questions – what’s CGSC and 1-st AD?

byron13 -> (10/30/2001 1:03:00 AM)
Granat: CGSC is the Command and General Staff College. 1st AD is "Old Ironsides" - the First Armored Division.

Ranger-75 -> (10/31/2001 1:02:00 PM)
Hi Byron, I wasn't offended, I just needed to "clarify" things. You wrote: "I have not reread your comments that prompted my response, but as I recall, you were speaking in rather absolute terms. The Japanese could only do this, the U.S. would to this, Britain would never lose. But, to the extent that any of it was absolute (and I do not believe any of it is), it is absolute only with the perspective of hindsight. The situation when viewed at the present is almost always different when viewed in hindsight." Hindsight & absolutes. It is only with the advantage of hindsight that I can state that with the then-in-charge leadership of both Germany and Japan, that certain things were going to happen, no ifs ands or buts. One was that Hitler was going to attack the Soviets as soon as he could which ended up being summer 1941. Another was that Japan was going to attack the US along with the British and Dutch in the Pacific for reasons I already stated. The question was when and where, not if. Again as long as Tojo and Sugyiama were in charge (and these guys were worse than the Germans for getting rid of people they didn't like), there was nothing that Yammamoto could do or say to get them off their "warpath" The Japanese psyche just contributed to the slide into disaster that these unenlightened people were taking Japan down into. Japan was actually suffering from food shortages in early 1941 - before the US submarine campaign, and this was after they had been pillaging Korea, Manchuria and then Indo-China for (sorry, can't help myself here) "All the rice in China". The subtle shift in the Japanese warlords additude was the oil embargo as a response to the taking over of Indo-China. The Japanese could NOT back down or withdraw- it would be a massive loss of "face" which especially back then would mave meant suicide for Tojo, et al. Lastly, Hitler was not willing to sacrifice his Luftwaffe as the price to clear the RAF from the skies above southern England and as such his forces could not create the conditions necessary for even a remote possibility of euccess at a cross channell invasion. Hitler needed the Luftwaffe for Barbarossa and the Air battle of Britain actually weakened the Luftwaffwe for this upcoming event. I never did say that Germany could not have Attempted an invasion, I just stated that Britain would not have surrendered even if some German ground forces got ashore in England (and even if London fell to an assault - wild fantasy thinking here). There was no way Germany could have maintained or enlarged their forces for a successful invasion and subsequent land campaign. The problem that a lot of westerners (myself included) is that we are too logical and civil, etc. The brutal nature of the totaltarian regimes was foreign to our leaders (and the rest of us) and that is why certain events unfolded as they did. Only if one were to throw out all the leaders and start fresh would a lot of "options" start to creep into the picture. The problem I had was that this whole discussion was throwing out the Japanese (and to a lesser extent) German leaders' will (unfortunately in these regimes, the people had little influence over their government) will while making no allowances for changes in US, GB, French or other allied nations leadership or "national will" if you will. Lets talk about Midway. As I said before, everything went right for the Japanese with the Pearl Harbor raid, while Most things went right for the US during the Midway battle. So the luck factor had changed hands, or so it seemed. But let's look at Midway through the colored glasses of those nine little items known as the Principles of War (as practiced by the US Army - I have no idea what the Navy uses, but they are probably similar if not identical). Objective (the most import one): IJN: Here the IJN had assigned two conflicting objectives to the 1st Air Fleet, that of supporting the landings, AND that of finding and destroying any US fleet that was supposed to come our AFTER the landings were under way. This was perhaps their most crucial violation and it combined with Nagumo's vacillating nature to make a recipe for disaster. USN: The USN's objective was simple and straightforward: ambush the Japanese carrier fleet off Midway thereby forcing cancellation of the landing attempt. Offensive: IJN: This is the only PoW that the IJN did not violate, they were on the attack and were using their initiative to fight at a time and place of their choosing (at least of Yammamoto's chosing). USN: The USN made good use of an offensive defense posture in this operation. Maneuver: IJN: The IJN maneuver plan caused the entire Combined Fleet to be spread out over 1,00 miles of ocean and control was lacking in that the transport group was ahead of schedule (and was this sighted one day before Japanes plans stated that the UNS would sight them). Further, the entire plan depended on the USN doing Everything that the IJN expected them to do. It made no allowances for any unexpected eventualities. USN: The USN movement plan was simple and placed their available forces where they could be most effective. Mass: IJN: While the IJN used nearly the entire Combined fleet, they dispersed it so much that none of the elements were mutually supporting (except the Close Support and Transport groups and look what happenned to the cruises in the close support group later). USN: The USN concentrated all available offensive power where it would prove to be the most effective. However, I must cite them (Nimitz) for diverting too many resources to the north. Those heavy cruisers could have added to the carrier TFs' AA power. Economy of Force: IJN: The IJN plan sent too many forces to the north. Those two additional CV/CVLs might have made a difference if they were with the 1st Air Fleet, however, they were also slower and this would have forces changes to an already complex plan. USN: As I stated above, the USN could have sent less to the north, The forces sent didn't have any effect on the outcome up there (and they weren't expected to do much) but the cruisers especially, were better off with the carriers. Unity of Command: IJN: Too many commanders, the primary problem being that Yammamoto himself should not have been at sea. He was too wrapped up in radio silence to have any effect on the battle. He failed to pass on critical information to Nagume, (assuming that Nagumo had received it the way he did). USN: There were no violations here by the USN (placing Fletcher in charge was not a unity of command problem, but rather a problem in identfying good leaders and putting them in charge while getting rid on ones that weren't up to task). When the Yorktown was put out of action Fletcher deferred to Spruance, a correct move. Security: IJN: Where do I start. Throught the entire war, the Japanese high command refuese to countenance even the possibility that their codes had been broken. There other lapses too like the unit that told the post office to forward its mail to Midway, Thelack of any backup pland for the failed operation "K", the subs late in getting on station, the completely fault assessment of Nagumo of the US fleets intentions and dispositions, the second most severely violated principle. By their own admission, the Japanese were caught up in what they called "victory deisese" I call it contemptive arrogance to the point of being a dangerous liability. USN: The USN took careful measures to keep its plans from the Japanese, they never even told the Midway garrison of their fleet plans. Surprise: IJN: It is humorous to note that the IJN actually thought that they had the element of surprise on their side in this battle. While they probably could not suspect at that time that their codes were broken, they certainly didn't make sufficient efforts in this matter. Surprise usually coincides with security as this battle illustrated. USN: The USN made maxium use of their intelligence efforts and effectively maximised its value as a combat multiplier. During the battle, they also waited for the Japanese first strike to go off against Midway thereby dissapating the 1st air fleet's striking power, and this bore later fruit. Simplicity: IJN: The IJN plan was the most complicated fleet operation conceived to date. Unfortunately for the Japanese, they failed to learn from this and subsequent plans were just as complex. USN: THe USN plan was simple, ambush the Japanese carriers off Midway and inflict maxium damage using what Nimitz called "strong attrition tactics" which meant air strikes on the carriers. The IJN violated 8 of the 9 principles of war, The UNS partially violated 2 (Mass and Economy of Force - and some say this was not a violation- he couldn't well ignore a threat against US soil). It was time for the IJN to sleep in the bed that they had made for themselves. The is doesn't really matter in this discussion part: Pakistan already has the A-bomb. They are also already an Islamic regime, although nothing like the despots in Afganistan. Their capitat says it all: Islamabad (does that mean islam is bad ) I can't see how bombing them during Ramadan is any different that Iran and Iraq bombing each other during ramadan for 8 years. The Palestinians will always hate Israel for what it is and has. They still see the state of Israel as occupying what they think should have been their country. We won't see the end of this until the second coming of Christ. Were you in ODS/S? Only part of the 1st AD was there (I think one Bde). That's the only AD levt if the inventory, do yoe realize that the next "great plan" is to take us to 8 active divisions [ October 31, 2001: Message edited by: Mike Santos ]

