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Ranger-75 -> (11/5/2001 9:01:00 AM)

Jeeez, I go away for the weekend and you guys fill up another page. Too much reading. I'll have to check back in later, after this week's CGSC (Byron, I'm taking the non-resident course, weekends & Mondays, That way I don't have to spend 11 months in Kansas)



TIMJOT -> (11/5/2001 3:48:00 PM)

quote:

Originally posted by Cmdrcain:
Granted if it had only been Japan, But the US also had germany and a Germany First.. and they needed for a while The Hornet and Wasp in Atlantic for Convoy Coverage and sub patroling.. DD's CL,CA's too needed for convoy, and Atlantic fleet needs.
I cant see an anymore useless deployment of the Wasp and BB.Washington than convoy duty in the North Sea. Useing USNs newest fastest BB escorting slow merchant shipping to Russia was just plan silly. All becuase Winnie had a Tirpizt complex. I mean gee all he had was 4 modern BBs the King GeorgeIV, Duke of York, Rodney, Nelson all stationed at scapa flow to go up against one lone BB that left its fiord only once in its carreer. Useing a fleet CV for escorting was even more silly. Never mind useing it to ferry aircraft in the dangerously confined seas of the Med. A job that the Wasp and its wooden flight decks was wholly unsuited. RE: CAs cl,dd, yes but none of the Pacific fleets were sent to Atlantic after PH so the PACIFIC FLEET REMAINED INTACT.,



grumbler -> (11/5/2001 11:46:00 PM)

quote:

Originally posted by TIMJOT:
I cant see an anymore useless deployment of the Wasp and BB.Washington than convoy duty in the North Sea. Useing USNs newest fastest BB escorting slow merchant shipping to Russia was just plan silly. All becuase Winnie had a Tirpizt complex. I mean gee all he had was 4 modern BBs the King GeorgeIV, Duke of York, Rodney, Nelson all stationed at scapa flow to go up against one lone BB that left its fiord only once in its carreer.
This use of the Washington was, in part, part of her ongoing shakedown. She had only commisioned in May '41 and ships at that time were felt to need a long pre-combat shakedown. It was also a bit of the "show the flag" to let the Brits know the US was able to help them. Unfortunately for the brits, neither Rodney nor Nelson was a modern fast battleship, so when it came time to taking on Tirpitz the british didn't have enough modern fast BBs to provide complete coverage (which makes you wonder why PoW was sent east if the danger in home waters was so great). However, explaining the situation doesn't excuse it. I agree that the two fast US BBs would have been much better suited to providing AA screens for the CVs at midway than providing political screens for Roosevelt and Churchill in the Atlantic.



grumbler -> (11/6/2001 6:51:00 AM)

quote:

Originally posted by TIMJOT:

I cant agree with you here. Although I am sure will come up with some sources that state otherwise. The fact is they did mount all three operations more or less simutaneously. They started invading the outlying islands of the DIE in Dec. and Jan. well before either of the Malaya or PI campaigns had been decided. Now if you are talking about the absolute final phase of the DEI operation ie; the invasion of Java. The fact that wasnt undertaken until late Feb. early March was more due the need to secure bases in Borneo, Celebes, Ambon, and Bali before the invasion than any operational need to complete the Malaya or PI campaigns first.
The Malayan and PI campaigns launched on Dec 7, while the DEI campaign (excluding the Borneo ops, which as you point out were mere preliminaries to the main event) didn't begin until the 21st and 23rd air flotillas had moved down from the PI campiagn in February.
quote:

In fact none of the 25th army took part in the DIE campaign. True the 48th div. was used, but that was more due to the typical Japanese unwillingness to veer from agreed upon plan.
True, but the forces they were transferring were air, not land forces. The main limitation on land forces was lift capabilities, not numbers of troops.
quote:

Or do you think would would have just waited until May 41 to attack Java? The fact is the IJA were unwilling to change plans to what they saw would be rewarding failure, but were only too willing to change planes to reward success.
I'm not sure what you are arguing here. What I am pointing out was that Japan withdrew more than two-thirds of the aircraft supporting the PI campaign when it came time to attack the DEI. that they were able to do so was a function of their success to date in eliminating the PI's capability to operate any combat aircraft. Had they not opted to do this, they would have been forced to leave 21st and 23rd Air Flotillas in Formosa, and so they would have had to plan entirely on CV air (which may or may not have been available, given the movements of the US fleet) for supporting their attacks into the DEI. I submit that this would have been far too risky in the minds of the Japanese planners. They needed some cretainty that the attacks on the DEI could go on as planned, for that was the entire purpose of fighting the war.



