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TIMJOT -> (9/20/2001 2:11:00 AM)
quote: I think the US public was fully prepared to go to war with japan over tha Japanese attacks on British and Dutch possessions in the Far East. The Japanese certainly believed this to be the case, and so rejected a "non-American" solution to their problems. They knew that they would never ave as good a crack at US forces as they would have on December 7th, and so their plans always included an attack on the US. This is the part of your post that was mainly my bone of contention and your statement that history supports this. We will never know if America would have gone to war even if we were not attack, but IMHO I think its unlikely, at the very least it would certainly not have been immediately, evidence seems to support this. Elliot Morrison; the widely respected official USN Historian, writes in "The Rising Sun in the Pacific"; "Supposing Japan attacked British, Dutch or French possessions, would the United States consider it a casus belli? Even President Roosevelt knew no answer to that question, and Captain Purnell could only guess. Mr Roosevelt by that time believed that the US should oppose, with force, if neccessary, any japanese advance into Malaya. But he could not be certain of obtaining a declaration of war from Congress on that issue, which would certainly have been interpreted as "sending American boys to support tottering colonial empires" Morrison goes on to write in his epic "Two Ocean War" (quote); There was no threat, express of implied, that the President would ask for a declaration of war on Japan if Tojo rejected it. The cold war could have gone indefinitely, so far as Washington was concerned (and we now know how long a cold war can go on), provided Japan made no fresh aggressive move. And its is doubtful wherther Congress would have considered as casus bellia Japanese move into Thailand, British Malaya or the Netherlands East Indies. In his book "Roosevelt and Churchill" Joseph P.Lash cites on p.225;pg2; Adm.J.I Richardson CinC US Fleet in his testimony before the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack,(quote) Adm.Richardson also quoted Roosevelt as saying in reply to his query of whether the US was going to enter the war that, "if the Japanese attacked Thailand, Kra Peninsula(Malaya),or the Dutch East Indies, we would not enter the war, that if they even attacked the Philipines , he doughted whether we would enter the war, but that they(Japan)could not always avoid making mistakes and that as the war continued and the area of operations expanded sooner or later they would make a mistake and we would enter the war". Regarding US populus will to fight. Morison further states in "Rising Sun in the Pacific"p.18;pg1 That a Gallop Poll taken after the "Panay insident" showed that 70% favored the complete withdrawl of the Asiatic Fleet,Marines,Missions and Medical Missions from China. Morrison cites on P.39,pg4; another poll taken prior to Pearl Harbor, which ask the question "How far should the US go?" 6% said fight, and 82% favored an embargo. All this seems to imply that most of the US populus plus much of the Congress were unwilling to go to war to save european colonies. Even if FDR and many in the military deemed it neccessary.

TIMJOT -> (9/20/2001 2:35:00 AM)
quote: I don't disregard the antiwar sentiment, I simply say that it had largely died out by Late 1941. The fact that Roosevelt could apply harsh sanctions on Japan (which were predicted to cause war) without significant Senate opposition tells you how much things had changed. The passage of the Two Ocean Naval Act in June 1940 was not the act of a pacifist/isolationist navy. See HP Wilmott (cited above) for more specifics. Feel free to cite the sources of your own info. Well, with further scrutiny FDR was actually trying very hard to balance his economic embargo between effective deterant and pushing Japan into war. Initailly his oil embargo was only required oil companies apply for licenses before being able to export oil. He intended to grant just enough licences on a case by case basis so as not to back Japan into a corner. However bureacratic miscommication resulted in all the applications for licences being rejected. At that point it was impossible for FDR to reverse the rejections without it looking like the US was backing down. The Two ocean navy was born from a realization that there was a need for the US to be able to defend both coast simutanously. I never said the Navy was isolationalist/pasifist, far from it, most in the Navy saw war with Japan enevitable. It was the US populus and Congress that was isolationalist.

TIMJOT -> (9/20/2001 2:49:00 AM)
Grumbler; I dont know who HP Wilmont is, but you quote him as saying " Only after the imposition of the allied blockade in mid 1941 ect.ect....." Well there was no Allied blockadethere was however a Allied embargowhich is quite a different thing. The embargo consisted of only certain strategic materials and was imposed only by the US,Netherlands and Britain. Other countries freely traded with Japan at this time. Even the US allowed non-strategic trade to continue to Japan. This inaccuracy does not give me much confidence in Mr.Wilmont as a credible source.

grumbler -> (9/20/2001 8:14:00 AM)
quote: Originally posted by TIMJOT: Grumbler, I had hoped we could have a nice friendly debate without resorting to this tedious siteing of sources stuff, but if you insist. Sorry, but that is the historian in me. I like citations, actually! Your van der Vat quote is interesting, and does seem to bear out your theory. It is a bit too judgemental and moralistic for my tastes, what with statements like "at least the generals had the wit to limit their designs" and "The residual Dutch and minimal British maritime presence in the Far East was not enough to justify the Navy's voracious budgetary plans, past, present or future" makes me wary of the source. I don't have his book (all the reviewers I read agreed that it was inferior to Toland as an introductory work, and I already had Toland), but I will check it out from the library and see if he backs up his statements with sources. quote: "The Eagle against the Sun"pg N/A; (QUOTE) "Now, in the summer and autumn of 1941 , army and navy stategist considered four alternatives (1)to sieze the DEI first, then the Philipines and Malaya;(2)to advance step by step form the Philipines to Borneo, Java, Sumatra, Malaya;(3)TO BEGIN WITH MALAYA AND THEN ADVANCE IN REVERSED ORDER TO THE PHILIPINES, THUS DELAYING AN ATTACK ON AMERICAN TERRITORY;(4)to attack Malaya and the Philipines simultaneously, followed by a quick siezure fo the DEI. The navy prefered option 2,because it offered a secured line of advance while the Army prefered option ,because it siezed the most important objectives first and it delayed an attack on American territory, which intern allowed for the possibility avoiding a war with America if it did not react. They eventually compromised on option 4. My copy of Spector does not have the caps, nor does it have either of the last two sentences. The description of the options appears on page 76 of my edition, BTW. My copy is the 1985 edition, 10th publishing. Which edition did you consult? quote: I also have read pretty much the same thing in "Yamamoto the Reluctant Admiral" unfortunately I dont have the book in hand so I cant site specifics. That being said, I never said the Japanese didnt have some legitimate reasons for attacking America, just that it was the wrong decision and as demostrated by Van Der Vat that it was a decision skewed by the exageration of the American threat by the Navy to justify their bugetary prominience. Also that there was at least other alternative plans debated. Except for your van der Vat quote, I have found no works which support your contention that the Japanese seriously considered, in 1941, any plans which bypassed the PI and left the US the initiative on whether or not to start a war. Toland has the Japanese understanding that the US would have to be attacked at the onset if the Japanese were to suceed, though he doesn't describe in detail the planning process and the conferences that Wilmott spends 8 pages on (pages 71-79, barring the descriptions of orders of battle, which take up an additional 10 pages. I guess we may just have "duelling experts." Given that the subject of strategy in the Pacific War is the entire focus of Wilmott's three-volume set, the level of detail he has available, and the fact that he flatly states that the position van der Vat takes is false, I will go with Wilmott.