TIMJOT -> (10/31/2001 3:00:00 PM)
quote: Both of you in the beginning, and then you dragged it out into a "free india" and even brought Ghandi into the picture. Ghandi's outlook on life (to put it mildly) was not in accordance with the Japanese methods of brutality and exploitation that they exhibited everywhere they went in Asia, so if anything Ghandi would have been even a more stabilizing influence in India in the event of a British "collapse" Which as I said would not have happenned. The Germans could not keep any sizeable force supplied in the UK, and the street fighting would have made Stalingrad and Vietnam look like an afternoon tea by comparison. First of all Mike, that was in response to a post that ask the question what would happen "IF" ( I repeat "IF") Britain had collasped in? It went on to ask. "Would the British set up a Free British government in India and continue the struggle" To which I replied. "A British collaspe would more likely result in a free India in India than a free Britain in India". I stand by those remarks. but I admit they are just my humble opinion. But do really think that Britain maintain the "RAJ" after being defeated? Second that whole set of post were refering to potential aspects of the new game. Not to any historical debate. Sorry for not getting back to you sooner but been too busy to keep up.

TIMJOT -> (10/31/2001 3:15:00 PM)
quote: The Maginot line would have been very useful if it was either extended to the coast or if Britain & France didn't walk into the trap set for them by Manstein. Here was a British failing that was to do them in again & again, that being their reluctance on putting their forces in a "neutral" country (Belgium in early 1940) before that country's neutrality was "violated". At least the US has learned this lesson. Singapore would not have been the walkover that it was if Britain had actually stationed forces in Siam (Singora) beforehand. Well then the decision not to extend it was wrong. But they really didnt have a choice politically it would be seen as shuting the Belgians and Dutch out and throwing them into the waiting arms of Germany. I dont think entering Belguim would have made a difference though. Since those forces would still be in position to be cut off. RE: Malaya, "Operation Matadore" was a British pipe dream. It had no chance of succeeding unless untaken weeks before the Japanese attack. If Britian invades nuetral Thialand before the Japanese move, would risk loseing US support. How could the US justify supporting Britain invading a nuetral country while at the same time condeming the Japanese for virtually the same thing?