grumbler -> (11/6/2001 7:04:00 AM)

quote:

Originally posted by TIMJOT:
I think this surrendering this initiative stuff is a little over-rated. Are they surrendering the initiative? They would be taking the initiative to move south while America was weak. RE; allowing America the timing of declaring war. Well they had been risking that since 1937. They couldnt know America wouldnt declare war over China, but they acted anyway. They couldnt know the US wouldnt declare war over indo-china, yet they took the risk anyway. Were they not surrendering initiative in these instances? Or look at it the other way. Were they not taking the initiative by taking these actions in lue of the risk.
I am not sure where you are going here. The Japanese viewed the risks of the US going to war over China and Indochina as small, and so took the risk of attacking those places. They viewed the risk of the US going to war over their attacks on the British and DEI as large, and so they decided to attack the US while it was unprepared. To allow the US to choose the moment of the DoW (which, for planning purposes, they had to assume would be at the worst possible moment for Japan) left the Japanese initial offensives far more liable to failure. Attacking the US at the outset was a risk, but it was one they could manage, becuase they could calculate the odds of success in that situation, wjhile they couldn't in the situation where the US got to choose when to go to war. If they never attacked the US, and the US decided to wait until 1944 or 1946 to start the war, the japanese are as sure to lose the war as they are if they fail to convince the US that attacking them to retake territory in 1943 is an error. They took the gamble they thought had the highest chance of payoff: to bloody the US so much early in the war that the US wouldn't have the stomach to fight on. I think that the facts support their decision.
quote:

Here is another example. Did not Hitler surrendered the initiative of the timing of a DOW to Britain and France when he invaded Poland. He took the risk that they would not go to war over Poland even though they had a signed treaty with France to do just that. He was wrong, but surrendering the timing of a DOW ultimately had no bareing in the western campaign.
A good example. Hitler counted on the Allies to decalre war, but felt that they would not be willing to take an offensive to help the Poles. He took exactly the sort of reasoned gamble the Japanese leaders took. None of them survived the consequances of their errors, but that's the risk you take when you gamble.
quote:

Ultimately I admit there was considerable risk involved. I just dont think it anymore risky than taking on the US, and UK simutaneoulsly. To say its always better to attack all your enemies and potential ememies at once is always the best strategy flies in the face of history.
I think you are mistating my position. I have never argued, for instance, that Japan should also have attacked the Soviet Union on December 7th, 1941, so I certainly cannot be accused of arguing that"its always better to attack all your enemies and potential ememies at once is always the best strategy."



grumbler -> (11/6/2001 7:20:00 AM)

quote:

Originally posted by TIMJOT:
Athough I agree that the Japanese leadership was probalbly incabable of making any other decision as they did historically, due to they're utter lack of understanding of the American people, leadership and political institutions. As well as there own lack of imagingation and over inflated perception of there superiority. This is not to say however that it was the right decision or that no other decision could have been made with a little more fore thought, understanding and introspection. You call it simply hindsite but really its hard to argue hypothetical without hindsite. How else can you judge the success or failure of a decision without hindsite? Every decision made in the time that its made is thought to be the correct course of action. Its only in the context of history that we can judge those decisions as being correct or not.
I would argue, if we are to start at first causes, that Japan's best choice would have been to attack no one at all. The history of the last 50 years has proven that the Yen is more nimble and effective in achieving its objectives than the Zero ever was!
quote:

I might add its not simply hindsite to know that. 1. America is thousands of miles away and would need months to project significant forces.
Precisely the months when Japan can elast afford any ambiguity about American intentions, because their forces are spread thin and engaged in difficult military operations with little margin for error.
quote:

2. Although the PI poses a signifacant threat. Its easily isolated if not actually invaded if DOW does occur.
How you isolate it from American reinforcement without military action against US forces escapes me at the moment. Care to expand on this idea?
quote:

3. America failed to go to war over China incident
even though it was in derect violation of the "Open Door Policy" the conerstone of American foreign policy for over a century. 4. America failed to go to war over "Panay Incident" 5. America failed to go to war over "Indo-china Incident"
However, the Japanese were aware that tensions with the US were ratcheting up rapidly as a result of these incidents. None of them occurred in isolation, they were all part of the history of US-Japanese relations. To argue that the fact that the US didn't go to war over the last incident means they will never go to war over a future incident is to ignore history.
quote:

6. America failed to go to war with Germany over U-boat incidents. 7. That America had no formal treaty with Britain or the Dutch to go to war on there behalf and even in lue to Indo-china continued to refuse such an agreement.
However, the Japanese were surely aware that the incidents with the U-boats had brought them dangerously close to war with Germany (and that the US HAD gone to war with Germany in WWI without any direct German attack on America, which lead to no problems with the war's popularity in the US). In addition, the US decision to sink all discovered U-boats west of (what was it, 20 degrees west longitude?) meant to the Japanese that the US was virtually, if not actually, at war with Germany anyway. Japan had meantime allied itself with Germany. The chances could not look good to the japanese that the US would stay out of the war much longer.
quote:

8. That America, though simpathetic and willing to give material and finacial aid to Britain, Russia and China was unwilling to go to war on their behalf.
This is a mere statement of opinion. Many Americans had already, of course, joined the Canadian Armed forces. How much longer the US would stay out of the war was the question, not whether or not they would join.
quote:

9. That America could have but did not give an ultimatum to Japan " Get out of China and Indo-china or there would be war."
Japan felt that this was the effective meaning of the oil embargo and freeze of trade and assets. The US didn't need to fight a war with Japan under the circumstances - the embargo would have meant the end of japan's military capabilities as surely as a war would. So, the US had, in effect, issued an ultimatum, just not phrased that way.



TIMJOT -> (11/6/2001 1:15:00 PM)

quote:

Originally posted by grumbler:
This use of the Washington was, in part, part of her ongoing shakedown. She had only commisioned in May '41 and ships at that time were felt to need a long pre-combat shakedown. It was also a bit of the "show the flag" to let the Brits know the US was able to help them. Unfortunately for the brits, neither Rodney nor Nelson was a modern fast battleship, so when it came time to taking on Tirpitz the british didn't have enough modern fast BBs to provide complete coverage (which makes you wonder why PoW was sent east if the danger in home waters was so great). However, explaining the situation doesn't excuse it. I agree that the two fast US BBs would have been much better suited to providing AA screens for the CVs at midway than providing political screens for Roosevelt and Churchill in the Atlantic.
Yes,　I agree Grumbler it had to be a political deployment. But they could have probably should have sent one of the older altantic fleet BBs if all they were doing was showing the Flag. Neverless I dont understand if the Navy didnt consider the Washington combat ready why did they send it into a potential combat situation? You think at least they would have sent the N.Carolina which was commissioned earlier and had more training. Yet she spent the six months after PH pleasure cruising in the carribien. I agree that useing them to screen CVs would have been a more effective way of breaking the crews in without putting them in any into any ship to ship situations, which I can understand they were reluctant to do with unexpirence crews. I notice though the Japanese held no such reservations when it came to The Yamato, which correct me if I am wrong, was commisioned after the N.Carolina I consider the Rodney and Nelson relatively modern. They were designed in the twenties commissioned in the 30s, had 16inch guns instead of the standard Brit 15inch had good armor protection. They were certainly good enough to match up with the Bismarks which were really nothing more than updated SMS Bayden class BBs. You have to admit Churchill had a Tirpitz complex that was disproportionate to the actual danger that it posed



TIMJOT -> (11/6/2001 1:27:00 PM)

quote:

The Malayan and PI campaigns launched on Dec 7, while the DEI campaign (excluding the Borneo ops, which as you point out were mere preliminaries to the main event) didn't begin until the 21st and 23rd air flotillas had moved down from the PI campiagn in February.

Dont forget　the Celebes and Ambon. The point is that it was a step by step advance into the DEI that started in late Dec. The CVL Ryujo and seaplane tenders supported these operations. The 21 and 23 flottillas were deployed only after these bases in Borneo and Celebes were secured. Sumatra was invaded before Singapore and PI was complete. That leaves Java, and you really cant expect them to have go charging in without securing the outlying islands first.



K G von Martinez -> (11/6/2001 4:36:00 PM)

Not sure if you can call Borneo a preliminary only. It was a prime target for it was the part of DEI with the oil!!