grumbler -> (9/20/2001 8:56:00 AM)
quote: Originally posted by TIMJOT: Grumbler; I dont know who HP Wilmont is, but you quote him as saying " Only after the imposition of the allied blockade in mid 1941 ect.ect....." Well there was no Allied blockadethere was however a Allied embargowhich is quite a different thing. The embargo consisted of only certain strategic materials and was imposed only by the US,Netherlands and Britain. Other countries freely traded with Japan at this time. Even the US allowed non-strategic trade to continue to Japan. This inaccuracy does not give me much confidence in Mr.Wilmont as a credible source. HP Wilmott is the author of many books on world war two, but in particular two works on the strategies each side pursued in the Pacific War: Empires in the Balance, Japanese and Allied Pacific Strategies to April 1942 and The Javelin and the Barrier, Japanese and Allied Strategies February-June 1942. I think that these are probably the essential works on the topic, given that strategies are the focus of his work, and not just an intro into another general history. I can only guess that, from the japanese viewpoint (which is what he is writing about) the embargo looked to the Japanese like a blockade of their vital resources. In any case, I think his dispationate view of Japanese strategy sounds more convincing than the judgemental view of van der Vat (who, I will emphasize, I haven't yet read, but whose views you obviously have taken to heart, what with your comments on the japense navy exactly mirroring his). I will continue to look into this, however. I appreciate your cues on to van der Vat - he may convince me yet. In the meantime, you can get H.P. Wilmott and see if he convinces you!

TIMJOT -> (9/20/2001 10:01:00 PM)
quote: Except for your van der Vat quote, I have found no works which support your contention that the Japanese seriously considered, in 1941, any plans which bypassed the PI and left the US the initiative on whether or not to start a war. Toland has the Japanese understanding that the US would have to be attacked at the onset if the Japanese were to suceed, though he doesn't describe in detail the planning process and the conferences that Wilmott spends 8 pages on (pages 71-79, barring the descriptions of orders of battle, which take up an additional 10 pages. Grumbler, I congradulate you on being so well read. You certainly seem to own more books then I on the subject. I believe I have read similar accounts to support my arguement in either "Japan's War" (Hoyt) or "Reluctant Admiral"(Agawa) or both. Both books are written from the Japanese perspective. Sorry I cant cite any specific passages though. I am not sure we are too far apart. You cite Wilmont as saying the Japanese did not "seriously" consider bypassing the PI, which would imply that it was at least considered, just not seriously, but what contitutes serious is very subjective and open to interpetation by the author. Certainly the IJN never seriously considered it, that I agree. But we really do digress from the main point of contention. My point was that had Japan not attacked the US, that FDR probably wouldnt or coudnt have declared war on Japan. You however feel that the US would have declared war anyway and you use as proof the fact that Japan's felt it was a fait de compli(spelling?). My point is that they were wrong in thinking that. I have sited several works to back this up. I could even cite one of your own authors (Toland) in his book "Ifamy" also suggests that FDR was concerned of what could be done if the Japanese would limit there attack to the Dutch and British. Like I said we will never know what would have happen if there was no PH or PI attack, but there is more than enough evidence to suggest that it was far from certain. I am interested in your thoughts of what do you think would have happened if Japan had not attacked America. I personally feel FDR would have done everything short of war. That being, cutting of all diplomatic realations, massively rienforceing the PI, imoposition of complete trade embargo including food and medicince, immediatly increasing lend/lease to Britain and ANZAC, extending lend/least to the Dutch, providing intellegence,and lastly and most provocativly establishing a naval blockade covering the western hemisphere. In fact in "Roosevelt and Churchill" Lash writes that FDR had ask Adm. Richardson CinC US Fleet to make contigency plans to do just that if the Japanese had attacked Malaya. Which in itself would suggest that FDR felt he wouldnt be able to declare an all out war if that eventuallity had arose. These are just some of things the US could have done short of war that would have been more palatable to the congress and people. [ September 20, 2001: Message edited by: TIMJOT ]

TIMJOT -> (9/20/2001 10:48:00 PM)
quote: Originally posted by grumbler: HP Wilmott is the author of many books on world war two, but in particular two works on the strategies each side pursued in the Pacific War: Empires in the Balance, Japanese and Allied Pacific Strategies to April 1942 and The Javelin and the Barrier, Japanese and Allied Strategies February-June 1942. I think that these are probably the essential works on the topic, given that strategies are the focus of his work, and not just an intro into another general history. I can only guess that, from the japanese viewpoint (which is what he is writing about) the embargo looked to the Japanese like a blockade of their vital resources. In any case, I think his dispationate view of Japanese strategy sounds more convincing than the judgemental view of van der Vat (who, I will emphasize, I haven't yet read, but whose views you obviously have taken to heart, what with your comments on the japense navy exactly mirroring his). I will continue to look into this, however. I appreciate your cues on to van der Vat - he may convince me yet. In the meantime, you can get H.P. Wilmott and see if he convinces you! Oh... "Empire in the Balance" the name just didnt click. I have been wanting to read that book for sometime, becuase I see it cited often in other books that I have read. I will try to get a copy. However, you state that van der Vat is "a little too judgemental and moralistic for your taste" , but your own quote from Wilmont " ...it was inconcievable that America would stand aside tamely and leave china and Europe's colonies to their fate" shows he is not immune to being somewhat judgemental. By the way, have you ever read a book from Toland, titled "But not in Shame", its out of print but its a book that concentrates on the battles of first six months of the war. I am interted in it becuase most books on the Pacific war tend to breeze through the period between PH and Midway because its a mainly a story of allied defeats. What I am looking for are detail accounts of these obscure loosing battles and the men who fought them. I dont mean Bataan and the Death march becuase that subject is fairly well covered. [ September 20, 2001: Message edited by: TIMJOT ] [ September 20, 2001: Message edited by: TIMJOT ]

GrahamFife -> (9/24/2001 2:16:00 AM)
A gloss on this debate. What if everything had gone as it did historically, except that Hitler did not declare war on the USA after PH. Churchill would have declared war on Japan - at the latest when they attacked Malaya. So the USA and the UK would both have been fighting Japan. But could FDR have won popular support for a declaration of war on Germany? And if he did, could he then have won popular support for the "Germany first" strategy?