TIMJOT -> (10/31/2001 3:29:00 PM)
quote: Originally posted by Mike Santos: Correction: "As to being able to attack the British and or DEI without drawing in the US. Remember that "line" ? Well the Japanese crossed it in July 1940 when they took over the rest of Indo-china. After that, the US was prepared (mentally) to go to war, if the Japanese stepped foot on anything that wasn't theirs anywhere else in the pacific." I meant July 1941. Sorry about that. Well maybe FDR was prepared for war after that, but the US? I am not so sure about that. I have already cited several sources that state otherwise. Including Morrison the "Official"USN historian. FDR is quoted as saying an attack on Malaya or DIE probably would not result in the US going to war. That Japan not complying to the US demands did not constitute a "Cassus Belli" and would result in war. Also several gallop polls from the period reveal that the majority of Americans were not willing to go to war over China or European colonies. The only line crossed that was going to bring the US into the war was an attack on America and its possessions.

byron13 -> (11/1/2001 2:43:00 AM)
Mike: No, I departed active duty in 1987. I would have loved to have gone to Iraq, but they weren't taking combat arms reservists. The fact that I was only M60A3 qualified wouldn't have helped. Most of my best friends were out by then, too, though one was with the 2nd ACR. Unfortunately, being senior troop commander, he got stuck as the Rear-D commander! He was so pissed he got out. I obviously had a number of acquaintances there, including a couple that got groovy medals. Coincidentally, my old battalion commander was the commander of the NTC at the time and was the one who determined that the reserve combat arms roundout units were not up to par and should not participate. I thought the entire 1AD participated. I know my brigade (2nd Brigade) did. I know Pakistan has the bomb, though there is speculation as to how many. What a nightmare if we get a fundamentalist faction in there, which is easily within the realm of possibility. Great. Fundamentalists that hate the U.S. have the bomb and are parked next to nuclear-armed India. That will lead to sleepless nights if anything will. I'm getting to be a pessimist over Afghanistan. I'm sure you guys are getting some good rumours up there, but CNN is getting me down. Muslim public opinion is very important and we're definitely losing the propaganda war. The Taliban can say whatever they want, and much of the Muslim world will believe them - even if out of ignorance. I heard today that the military has signed a $400,000 contract with a PR firm to try and turn the PR tide - jeez. Hopefully, the Northern Alliance will kick off a decisive offensive in the next couple of days. If not, it's going to get ugly domestically and abroad. Iraq is a fascinating study for me. I wonder what will happen if we find they are somehow responsible for the anthrax. I doubt attempted assasination or an air campaign will work, and we'd have to go in on the ground again. But from where? I'm not at all convinced that Saudi Arabia will let us stage from there this time. Kuwait owes us a favor, but I wouldn't want to have to assemble more than a Corps' worth of equipment and supplies in such a limited area right on the border of Iraq. And do you stage the equipment through Kuwait's one large port and (probably) one suitable airfield - both of which are on Iraq's border and subject to Scud attack? With what little buddy-boy Clinton has left us, you'd have to empty all of CONUS to get enough heavy stuff there. And I doubt the Syrians or the French are going to contribute this time either; it would probably be just us and the Brits. Finally, Iraq would know that this is the final battle and would probably unleash whatever NBC weapons it has - Israel included. The whole scenario makes me shudder. If Iraq is culpable, I hope they think it through before they make any grandiose statements.

