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grumbler -> (10/5/2001 6:21:00 AM)
quote: Originally posted by TIMJOT: I dont want to turn this into the battle of the OOB's, but The I repeat the Southern Area Army under Gen.Count Teruchi, which encompassed the 14,15,16 and 25th armies, had at his disposal a reserve that included the 21 and 32 divisions and the 21 mixed Bgd. The 4th division as I also pointed was availabe and actually used in the PI operation. But you are assuming that availability also means that these troops both (1) had no other missions (i.e. were in reserve specifically to be committed to the theaters we are discussing), and (2) that the japanese had the lift to deliver them all simultaneously to the PI, DEI, and malaya. In think that if the japanese had had this capability, they would have used it. In other words, there would have been no debate babout the order in which they attacked the three objective areas, but rather they would historically have attacked them all. This is clearly not the case, so I maintain that, had the Japense kept an invasion force for the PI in reserve just in case the US declared war immediately, then they could not have conducted the DEI operations until the Malayan ops were complete. This says nothing, of course, about air power, which I pointed out earlier was even more phased than the military ops. 21 and 23 Air Flotillas were required both by the PI ops and the DEI ops. They could not be in both places at the same time.

grumbler -> (10/5/2001 6:35:00 AM)
quote: Originally posted by TIMJOT: I stand corrected on the two extra divisions. However like I said the 56th division wasnt even used by Yamashita and I tend the believe that the 18th division was sent to Burma as a afterthought because the the Malaya campaign was expected to take 100 to 150 days and therefore it could not have been included in the original Burma plan. I was under the impression that the capture of Rangoon was the decisive part of the campaign, since after its fall it was pretty much a rout and a running retreat all the way back to the Indian border. Read H.P Wilmott and it will become more clear to you, I think, that the Central Burma campaign was much more in doubt than you think. The fall of Rangoon was, indeed, a major Allied disaster and a major Japanese coup (the japanese didn't think they could do it with their initial forces, but in typical Japanese style just pushed until they were stopped, and the Allies paniced and filed to defend rangoon even when they had the troops to do it - another reason why I grant the conclusion that the japanese would have won a prolonged struggle in the reinforced PI - they just seemed to know better how to take advantage of breaks). Burma's capture, as you note, came much earlier than the Japanese had palnned, but they needed to plan for it, as it had resources they needed. Another reason to attack the PI as soon as possible, in order to free up troops.

grumbler -> (10/5/2001 7:01:00 AM)
quote: Originally posted by TIMJOT: Funny I always thought the Gilbert and Marshalls were in the central pacific. But for your sake lets call it the south central pacific and the US I am guessing that you mean would advance through the north central pacific via Wake. Well you still could not avoid the Marianas, not to mention the thousands of miles of open left flank subject to attacks from Jap bases in the Marshalls, Gilberts, and Carolina islands. Maybe thats why historically we did advance via those island groups. I dont understand how you can say it doesnt model the IJN plan for a decisive battle. Up until Yamamoto came along and changed everything with his PH idea. The excepted IJN plan was to lure the USN into a decisive battle near the PI. Attriting it along the way from land based aircraft and submarines operating from bases in the central pacific; period! Thats what every naval staff officer was taught from 1900-1940. Regarding subs; Hisorically I think something like 30 modern subs were dispatched to the PI prior to the outbreak of war, to go along with about a dozen older S-Class subs already there. They were far from deadly due to the poor torps you pointed out. You cant just dismiss that fact those subs were historically unable to stop or even delay the invasion. The torps just didnnt work! What are they going to do ram them? As pointed out by Comparative IJN and USN interwar strategies - Pacific Strategy Evolution by Joseph Czarnecki 10 February 2001, the japanese war plan (1923, the last time it was updated) assumed "(1) Destroy U.S. Asiatic Squadron. (2) Invade Philippines and Guam. (3) Attrite advancing U.S. Fleet with light forces based in the Mandates. (4) Decisive Battle occurs in daylight between the Bonins and the Marianas." (Numbers added by me for clarity). The US plans assumed "A trans-Pacific transit would only be possible pre-hostilities..." In the event of war being forced upon the US, "Kimmel's plan was to seek a fleet battle northeast of Wake, outside Japanese land-based air range." Evans and Peattie in Kaigun "Kaigun" page 475, had Yamamoto noting, "while fleet training had been based on the wait-and-react strategy leading up to the classic gun battle, in past war games and maneuvers, the navy never did succeed in winning such an encounter." Thus, a decisive fleet battle on the Wake-Marianas approach, with an unreduced PI behind the Japanese, did not conform to japanese expectations. Indeed, japanese naval plans for the Decisive battle specifically included the seizure of the PI ahead of time. The US plans did not (although by 1936 the US army and navy, expecting the PI to be an early target of the japanese, did not expect it to hold out). Thus, the plan you suppose, which allows the US to time its entry into the war, DOES conform more to USN plans than IJN ones. The USN sent a dozen new subs to the PI in 1941, not 30. The total force in the Asiatic Fleet in December 1941 was 29 subs, of which 6 were "S" class "pigboats" and the rest "fleet" submarines of between 6 and 3 years' service. Two fleet boats were immediately destroyed, and 9 were unavailable to oppose the landigs because they were on too distant patrol. None of them, in fact, attacked any of the Japanese landing forces becuase they were not in position to do so. It is hard to say what affect they may have had with some advance warning and proper time to reposition. Torpedoes, as we both note, were a major concern (although they were not 100% inperfect and the transports made very large and slow targets).

grumbler -> (10/5/2001 7:21:00 AM)
TIMJOT, I meant to include in the above post something else "Electric Joe" noted in his paper, that might actually help your argument (but you can decide that) "Much is made of MacArthur's and the Army's reversal on the issue of defending the Philippines in July 1941. What is ignored, or generally unknown, is that this was predicated upon the assumption that war would not break out before April 1942. Thus, had the war broken out before then, sans Pearl Harbor, but otherwise per history, the USN still would not have committed to relieving the Philippines. In fact, there's no guarantee the USN would have agreed to do so even in April 1942."

grumbler -> (10/5/2001 7:37:00 AM)
quote: Originally posted by TIMJOT: I dont think the allies resistance could have been any shorter than it was. as it was the few US forces that fought in the DEI, the asiatic fleet, a few B-17,PBY's,P-40's and 1 arty bn. didnt delay the japanese advance a lick. its precisely the domestic poltics involved that I think would cause at least a delay a DOW. I think that, from the Japanese standpoint, the existance of an Australian division at Singapore, the return of two more from the Middle east (which surely they would have heard at least something about), and the reinforcement by the US of the DEI with several thousand troops (given that the Dutch themselves only had 40,000 troops in the DEI) and aircraft meant that they could take nothing for granted. Additionally, the Dutch and british were certainly at least somewhat heartened by the fact that they had the (at least potential) might of the US on their side. In the end, I agree, all the US shoestring efforts in the DEI were pretty much for nought. However, this was not seen as such at the time and the Dutch, at least, might have seen their way into following the french action in Indochina had not the US been involved in the war. for Japan, the benefits of taking all the Dutch oil fields intact would have been incalculable. So, I don't dismiss the possibility that a delayed US entry into the war would have been of no value to Japan. We just don't know. For japan to have counted on it was too much of a gamble on her part, however. That is the crux of my argument.