TIMJOT -> (11/6/2001 5:11:00 PM)

quote:

Originally posted by kgvm:
Not sure if you can call Borneo a preliminary only. It was a prime target for it was the part of DEI with the oil!!
True, Java was probably was the least important strategically. Borneo Sumatra had the oil, Celebes had the airfields, Java just had rice and was the political and population center. So the most important part of the operation was finished before the end of febuary.



grumbler -> (11/6/2001 11:18:00 PM)

quote:

Originally posted by TIMJOT:
You think at least they would have sent the N.Carolina which was commissioned earlier and had more training. Yet she spent the six months after PH pleasure cruising in the carribien.
North Carolina had enormous technical problems with her propellors that kept her from achieving anything like full speed for a year after commissioning. She was the first to have the skegs on the outer shafts and they replaced her props several times before coming up with a solution that didn't cause damaging vibrations at high speeds.
quote:

I consider the Rodney and Nelson relatively modern. They were designed in the twenties commissioned in the 30s, had 16inch guns instead of the standard Brit 15inch had good armor protection. They were certainly good enough to match up with the Bismarks which were really nothing more than updated SMS Bayden class BBs. You have to admit Churchill had a Tirpitz complex that was disproportionate to the actual danger that it posed

Nelso and Rodney were far too slow to catch Tirpitz, and so were of limited use in countering her. Churchill was, of course, the product of an older, battleship oriented generation, and up to 1941 carriers had had little success against ships at sea. He felt only a battleship could match a battleship which may have been true when he was studying naval warfare but shich certainly was untrue by 1941.



TIMJOT -> (11/8/2001 3:29:00 PM)

quote:

True, but the forces they were transferring were air, not land forces. The main limitation on land forces was lift capabilities, not numbers of troops.

Not this sealift argument again There were sealift limitions, but large sealift capacity wasnt needed until the Java operation. Which wouldnt have be undertaken until Malaya and Borneo, Celebes, and Sumatra regardless of any scenerio, thus sealift would not have been a problem.



TIMJOT -> (11/8/2001 3:39:00 PM)

quote:

Had they not opted to do this, they would have been forced to leave 21st and 23rd Air Flotillas in Formosa, and so they would have had to plan entirely on CV air (which may or may not have been available, given the movements of the US fleet) for supporting their attacks into the DEI.
You should say elements of the 21st and 23rd flotillas. Saburo Sakai said in his book that there was never more than 54 Zero's from his flottila used in the DEI campaign. Again without PH the Japanese had 6 fleet and 4 cvls to deal with 3 US CV's. As it was the CVL Ryujo did the lionshare of the support early phase of DEI. The Japanese didnt even use the other 3 CVL's Honsho Shoho, Hosho, which were all just sitting at anchor back in Japan.



TIMJOT -> (11/8/2001 4:00:00 PM)

Grumbler
quote:

I am not sure where you are going here. The Japanese viewed the risks of the US going to war over China and Indochina as small, and so took the risk of attacking those places. They viewed the risk of the US going to war over their attacks on the British and DEI as large, and so they decided to attack the US while it was unprepared.

My point is. How could they know that? You say that they unwilling to risk not knowing if the US would go to war or not. Yet as I point out they did just that several times prior. You say they saw the risk was low. Why would they think that? The "Open door policy" was the conerstone of US foreign policy second only to the "Monroe doctorine" The US strong advocation of this policy, more than anything else kept China from being gobbled up by the colonial powers at the end of the 19th century. It was incredibly risky. The US had more at stake economically and politically with china than anyhere else in Asia, includeing the Philipines.Yet they took the risk anyway. My point is that there is a track record hear. The US didnt go to war on behalf of chinal and the open door policy. It didnt go to war after being attacked "Panay" or its citzens being killed "Shanghia" it didnt go to war in behalf of French Indo-china. Why would it be a stretch to think if the US wasnt willing to go to war over China. A country that it had so much at stake politically and economically. Why would it go to war over Malaya or DIE, which they had very little at stake politically or econmically? The US just didnt seem to be willing to go to war if not attacked. [ November 08, 2001: Message edited by: TIMJOT ] [ November 08, 2001: Message edited by: TIMJOT ] [ November 08, 2001: Message edited by: TIMJOT ] [ November 08, 2001: Message edited by: TIMJOT ]



TIMJOT -> (11/8/2001 4:22:00 PM)

Grumbler
quote:

If they never attacked the US, and the US decided to wait until 1944 or 1946 to start the war, the japanese are as sure to lose the war as they are if they fail to convince the US that attacking them to retake territory in 1943 is an error. They took the gamble they thought had the highest chance of payoff: to bloody the US so much early in the war that the US wouldn't have the stomach to fight on. I think that the facts support their decision.