Ranger-75 -> (11/1/2001 1:09:00 PM)
timjot, You still fail to define what you mean by a "British collapse". The fall of London along with southern England / Wales would not have been sufficient. Even occupation of the entire British Isles, which was not possible, would not have resulted in a collapse of the government. The population would have resisted (British civilains were armed back then, unlike today and unlike every other country in Europe) and the government would have moved to Canada. Hitler realized this (Goering refused to ever base his thoughts, words, or actions in reality and hence did not). The entire OKH and OKM were against any attempt from the very beginning. Therefore Hitler turned to (in his mind and rightly so in the long run) his primary enemy, the Soviets. Britain coundn't defeat him and he knew it, That he couldn't defeat Britain didn't bother him. After he dealt with Russia, he would approach the British and appeal to their reason. He didn't plan on the Japanese taking the actions that he did, and he foolishly declared war on the US aftrwards, even though the Japanese refused to hold up theirend of the bargin viv a vis the Soviets. That was what set at that time, in the first few days of December, 1941, the conditions for eventual total defeat of the axis powers, barring the German (or Japanese) development of something like the a-bomb. The Maginot Line. For "political reasons" France didn't extend the line to the coast. They could have and Holland & Belgium actually had "treaties" with Germany. However, the allied dispositions at start and their movements in the first few days contributed greatly, probably critically, to the German succceses in May 1940. If the Ardennes were "adequately defended" and if the allied mobile forces didn't half isolate themselves, the entire campaign would have had a very different ending. and this would have had an effect in the Pacific where Indo-China was concerned. The Dutch were "horrified" at the German attack on May 10. They had an "in force" "treaty" with Germany at the time and they "could not understand why Germany was attacking them". This whole episode was the crux of the problem that Britain and Fance faced in the late 30's up until 10 May 1940. The smaller democracies just refused to face reality, as did Siam. Nevertheless, the British should have pressed the issue further with these governments. The problem was that the British were not as good at strong arm diplomacy with democracies as they were with other "lesser" nations and the allies sufferred greatly as a result. That was the real diplomatic failure of the allies. They lost those battles before they were started. As I said the US has learned to be more forceful with nations in this regard, witness the arrangements with Saudi Aribia in 1990. If we waited until Hussein actually entered saudi Arabia, he would still control that area. As to the US entry into war, The Navy didn't and doesn't make policy, The President and the national command authority does that. It is tru that the Navy greatly preferred delaying getting involved in a war, at least thtough March 1942, but they were "ready" (a relative term as has been shown) in July 1941, when the entire US forces in the Pacific were placed on full war alert (including Hawaii, which unfortunately dien't last). To get a true prespective on things you really should look into Churchill's writings. He had many exchanges with Roosevelt and the SecState and wasn't tied to any "party line" as were some of the US historians. Again, you miss the ponit that the Japanese were not going to start slow and then gradually increase the pressure, they were going to blast upon the scene so as to take everyone off balance and secure as many initial gains as possible before the Allies could react. They were largely successful in this, even though it was a recipie for ultimate disaster. If you want to make the premise that an alternate Japanese strategy was plausible, then you have to dispense with the entire leadership of Japan at the time.

TIMJOT -> (11/1/2001 8:15:00 PM)
You still fail to define what you mean by a "British collapse". The fall of London along with southern England / Wales would not have been sufficient. Even occupation of the entire British Isles, which was not possible, would not have resulted in a collapse of the government. The population would have resisted (British civilains were armed back then, unlike today and unlike every other country in Europe) and the government would have moved to Canada. Hitler realized this (Goering refused to ever base his thoughts, words, or actions in reality and hence did not). The entire OKH and OKM were against any attempt from the very beginning. Therefore Hitler turned to (in his mind and rightly so in the long run) his primary enemy, the Soviets. Britain coundn't defeat him and he knew it, That he couldn't defeat Britain didn't bother him. After he dealt with Russia, he would approach the British and appeal to their reason. He didn't plan on the Japanese taking the actions that he did, and he foolishly declared war on the US aftrwards, even though the Japanese refused to hold up theirend of the bargin viv a vis the Soviets. That was what set at that time, in the first few days of December, 1941, the conditions for eventual total defeat of the axis powers, barring the German (or Japanese) development of something like the a-bomb. quote: Mike, I not defineing it becuase Im not advocating it. I dont think you could have a British collaspe either. Not unless you have a completely A-historical version of WWII. But I was just responding to a post that ask what would happen in India "IF" Britain collaspe. Again it was in the context of discussing game paremeters not historical paremeters. By the way I agree with everything you wrote in your Midway post. I

TIMJOT -> (11/1/2001 8:20:00 PM)
quote: The Maginot Line. For "political reasons" France didn't extend the line to the coast. They could have and Holland & Belgium actually had "treaties" with Germany. However, the allied dispositions at start and their movements in the first few days contributed greatly, probably critically, to the German succceses in May 1940. If the Ardennes were "adequately defended" and if the allied mobile forces didn't half isolate themselves, the entire campaign would have had a very different ending. and this would have had an effect in the Pacific where Indo-China was concerned. Absolutely, but they didnt leave the ardennes lightly defended out respect of Belguim nuetrality, Belguim was already figthting. They left it undefended becuase they thought it was impassible.

TIMJOT -> (11/1/2001 8:28:00 PM)
quote: As to the US entry into war, The Navy didn't and doesn't make policy, The President and the national command authority does that. It is tru that the Navy greatly preferred delaying getting involved in a war, at least thtough March 1942, but they were "ready" (a relative term as has been shown) in July 1941, when the entire US forces in the Pacific were placed on full war alert (including Hawaii, which unfortunately dien't last). Yes, but only the congress can declare war and FDR didnt have the support to go to war over Euro-colonies and that is documented. Again I have cited sources. Most Americans never even heard of Borneo or Malaya and certainly werent willing to go to war to protect them. Can you see Ameircan mothers willing to send there sons to die for Singapore?