grumbler -> (9/24/2001 7:28:00 AM)
quote: Originally posted by TIMJOT: Oh... "Empire in the Balance" the name just didnt click. I have been wanting to read that book for sometime, becuase I see it cited often in other books that I have read. I will try to get a copy. I think you will find it well worth your while. Use your punlic or school library's inter-library loan program if they don't have it in the stacks. quote: However, you state that van der Vat is "a little too judgemental and moralistic for your taste" , but your own quote from Wilmont " ...it was inconcievable that America would stand aside tamely and leave china and Europe's colonies to their fate" shows he is not immune to being somewhat judgemental.] The difference is that Wilmott is describing how the Japanese felt, while van der Vat is describing how he feels. Van der Vat is ascribing motives to dead people without any proof at all. BTW, Isura Ibugi, a noted Japanese wriiter on this, describes the Allied actions of mid-1941 as a "blockade" on page 132 of his "Pacific War so that should rest your mind on Wilmott's use of the term. At least one japanese thought of it that way, and so Wilmott can be excused for ascribing that term to their thinking. quote: By the way, have you ever read a book from Toland, titled "But not in Shame", its out of print but its a book that concentrates on the battles of first six months of the war. I am interted in it becuase most books on the Pacific war tend to breeze through the period between PH and Midway because its a mainly a story of allied defeats. What I am looking for are detail accounts of these obscure loosing battles and the men who fought them. I dont mean Bataan and the Death march becuase that subject is fairly well covered.] It is interesting that you should mention But not in Shame, as that was the work that got me interested in the Pacific War to begin with! It is a great bit of writing, IMO. I have always found it interesting that Toland has been poo-pooed many times, and yet in the end he has almost always been proven right. A few weeks ago, on www.warships1.com, there was a scholorly debate about the Battle of the Surigao Strait, and which Japanese cruiser rammed whom, and from what angle. In the end, both sides abandoned their starting positions when Toland's account turned out to be the only one that described what the first-person accounts agreed upon. I think it was Toland's lack of academic credentials that hurt him - he certainly has a far better grasp of Japanese psychology (and certainly had far better access to first-person accounts) than any writer in English before or since. BNIS is available in used book stores specializing in history, and isn't too expensive (I bought a copy as a gift that was $7 in good condition). You can probably also get it through the ILL system. Some other books to look for on the subject are H.G. Winslow's The Fleet the Gods Forgot, a good treatment of the US Asiatic Fleet, and The Ghost That Died at Sunda Strait, a very detailed description of the wartime career and death of USS Houston. Winslow was one of her crew. He sometimes makes extravagent claims for the Asiatic Fleet and Houston (insisting, for example, that the Japanese lost several ships in the Battle of the Java Sea and have consistently refused to admit it since then). Also, Oliver Lindsay's The Lasting Honour is an excellent book on the fall of Hong Kong and the political decisions that doomed 5,000 UK and Canadian troops to defend an indefensible position. Though his fopcus is on the futility of the dispatch of the Canadian reinforcements to Hong Kong, he is not Canadian (though I would bet that 60% of the sales of the book were in Canada!) I am still trying to find the journal article that chronicles the changes in US public opinion towards war during 1941. Until I find it, I will simply note that the received wisdom is not always the full truth.

TIMJOT -> (9/24/2001 8:47:00 PM)
quote: Originally posted by grumbler: It is interesting that you should mention But not in Shame, as that was the work that got me interested in the Pacific War to begin with! It is a great bit of writing, IMO. I have always found it interesting that Toland has been poo-pooed many times, and yet in the end he has almost always been proven right. A few weeks ago, on www.warships1.com, there was a scholorly debate about the Battle of the Surigao Strait, and which Japanese cruiser rammed whom, and from what angle. In the end, both sides abandoned their starting positions when Toland's account turned out to be the only one that described what the first-person accounts agreed upon. I think it was Toland's lack of academic credentials that hurt him - he certainly has a far better grasp of Japanese psychology (and certainly had far better access to first-person accounts) than any writer in English before or since. BNIS is available in used book stores specializing in history, and isn't too expensive (I bought a copy as a gift that was $7 in good condition). You can probably also get it through the ILL system. Some other books to look for on the subject are H.G. Winslow's The Fleet the Gods Forgot, a good treatment of the US Asiatic Fleet, and The Ghost That Died at Sunda Strait, a very detailed description of the wartime career and death of USS Houston. Winslow was one of her crew. He sometimes makes extravagent claims for the Asiatic Fleet and Houston (insisting, for example, that the Japanese lost several ships in the Battle of the Java Sea and have consistently refused to admit it since then). Also, Oliver Lindsay's The Lasting Honour is an excellent book on the fall of Hong Kong and the political decisions that doomed 5,000 UK and Canadian troops to defend an indefensible position. Though his fopcus is on the futility of the dispatch of the Canadian reinforcements to Hong Kong, he is not Canadian (though I would bet that 60% of the sales of the book were in Canada!) I am still trying to find the journal article that chronicles the changes in US public opinion towards war during 1941. Until I find it, I will simply note that the received wisdom is not always the full truth. Thanks for the heads up on those books. I've seen BNIS on Amazon's used book section, so I will probably go ahead in get it. I like Toland also, but I was suprised that you cited him becuase, just as you pointed out, many historians tend to discredit him, but having lived in Japan, I think he brings an interesting perspective. Have you read "IFAMY"? I ask because one of his contentions, is that FDR was looking to manufacture an incident between the US and Japan, becuase he was worried that Japan would ignore the US and just attack the Euro-colonies. Which again would seem to back up my theory. Let me know what you dig up on US public opinion, but I already cited several Gallop poles that would sugest the public supported some sort of intevention, but not direct military involvement. By the way you didnt answer my question on what you think would have happened if Japan had attacked DEI and Malaya but not the the US. I know you think the US would have declared war, but could you be more specific. Does the US declare war imediatly or do the wait until some of their newest ships join the fleet? What would an intact Pac Fleet do? Would it sail to reinforce the PI? Would it sail to help defend the Malaya barrier? Would it sail to attack the Japanese homeland?