grumbler -> (10/5/2001 7:40:00 AM)
quote: Originally posted by TIMJOT: Grumbler; I apologize about all the seperate post, but for some reason I was not able to edit all your quotes onto one post. So make sure you go back and read them all. I actually prefer the point-by-point posts. It makes it easier to focus in on what we think is important in our differences! I hope you are enjoying this debate as much as I am!

grumbler -> (10/5/2001 7:57:00 AM)
quote: Originally posted by moore4807: Grumbler & TIMJOT, I have read your posts with interest about the Pacific War variations. My personal opinions tend to lean towards TIMJOT's, as I continually play Pacific War and do the very precise thing he advocates as the Japanese player. I'm not even in the same category or as well read as both of you. (You've both given me a lot of reading material to catch up on!) I just notice some things in the game for the US forces that is discussed here. How, in game terms, do you avoid war with the US? The fact that the US is hostile is hard-coded into the game. The US air zones from the PI prevent Japanese conoys from transporting oil and resources from the south to Japan. quote: 1) To reinforce and supply PI and Guam from the beginning, you virtually have to strip the west coast of transports and tankers (most of these getting sunk in the game, by the way...) These wouldnt be replaced nearly as fast if the US isnt at war.... This assumes that Japanese AZOCs block supplies via normal convoy to the PI. Not the case if Japan and the US are not at war. It is true, however, that even a PI left to "wither on the vine" becomes useless pretty quickly, because of game assumptions about US air activities in the PI. quote: 2) The IJN Fleet carriers are pretty much free to split up (my choice is 2CV-1CVL with fleet support)giving exactly the freedom to move south and west if needed. The US is not very likely to rush into Japan's back yard when 3CV's is all they have to fight with for the first 18 months! You are basing this on the assumption (contrary to Japanese expectations) that Amboina and Timor are not major air bases with significant bomber forces. You have much better data than the japanese had, and so are more willing to split their forces than the Japanese were. quote: I note this is hindsight and computer AI play for the most part, but I thought it may be pertient to the discussion. I "think" the Japanese could have caused us bigger headaches NOT attacking PH and getting the DEI oil riches. India could have been taken then with no US interference until that point and its a much different war then. Would you agree that this decision might be different if the US was given the option of when to begin the war? Imagine having all of your forces concentrated on Malaya and the DEI and suddenly finding that the US has reinforced Guam with a division from hawaii, packed Wake and Guam with navy aircraft and the PI with Army aircraft, and then declared war! You would have to rapidly redeploy your own air to keep the AZOCs of the Americans from completely cutting off your own forces, and then engage in a major campaign in the PI to get rid of the problem. you would win, but in the meantime you would have no air forces for the vital capture of the DEI. You might not get around to that until june or July of 1942, by which time your fuel would have started to run out. I think the japanese made the smart choice, which was to tae out their enemies while Japan had a dominant hand. To delay war on the US and allow the US to pick the time of going to war was far, far too risky. The success of their actual plans argues strongly that they knew exactly what they were doing.

TIMJOT -> (10/5/2001 9:08:00 AM)
quote: The Japanese could not KNOW that war would be declared by the US right away, and so could not count on the South Seas Detachment to sieze Guam unaided. They would HAVE to plan on the possibility of an invasion opposed by US naval forces and thus had to plan on supporting the invasion with naval and air forces of their own. These forces could not, then, be allocated in their plans for a strike elsewhere, as they would be leaving the initiative in American hands. They would be far better off striking immediately and knowing that their forces could then be made available elsewhere (and also know that the American fleet would be nowhere near Guam when the axe fell). No they could not KNOW that the US would declare war right away, but they could have the same forces at the ready as they historically did, in case they did. You say it was too risky to not attack the US becuase they might declare war immediately upon the Japanese strike south. If they did they could have all the forces ready and followed the historical plan in its historical sequence. Again if war is declared immediatley then there is no way the USN could send naval forces to defend Guam in time. Now if the US does not declare war right away then I already admitted that makes things much more tricky for the Japanese. Because then the US could continue to reinforce the PI, wake and Guam unhinderd. There would be nothing the Japanese could do about it without committing an overt act of war against the US. I'll paraphrase a quote of FDR in a previous post. He states that that the US could probably not declare war if the Japanese just attacked the British and the Dutch, but sooner or latter the Japanes would make a mistake to cause war. I am sure FDR was hopeing the Japanese would try in stop such a reinforcement. He desperately wanted and felt he needed the Japanese to commit the first overt act. In fact the war warning sent to PH and PI said as much. It stated and Im paraphaseing again "We believe war may be immenent, However we wish Japan commmit first overt act if possible". You cant have it both ways though. You believe in an immediate DOW but all the risks you describe for the Japanese seem to more inline with a delay DOW.

TIMJOT -> (10/5/2001 9:23:00 AM)
quote: Wake is apparently some 630 miles from Kwajelein - I didn't do a very good job with my quick map measurements! Again, however, an "indefinate" jump-off date for the japanese conquest of the island would have to account for the (even greater) likelihood of US intervention, and would have tied up forces Japan needed to use elsewhere. Leaving the initiative on when war was declared in US hands would have tied down yet more japanese resources. Again, I have already conceded the Japanese probably could not take Wake in my scenerio. I just say without Guam its insignificant for all the reasons I have already stated. Its usefullness as part of the airbridge to the PI without Guam is nullified.