Facts support there decision!!! Where in history does it show that the US would just give up after being bloodied as you say. What precedence would lead the Japanese to conclude that the US would not see the war through if they could get there first licks in???? You have to admit the Japanese were utterly wrong regarding there understanding the American character and strength of will. [ November 08, 2001: Message edited by: TIMJOT ]



TIMJOT -> (11/8/2001 4:31:00 PM)

A good example. Hitler counted on the Allies to decalre war, but felt that they would not be willing to take an offensive to help the Poles. He took exactly the sort of reasoned gamble the Japanese leaders took. None of them survived the consequances of their errors, but that's the risk you take when you gamble.
quote:

No.... Hitler didnt think the Allies would go to war for Poland. Quote; "Who would go to war for Danzig?". He didnt plan to go to war with the west until 43. He took the gamble and lost, but surrendering the initiative on DOW didnt have any effect in the outcome of the war. My point being there is some precendence in counties or leaders takeing such risk. Why then as you say it was impossible for Japan to do the same. Simply put attacking the US and Japan could never win. Avoid attacking the US and they might be able to come out ahead. I will take "might" over "cant" any day. [ November 08, 2001: Message edited by: TIMJOT ]



TIMJOT -> (11/8/2001 4:42:00 PM)

I think you are mistating my position. I have never argued, for instance, that Japan should also have attacked the Soviet Union on December 7th, 1941, so I certainly cannot be accused of arguing that"its always better to attack all your enemies and potential ememies at once is always the best strategy." Grumbler
quote:

Well all potential enemies in the Pacific Theater anyway. The Soviet Union was just potential enemy on the Continent.



TIMJOT -> (11/8/2001 4:55:00 PM)

Precisely the months when Japan can elast afford any ambiguity about American intentions, because their forces are spread thin and engaged in difficult military operations with little margin for error. Grumber
quote:


Just how thinly? the only major units the Japanese used in all of the PI, Malaya operations were two Kongo BB's the rest werer cruiser and destroyer squadrons. The two other Kongos where with the 1st carrier Fleet and the rest of the Battle Fleets 6 BBs stayed in Japan, along with 3 CVLs. So without PH the Main striking power of the combined Fleet was available. But anyhow the USN wouldnt be able to project anything more than the historical hit and run raids in the insueing months in which time the southern operation would have been completed. Thus freeing up the rest of the Fleet.



TIMJOT -> (11/8/2001 5:15:00 PM)

Grumbler
quote:

How you isolate it from American reinforcement without military action against US forces escapes me at the moment. Care to expand on this idea?
I am saying that if as you say there is a US DOW then the PI is still easy to isolate even if you dont think an invasion would be possible. 1. Guam is easily taken, which cuts any possible air resupply. 2. Sea resupply becomes next to impossible after a DOW becuase all the sealanes and approaches to the PI are covered by Japanese bases. Now if the US delays DOW and use the ensuing months to reinforce the PI. Then you have a much stronger PI garrison, but its still isolated and the Japanes would have the needed time to complete there southern campaign uninpeded. So just how dangerous is a much stronger but still isolated PI anyway. For example would it have helped the germans to have more troops traped at Stalingrad? [ November 08, 2001: Message edited by: TIMJOT ]



TIMJOT -> (11/8/2001 5:27:00 PM)

Grumbler
quote:

However, the Japanese were aware that tensions with the US were ratcheting up rapidly as a result of these incidents. None of them occurred in isolation, they were all part of the history of US-Japanese relations. To argue that the fact that the US didn't go to war over the last incident means they will never go to war over a future incident is to ignore history.

No, but it demonstrates that there was a reluctance in the US to go to war and there was no precendence to indicate that the US would go to war over the next incident. Especially if you take into account the US refuse to give Britain or the Dutch any formal guarantees or declarations.