TIMJOT -> (9/24/2001 9:06:00 PM)
quote: Originally posted by Graham: A gloss on this debate. What if everything had gone as it did historically, except that Hitler did not declare war on the USA after PH. Churchill would have declared war on Japan - at the latest when they attacked Malaya. So the USA and the UK would both have been fighting Japan. But could FDR have won popular support for a declaration of war on Germany? And if he did, could he then have won popular support for the "Germany first" strategy? I think the US would have declared war on Germany eventually. Probably by playing up the fact that Japan and Germany were allies and by implicating Germany somehow in the attack ala the "Zimmerman" telegram that went a long way in getting us inot WWI. I think there would have been tremendous pressure for a Japan first strategy though. I read a poll that stated a large majority of Americans beleived the US was tricked into getting involved in WWI, so might have been difficult to get America behind a declaration of war on Germany and a Germany first strategy, when it was Japan that was killing our boys.

grumbler -> (10/1/2001 8:46:00 AM)
TIMJOT, I've been extremely busy recently and haven't had much time to do research, but hopefully the next week will be a bit less tense. As to your question, I think the US would have decalred war immediately upon the Japanese attacking the British and Dutch. Waiting for newer ships would not have compensated for the loss of time during which the Japanese would have taken the Malay and Indonesian resources they needed, and then gathered their forces for a fight over the Central Pacific. The US would have attempted, I think, to reinforce the PI and send planes and supplies to the DEI (the latter much as they did historically). Certainly Wake and Guam would be high priorities for reinforcement, and the air-sea battles near Guam might well determine the course of the war. The Japanese, under these circumstances, would be in a difficult position. If they had committed the bulk of their air sea and land forces to the battles in the south, they might find it difficult to muster the forces needed to neutralize the PI air threat to their LOC without compromising all of their planning. They would be fighting an ad hoc war, just as the US was, and much of their advantage would thus be gone. Even if the US delayed its entry into the war, the PI would be in a much stronger position in late March than it had been in December. I cannot imagine the Japanese proceding with the Burma campaign, giving the dire need for troops and aircraft in the Battle for the Philippines. I wonder if Japan even had the ability to conduct an amphibious landing against the sort of opposition they would face in the reinforced Philippines? Somehow, I think, they would prevail, but the cost on both sides would be high. Would they have the strength to threaten the South Pacific as they did historically, giving the fact that they would probably just have completed a debilitating 6-month campaign in the PI? An interesting idea for a campaign. Let's hope the game designers allow for the possibility.

TIMJOT -> (10/2/2001 12:11:00 AM)
quote: Originally posted by grumbler: TIMJOT, I've been extremely busy recently and haven't had much time to do research, but hopefully the next week will be a bit less tense. As to your question, I think the US would have decalred war immediately upon the Japanese attacking the British and Dutch. Waiting for newer ships would not have compensated for the loss of time during which the Japanese would have taken the Malay and Indonesian resources they needed, and then gathered their forces for a fight over the Central Pacific. The US would have attempted, I think, to reinforce the PI and send planes and supplies to the DEI (the latter much as they did historically). Certainly Wake and Guam would be high priorities for reinforcement, and the air-sea battles near Guam might well determine the course of the war. The Japanese, under these circumstances, would be in a difficult position. If they had committed the bulk of their air sea and land forces to the battles in the south, they might find it difficult to muster the forces needed to neutralize the PI air threat to their LOC without compromising all of their planning. They would be fighting an ad hoc war, just as the US was, and much of their advantage would thus be gone. Even if the US delayed its entry into the war, the PI would be in a much stronger position in late March than it had been in December. I cannot imagine the Japanese proceding with the Burma campaign, giving the dire need for troops and aircraft in the Battle for the Philippines. I wonder if Japan even had the ability to conduct an amphibious landing against the sort of opposition they would face in the reinforced Philippines? Somehow, I think, they would prevail, but the cost on both sides would be high. Would they have the strength to threaten the South Pacific as they did historically, giving the fact that they would probably just have completed a debilitating 6-month campaign in the PI? An interesting idea for a campaign. Let's hope the game designers allow for the possibility. With all due respect Grumbler, IMHO this is where your argument doesnt hold up. Lets assume the US declares war immediatley. How are they then able to reinforce the PI. Due to its isolated location it would be almost impossible to reinforce it meaningfully once war is declared. Regarding the DEI, yes the US would have attempted to reinforce it, as you pointed out they did historically. However they would be unable to reinforce it anymore than they did historically which was miminal to say the least. Wake could be reinforced but due to its small size and proximity to Japanese bases in Marshall Islands could only serve as an isolated outpost. Guam would be over run with miminal effort, before it could be reinforeced. Why would the Japanese be in a difficult position? Why do you suppose they would have to commit anymore of there forces south than they historically did? Historically, they were able to mount both operations simutaneosly. Why then could they not hold back in reserve the forces they historically used to attack the PI. Then if the US declares war, they immidiately launch there attack. Yes it would not be a surprise, but remember the PI attack was not a surprise. It occured hours after PH. Also without the PH attack the powerful carrier strike force would be availble to counter any sorte of the USN. Before you say that fleet was needed elsewhere. I would just say other than two operations of dubious value, ie; the attack on Darwin and the sorte into the Indian ocean the carriers were not even needed in the south. Nor was the IJN battle fleet.The operations were carried out soley by cruiser and destroyer squadrons, supported by light carriers and land base airforces. Now, if as you suggest the US delays declaring war, then I agree things get more difficult for the Japanese, but not immpossible. First the US would probably have to wait unitil April at the ealiest, becuase MacArthur had said it would take until then before the PI could be ready. By then the 4 divisions used in Malaya and 2 divisions used in DEI would be available suppliment Homa's original invasion force of 2 divisions. For a total of 8 Divisions that could be brought to bare against the PI. More than enough even for a reinforced PI. Thats not even counting the two divisions used for the Burma campaign. So no, they would not need to cancel that operation. You also have to remember due to its location, even a reinforced PI is easily cutoff and isolated. Come to think of it, this scenerio could solve the IJN main delema and the reason Yamamoto originally proposed the PH attack. Which was that the IJN long held plan of luring the USN to a decisive battle somewhere around the PI was flawed becuase there was no way to be sure the USN would sail to relieve the PI. Under this scenerio however, after the US spent months massively reinforceing the PI with men and material it would be unthinkable to leave it to its fate. The USN would be forced to run the guantlet and come to the rescue. The IJN would then get what it always wanted a decisive naval battle in the place and time of its chooseing. I dare say owing to its weaknesses in early 42 the USN would be instore for a much more greater defeat than it recieved at PH. Such a defeat in a less than wholeheartedly supported war, could very well bring the US to the negotiating table. Just my opinion. [ October 01, 2001: Message edited by: TIMJOT ]