TIMJOT -> (10/5/2001 10:32:00 AM)
quote: Originally posted by grumbler: The Japanese 65th Brigade was sent into the PI only in January (possibly late December) and was not really a combat formation. It had six infantry battalion, but no support arms, and the troops had only one month's basic training. (Wilmott, p. 369). The 4th infantry division only arrived on 27 February (and since the 48th was withdrawn on January 2, hardly an "immediate" replacement). The Japanese may not have had the lift to carry their South Army reserve into the PI. Of the 300 japanese planes used to neutralize the Philippines in December and January 1941, some 200 were part of the 11th Air Flotilla, which was subsequantly withdrawn to support the attack in the DEI. Absent these forces (21st and 23rd Air Flotillas), the 5th air division would be hard-pressed to gain air superiority over the Americans - a prerequisite to amphibious attack. Further, the Japanese could not count on using the bases on Jolo island to break the Dutch. this would have made air support for the DEI much more difficult to arrange. In essence, you argue here that japan both could sustain the Malayan, PI, and DEI operations simultaniously (something I don't think even van der Vat claims), and that they would know the timing of the US DoW and be able to make plans accordingly. I don't think either of these contentions bears closer examination. If the Japanese are maintaining the forces necessary to attack the PI at the ready, then they lack the lift, troops, and aircraft necessary to take out the DEI. Better for them, I think, to sieze the initiative and eliminate the Amerricans according to a schedule they control, so that forces can be freed up in time for the crucial assault on the DEI. Remember that their oil situation made the capture of the DEI at the first opportunity a crucial factor in the war. To delay that while waiting for the US to declare war invited disaster. Yes the 65th was slated to be the occupational force. Whats your point? You still have to count it as part of Homma's Army. Occupational forces are important in these types of campaigns becuase they free up combat formations to do there thing. Besides it did end up seeing a lot of combat. The 4th wasnt sent sooner becuase it wasnt thought to be needed. They had already captured Manila and thought all they had to do was to mop up a few thousand remaining troops on Battaan. They had no idea there was some 70,000 troops on Bataan at that time. Even up to the time of Bataan's surrender they had only expect some 30,000 prisoners. I dont think sea lift had anything to do with not commiting the reserve to the PI operation. I think first and foremost it was politcal. The High command was not happy with Homma or the pace fo the PI operation. All other operations were executed flawless and a head of schedule. Only Homma has dragging behind. The High command simply didnt think he deserved more troops. They finally grudgly gave him the 4th which was a 2nd tier Div. and the reserve 21 mixed Bgd. The other reason was tactical. The 32 Div. was acually used in the invasion of Summatra not becuase it was planned but becuase the collaspe of the British in Malaya opened the oportunity push up the attack ahead of schedule. Now we have to get one thing straight here. I never advocated that the Japanese take every objective in the the South simutaneously as your post seem to imply. If you got back to my original post. I said they should have attacked on the line Malaya, DEI. meaning Malaya initially with a follow on to DEI. Basically exactly what they did historically minus the PI operation. Which was follow up the initail assault on Malaya with attacks on the outlying DIE islands. Borneo, Celebes, Ambon,Timor,Bali and finally converging on the main islands of Java and Sumatra. These preferal opeations were carried out simutaneously with PI and Malay operations so there is no conflict there. [ October 05, 2001: Message edited by: TIMJOT ]

TIMJOT -> (10/5/2001 10:43:00 AM)
quote: Of the 300 japanese planes used to neutralize the Philippines in December and January 1941, some 200 were part of the 11th Air Flotilla, which was subsequantly withdrawn to support the attack in the DEI. Absent these forces (21st and 23rd Air Flotillas), the 5th air division would be hard-pressed to gain air superiority over the Americans - a prerequisite to amphibious attack. Further, the Japanese could not count on using the bases on Jolo island to break the Dutch. this would have made air support for the DEI much more difficult to arrange. You forget without the PH attack you have the 1st carrier fleet with its 400+ aircraft available to make up the difference. Break the Dutch! Jolo might have been a convient stageing area for the attack on Borneo but you can hardly call it crucial. The landings were supported by the CVL Ryujo and seaplane tenders Chitose and Miszho. Even then there was hardly any Dutch resistance to break. Grumbler; Thats all I have time for tonight. I will try to answer your other post this weekend. [ October 04, 2001: Message edited by: TIMJOT ] [ October 05, 2001: Message edited by: TIMJOT ]

TIMJOT -> (10/5/2001 11:30:00 PM)
quote: Originally posted by grumbler: The activities of the Kido Butai were indeed extensive in the post-PH period. They launched attacks to clear the approaches of Singapore and cut off reinforcements (although, as you point out, they didn't directly intervene in the fighting, as that was the job of the army air forces and 22 Air Flotilla). It is true that their attacks often were against targets that, in hindsight, were not worthy of their might, but to claim that the japanese "under-utilized" their forces is monday-morning quarterbacking (you might as well argue that the US underutilized their air defenses at Pearly Harbor, since all the fighters were not airborne and 100% of the AA guns were not manned and ready). The Japanese were pros, and used their forces as best professional judgement told them they should be used. To argue that they should have followed an alternative course of action, you have to show that they KNEW they were underutilizing their forces, and I don't think that you can do this. OK hear is the operational timeline for Kido Butai after PH. 12/23 Kaga,Akagi,Shokaku,Zuikaku back Japan 12/29 Hiryu,Soryu return Japan after Wake strike 1/14 Kaga,Akagi,Shokaku,Zuikaky arrive Truk 1/17 Hiryu,Soryu arrive Palua 1/20 Kaga,Akagi,Zuikaku,Shokaku strike Rabaul 1/27 Kaga,Akagi,Zuikaku, back at Truk 1/27 Shokaku back to Japan 1/30 Hiryu,Soryu Strike Ambon 2/01 Ka,Ak,Zu sorte to catch US TF in Marshalls 2/15 Ka,Ak,Zu,Hi,So strike Darwin 2/25 Ka,Ak,Zu,Hi,So mop up sea south of Java 3/25 Ka,Ak,Zu,HI,So "Oper.C" Indian ocean raid The Kido Burai did not clear the approaches to Singapore. It was never even near Singapore until late March when in participated in Operation C. Thats a full month and half after Singapore Fell. However I am not saying they shouldnt have used the 1st carrier fleet. It was available and it would be silly not to use it. Just that it was not critical for the DEI operation. Pointing that out is not monday quarter backing. the Japanese didnt need hindsite to know what they were up against. They had good intelliegence the forces oppossing them. Contrary to your statement they had no expectations of being met by huge bomber armadas striking out from Rabaul and Ambon. You have to think out of the box here. All the priorities and timelines change when you take away PH and PI attacks. Two carriers would have been more than enough to carrier out these preferal operations. Ambon could have easily been attacked in Dec-early Jan. and then onto Rabaul or vis-versa there is a miriad of possibilities once you take PH out of the euation.

TIMJOT -> (10/6/2001 5:15:00 AM)
quote: Originally posted by grumbler: But you are assuming that availability also means that these troops both (1) had no other missions (i.e. were in reserve specifically to be committed to the theaters we are discussing), and (2) that the japanese had the lift to deliver them all simultaneously to the PI, DEI, and malaya. In think that if the japanese had had this capability, they would have used it. In other words, there would have been no debate babout the order in which they attacked the three objective areas, but rather they would historically have attacked them all. This is clearly not the case, so I maintain that, had the Japense kept an invasion force for the PI in reserve just in case the US declared war immediately, then they could not have conducted the DEI operations until the Malayan ops were complete. This says nothing, of course, about air power, which I pointed out earlier was even more phased than the military ops. 21 and 23 Air Flotillas were required both by the PI ops and the DEI ops. They could not be in both places at the same time. I think I answered this in a previous post, but just in case. The Southern area Army was the Umbrella organization for the 4 Armies committed to the theater we are discussing and thus any of those armies coud draw from it if there was a need or an oportunity. Example; elements of the 32 div. were sent to Sumatra to take advantage of the unexpected quick collaspe of the British in Malaya and the 21 mixed Bg. was sent to the PI when Homma ran into unexpected stiff resistance on Battaan. Lift is not the problem you make it out to be becuase contrary to what you think I am not advocating they Hit all three simutaneously. Rather that the precede pretty much in the same sequence sans the PI operation. Even with the PI operation they had enough sealift for Malaya and the preferal DEI operations simutaneously ie; west Borneo in Dec. east Borneo and Celebs in Jan. It wasnt until the Java landings that they required additional sealift and forces. The 21,23 flotillas moved to DEI only after airbases in Borneo and Celebes were already secured. Which was early Feb. Two months after initial hostilities.