TIMJOT -> (11/1/2001 8:37:00 PM)
quote: To get a true prespective on things you really should look into Churchill's writings. He had many exchanges with Roosevelt and the SecState and wasn't tied to any "party line" as were some of the US historians. Again, you miss the ponit that the Japanese were not going to start slow and then gradually increase the pressure, they were going to blast upon the scene so as to take everyone off balance and secure as many initial gains as possible before the Allies could react. They were largely successful in this, even though it was a recipie for ultimate disaster. If you want to make the premise that an alternate Japanese strategy was plausible, then you have to dispense with the entire leadership of Japan at the time. I have read 2 volumes of his WWII. I find his writtings somewhat suspect though. He has been known to excercise shall we say poetic licence. Churchill was very afraid that Japan would just attack British possessions and repeatedly tried to convince FDR to station part the US fleet to Singapore. FDR refused, and much to his consternation, also refused to give Britain formal agreement that would require the US to go to war if Japan moved south.

TIMJOT -> (11/1/2001 8:48:00 PM)
Mike, I admit the Japanese leadership was for war. If for no other reason than to save face. However they chose war with America becuase they felt as you do that it was the only way to could achieve there goals of Empire. You mention the principles of war in a previous post. This is exactly my point. The Japanes failed in one the oldest and basic principles of war "Know thy ememy" (Sun Tzu). They were of two minds when if came to America. On one hand they thought America was beligerent enough and had the will to go to war. On the other hand they felt the America lacked the warrior spirit and will to win the war. Pretty schizofrenic thinking from my point of view. They really never understood the American people or how its political system worked if they had they might been able to see past FDR's bluff.

TIMJOT -> (11/1/2001 9:02:00 PM)
Mike, I just want to be clear on this. I dont think there is any possible scenerio were Japan can win the war if it attacks America first. The only way I think Japan even has the slightest possibility to win at least favorable terms. Would be if FDR brings America into a war that doesnt have the whole support of the people. Then I can see a slight possiblilty that some major defeats could bring America to the negotiating table. Ala Korea and Vietnam. Two unpopular wars that we got involved in without being directly attacked and for unclear reason. Just MHO

Doug Olenick -> (11/2/2001 1:11:00 AM)
Byron, I know how you feel about the Gulf War. My NY Army NG unit was not called out. We were a cold-weather trained Mountain Infantry unit, not with the 10th Div., but a unit of the 172nd Inf. At the time we were considered an Independent Infantry Brigade. Anyway, there was no reason to reason for us to be near Kuwait/Iraq. Kind of a square peg and round hole situation. All that time freezing through Winter Warfare school.... Don't get pessimistic over what's going on in Afghanistan now. The media is butchering the situaion with its lousy, one-sided reporting. They think this is 1968 all over again. And to think I'm a reporter, oye. My personal feeling is we should care less what the other Arab countries say. Screw'em. Either they let us go get this guy or they become the next on the list. I could go on but there is not enough room on this server for my rant.

grumbler -> (11/4/2001 8:22:00 AM)
Okay, I've been doing some reading (van der Vat) and some thinking, and these are my conclusions: (1) van der Vat is completely unpersuasive to me in his claim that the japanese Army wanted to avoid war with the US, and the the IJN forced war with the US because they wanted to protect their own position vis a vis defense exopenditures. Van der Vat has not one source not used also by Wilmott in the relevant chapters, and Wilmott has many not used by vdV. Wilmott states categorically that Japan has no plan for war in 1941 that didn't include attacking the US at least in the PI, and I think his research far more sound. (2) The Japanese faced uncertainty about the US reaction to their attacks on the Dutch and British in the Far East. While TIMJOT can cite some figures applicable to several years before the time in question, I cannot find the public poll data for late 1941, which (with imperfect recall) indicated that the US public had come to regard war with the japanese as almost inevitable after the takeover of French IndoChina. Perhaps if I still had my Lexus/Nexus connections, I could find it, but this appears to be a doubtful issue. (3) If the US delayed war until it was "ready to fight" then Wake would certainly be a tougher issue than it was historically. The Japanese would probably write it off as a bad deal. Guam (not a small island, btw, but rather a quite lareg one, cacable of operating B-17s in 1941 and B-52s and SSBNs in the Cold War) was probably not defensable in 1941 or early 1942 and so probably only minor forces would be left there. The Pi would get significant air reinforcements (c. 100 fighters and 40 B-17s which were, in fact, en route at the time) but significant ground forces would have taken months to get there. (4) The Japanese plan for conquest in the south was based on the premise that only two of three objective areas - the PI, malaya, and the DEI - could be atacked succwessfully at any one time. The reason to opt for the attack on the PI was because forces for the attack on the DEI could not be positioned until the Malaya campaign had been brought to a succcesful conclusion. Thus, the DEI forces could be used against the PI until the conditions were right for an attack on the DEI. (5) To leave the initiative as to the timing for the American DoW in American hands threatened the entire japanese strategy. This seems to me to be a risk that the Japanese couldn't afford to take, given that it was national survival that was at stake. If the japanese were forced to recall forces from the DEI in march 1942 to deal with a sudden US DoW would put the timing for the fall of the Dutch oil fields in jeapordy, which was the one thing the Japanese felt they could not afford. (6) To argue that, in hindsight, it MIGHT have been true that the US would not have been prepared to endure great loss for the sake of the British and Dutch colonial empires is to ignore completely (as van der Vat does) the situation facing japan at the time the decisions had to be made. The Japanese leadership knew that the war was a gamble. They felt that the odds most favored them when they controlled the variables. Allowing the US to control the vital variable of when war broke out between the US and Japan would go against everything the Japanese believed about themselves, their culture, and the art of war. (7) Thus, I think that the japnaese attacks on the PI (though not those against PH) were almost inevitable, given their war aims. While in hindsight it might be argued that the Japanese might have been better off to ignore the PI and attack only the Dutch and British, this is merely hindsight arguing and of little exect hypothetical interest to historians.