grumbler -> (10/2/2001 10:24:00 PM)
quote: Originally posted by TIMJOT: With all due respect Grumbler, IMHO this is where your argument doesnt hold up. Lets assume the US declares war immediatley. How are they then able to reinforce the PI. Due to its isolated location it would be almost impossible to reinforce it meaningfully once war is declared. Reinforcing the Pi would have taken time, it is true, but the links via Guam and Wake would still be active, since the Japanese would not be in a position to sieze them upon the outbreak of war. the japanese would have to account for the fact that these would now be opposed invasions, and thus would have to allocate naval and air support to them that they did not plan for in their initial plans. quote: Wake could be reinforced but due to its small size and proximity to Japanese bases in Marshall Islands could only serve as an isolated outpost. Guam would be over run with miminal effort, before it could be reinforeced. Wake would obviously be in a stronger position under this scenario than it was historically. Japanese bases in the Marshall Islands were almost a thousand miles away. quote: Why would the Japanese be in a difficult position? Why do you suppose they would have to commit anymore of there forces south than they historically did? Historically, they were able to mount both operations simutaneosly. Why then could they not hold back in reserve the forces they historically used to attack the PI. Then if the US declares war, they immidiately launch there attack. the japanese could launch two of three operations simultaneously: Malaya, the PI, and the DEI. you are supposing that they followed van der Vat's claimed strategy of attacking the DEI and Malaya first. Thus, they would not have the forces that attacked the PI historically in the PI theatre, they would all be in the south attacking the DEI. The forces that they used against the PI (barring the two divisions they left to keep the US forces bottled up on Bataan) were, in fact, required and used in the DEI campaign. quote: Yes it would not be a surprise, but remember the PI attack was not a surprise. It occured hours after PH. Also without the PH attack the powerful carrier strike force would be availble to counter any sorte of the USN. Before you say that fleet was needed elsewhere. I would just say other than two operations of dubious value, ie; the attack on Darwin and the sorte into the Indian ocean the carriers were not even needed in the south. Nor was the IJN battle fleet.The operations were carried out soley by cruiser and destroyer squadrons, supported by light carriers and land base airforces. The Japanese carriers were extensively used in the Malaya and DEI campaigns. Had they not been available, then these operations would have been much more difficult and lengthy. More later...

grumbler -> (10/3/2001 6:13:00 AM)
quote: Originally posted by TIMJOT: The Japanese had available for these operations 3 divisions under Homma, 4 under Yamashita, one under Iida, and 2 under Imamura. Imamura had to be reinforced from Homma for his plan to work. Thus, the Japanese were spread too thinly for simultaneous attacks on all their targets. Some prioritization had to occur. The decision was made, rightly in my opinion, that the PI had to be neutralized before the attack on the DEI could occur. Thus, there was no reserve of forces just waiting to attack the PI while the DEI and Malaya were conquered. Now, if as you suggest the US delays declaring war, then I agree things get more difficult for the Japanese, but not immpossible. First the US would probably have to wait unitil April at the ealiest, becuase MacArthur had said it would take until then before the PI could be ready. By then the 4 divisions used in Malaya and 2 divisions used in DEI would be available suppliment Homa's original invasion force of 2 divisions. For a total of 8 Divisions that could be brought to bare against the PI. More than enough even for a reinforced PI. Thats not even counting the two divisions used for the Burma campaign. So no, they would not need to cancel that operation. You also have to remember due to its location, even a reinforced PI is easily cutoff and isolated. The Japanese used more than two divisions in Burma. Initially, it is true, that only 33rd and 55th divisions were deployed, and they were successful, by late February, in taking Rangoon. However, the Japanese had to reinforce 15th army with the equivelent of three more divisions, 18th, 56th, and tank units, plus over 400 aircraft, before they were ready for the decisive campaign in central and northern Burma. These units would not have been available for Burma had they been sent to the PI. However, the Japanese could, as you suggest, muster up to eight divisions to attack the PI (if, of course, no garrison forces of divisional strength were needed in Malaya or the DEI, which was not the case in reality). However, these forces could not have been lifted simultaneously, so they would have to attack in some sort of sequential order. While I doubt that the decision on when to declare war would be exclusively based on MacArthur's ideas of what "ready" meant, it is probably not unreasonable to assume, as you do, that a 5-6 month wait would be undertaken in order to reinforce the PI and (especially) the LOC to the PI. Certainly the japanese would be in no position to force the issue before mid-April anyway, as it would take some time to reconcentrate their forces from the DEI and Malaya. A US declaration of war in, say, mid-February would screw the japanese completely, with their forces well-committed to the south and suddenly out of supply. However, we will assume the rosiest possible picture for the Japanese, which is that the US would time their DoW to coincide with the completion of the Japanese conquests in the south. In that case, the garrison of the Pi could easily have included several additional US Army divisions, plus the 11 divisions in the PI. Since the japanese were limited in the available invasion sites on Luzon, this would have made their task quite difficult. Far more so than was the historical case, certainly, especially as the air would be contested. quote: Come to think of it, this scenerio could solve the IJN main delema and the reason Yamamoto originally proposed the PH attack. Which was that the IJN long held plan of luring the USN to a decisive battle somewhere around the PI was flawed becuase there was no way to be sure the USN would sail to relieve the PI. Under this scenerio however, after the US spent months massively reinforceing the PI with men and material it would be unthinkable to leave it to its fate. The USN would be forced to run the guantlet and come to the rescue. The IJN would then get what it always wanted a decisive naval battle in the place and time of its chooseing. I dare say owing to its weaknesses in early 42 the USN would be instore for a much more greater defeat than it recieved at PH. Such a defeat in a less than wholeheartedly supported war, could very well bring the US to the negotiating table. Just my opinion. Actually, this would model far more the US concept of the decisive battle than the Japanese one. The US would be arriving via the Central Pacific rather than via the Gilberts and Marshalls. They would thus avoid the guantlet of japanese air attacks. Meanwhile, Manila would be supporting a vast array of submarines, which would make life quite difficult for the japanese transport forces (and the poor merships trying to get those vital resources back to Japan). With aerial reconnaisance the subs could prove to be quite deadly, poor torpedoes or not. I think that you are corect in assuming, however, that the Japanese would eventually win the Battle of the Philippines. they would simply be better prepared to take advantages of any vagaries of fortune, since the campaign would be fought in closer proximity to Japan than the US. However, it would be a long and gruelling campaign, and would probably finish with an exhausted Japanese military (as well as an exhausted American one). Time would, moreover, be on the side of the Americans, and the road to Tokyo would be a shorter one, as Guam and Wake would still be held (and the Japanese mandate islands much more trashed than was historically the case, as they would just have had a major batle fought over and near them). If the japanese were lucky enough to inflict losses of 3-1 in this campaign, this would still be significantly to the japanese disadvantage. By the end of 1943, the Japanese would still be significantly outnumbered at sea. Further, the US public would have been gripped by the tales of the defense of the PI, much as they were historically by Guadlacanal, and I think that a US loss in the PI would not be the end of the war by any stretch of the imagination, even if the bulk of the USN were lost there. However, this does not take into account the impact of no American entry until 1942 on the resistance of the other allies in the area. Perhaps Malaya and the DEI would fall sooner if the USA was not on their side when they faced their final challenges. For those reasons, as wel as domestic politics, I think the US delaying a DoW is not likely.