TIMJOT -> (10/6/2001 10:52:00 AM)
quote: Originally posted by grumbler: Read H.P Wilmott and it will become more clear to you, I think, that the Central Burma campaign was much more in doubt than you think. The fall of Rangoon was, indeed, a major Allied disaster and a major Japanese coup (the japanese didn't think they could do it with their initial forces, but in typical Japanese style just pushed until they were stopped, and the Allies paniced and filed to defend rangoon even when they had the troops to do it - another reason why I grant the conclusion that the japanese would have won a prolonged struggle in the reinforced PI - they just seemed to know better how to take advantage of breaks). Burma's capture, as you note, came much earlier than the Japanese had palnned, but they needed to plan for it, as it had resources they needed. Another reason to attack the PI as soon as possible, in order to free up troops. I want to believe Wilmott, but if he says the decisive battle was in central Burma, I just dont buy it. The decisve campaign in Burma was the Capture of Rangoon. The paramount reason for invading Burma was to cut the flow of supplies to China via Rangoon and the Burma Road. The oil and rubber were an afterthought. Once Rangoon fell the British position in Burma was untenible and the Burma Rd. useless. If the dought you speak of comes from Japanese sources then I am even more leary. The Japanese after the war were notorious of downplaying there strengths and exagerating there weaknesses. They relish the underdog mentality because it makes the acheivements look even greater. There is a certain Col. Tsuji who is infamous for this and is often cited in many works. To have him tell it they conquered Malaya with sticks and stones.

TIMJOT -> (10/6/2001 11:35:00 AM)
quote: Originally posted by grumbler: As pointed out by Comparative IJN and USN interwar strategies - Pacific Strategy Evolution by Joseph Czarnecki 10 February 2001, the japanese war plan (1923, the last time it was updated) assumed "(1) Destroy U.S. Asiatic Squadron. (2) Invade Philippines and Guam. (3) Attrite advancing U.S. Fleet with light forces based in the Mandates. (4) Decisive Battle occurs in daylight between the Bonins and the Marianas." (Numbers added by me for clarity). The US plans assumed "A trans-Pacific transit would only be possible pre-hostilities..." In the event of war being forced upon the US, "Kimmel's plan was to seek a fleet battle northeast of Wake, outside Japanese land-based air range." Evans and Peattie in Kaigun "Kaigun" page 475, had Yamamoto noting, "while fleet training had been based on the wait-and-react strategy leading up to the classic gun battle, in past war games and maneuvers, the navy never did succeed in winning such an encounter." Thus, a decisive fleet battle on the Wake-Marianas approach, with an unreduced PI behind the Japanese, did not conform to japanese expectations. Indeed, japanese naval plans for the Decisive battle specifically included the seizure of the PI ahead of time. The US plans did not (although by 1936 the US army and navy, expecting the PI to be an early target of the japanese, did not expect it to hold out). Thus, the plan you suppose, which allows the US to time its entry into the war, DOES conform more to USN plans than IJN ones. The USN sent a dozen new subs to the PI in 1941, not 30. The total force in the Asiatic Fleet in December 1941 was 29 subs, of which 6 were "S" class "pigboats" and the rest "fleet" submarines of between 6 and 3 years' service. Two fleet boats were immediately destroyed, and 9 were unavailable to oppose the landigs because they were on too distant patrol. None of them, in fact, attacked any of the Japanese landing forces becuase they were not in position to do so. It is hard to say what affect they may have had with some advance warning and proper time to reposition. Torpedoes, as we both note, were a major concern (although they were not 100% inperfect and the transports made very large and slow targets). Now we are spliting hairs here. I said IJN sought a decisive battle in the Seas around the PI ie; the Philipine Sea, which is the sea between the Marianas and Bonin islands. Who said anything about an unreduce PI? I said had the US spent months massively reinforceing the PI before declaring war then the USN would have been hard pressed to stand by while the Japanese attacked the PI. With so much money,men,and material invested there, they would be compelled to sail to their relief. I think the Public,politics and honor would demand it. Which would solve IJN delema of how to lure the US fleet into the battle they had longed planed for Just how was Kimmel going to conviently oblige the IJN to seek battle NW of Wake and out of range of shore aircraft? Seems to me like wishful thinking. I dont know what Kimmel was thinking but The Revised War Plan Orange called for the the USN to mount a long methodical campaign through the central Pacific secureing bases along the way and aimed to the recapture the the PI. They estimated it would take 2 years. This did not jive with the Army plan for the defence of the PI wich called for falling back to Battaan ts to deny enemy access of Manila Bay for a period of 6 months, when the naval would supposedly come to the rescue. In reality the Army had written off the PI, but could never bring themselves to acknowloge it. All this change when Marshall and FDR aproved of the MacArthur plan. If this plan had been carried out the PI would have become to valuable to sacrifice and the Navy would have been between a rock and a hard place.

TIMJOT -> (10/6/2001 11:50:00 AM)
quote: The USN sent a dozen new subs to the PI in 1941, not 30. The total force in the Asiatic Fleet in December 1941 was 29 subs, of which 6 were "S" class "pigboats" and the rest "fleet" submarines of between 6 and 3 years' service. Two fleet boats were immediately destroyed, and 9 were unavailable to oppose the landigs because they were on too distant patrol. None of them, in fact, attacked any of the Japanese landing forces becuase they were not in position to do so. It is hard to say what affect they may have had with some advance warning and proper time to reposition. Torpedoes, as we both note, were a major concern (although they were not 100% inperfect and the transports made very large and slow targets). Now we really are spliting hairs. I knew it was around thirty, just didnt have the exact stats in hand. I would classify 3 to 6 years old, modern in 1940's terms. So according to your stats that makes 23 modern to semi modern Fleet subs. The main landings at linguyan gulf were not until dec 23. Just how far were those 9 subs on patrol? The Atlantic? If they were out of position it was sheer inepitude. It was no secrete that Languyan was the most probale main landing site due to access to Luzons open central plain. The notion that the subs were out of position when they had two weeks warning is a sorry excuse. The torps were not 100% defective but they were very very very bad.