grumbler -> (11/4/2001 8:34:00 AM)
On the German invasion of Britain: I think that it is beyond dispute that any German invasion of Britain was well beyond the capacities of the German Wehrmacht in 1940 (and later). German air mastery over the channel was simply not within their capabilities, and mere air superiority would not cut it given that they were going to cross in the most improvised invasion fleet in WWII. A single British fighter-bomber breakthrough to the invasion fleet would have resulted in catestrophic losses. ven without this, the total lack of German ASW capabilities in the channel would have given Britain large submarine force a field day. The waterlogged remnants of the german invasion forces would have stood and watched their invasion/resupply craft (which probably would have suffered 50% or so losses getting the first wave across) lose another 50% of their strength getting back to France. How many of the 25% of the surviving crew of the slow transports (barges and ferries for the most part) would have willingly taken across a second wave, or even supplies for the first wave? When the Allies had complete air and sea supermacy over the channel they only attempted an invasion once they had spent two plus years preparing the forces, the landing craft, and the plan. To imagine that the Germans could success "on the fly" (against fewer beach defenses, to be sure, but against comparable land forces and much, much stiffer air and sea opposition) is to stretch the bounds of belief past the beaking point.

TIMJOT -> (11/4/2001 10:46:00 AM)
quote: (1) van der Vat is completely unpersuasive to me in his claim that the japanese Army wanted to avoid war with the US, and the the IJN forced war with the US because they wanted to protect their own position vis a vis defense exopenditures. Van der Vat has not one source not used also by Wilmott in the relevant chapters, and Wilmott has many not used by vdV. Wilmott states categorically that Japan has no plan for war in 1941 that didn't include attacking the US at least in the PI, and I think his research far more sound. Good to have you back Grumbler; Well I have no dought that there was no plan in mid to late 41 that didnt include attacking the US, becuase they had by that time they had indeed decided to take that course of action. I dont think I ever denied that. I never argued what they "DID" decide. Just what they "SHOULD" have done. Of course its hindsite.

TIMJOT -> (11/4/2001 11:01:00 AM)
quote: (2) The Japanese faced uncertainty about the US reaction to their attacks on the Dutch and British in the Far East. While TIMJOT can cite some figures applicable to several years before the time in question, I cannot find the public poll data for late 1941, which (with imperfect recall) indicated that the US public had come to regard war with the japanese as almost inevitable after the takeover of French IndoChina. Perhaps if I still had my Lexus/Nexus connections, I could find it, but this appears to be a doubtful issue. Well in the PH hearings, there is documented testimony that states that FDR as late as October 41 didnt consider attack on Malay or DEI would result in war. Sec.Stimson is on record that his late Nov.41 message to the Empereor was not an ultimatum and did not imply there would be war if Japan didnt comply. Churchill repeatedly ask FDR to station a US fleet at Singapore and to make a formal declaration, that an attack on Malaya would constitute war with the US. He refused both request out of hand. Now if FDR and the American people were so willing to go to war for Malaya. Why wouldnt he make it official? If he had so much support why not sign a formal treaty and take all the ambiguity out of it?

TIMJOT -> (11/4/2001 11:14:00 AM)
quote: (3) If the US delayed war until it was "ready to fight" then Wake would certainly be a tougher issue than it was historically. The Japanese would probably write it off as a bad deal. Guam (not a small island, btw, but rather a quite lareg one, cacable of operating B-17s in 1941 and B-52s and SSBNs in the Cold War) was probably not defensable in 1941 or early 1942 and so probably only minor forces would be left there. The Pi would get significant air reinforcements (c. 100 fighters and 40 B-17s which were, in fact, en route at the time) but significant ground forces would have taken months to get there. Grumbler, I have repeatedly agreed with you that a delayed entry into the war means that Wake would be next to impossible to take. No arguement, but I also dont think its a big deal. I mean just how significant was the Japanese capture of Wake had with the course of the war? RE; Guam, well size is relative. Its small compared to the PI, but I agree it was big enought to serve as a bomber base. Its main value though was as vital role it played in the trans-pacific air ferrying route. Like you said though its basically undefensible and this is born out from the fact that in late 41 the US made efforts to reinforce Hawaii, Midway, Wake, PI but made no such effort for Guam.