moore4807 -> (10/3/2001 6:52:00 PM)
Grumbler & TIMJOT, I have read your posts with interest about the Pacific War variations. My personal opinions tend to lean towards TIMJOT's, as I continually play Pacific War and do the very precise thing he advocates as the Japanese player. I'm not even in the same category or as well read as both of you. (You've both given me a lot of reading material to catch up on!) I just notice some things in the game for the US forces that is discussed here. 1) To reinforce and supply PI and Guam from the beginning, you virtually have to strip the west coast of transports and tankers (most of these getting sunk in the game, by the way...) These wouldnt be replaced nearly as fast if the US isnt at war.... 2) The IJN Fleet carriers are pretty much free to split up (my choice is 2CV-1CVL with fleet support)giving exactly the freedom to move south and west if needed. The US is not very likely to rush into Japan's back yard when 3CV's is all they have to fight with for the first 18 months! I note this is hindsight and computer AI play for the most part, but I thought it may be pertient to the discussion. I "think" the Japanese could have caused us bigger headaches NOT attacking PH and getting the DEI oil riches. India could have been taken then with no US interference until that point and its a much different war then. Again only my opinion-feel free to disagree... Jim

TIMJOT -> (10/3/2001 11:24:00 PM)
quote: Reinforcing the Pi would have taken time, it is true, but the links via Guam and Wake would still be active, since the Japanese would not be in a position to sieze them upon the outbreak of war. the japanese would have to account for the fact that these would now be opposed invasions, and thus would have to allocate naval and air support to them that they did not plan for in their initial plans. If war is declared immediately as you suggest then Guam is a goner. Warning or not, the garrison was only a couple hundred Marines, no artillary, no fighters and right in the middle of the Japanese held Mariana's. The Japanese would just dispatch its South Seas Detachment from Palau as it historically did, before the US could ever get reinforcements to it. Regarding Wake I have already conceded that the Japanese would probably have to forget about taking that island, but as I pointed out Wake is a tiny atol with no harbor and I believe its closer to 500miles from the Marshalls not 1000. In fact Wake was bombed almost daily from bombers from Kawajalen in Dec.41 It was exactly for these reasons that the recapture of Wake never figured greatly in US pacific strategy.

TIMJOT -> (10/4/2001 12:33:00 AM)
null quote: the japanese could launch two of three operations simultaneously: Malaya, the PI, and the DEI. you are supposing that they followed van der Vat's claimed strategy of attacking the DEI and Malaya first. Thus, they would not have the forces that attacked the PI historically in the PI theatre, they would all be in the south attacking the DEI. The forces that they used against the PI (barring the two divisions they left to keep the US forces bottled up on Bataan) were, in fact, required and used in the DEI campaign. Only the 48th division was withdrawn from the PI to assist in the invasion of Java, in which it was hardly needed. The 4th division from Shanghia was quickly dispatched to replace it. For the sake of arguement though, give Imamura's 16th Army the 48th. Yamashita had 4 div. in which he only use three, the 5th,18th,Guards. He didnt bother to use the 56th becuase logistically it wasnt worth it. Now add that to the Southern Army reserve 21st Div, 32nd Div, 21 mixed Bgd., to Homma's 16th Div, 4th Div, 65th Bgd. and you have more than enough forces to cover a PI operation. Remember if war is declared immediatly as you suggest then the PI has no more significant forces than it did originally and would not need anymore than the 2 divisions it used originally. As far as airforces are concern the IJA 5th air div. was used in the PI operation, while the 3rd air Div. and 11 Naval air flottilla was used in the southern operarion so no conflict there. The only major naval units withdrawn south ther the CVL Ryujo and 2 Seaplane tenders. Hardly significant since with no PH you now have the 1st carrier feet available.

TIMJOT -> (10/4/2001 12:52:00 AM)
quote: Originally posted by grumbler: The Japanese carriers were extensively used in the Malaya and DEI campaigns. Had they not been available, then these operations would have been much more difficult and lengthy. More later... I think "extensively" is an exageration. After PH the 1st carrier fleet covered landings on Rabaul with a garrison of few hundred Aussies and a handful of catalina's, then it covered the Ambon island invasion that had a small garrison of Dutch and Aussies with an airforce of 2 Brewster Buffalos, 12 Hudsons and a few catalina's. Next was Timore with even less garrison forces, Then the unneccessary raids on Darwin and Indian ocean. The 1st carrier divison was greatly under utilized in the DEI campaign, but again for the sake of arguement I say 2 carriers would have been more than sufficient complete these minor operations, save the Darwin and Indian Ocean raids which again in IMHO were unneccessary.By the way the 1st carrier fleet didnt take part at all in the Malaya campaign. [ October 04, 2001: Message edited by: TIMJOT ]

TIMJOT -> (10/4/2001 1:14:00 AM)
quote: The Japanese had available for these operations 3 divisions under Homma, 4 under Yamashita, one under Iida, and 2 under Imamura. Imamura had to be reinforced from Homma for his plan to work. Thus, the Japanese were spread too thinly for simultaneous attacks on all their targets. Some prioritization had to occur. The decision was made, rightly in my opinion, that the PI had to be neutralized before the attack on the DEI could occur. Thus, there was no reserve of forces just waiting to attack the PI while the DEI and Malaya were conquered. I dont want to turn this into the battle of the OOB's, but The I repeat the Southern Area Army under Gen.Count Teruchi, which encompassed the 14,15,16 and 25th armies, had at his disposal a reserve that included the 21 and 32 divisions and the 21 mixed Bgd. The 4th division as I also pointed was availabe and actually used in the PI operation.