TIMJOT -> (10/7/2001 5:47:00 AM)
quote: Originally posted by grumbler: TIMJOT, I meant to include in the above post something else "Electric Joe" noted in his paper, that might actually help your argument (but you can decide that) "Much is made of MacArthur's and the Army's reversal on the issue of defending the Philippines in July 1941. What is ignored, or generally unknown, is that this was predicated upon the assumption that war would not break out before April 1942. Thus, had the war broken out before then, sans Pearl Harbor, but otherwise per history, the USN still would not have committed to relieving the Philippines. In fact, there's no guarantee the USN would have agreed to do so even in April 1942." No, he is right there is no guarnatee that the navy would come to the rescue sans PH, even in April 42. The navy knew how dangerous such an operation would be. But it would have been considerably more difficult to abandon a heavily reinforced PI in April 42 than the realively weak PI of Dec.41 . It was hard enough pill to swallow to sacrifice just 20,000 troops think of the difficulty of abandoning 50,000 or 70,000. Not to mentions millions of dollars of worth of equipment. An intact USN without the excuse of PH would have been put under tremendous public and political pressure to act. You have to remember also that the USN without the humbling expirence of PH, would have entered the war with all its pre-war racial bias and superioty complexes. I dought the navy could tolerate what might be seen as cowering in the face of the enemy. No matter how many war games being played out at Newport would suggest otherwise. It is often said that not even the best war plans survive the first day of battle. So maybe in a perfect world of wargaming the USN could afford to ignore the PI but in the imperfect real world it is doughtfu.

TIMJOT -> (10/7/2001 5:52:00 AM)
quote: So, I don't dismiss the possibility that a delayed US entry into the war would have been of no value to Japan. We just don't know. I dont disagree with you at all. I believe that a delay entry into the war would have been extremely valuable to the Japanese. Thats precisely why I think they should have avoided attacking the US. Thanks for helping my arguement.

moore4807 -> (10/7/2001 1:17:00 PM)
Grumbler, Getting back to your reply- I cannot help to stress that it is hindsight that the IJN could of went west with her carriers and DEI/Rangoon as TIMJOT pointed out. In generalities only if we declared war on Japan even in 1942 the only difference it would have made was a few more battlewagons head to South/Central Pacific... My opinion is they would have been the American equivalent of the Hood/Repulse without radar & carrier support (and lots of it!) I think that yes if EVERYTHING had gone right for the Japanese and they went for the DEI/Rangoon, it would have been much harder for Roosevelt to bring the US Congress into the game, Yes eventually they would have-if for no other reason than helping Churchill...and much later than Dec 1941. As was pointed out by both of you, it was a pretty impressive Army fielded by Japan who simply tried to do too much with too little over too much space- yet what they accomplished is impressive -and a little frightening considering what we face today... I have really enjoyed reading both of your and TIMJOT's views and thank you for your comments and opinions. Stay safe Jim

TIMJOT -> (10/8/2001 8:01:00 PM)
quote: For japan to have counted on it was too much of a gamble on her part, however. That is the crux of my argument. How much more of a gamble was it to take on two of the worlds stongest seapowers simutaneously? How much of a gamble was the PH attack? Where they had to risk there entire fleet carrier force in a mission that required them to sail thousands of miles undetected into emeny waters with no guarantee that the fleet would be in port when they got there or that they were not sailing into a trap. To bank everytning on such a risky attack that probalbly had less than a 50% chance of being pulled off was the consumate gamble. By the way Yamamoto was an admitted addicted gambler. Being an adved poker player, he would have been better served calling the USA bluff. Which, is all FDR's bellicose postureing really was. [ October 08, 2001: Message edited by: TIMJOT ]

TIMJOT -> (10/8/2001 10:13:00 PM)
quote: Originally posted by moore4807: Grumbler, Getting back to your reply- I cannot help to stress that it is hindsight that the IJN could of went west with her carriers and DEI/Rangoon as TIMJOT pointed out. In generalities only if we declared war on Japan even in 1942 the only difference it would have made was a few more battlewagons head to South/Central Pacific... My opinion is they would have been the American equivalent of the Hood/Repulse without radar & carrier support (and lots of it!) I think that yes if EVERYTHING had gone right for the Japanese and they went for the DEI/Rangoon, it would have been much harder for Roosevelt to bring the US Congress into the game, Yes eventually they would have-if for no other reason than helping Churchill...and much later than Dec 1941. As was pointed out by both of you, it was a pretty impressive Army fielded by Japan who simply tried to do too much with too little over too much space- yet what they accomplished is impressive -and a little frightening considering what we face today... I have really enjoyed reading both of your and TIMJOT's views and thank you for your comments and opinions. Stay safe Jim moore, I agree with you that even in my scenerio that there would probabley be war between the US and Japan eventually. Most likely I see Japan flush with her victories against the British and the Dutch would find it increasingly intolerable to allow a foreign bastion ie;the Philipines; to exist in the middle of their newly won empire. The victory desease that historically swept Japan's armforces in 42 would have made it too tempting not to eliminate the potential threat that the Philipines represented. The resulting attack on the PI most likely would have had same galvanizing effect as Pearl Harbor. With the ultimate defeat of Japan being as inevitable as it was historically, albeit at a later date. In fact the only chance I see that Japan could possibly have a chance of winning a war with the US. Would be if what grumbler is advocating had happen. Which is FDR finagles a DOW in response to a Japanese attack on Malaya and DEI. A DOW without being attacked and the reason being the defense of Eruro-colonies would never IMHO have the whole hearted support needed to prosecute a total war. I see it more cloesly resembling the Korean and Vietnam wars. Two wars that the US got involved in for less than clear reasons and which lost large portions of public support after major defeats, (foremost being Yulu River and the latter being Tet), and eventually brought us to the negotiating table. So historical precendence demonstrates that a DOW under these circumstances and combined with a catastrophic defeat or even just prolong and continueing losses could very well have caused enough desension at home to compel the admistration to negotiate a settlement favorable to Japanese. Which was all Japan had hoped for in the first plance.

Ranger-75 -> (10/19/2001 3:53:00 AM)
You are all looking at this with the wrong perspective. Japan's leaders knew that with the oil cutoff from the US, GB, & DT that they would run out of oil in about a year. (what they didn't realize that even with the DEI fields they would be in a world of hurt anyway). They developed 2 main options "north" against the USSR and "south" against DEI & Malaysia. China was not an option. Sugiyama had promised the emprorer from 1937 on that the "China incident" would be solved in 30 days. The 30 days ended up taking 9 years. They were predisposed against the northern option because of the beating they took in 1939, and because of (in hindsight valid) doubts of the German capability to defeat the USSR. Also, the northern option didn't have the promise of as much needed oil & resources as the southern option. The problem you all have is that you somehow make it seem that Japan could have attacked the DEI, etc WITHOUT attacting the US Fleet. This was just not going to happen, the Japanese had an incredible animosity towards the US dating from the 1840's. The Naval treaty conferences (and the backdoor dealings) of the 1920's and 30's further infuriated the Japanese towards the US. This coupled with the Phillippines in their back yard meant some sort of strike against the US was inevitable. Sneak attacks were a hallmark of Japanese behaivour as demonstrated in 1905, 1937 and before. It was just a matter of where and when. That's where Yammamoto came in with his idesa for destroying (not merely disabling) the US pacific fleet before hostilities began. Alas, Nagumo failed to do even that. As for making all the wild assumptions of a British collapse here or there before Dec 1941, etc you need to take a dose of reality. Britain was never going down against Germany. They couldn't win alone against Germany, nor was it likely that they could win even with the USSR drawn in, they needed the new world's involvement (the US) but even if the RAF was ground down in the air battle for Britain the Royal Navy would have made it impossible for any German army to be supplied in England. Likewise, imagining that Hitler would not attack the USSR is just further wishful thinking. If you want to take a look at a might have been, then imagine that the French and British commands had even a little bit of common sense in April - May 1940 and had not actually helped the Germans cut off their best units in Flanders. Then with the French not defeated, the Japanese would not have been able to waltz into Indo-china and the Malayan campaign might never have even gotten off the ground. Let's see with Singapore a British base, the DEI would have been much harder to conquer, if it was possible at all. The British (and Macarthur's) actions during the first days of action didn't help the allied cause either. If you want to play with such silly pre (pacific) war might-have beens, then you'll need a global simulation. Best leave the pre war situation as it was and make the best of the hand you are dealt.