TIMJOT -> (11/4/2001 12:04:00 PM)
(4) The Japanese plan for conquest in the south was based on the premise that only two of three objective areas - the PI, malaya, and the DEI - could be atacked succwessfully at any one time. The reason to opt for the attack on the PI was because forces for the attack on the DEI could not be positioned until the Malaya campaign had been brought to a succcesful conclusion. Thus, the DEI forces could be used against the PI until the conditions were right for an attack on the DEI. quote: I cant agree with you here. Although I am sure will come up with some sources that state otherwise. The fact is they did mount all three operations more or less simutaneously. They started invading the outlying islands of the DIE in Dec. and Jan. well before either of the Malaya or PI campaigns had been decided. Now if you are talking about the absolute final phase of the DEI operation ie; the invasion of Java. The fact that wasnt undertaken until late Feb. early March was more due the need to secure bases in Borneo, Celebes, Ambon, and Bali before the invasion than any operational need to complete the Malaya or PI campaigns first. In fact none of the 25th army took part in the DIE campaign. True the 48th div. was used, but that was more due to the typical Japanese unwillingness to veer from agreed upon plan. You have to remember that the Japanese had planed for the PI operation to have been completed by then so it was logical to earmark the 48th which would be in perfect position to move to eastern Java after what was expected to be a relatively easy campaign in the PI. Homma's inablitly to complete the PI campaign on schedule was seen as his failure and they were unwilling to change to there plans on his behalf. Had they thought the PI would have taken so long the would have planned accordingly and used one of the other Div. that I have already pointed out that were available. Or do you think would would have just waited until May 41 to attack Java? The fact is the IJA were unwilling to change plans to what they saw would be rewarding failure, but were only too willing to change planes to reward success. For example they decided to use the Southern Army reserve 32 div. in invading Sumatra well ahead of schedule with the unexpected quick success in Malay and the outlying DEI [ November 04, 2001: Message edited by: TIMJOT ] [ November 04, 2001: Message edited by: TIMJOT ]

TIMJOT -> (11/4/2001 12:36:00 PM)
(5) To leave the initiative as to the timing for the American DoW in American hands threatened the entire japanese strategy. This seems to me to be a risk that the Japanese couldn't afford to take, given that it was national survival that was at stake. If the japanese were forced to recall forces from the DEI in march 1942 to deal with a sudden US DoW would put the timing for the fall of the Dutch oil fields in jeapordy, which was the one thing the Japanese felt they could not afford. quote: I think this surrendering this initiative stuff is a little over-rated. Are they surrendering the initiative? They would be taking the initiative to move south while America was weak. RE; allowing America the timing of declaring war. Well they had been risking that since 1937. They couldnt know America wouldnt declare war over China, but they acted anyway. They couldnt know the US wouldnt declare war over indo-china, yet they took the risk anyway. Were they not surrendering initiative in these instances? Or look at it the other way. Were they not taking the initiative by taking these actions in lue of the risk. Here is another example. Did not Hitler surrendered the initiative of the timing of a DOW to Britain and France when he invaded Poland. He took the risk that they would not go to war over Poland even though they had a signed treaty with France to do just that. He was wrong, but surrendering the timing of a DOW ultimately had no bareing in the western campaign. America has had a history of winning wars that they did not make the first move. So taking the initiative in declaring war isnt always necessarly an advantage. Ultimately I admit there was considerable risk involved. I just dont think it anymore risky than taking on the US, and UK simutaneoulsly. To say its always better to attack all your enemies and potential ememies at once is always the best strategy flies in the face of history. You might as well say that Hitler should have declared War on the US and Russia in 39 just to deny them the opportunity to declare war on him first. [ November 04, 2001: Message edited by: TIMJOT ] [ November 04, 2001: Message edited by: TIMJOT ] [ November 04, 2001: Message edited by: TIMJOT ]