TIMJOT -> (10/4/2001 1:24:00 AM)
quote: The Japanese used more than two divisions in Burma. Initially, it is true, that only 33rd and 55th divisions were deployed, and they were successful, by late February, in taking Rangoon. However, the Japanese had to reinforce 15th army with the equivelent of three more divisions, 18th, 56th, and tank units, plus over 400 aircraft, before they were ready for the decisive campaign in central and northern Burma. These units would not have been available for Burma had they been sent to the PI. I stand corrected on the two extra divisions. However like I said the 56th division wasnt even used by Yamashita and I tend the believe that the 18th division was sent to Burma as a afterthought because the the Malaya campaign was expected to take 100 to 150 days and therefore it could not have been included in the original Burma plan. I was under the impression that the capture of Rangoon was the decisive part of the campaign, since after its fall it was pretty much a rout and a running retreat all the way back to the Indian border. [ October 04, 2001: Message edited by: TIMJOT ]

TIMJOT -> (10/4/2001 1:48:00 AM)
quote: However, the Japanese could, as you suggest, muster up to eight divisions to attack the PI (if, of course, no garrison forces of divisional strength were needed in Malaya or the DEI, which was not the case in reality). However, these forces could not have been lifted simultaneously, so they would have to attack in some sort of sequential order. While I doubt that the decision on when to declare war would be exclusively based on MacArthur's ideas of what "ready" meant, it is probably not unreasonable to assume, as you do, that a 5-6 month wait would be undertaken in order to reinforce the PI and (especially) the LOC to the PI. Well it wasnt just MacArthur, it was also the opinion of Gen.Marshall, Army general staff and Gen.Arnold Airforce Chief. It was based on production schedules, weapons stocks, unit readiness and shipping availabilty. All agreed that it would take until least April 1942 for the PI to be ready. "Ready" means being able to successfully defend against a Japanese invasion. Athough I dought even these forces earmarked for the PI would have been enough to tharwt an concentrated Japanese invasion once the DEI and Malaya was secured. By the way the Japanese didnt use front line Inf.Division for occupational duty they used special independent brigades and what they termed square divisions made up of 2nd tier troops for this job. Historically the Japanese simutaneously landed 2 Div. each in Malaya and PI. Plus 6 independent SNLF's and IJA detatchents. So I dont think landing 4-5 div. simutaneously is much a stretch and due to the close proximity of bases on Formosoa, Hainain, Ryukus, Borneo, Marianas and Palua it would be faily east to set up workable ferrying operation. [ October 03, 2001: Message edited by: TIMJOT ] [ October 04, 2001: Message edited by: TIMJOT ] [ October 04, 2001: Message edited by: TIMJOT ]

TIMJOT -> (10/4/2001 4:26:00 AM)
quote: In that case, the garrison of the Pi could easily have included several additional US Army divisions, plus the 11 divisions in the PI. Since the japanese were limited in the available invasion sites on Luzon, this would have made their task quite difficult. Far more so than was the historical case, certainly, especially as the air would be contested. I am not so sure about that. MacArthur's plans for defense didnt include any additional US divisions. In fact Marshall had offered him the National Guard 41st Div. in Nov 41 and he rejected it, on the grounds that he lacked the facilities for another division and that it would ultimatetly detract from the building up of his Philipine Army divisions. He requested only one US army regular regiment to bring the Philipine div. up to strength. However lets say in lieu of the Japanese attack on Malaya and DIE US decides to send the PI additional div. regardless. I dought very much that the US could ship several divisions by mid Febuary as you suggest. Probably 1 div. with ancillary support, arty, eng, AA, units could be all that could feasibly deployed in that short period of time. There was a critical lack of shipping in late 41 early 42. For example that regiment that MacArthur had requested was sitting in SanFran just waiting for shipping when war broke out. The 41st div. was sent to Austrailia in Jan 42 and didnt arrive in its entirety until April. Now as you said they would have had those 11 PA div., but I dought an additional two months training would have made them that much more effective than they were historically.

TIMJOT -> (10/4/2001 4:54:00 AM)
quote: Actually, this would model far more the US concept of the decisive battle than the Japanese one. The US would be arriving via the Central Pacific rather than via the Gilberts and Marshalls. They would thus avoid the guantlet of japanese air attacks. Meanwhile, Manila would be supporting a vast array of submarines, which would make life quite difficult for the japanese transport forces (and the poor merships trying to get those vital resources back to Japan). With aerial reconnaisance the subs could prove to be quite deadly, poor torpedoes or not. Funny I always thought the Gilbert and Marshalls were in the central pacific. But for your sake lets call it the south central pacific and the US I am guessing that you mean would advance through the north central pacific via Wake. Well you still could not avoid the Marianas, not to mention the thousands of miles of open left flank subject to attacks from Jap bases in the Marshalls, Gilberts, and Carolina islands. Maybe thats why historically we did advance via those island groups. I dont understand how you can say it doesnt model the IJN plan for a decisive battle. Up until Yamamoto came along and changed everything with his PH idea. The excepted IJN plan was to lure the USN into a decisive battle near the PI. Attriting it along the way from land based aircraft and submarines operating from bases in the central pacific; period! Thats what every naval staff officer was taught from 1900-1940. Regarding subs; Hisorically I think something like 30 modern subs were dispatched to the PI prior to the outbreak of war, to go along with about a dozen older S-Class subs already there. They were far from deadly due to the poor torps you pointed out. You cant just dismiss that fact those subs were historically unable to stop or even delay the invasion. The torps just didnnt work! What are they going to do ram them?

TIMJOT -> (10/4/2001 5:13:00 AM)
quote: However, this does not take into account the impact of no American entry until 1942 on the resistance of the other allies in the area. Perhaps Malaya and the DEI would fall sooner if the USA was not on their side when they faced their final challenges. For those reasons, as wel as domestic politics, I think the US delaying a DoW is not likely. I dont think the allies resistance could have been any shorter than it was. as it was the few US forces that fought in the DEI, the asiatic fleet, a few B-17,PBY's,P-40's and 1 arty bn. didnt delay the japanese advance a lick. its precisely the domestic poltics involved that I think would cause at least a delay a DOW. [ October 03, 2001: Message edited by: TIMJOT ]

TIMJOT -> (10/4/2001 5:49:00 AM)
Grumbler; I apologize about all the seperate post, but for some reason I was not able to edit all your quotes onto one post. So make sure you go back and read them all.