TIMJOT -> (10/19/2001 8:27:00 PM)
quote: Originally posted by Mike Santos: You are all looking at this with the wrong perspective. Japan's leaders knew that with the oil cutoff from the US, GB, & DT that they would run out of oil in about a year. (what they didn't realize that even with the DEI fields they would be in a world of hurt anyway). They developed 2 main options "north" against the USSR and "south" against DEI & Malaysia. China was not an option. Sugiyama had promised the emprorer from 1937 on that the "China incident" would be solved in 30 days. The 30 days ended up taking 9 years. They were predisposed against the northern option because of the beating they took in 1939, and because of (in hindsight valid) doubts of the German capability to defeat the USSR. Also, the northern option didn't have the promise of as much needed oil & resources as the southern option. The problem you all have is that you somehow make it seem that Japan could have attacked the DEI, etc WITHOUT attacting the US Fleet. This was just not going to happen, the Japanese had an incredible animosity towards the US dating from the 1840's. The Naval treaty conferences (and the backdoor dealings) of the 1920's and 30's further infuriated the Japanese towards the US. This coupled with the Phillippines in their back yard meant some sort of strike against the US was inevitable. Sneak attacks were a hallmark of Japanese behaivour as demonstrated in 1905, 1937 and before. It was just a matter of where and when. That's where Yammamoto came in with his idesa for destroying (not merely disabling) the US pacific fleet before hostilities began. Alas, Nagumo failed to do even that. As for making all the wild assumptions of a British collapse here or there before Dec 1941, etc you need to take a dose of reality. Britain was never going down against Germany. They couldn't win alone against Germany, nor was it likely that they could win even with the USSR drawn in, they needed the new world's involvement (the US) but even if the RAF was ground down in the air battle for Britain the Royal Navy would have made it impossible for any German army to be supplied in England. Likewise, imagining that Hitler would not attack the USSR is just further wishful thinking. If you want to take a look at a might have been, then imagine that the French and British commands had even a little bit of common sense in April - May 1940 and had not actually helped the Germans cut off their best units in Flanders. Then with the French not defeated, the Japanese would not have been able to waltz into Indo-china and the Malayan campaign might never have even gotten off the ground. Let's see with Singapore a British base, the DEI would have been much harder to conquer, if it was possible at all. The British (and Macarthur's) actions during the first days of action didn't help the allied cause either. If you want to play with such silly pre (pacific) war might-have beens, then you'll need a global simulation. Best leave the pre war situation as it was and make the best of the hand you are dealt. With all due respect Mr. Santos. I see nothing in your post that hasnt already been discussed in detail. So just how are we looking at this from the wrong perpective? Who said anything about a pre-41 British collaspe? who said anything about Hitler not attacking Russia? If it was it was as another what if tangit, not as a pre-conditon options in the Pacific. The key point in this discussion is; (OTHER OPTIONS THE JAPANESE COULD HAVE TAKEN IN THE PACIFIC). It may be "Silly" as you say to discuss such possibilites but in the context of this forum I prefer to view it as simply as an intellectuual excercise. Most of the post have been thoughtful and for the most part differing arguements have been back up by "published soures" .For you to state "This just wasnt going to happen" is simply your personel opion on the state of mind of the Japanese armed forces. I might add, not a very informed one either. Are you saying there were no other possible options the Japanese could have taken? Becuase if you are you would be wrong. Of course the Japanese had very good reasons for doing what they did or they wouldnt have done it that way, but thats not to say they were the right decisions. In fact history has proven they were not right. So why cant we debate that? Did France have good reasons to build the Maginot Line? Yes. Was it the right decision? NO! Did Hitler have good reasons to attack Russia in 41? Yes. Was it the right decision? NO! Did Churchill have good reasons to send troops to Greece? Yes. Was it the right decision? NO! I could go on and on but I wont. History is full of such of examples. To say Japan was any different is not supportable. The fact is Japan did have other credible options to them abeit not obviously apparent to them at the time. But more enlighten thinking could have gotten them better results I would suggest you go back and read the post carefully before you rehash what has already been discussed. If you are serious in entering this debate. [ October 19, 2001: Message edited by: TIMJOT ] [ October 19, 2001: Message edited by: TIMJOT ]

grumbler -> (10/22/2001 5:26:00 PM)
YIMJOT, I have no abandoned this discussion, I have just been incredibly busy and haven't had the time to write up the detailed posts required to argue successfully with you. I did get van der Vat's book and am looking at it now, so expect more in a few days. Sorry for the delay.

byron13 -> (10/24/2001 2:09:00 AM)
I'm going to have to agree with TIMJOT that Mr. Santos' comments were out of line. The problem with the comments is their absolute certainty. The difference between absolute success and absolute failure can sometimes be a very fine line. With but one or two decisions being made differently, we could easily be saying that it was folly for the Americans to send their outnumbered carriers to Midway to be destroyed. Or, with a couple of different decisions, the German thrust through France could have been seen as folly as well. To say that Britain would never go down against Germany is foolish when viewed from the perspective at the time. Britain was assuming an invasion would occur, and it did not have the materiel to resist effectively. The only thing between it and Germany was the RAF, and I doubt that anyone at the time would have predicted the success the RAF had. If you posed the facts as they existed in July 1940 to anyone, they would have said Britain was in deep trouble. Who would say that the RAF would win when so outnumbered, their losses far outstripped their ability to replace aircraft, and their airfields could be pummeled at will by the Luftwaffe? British ships were defenseless against the subs. Decisions are made based upon concurrent impressions and assessments. Could the Japanese have invaded the West Coast of the U.S.? In hindsight probably not, but it was a considerable fear at the time. Could the Germans have successfully invaded England? In hindsight probably not, but it was almost assumed that an invasion would occur. So absolutes in history just don't work. I also have a problem with the attack on U.S. forces being written in stone. Attacking the DEI does not necessarily require a sneak attack upon the U.S. as suggested. A person with a forceful personality (but incorrect as to his assessments) may have convinced the Japanese staff that the U.S. had no stomach for fighting and that the DEI could have been attacked with minimal risk of U.S. involvement. Mistakes and apparently foolish decisions are not made by foolish people; they are made by people that have made incorrect assessments and assumptions from limited information. Was Hussein a fool for attacking Kuwait? Was it preordained that America would be able to put together a coalition of ground forces that included Syrian and French units? Who would have thought that probable? He made a miscalculation, and events did not unfold as he predicted. This does not make him a fool or the outcome inevitable. Likewise, nothing discussed in this forum was inevitable - except for my brilliant arguments regarding the military colosus known as the Philippines