TIMJOT -> (11/8/2001 5:39:00 PM)

Grumbler
quote:

However, the Japanese were surely aware that the incidents with the U-boats had brought them dangerously close to war with Germany (and that the US HAD gone to war with Germany in WWI without any direct German attack on America, which lead to no problems with the war's popularity in the US). In addition, the US decision to sink all discovered U-boats west of (what was it, 20 degrees west longitude?) meant to the Japanese that the US was virtually, if not actually, at war with Germany anyway. Japan had meantime allied itself with Germany. The chances could not look good to the japanese that the US would stay out of the war much longer.
It was exactly the American expirence of WWI that made the MAJORITY of Americans so reluctant to enter into WWII. Through the writtings of the "Lost Generation" with such books as "All Quiet on the Western Front". That brought the horrors and senselessness of that war to light. Most Americans in the aftermath of that war felt they were tricked into the war. Through propaganda and in the case of the "Zimmerman Telegram" outright deciete on the part of are supposed allies. Once they saw the war wasnt over ideals but over the European status quo.Most Americans vowed never to get involved in another foreign war again. Which begat the period of isolationism. By the way, it was the DIRECT attacks on US shipping that formally brought us into the war [ November 08, 2001: Message edited by: TIMJOT ]



TIMJOT -> (11/8/2001 5:45:00 PM)

quote:

This is a mere statement of opinion. Many Americans had already, of course, joined the Canadian Armed forces. How much longer the US would stay out of the war was the question, not whether or not they would join.

No this is a statement of FACT. Up to that point America had demonstrated that it was willing to be an arsenal of democracy or even an arsenal of communism (Soviet Union) but was unwilling to go to war. Or was their a DOW before PH that I am unaware of. I dont think a few volunteers have much baring in this debate.



TIMJOT -> (11/8/2001 5:54:00 PM)

quote:

So, the US had, in effect, issued an ultimatum, just not phrased that way.
The embargo in itself was not an utimatum it was a punishment. It did not prevent the Japanese from grabbing there own oil. It just forced them on the Clock. An utimatum would have been a formal declaration that if you dont get out of indo china there would be war. Or if you attack DEI there would be war. I ask you again. If war was a faite de compli why then did the US not give Britian and Holland formal treaties? [ November 08, 2001: Message edited by: TIMJOT ]



TIMJOT -> (11/8/2001 5:59:00 PM)

Grumbler
quote:

North Carolina had enormous technical problems with her propellors that kept her from achieving anything like full speed for a year after commissioning. She was the first to have the skegs on the outer shafts and they replaced her props several times before coming up with a solution that didn't cause damaging vibrations at high speeds.
Thanks for the info Grumbler. I did not know that about the tech problems. All I could find about the NC was that it spent the months prior deployment to the Pacific in the carribian combat training. It just seemed to me a long time for training considering the Washington was already on combat duty. By the way, why didnt the Washington have the prop problem? [ November 08, 2001: Message edited by: TIMJOT ]



grumbler -> (11/10/2001 9:26:00 PM)

quote:

Originally posted by TIMJOT:
By the way, why didnt the Washington have the prop problem?
The easy question first! When NC was found to have prop problems, the naval architects quickly realized they didn't have the math to solve the problem (fluid dynamics is a bitch - I know I failed the course twice!). A number of screw sets were ordered, because it was going to have to be "trial and error" problem-solving. As it turned out, the "right" solution was found on the set eventually installed in Washington. They then had to wait for the right prop set to be manufactured for NC. This is why Washington was ready for service before NC.



grumbler -> (11/10/2001 9:33:00 PM)

quote:

Originally posted by TIMJOT:
Not this sealift argument again There were sealift limitions, but large sealift capacity wasnt needed until the Java operation. Which wouldnt have be undertaken until Malaya and Borneo, Celebes, and Sumatra regardless of any scenerio, thus sealift would not have been a problem.
Sea lift involves resupply as well as troop lift. The japanese sea lift was barely sufficient to keep two offensives going (Wilmott addresses this problem with regard to Malaya - the PI was less of an issue because the distances to japan were less, the DEI more of an issue because it was further).
It is easy, in our armchairs, to dismiss logistical issues and focus on the operational numbers, but it is a misleading conceit. Japan had limited merchant shipping and needed all of it for its economy. The more that was taken away for military operations, the less there was to support the production for the war economy back home. While you don't think sealift would have been a problem, the Japanese didn't agree. It may, I suppose, have been possible for the Japanese to launch simultaneous operations in the DEI, PI, and Malaya. Wilmott could be wrong. But since he gives me facts and you just give me opinions, I think I will stick to Wilmott's view.