TIMJOT -> (10/4/2001 8:10:00 AM)
quote: Originally posted by moore4807: Grumbler & TIMJOT, I have read your posts with interest about the Pacific War variations. My personal opinions tend to lean towards TIMJOT's, as I continually play Pacific War and do the very precise thing he advocates as the Japanese player. I'm not even in the same category or as well read as both of you. (You've both given me a lot of reading material to catch up on!) I just notice some things in the game for the US forces that is discussed here. 1) To reinforce and supply PI and Guam from the beginning, you virtually have to strip the west coast of transports and tankers (most of these getting sunk in the game, by the way...) These wouldnt be replaced nearly as fast if the US isnt at war.... 2) The IJN Fleet carriers are pretty much free to split up (my choice is 2CV-1CVL with fleet support)giving exactly the freedom to move south and west if needed. The US is not very likely to rush into Japan's back yard when 3CV's is all they have to fight with for the first 18 months! I note this is hindsight and computer AI play for the most part, but I thought it may be pertient to the discussion. I "think" the Japanese could have caused us bigger headaches NOT attacking PH and getting the DEI oil riches. India could have been taken then with no US interference until that point and its a much different war then. Again only my opinion-feel free to disagree... Jim Game or not, your absolutely right about both the lack of adequate shipping and the diffuculty this presents to reinforce the PI. I also agree with you, that there was a lot of miss potential in a Indian ocean campaign. However an intact US fleet would make it difficult to risk a large concentration of forces needed in a successful India campaign. Athough the rewards might be worth the risk. Especially if the Germans had opted for Operation Orient instead of Operation Barbarosa.

grumbler -> (10/5/2001 5:30:00 AM)
quote: Originally posted by TIMJOT: If war is declared immediately as you suggest then Guam is a goner. Warning or not, the garrison was only a couple hundred Marines, no artillary, no fighters and right in the middle of the Japanese held Mariana's. The Japanese would just dispatch its South Seas Detachment from Palau as it historically did, before the US could ever get reinforcements to it. Regarding Wake I have already conceded that the Japanese would probably have to forget about taking that island, but as I pointed out Wake is a tiny atol with no harbor and I believe its closer to 500miles from the Marshalls not 1000. In fact Wake was bombed almost daily from bombers from Kawajalen in Dec.41 It was exactly for these reasons that the recapture of Wake never figured greatly in US pacific strategy. The Japanese could not KNOW that war would be declared by the US right away, and so could not count on the South Seas Detachment to sieze Guam unaided. They would HAVE to plan on the possibility of an invasion opposed by US naval forces and thus had to plan on supporting the invasion with naval and air forces of their own. These forces could not, then, be allocated in their plans for a strike elsewhere, as they would be leaving the initiative in American hands. They would be far better off striking immediately and knowing that their forces could then be made available elsewhere (and also know that the American fleet would be nowhere near Guam when the axe fell). Wake is apparently some 630 miles from Kwajelein - I didn't do a very good job with my quick map measurements! Again, however, an "indefinate" jump-off date for the japanese conquest of the island would have to account for the (even greater) likelihood of US intervention, and would have tied up forces Japan needed to use elsewhere. Leaving the initiative on when war was declared in US hands would have tied down yet more japanese resources. [ October 04, 2001: Message edited by: grumbler ]

grumbler -> (10/5/2001 5:54:00 AM)
quote: Originally posted by TIMJOT: null Only the 48th division was withdrawn from the PI to assist in the invasion of Java, in which it was hardly needed. The 4th division from Shanghia was quickly dispatched to replace it. For the sake of arguement though, give Imamura's 16th Army the 48th. Yamashita had 4 div. in which he only use three, the 5th,18th,Guards. He didnt bother to use the 56th becuase logistically it wasnt worth it. Now add that to the Southern Army reserve 21st Div, 32nd Div, 21 mixed Bgd., to Homma's 16th Div, 4th Div, 65th Bgd. and you have more than enough forces to cover a PI operation. Remember if war is declared immediatly as you suggest then the PI has no more significant forces than it did originally and would not need anymore than the 2 divisions it used originally. As far as airforces are concern the IJA 5th air div. was used in the PI operation, while the 3rd air Div. and 11 Naval air flottilla was used in the southern operarion so no conflict there. The only major naval units withdrawn south ther the CVL Ryujo and 2 Seaplane tenders. Hardly significant since with no PH you now have the 1st carrier feet available. The Japanese 65th Brigade was sent into the PI only in January (possibly late December) and was not really a combat formation. It had six infantry battalion, but no support arms, and the troops had only one month's basic training. (Wilmott, p. 369). The 4th infantry division only arrived on 27 February (and since the 48th was withdrawn on January 2, hardly an "immediate" replacement). The Japanese may not have had the lift to carry their South Army reserve into the PI. Of the 300 japanese planes used to neutralize the Philippines in December and January 1941, some 200 were part of the 11th Air Flotilla, which was subsequantly withdrawn to support the attack in the DEI. Absent these forces (21st and 23rd Air Flotillas), the 5th air division would be hard-pressed to gain air superiority over the Americans - a prerequisite to amphibious attack. Further, the Japanese could not count on using the bases on Jolo island to break the Dutch. this would have made air support for the DEI much more difficult to arrange. In essence, you argue here that japan both could sustain the Malayan, PI, and DEI operations simultaniously (something I don't think even van der Vat claims), and that they would know the timing of the US DoW and be able to make plans accordingly. I don't think either of these contentions bears closer examination. If the Japanese are maintaining the forces necessary to attack the PI at the ready, then they lack the lift, troops, and aircraft necessary to take out the DEI. Better for them, I think, to sieze the initiative and eliminate the Amerricans according to a schedule they control, so that forces can be freed up in time for the crucial assault on the DEI. Remember that their oil situation made the capture of the DEI at the first opportunity a crucial factor in the war. To delay that while waiting for the US to declare war invited disaster.

grumbler -> (10/5/2001 6:11:00 AM)
quote: Originally posted by TIMJOT: I think "extensively" is an exageration. After PH the 1st carrier fleet covered landings on Rabaul with a garrison of few hundred Aussies and a handful of catalina's, then it covered the Ambon island invasion that had a small garrison of Dutch and Aussies with an airforce of 2 Brewster Buffalos, 12 Hudsons and a few catalina's. Next was Timore with even less garrison forces, Then the unneccessary raids on Darwin and Indian ocean. The 1st carrier divison was greatly under utilized in the DEI campaign, but again for the sake of arguement I say 2 carriers would have been more than sufficient complete these minor operations, save the Darwin and Indian Ocean raids which again in IMHO were unneccessary.By the way the 1st carrier fleet didnt take part at all in the Malaya campaign.[ October 04, 2001: Message edited by: TIMJOT ] The activities of the Kido Butai were indeed extensive in the post-PH period. They launched attacks to clear the approaches of Singapore and cut off reinforcements (although, as you point out, they didn't directly intervene in the fighting, as that was the job of the army air forces and 22 Air Flotilla). It is true that their attacks often were against targets that, in hindsight, were not worthy of their might, but to claim that the japanese "under-utilized" their forces is monday-morning quarterbacking (you might as well argue that the US underutilized their air defenses at Pearly Harbor, since all the fighters were not airborne and 100% of the AA guns were not manned and ready). The Japanese were pros, and used their forces as best professional judgement told them they should be used. To argue that they should have followed an alternative course of action, you have to show that they KNEW they were underutilizing their forces, and I don't think that you can do this.

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