TIMJOT -> (10/25/2001 5:33:00 AM)
quote: Originally posted by byron: I'm going to have to agree with TIMJOT that Mr. Santos' comments were out of line. The problem with the comments is their absolute certainty. The difference between absolute success and absolute failure can sometimes be a very fine line. With but one or two decisions being made differently, we could easily be saying that it was folly for the Americans to send their outnumbered carriers to Midway to be destroyed. Or, with a couple of different decisions, the German thrust through France could have been seen as folly as well. To say that Britain would never go down against Germany is foolish when viewed from the perspective at the time. Britain was assuming an invasion would occur, and it did not have the materiel to resist effectively. The only thing between it and Germany was the RAF, and I doubt that anyone at the time would have predicted the success the RAF had. If you posed the facts as they existed in July 1940 to anyone, they would have said Britain was in deep trouble. Who would say that the RAF would win when so outnumbered, their losses far outstripped their ability to replace aircraft, and their airfields could be pummeled at will by the Luftwaffe? British ships were defenseless against the subs. Decisions are made based upon concurrent impressions and assessments. Could the Japanese have invaded the West Coast of the U.S.? In hindsight probably not, but it was a considerable fear at the time. Could the Germans have successfully invaded England? In hindsight probably not, but it was almost assumed that an invasion would occur. So absolutes in history just don't work. I also have a problem with the attack on U.S. forces being written in stone. Attacking the DEI does not necessarily require a sneak attack upon the U.S. as suggested. A person with a forceful personality (but incorrect as to his assessments) may have convinced the Japanese staff that the U.S. had no stomach for fighting and that the DEI could have been attacked with minimal risk of U.S. involvement. Mistakes and apparently foolish decisions are not made by foolish people; they are made by people that have made incorrect assessments and assumptions from limited information. Was Hussein a fool for attacking Kuwait? Was it preordained that America would be able to put together a coalition of ground forces that included Syrian and French units? Who would have thought that probable? He made a miscalculation, and events did not unfold as he predicted. This does not make him a fool or the outcome inevitable. Likewise, nothing discussed in this forum was inevitable - except for my brilliant arguments regarding the military colosus known as the Philippines Bravo Byron, I want to commend you for a brillaintly written and well thought out post. I may add I agree with it entirely. Particulary with the mighty mighty Philippines, a superpower for the ages.

