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topeverest -> Summer campaign notes (11/12/2017 2:54:39 AM)
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here is my thought summary of my initial study...
Regarding the summer offensive, there are a number of hurdles I have identified that could limit the level of success
First, I am concerned that trucks will be slightly negative at the time of the assault. I have been closely monitoring truck consumption and acquisition, but the levels have been slightly below 100% on a turn over turn basis. Best guess on my part is the large number of upgrades occurring. Also, I still have quite a few guard corps to make, so the prospect of getting ahead on trucks is dim if I build all the corps I have scheduled. The likely solution (if this problem materializes) is HQ buildup and a shorter duration campaign designed around a more compact battlefield.
Second, I need to consider the type of attack I should make. The axis MLR has developed a number of salient and weak points, opening up the potential opportunity to do more than push back the enemy MLR. The big opportunity is to pierce the enemy’s line and attempt to destroy some units in a Stalingrad style offensive that also reclaims material real estate. But I really need to think piercing the enemy MLR through, even if it is the obvious choice.
Third, I should not think too big in this first strategic offensive of the war. I am inexperienced; German formations are strong; the enemy will be able to quickly react to any puncture of its lines; and the enemy certainly could determine my intentions long before I can execute the attack in late June. So I need to plan well. Looking into the 4 options I have pre-screened, (Leningrad – Italian puncture to Kharkov – Stalingrad pincer – and Rostov trap) the merits of each potential assault are not equal.
1. Cherepovets to Leningrad. This is a surprise effort against military logic to pulse into Leningrad and then attempt to knock Finland out of the war early. Finland is stretched very thin, and it would not take a large force to transition to the offensive. The opportunity is substantial, and at least initially, the enemy would be entirely unprepared. This effort both has a high ‘surprise’ quotient and the best chance of a solid piercing of the enemy lines leading to a wave attack towards Leningrad. On the downside, the enemy probably would not have to retreat from most of his holdings in the south
2. Drive on Kharkov through the Italians. This is an effort to entirely bypass the Stalingrad Krasnodar salient and compel the enemy to withdraw from exposed positions further east and south by breaking through the MLR. This plan also benefits from the rail lines across the Don and into the German held interior. Because of the bending geography of the enemy lines, there is a substantial opportunity mushroom out, capture a number of enemy units, and cause general mayhem. That said, it is not clear that the enemy would be compelled to retire from his holdings further east and south. Furthermore, with the known concentrations of German armor around Moscow, Orel and Stalingrad - Rostov, Germany will be quickly able to quell any puncture. The risks associated with this plan are material and probably discount it altogether
3. Rostov trap. This is an attractive, short jump, piercing attack designed to isolate and entire army group – and force a desperate extrication battle. This plan has the advantage of being requiring the fewest number of hexes to be taken, but it also is the most obvious to the enemy. The enemy would respond with all its might to open up an alley to extricate (and potentially replace) their forces. This is a ‘dense pack’ strategy and it relies on cutting off Rostov on the first turn of the attack
4. Stalingrad pincer. This is a highly attractive pincer of part or all of the Stalingrad salient with the desired effect to pocket a large number of Axis units and force a general retreat. In this area, the enemy is particularly exposed in several salient, any of which would be an ideal attack target. Sub target include the SS corps pushing for Stalingrad itself and the Luftwaffe corner northwest of Stalingrad about 100 miles where the enemy unhinges from its Don defensive perimeter. The main thought of this attack is to crack the salient and capture some units so that the enemy is forced to withdraw out of the Stalingrad area
If we consider the expected attacking force organizationally:
1. 25 cavalry corps (5 guard)
2. 50 armored corps (7 guard)
3. 100 infantry corps (50 guard)
That is about 55 theoretical hexes attack capable or 43 armies maximum push. Somehow I doubt the attack will be that big, but it is interesting to see the upper bound. If the pinko commies want to bust through and exploit, organization of the attack is going to be important.
Must think further on that...
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