TIMJOT -> (11/4/2001 1:13:00 PM)
(7) Thus, I think that the japnaese attacks on the PI (though not those against PH) were almost inevitable, given their war aims. While in hindsight it might be argued that the Japanese might have been better off to ignore the PI and attack only the Dutch and British, this is merely hindsight arguing and of little exect hypothetical interest to historians. quote: Athough I agree that the Japanese leadership was probalbly incabable of making any other decision as they did historically, due to they're utter lack of understanding of the American people, leadership and political institutions. As well as there own lack of imagingation and over inflated perception of there superiority. This is not to say however that it was the right decision or that no other decision could have been made with a little more fore thought, understanding and introspection. You call it simply hindsite but really its hard to argue hypothetical without hindsite. How else can you judge the success or failure of a decision without hindsite? Every decision made in the time that its made is thought to be the correct course of action. Its only in the context of history that we can judge those decisions as being correct or not. I might add its not simply hindsite to know that. 1. America is thousands of miles away and would need months to project significant forces. 2. Although the PI poses a signifacant threat. Its easily isolated if not actually invaded if DOW does occur. 3. America failed to go to war over China incident even though it was in derect violation of the "Open Door Policy" the conerstone of American foreign policy for over a century. 4. America failed to go to war over "Panay Incident" 5. America failed to go to war over "Indo-china Incident" 6. America failed to go to war with Germany over U-boat incidents. 7. That America had no formal treaty with Britain or the Dutch to go to war on there behalf and even in lue to Indo-china continued to refuse such an agreement. 8. That America, though simpathetic and willing to give material and finacial aid to Britain, Russia and China was unwilling to go to war on their behalf. 9. That America could have but did not give an ultimatum to Japan " Get out of China and Indo-china or there would be war." [ November 04, 2001: Message edited by: TIMJOT ] [ November 04, 2001: Message edited by: TIMJOT ] [ November 04, 2001: Message edited by: TIMJOT ]

Cmdrcain -> (11/4/2001 2:43:00 PM)
quote: Originally posted by byron: Wait a minute. The production thread is boring, but you want to take advantage of our efforts? Never! It would be interesting to alter production that early, but it would be an odd system. For the American, I guess there wouldn't be any detail, but just some kind of general guidance to the computer. When the war starts, you have whatever the computer decided could/would be produced in that four years. I can't imagine anyone sitting down and playing four years of nothing but detailed production. Allowing set production way early could have some interesting twists, it would allow a more what if option like What If USA and Japan had had Carrier /air people get their way over the Surface people, then instead of those Fast BB's USA makes maybe you setup to produce More Carriers, the Essex class alot sooner, Japanese might convert surface prod into a bigger CV fleet too. Then theres the Plane prod.. I'd love also to be able to finetune the research areas.. maybe (at a cost in developing better piston engine types) the usa could get a leg up on jets.. it would mean through producing and using longer the say p39 and p40 and delays or no production of some of the later plane types, Which might be bad if Japan advances in piston types.. Also remember some reserachs by japan were delayed by natural events, eliminate that and? And What if Japanese player was able put into research and build a real long range bomber type..

Cmdrcain -> (11/4/2001 3:01:00 PM)
quote: Originally posted by Ringbolt: What about if the Germans had wanted bases in South America and raided US shipping on the way to Austrailia from the east or even between the west coast and Pearl? It just occured to me that this is something allies in fact and not just in name might have done. Werent Argentina and Chile both cozy with the Reich before the war too? With windows I cant see how the game couldn't have Mods that allowed for a vaster global scale, with Germany doing that and perhaps USA going to war with Argentina and Chile sides Germany and japan.. Would expand the Pacific Theater to include south american coast.

Cmdrcain -> (11/4/2001 3:10:00 PM)
quote: Originally posted by TIMJOT: Ah... the CV's missions were to ferry aircraft to Midway and Wake. Hardly a mission suited for BB's Yes, they were on missions to ferry Marine fighters to Wake and Midway and One CV, Saratoga was in West Coast Port Other Carriers were on East Coast.

Cmdrcain -> (11/4/2001 3:16:00 PM)
quote: Originally posted by TIMJOT: The fact of the matter is, that the USN position in the Pacific after Pearl Harbor, was never as dire as historically its been made out to be. In fact within one month of PH the USN could have and probably should have deployed deployed 6 Fleet carriers two Fast Modern BB's and 3 older but somewhat modernized BB's. Add this to the fact that no CA's were lost or even damaged at PH and you have essentally an intact Fleet. All your missing are 7 of the oldest slowest and essentially most useless ships of the Fleet. Granted if it had only been Japan, But the US also had germany and a Germany First.. and they needed for a while The Hornet and Wasp in Atlantic for Convoy Coverage and sub patroling.. DD's CL,CA's too needed for convoy, and Atlantic fleet needs.

Cmdrcain -> (11/4/2001 3:43:00 PM)
quote: Originally posted by byron: Mike: Iraq is a fascinating study for me. I wonder what will happen if we find they are somehow responsible for the anthrax. I doubt attempted assasination or an air campaign will work, and we'd have to go in on the ground again. But from where? I'm not at all convinced that Saudi Arabia will let us stage from there this time. Kuwait owes us a favor, but I wouldn't want to scenario makes me shudder. If Iraq is culpable, I hope they think it through before they make any grandiose statements. If Iraq responsiable for Bio attk on USa, ICBM on Baghdad.. Saddam gone.

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