Ranger-75 -> (10/26/2001 11:12:00 AM)
To timjot and byron; "who said anything about a pre-41 British collapse?" Both of you in the beginning, and then you dragged it out into a "free india" and even brought Ghandi into the picture. Ghandi's outlook on life (to put it mildly) was not in accordance with the Japanese methods of brutality and exploitation that they exhibited everywhere they went in Asia, so if anything Ghandi would have been even a more stabilizing influence in India in the event of a British "collapse" Which as I said would not have happenned. The Germans could not keep any sizeable force supplied in the UK, and the street fighting would have made Stalingrad and Vietnam look like an afternoon tea by comparison. "who said anything about Hitler not attacking russia?" "Did Hitler have good reasons to attack Russia in 41? Yes. Was it the right decision? NO!" Timjot mentioned this on 3 oct in this same thread. And yes it was mentioned as a item that could have some influence in the Indian ocean front. You don't understand what was going on in Germany, Hitler was dead set on attacking the Soviets. Remember the drivel he wrote in 1923 while in Landsberg? He followed it farily well. Hitler was going to attack the Soviets, come hell or high water. He resented even sending the small forces that he did send to Africa. Remember too that Hitler did not want to get involved in a war with the west (UK & France) it was only after he "crossed the line" by gobbling up the rest of Chechslovakia in 1939, that Britain & France finally realized that he could no longer be trusted. That was the turning point in the British & French relations with Germany. There was a similar "line crossing" that the Japanese comitted. If you want to find out what it was, read on. "Did France have good reasons to build the Maginot Line? Yes. Was it the right decision? NO!" The Maginot line would have been very useful if it was either extended to the coast or if Britain & France didn't walk into the trap set for them by Manstein. Here was a British failing that was to do them in again & again, that being their reluctance on putting their forces in a "neutral" country (Belgium in early 1940) before that country's neutrality was "violated". At least the US has learned this lesson. Singapore would not have been the walkover that it was if Britain had actually stationed forces in Siam (Singora) beforehand. "Did Churchill have good reasons to send troops to Greece? Yes. Was it the right decision? NO!" A lot of abosolutes here with the "NO!"s. I don't have a comment on Greece, except that the British erred in letting the Greek commander dictate the disposition of Greek forces. That made things much easier for the Germans. Once more British reluctance to take charge in another country did them in. "I could go on and on but I wont. History is full of such of examples. To say Japan was any different is not supportable. The fact is Japan did have other credible options to them abeit not obviously apparent to them at the time. But more enlighten thinking could have gotten them better results" The problem with this statement is that with the exception of Yammamotto (who was not in charge of policy or strategy EVER), there was NO enlightened thinking in Japan. You mentioned one quote in van der Vat where the army was against attacking the US. That was for a very brief time, After July 1941, Tojo and Suigyama were hell bent on attacking the US. They just weren't in favor of the pearl harbor raid because of the risks involved, not bacause they didn't want to attack the US. You seem to have missed the point of van der Vat's entire premise, that being that the Japanese were bent on expanding their "empire" at the expense of everyone around them, and that they were a bunch of ruthless liars (they lied to the emporer's face on several occasions). They wouldn't back down even if the alternative weas to get in an even bigger mess. They saw no problems with attacking neutral countries without a prior declaration of war, such as at pearl harbor and several others before then. They refused to face reality even after the shock of 2 atom bombs and losing Manchuria to the the Soviets. do you recall the phrase "not necessarily to Japan's advantage"? and in the end they still refused to own up to their responsibilities in causing the war. As to attacking the Soviets, this was in the japanese plans until just around the time of the Midway operation. After that, with the growing losses in China and Burma and the necessity of diverting division after division from the Kwantung army to south China, Burma and the pacific, the IHQ finally realized that they could not attack the soviets, and their strategy turned to keeping the soviets out of the war (this was a very real fear of the Japanese from mid 1942 on). Yes there were other possibilities but not with the people in charge at the time. As to being able to attack the Brithsh and or DEI without drawing in the US. Remember that "line" ? Well the Japanese crossed it in July 1940 when they took over the rest of Indo-china. After that, the US was prepared (mentally) to goto war, if the Japanese sttped foot on anything that wasn't theirs anywhere else in the pacific. "With but one or two decisions being made differently, we could easily be saying that it was folly for the Americans to send their outnumbered carriers to Midway to be destroyed." "Or, with a couple of different decisions, the German thrust through France could have been seen as folly as well." Manstein's plan was brilliant, it ran afoul of OKW and OKH. It was actually a bit of good fortune for Germany that the original plan was compromised in an aircraft accident (the foolish allied HQ still fell into a trap) and that Manstein was actually able to get his plan in front of Hitler's eyes at about the same time. Manstein still spent the campaign in a corps command against the Maginot line. The Midway operation indeed had a lot of good fortune associated with it. But remember a few points. After the initial Japanese raid on Midway, the 4 carriers has fewer operational aircraft on them than the 3 US CVs. Also remember that Nagumo, besides being a vacillator, was completely wrong about the US intentions and dispositions. I also can't help but think that there was a "little bit extra" on the side of the US. As one author out it (and I can't remember the name, it's buried in my garage) "the luck that was all with the japanese at the time of pearl harbour started to shift to the US". This was at the time of the failed Operation K and the late submarine deployment. Even so, Nimitz' plan was sound and it was soundly executed by his carrier commanders. Actually the US could have done better than they did. If they had launched a full strike at first (or the hornet SBD commander made a right instead of a left), had better search plane discipline with regard to keeping updated contact info and had better deployed their CAP, then they would have probably gotten the Hiyru in their first strike or would have been able to defeat the two japanese strikes against the Yorktown. Lastly if I-168 was not extremely lucky (its commander even admitted as such) the Yorktown would have made it back to Pearl Harbour. "To say that Britain would never go down against Germany is foolish when viewed from the perspective at the time. Britain was assuming an invasion would occur, and it did not have the materiel to resist effectively. The only thing between it and Germany was the RAF, and I doubt that anyone at the time would have predicted the success the RAF had. If you posed the facts as they existed in July 1940 to anyone, they would have said Britain was in deep trouble. Who would say that the RAF would win when so outnumbered, their losses far outstripped their ability to replace aircraft, and their airfields could be pummeled at will by the Luftwaffe? British ships were defenseless against the subs. Decisions are made based upon concurrent impressions and assessments. Could the Japanese have invaded the West Coast of the U.S.? In hindsight probably not, but it was a considerable fear at the time. Could the Germans have successfully invaded England? In hindsight probably not, but it was almost assumed that an invasion would occur. So absolutes in history just don't work." To say that Britain wasn't going to be subject to an invasion ATTEMPT by the Germans would be a foolish statement, but that is not what I said. As I mentioned before, the Germans did not have the ability to keep their forces supplied across the channel, Tanks don't run without fuel. The units that came back from dunkirk did indeed have to leave all their heavy equipment behind, but these material deficiencies were made up during the air campaign. so by the time that Germany MIGHT" have driven the RAF back from its forward bases, their units would have been replinished. Yes the British was expecting the Germans to try, but they didn't expect them to succeed. The RAF was outnumbered, but their losses did not outsrtip their factories capacity to replace them. It was the constant raids on the forward airfield like Marsten (or Manston, I can't remember) that concerned Dowding the most. The British were more worried about losing the use of the airfields than about plane losses. doen't forget only 1 RAF pilot for every 4 or 5 planes lost, whereas for the Luftwaffe, this was more like 1 for 1. British merchant ships were defenceless against subs, but not warships, especially with any degree of destroyer escort. And as far as the Luftwaffe's effectiveness against ship targets, well, just look at the Med for examples, I don't recallany major RN shipo llssess to German aircraft. Yes a few ships (carriers mostly) were hit, sometimes rather severely, but none was ever put in danger of sinking. and the RAF had a total of 7 (3 large and 4 light) carriers available to them in 1940 (after the loss of the glorius & corageous is taken into account) against ZERO german carriers. And the British did know how to use their carriers as demonstrated against the Italian navy. In the end, Hitler, like Napoleon was perplexed by the sea and never understood it's complexities (I'm borrowing from Shirer here). As far as a Japanese invasion of the west coast. They might have been able to arrive off the coast undected (not likely, but a VERY slight possibility) but once within about 100-200 miles, they would have been detected and the thousands of aircraft being produced in the US would not have had to stage off to some island base in order to get some very good target practice in on any invasion fleet. So, they could have tried, but again, not succeeded. "Was Hussein a fool for attacking Kuwait? Was it preordained that America would be able to put together a coalition of ground forces that included Syrian and French units? Who would have thought that probable? He made a miscalculation, and events did not unfold as he predicted. This does not make him a fool or the outcome inevitable." This is not really relevant to a discussion (however based in fantasy it may be) of the Pacific War, but yes Hussein was a fool at least as far as military operations go. Look at his dispositions. He is a vey clever political operative and is ruthless and cruel to boot, but he is still a fool. The Syrians had no fighting role. That was largely confined to US, UK forces. And, yes, the outcome was inevitable (that his army would be ejected from Kuwait with severe losses to the Iraqis). The only suprising item was that is was so quick. (The last hurragh of the VII Corps and 3rd Armoured Division!). Of course 6 weeks of relentless air attacks will tend to make a lot of units inneffective. There. That's all I have time for tonight. I must devote my time to CGSC for the next several months. That's much more important to me than enganging in arguments with folks who won't even reveal their real names. -(MAJ) Michael A. Santos

Ranger-75 -> (10/26/2001 11:19:00 AM)
Correction: "As to being able to attack the British and or DEI without drawing in the US. Remember that "line" ? Well the Japanese crossed it in July 1940 when they took over the rest of Indo-china. After that, the US was prepared (mentally) to go to war, if the Japanese stepped foot on anything that wasn't theirs anywhere else in the pacific." I meant July 1941. Sorry about that.

Ranger-75 -> (10/26/2001 11:56:00 AM)
I just dug this up and couldn't resist enlightening you on aircraft losses during the air battle for Britain... Quoted by timjot or byron: "Who would say that the RAF would win when so outnumbered, their losses far outstripped their ability to replace aircraft..." Let's see. Admittedly, the Luftwaffe started the battle with more airplanes than the RAF, however during the air campaign, the RAF lost about 900 fighters (and far fewer pilots), while the Luftwaffe lost about 1,700 planes of all types (probably 1/2 to 1/3 fighters). During this time British factories produced 1,900 single seat fighters while Germany produced 750-800 single seat fighters. That makes the Luftwaffe stand at about even (give or take 100-200 either way) for fighters while the RAF gained 1,000 fighters over the same period. Hardly a matter of losses outstripping replacements...

stubby331 -> (10/26/2001 1:16:00 PM)
way to go santos. I think you covered everything.

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