grumbler -> (11/10/2001 9:39:00 PM)

quote:

Originally posted by TIMJOT:
No.... Hitler didnt think the Allies would go to war for Poland. Quote; "Who would go to war for Danzig?".
A single quote out of context doesn't tell me anything. Are you arguing that in late August 1939 Hitler expected the Allies to abandon their brand-new guarantees to Poland? I don't find this credible. My books are at school and I am home, but I think I can show that your Hitler quote preceeds the Allied guarabntees to Poland. I also think that the operational orders to the German troops stationed in the west at this time (which I have, somewhere, and hope to find) will show that the Germans fully expected an Allied DoW.



grumbler -> (11/10/2001 10:00:00 PM)

quote:

Originally posted by TIMJOT:
You should say elements of the 21st and 23rd flotillas. Saburo Sakai said in his book that there was never more than 54 Zero's from his flottila used in the DEI campaign. Again without PH the Japanese had 6 fleet and 4 cvls to deal with 3 US CV's. As it was the CVL Ryujo did the lionshare of the support early phase of DEI. The Japanese didnt even use the other 3 CVL's Honsho Shoho, Hosho, which were all just sitting at anchor back in Japan.
Well, since each flotilla was about 100 planes, split roughly evenly between fighters and bombers, I wouldn't expect there to be more than 54 zeros in Suburo Sakai's flotilla. If the japanese were leaving the initiative to the USN, then it is not unreasonable to expect 6 CVs to have some problems defending tens of thousands of miles of frontier from 3 USN CVs (who, after all, can choose the time and place for their attacks). The Japanese would have to split their forces to cover all of their front line Pacific bases. While it is true that the US cariers would prove, in the event, to be remarkably inept at ground attack at the start of the war, the japense copuld not know this and expected attacks on their frontline bases to cause more damage than they historically did. The Japanese CVLs "just sitting at anchor" were either to small and slow for their current needs (Hosho), incomplete (Shoho), or something else (I'm not sure what ship you are referring to when you talk about the "Honsho"). Ryujo was fast enough and large enough to make her burning precious fuel worthwhile.



TIMJOT -> (11/12/2001 2:26:00 PM)

quote:

Originally posted by grumbler:
The easy question first! When NC was found to have prop problems, the naval architects quickly realized they didn't have the math to solve the problem (fluid dynamics is a bitch - I know I failed the course twice!). A number of screw sets were ordered, because it was going to have to be "trial and error" problem-solving. As it turned out, the "right" solution was found on the set eventually installed in Washington. They then had to wait for the right prop set to be manufactured for NC. This is why Washington was ready for service before NC.
Very interesting, thanks for the info.



TIMJOT -> (11/12/2001 2:37:00 PM)

quote:

Originally posted by grumbler:
Sea lift involves resupply as well as troop lift. The japanese sea lift was barely sufficient to keep two offensives going (Wilmott addresses this problem with regard to Malaya - the PI was less of an issue because the distances to japan were less, the DEI more of an issue because it was further).
It is easy, in our armchairs, to dismiss logistical issues and focus on the operational numbers, but it is a misleading conceit. Japan had limited merchant shipping and needed all of it for its economy. The more that was taken away for military operations, the less there was to support the production for the war economy back home. While you don't think sealift would have been a problem, the Japanese didn't agree. It may, I suppose, have been possible for the Japanese to launch simultaneous operations in the DEI, PI, and Malaya. Wilmott could be wrong. But since he gives me facts and you just give me opinions, I think I will stick to Wilmott's view.
No need to get huffy, Sometime what I write comes off stronger than I intend. I apologize if I have offended you. Anyhow, I am not denying there was sealift limitations, but Im also not advocating anything more than what the Japanese were able to do historically, just a slightly diffierent order. Its not just my opinion to say that all of the DIE campaign exept for the invasion of Java had been virtually completed before the fall of Singapore and the completion of the PI campaign. So sealift was adequated enough to keep the Malaya campaign going simutaneously with the PI operation and tthe invasions of Borneo, Celebes ,Bali, Ambon and Timore. Am Im wrong? I dont have access to the shipping details that you do. Just dates of each of the operations. I assume most of the sealift for the Java invasion most have come from the Malaya operation, because the PI operation was still ongoing. [ November 12, 2001: Message edited by: TIMJOT ] [ November 12, 2001: Message edited by: TIMJOT ]



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